

CRUSADERS AND MUSLIMS IN TWELFTH-CENTURY SYRIA

EDITED BY

MAYA SHATZMILLER



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PREFACE

The papers presented in this volume were delivered at a conference held at the University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario) in November 1988. The conference brought together experts on the Crusades from England, France, Canada, and the United States to discuss the confrontation between the Franks and Muslims in twelfth-century Syria. This collection goes far beyond its original mission, however, in providing new insights into Crusades' studies, and contributing an innovative historiographical overview. What marked this conference was the desire to balance the traditional European view with an Islamic perspective. It investigates specific issues shared by both Islamic and Christian historiography, such as the nature of their respective propaganda. On the Crusades, there has been much more European scholarship than Islamic scholarship—a fact which might lead students to conclude that Arabic source material is lacking, or that the Crusades had little impact on Islamic society, neither of which is true. It is true however, that the scope and the depth of European Crusade studies and Christian soul-searching stand in great contrast to Islamic Crusade historiography. Today, as in the past, hardly any Islamic historians have devoted their entire careers exclusively to this topic, as many European historians have done. Nonetheless, as these papers show, chronicles, diplomatic, literary, and legal sources amply demonstrate the impact of the Christian penetration on Islamic society, even though this impact was not immediately noticed.

Each author's individual contribution lies in the new ideas and insights he or she has brought to a particular topic. Jonathan Riley-Smith provides much needed bibliographical material in his brilliant essay on the state of historical studies of the Crusades of the period under consideration, from 1095 to 1204. There have been many changes and developments in our interpretation of crusading events in the twelfth century. New facts have emerged, new dimensions have been discovered, even in the frequently examined subject of Urban's journey through France in 1095–1096. One of Riley-Smith's most valuable insights is his conviction that a clear perception of the Crusades—what they were and what they were not—developed slowly in the European consciousness. Moreover, our sympathetic understanding of the Crusades has

been influenced by developments in the present century, as a result of which we can perceive more accurately their fascinating mixture of religious enthusiasm, spiritual need, and the dynamics of an expanding society.

James Brundage's essay, with its attendant documents, addresses the question of whether or not there were professional canonists in the Latin Orient. When did they appear in the sources? Who were they, and how many of them were trained in canon law? We know that much litigation occurred in the twelfth-century Latin Orient, and Brundage demonstrates the importance of trained canonists to that society. They represented a significant element in Crusade society, and Brundage suggests that they exercised a far greater influence than their numbers might imply.

No investigation of twelfth-century Syria could be complete without an essay on the settlements which the Italian city states created in the Latin Orient. Despite the dearth of evidence, Michel Balard constructs a convincing picture. He begins with the basic concessions made to the Italian maritime states and the circumstances under which these were made. He then examines the organization and activities of these states within states. In this way he is able to explain why it was that no matter how much the princes of the Latin Orient resented the privileged position of the Italian city states, they could never free themselves from dependence on the maritime republics. Each of these states succeeded in creating an independent urban environment which permitted its citizens to defy the authority of the Latin princes, thus contributing to the decline of Frankish power.

John Gilchrist correctly identifies Innocent III's pontificate as the crucial period in the definition of the Crusades. At this time, greater precision was obtained by combining thoughts and images from the Bible with concepts drawn from contemporary feudal practice. The Crusades became a morally acceptable war between God and his enemies, a theological development which Gilchrist sets firmly within the context of the great pope's religious understanding. In Innocent's eyes, the world was a transitory place filled with much suffering. Even though human nature was corrupt, steps could be taken to prepare for entrance into the heavenly kingdom. Christ's cross preceded, and the crucifixion of the self led to participation in heavenly joys. Taking up the cross was the Christian's duty, which also led to his liberation. The disasters which befell the Holy Land were part of the Church's struggle to direct the believer along the right path, which led to salvation. Thus, in Innocent's mind, the Crusade was the

epitome of following Christ. The Latin East was Christ's patrimony, and to its defence the Pope summoned faithful souls, deploying all his skills as theologian, jurist, universal bishop and charismatic leader of the Christian people.

A great depth of feeling existed here. Penny Cole's investigation of the heathen pollution of the Lord's inheritance in the Latin East shows how profoundly Christian Europe had appropriated certain scriptural texts. Here was no religious abstraction, but rather a use of Scripture to justify a menacing situation. The aggressive infidelity of the Muslims had to be resisted and their acts of pollution had to be cleansed by force, by fire and by the sword. All authorities on the Crusades accepted and justified the use of violence. Appeals for help were couched in bellicose forms, denouncing unprovoked aggression against Christ. The Crusade documents call for a war of reprisal, as the truth of Christian revelation demanded a cleansing of the holy places of the Lord, a purging by violence of what the heathen had maliciously soiled.

Yet how effective was this abundance of emotional rhetoric, this splendid manipulation of human feeling in favour of defending Jerusalem? John Rowe's examination of Alexander III's Crusade policies suggests a limited result. The coruscating splendours of Curial rhetoric were lost in a welter of tensions and conflicting ambitions. Whether in Latin Christendom itself or in the relationships between Latins and Byzantines, too many distractions hindered the Christian responsibility to defend and sustain the Holy Land. A coherent deployment of Christian resources to launch a new expedition to the East proved impossible, even though the Papacy devoted its energies and resources to achieving this goal. In the end, the loss of Jerusalem, long feared and resolutely opposed, could not be avoided.

Yet certain flaws in the Latin Orient were beyond remedy. Peter Edbury's paper on factionalism in the closing years of the First Kingdom draws attention not only to problems of interpretation but also to the inherent weakness of Latin power, which was spread so thinly across the expanse of Syria-Palestine. This weakness found expression in debates about how to use the meager military resources of the Latin Orient. Should the Latins attempt merely to contain the superior strength of Saladin or should they risk confrontation? Opinions shifted constantly. There emerged, as Edbury suggests, a kind of pragmatism which weighed possibilities and entertained options. Unfortunately the process came to a not unexpected close at Hattin, where the result proved catastrophic and permanent.

How all this influenced the Muslim recovery, and how much of the recovery came from internal developments, is a pertinent question. Nikita Elisséeff describes the rise of the concept of Jihād after the fall of Jerusalem in July 1099. The full exposition of the theme was by al-Sulāmī, a preacher from Damascus, who called for a reassertion of Islamic values and the recreation of a genuine Islamic unity. Al-Sulāmī's acute insight into how the Muslims should respond to the Frankish conquest was set aside until his plan was adopted by Nūr al-Dīn, the first person to organize a Muslim counter-attack. There, the Jihād became the embodiment of Muslim devotion, and Nūr al-Dīn, through various methods of propaganda, encouraged the development of the idea of himself as the truly holy warrior and martyr in the cause of Islam. Nikita Elisséeff shows that the political recovery was a slow process, centered around Damascus and Aleppo. There were causes for—and symptoms of—the early hesitancy, and Elisséeff provides many insights which allow us to understand the initial mixed reaction, and the sweeping reorientation in resources and mentalities which was required for recovery. Under the Crusaders' impact, Muslim society had to discard many outlooks, and new attitudes had to be adopted. The Muslims needed to put their house in order, but that process implied more than merely military and political unification; it also required an inner rejuvenation. A new belligerence was inspired by the old Jihād ideology, which received new faces and new applications.

In the midst of all these new developments, however, certain patterns survived from the past. Donald Richards' work describes the career and work of 'Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, who spent a significant portion of his life serving Saladin, the great Muslim leader, as both his personal secretary and friend. Richards shows how turbulent was his life; as befitted the troubled times.

Malcolm Lyons' pioneering study deals with mentalities. Searching for the mood and spirit of the common people in the Middle East during the period of the Crusades is a difficult task, which Lyons undertakes by studying the collection of hero cycles in popular Arabic. This extraordinary source is filled with historical inaccuracies and additions made both by early narrators and through later additions. Its study is further complicated because the text exists only in uncritical editions, and there are few pertinent studies of the poems. In spite of these obstacles, Professor Lyons persists with this task, as he believes that it provides us with a unique chance of understanding the mentality of these usually unaccessible members of medieval Arabic society. Lyons

concludes that “the Crusades were not seen in terms of Middle East history as an isolated phenomenon”, but were understood in conjunction with the pre-Islamic wars between Persia and Byzantium, or later wars with foreign invaders. They formed part of a pattern of expansion and contraction to which, because of its inevitability, “common people were forced to make their accommodation”.

Hadia Dajani-Shakeel describes the relationship between the Crusaders and the Muslims which was expressed in diplomatic contracts and peace treaties during the first fifty years of the Latin presence in Syria. Her study shows that even though religious principles on both sides dictated absolute and uncompromising war, force of circumstances, the shifting web of private interests, and the endless alternation between power and weakness, all combined to produce the facts of compromise and co-existence. These patterns did not differ from those existing between neighbours of the same religion. Even if this study does not state it explicitly, it provides a good picture of the suffering of the local Muslim and Christian populations, and of the decimation and desolation of the land. This forms the background for diplomacy and peace treaties. This study reinforces the assertions made elsewhere in this volume regarding the dearth of knowledge about the life of ordinary people in twelfth-century Syria, and how difficult it is for their voices to be heard and studied.

The bibliography which follows the papers draws together the primary and secondary sources used by the authors for the study of themes investigated here. Its purpose is to provide a detailed, comprehensive description of these sources for those who come to the study of the Crusades from other disciplines. Two papers which were read at the Conference were not included in this collection, one of them my own. My paper, entitled *The Crusades and Islamic Warfare—A Re-evaluation*, concludes that the Crusades had little or no influence on the development of the Arabic military manual, and has since been published in *Der Islam*.

For those of us at the University of Western Ontario, the Conference was an opportunity to affirm the commitment of the scholarly community and the University to medieval studies. It also marked the many years of committed work by our senior medievalist, John G. Rowe, who was involved in every stage of the Conference and the editorial work, and his contributions to the field of Crusades' studies. We would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Academic Development Fund and the Deans of Arts and Social

Science at the University of Western Ontario for their contributions to the cost of the conference and to the cost of preparing the manuscript for publication. We wish to thank the secretarial staff of the Department of History, especially Mrs. Laura McFadden, for their assistance in preparing this volume. Many thanks also go to Mr. Ken Craft, a graduate student in the Department of History, who has provided unflagging assistance throughout the long and difficult preparation of the Conference. Mrs. Susan Merskey assisted with the final stages of the editorial process, as did Mrs. Julia Bernheim at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. Maribel Dietz, a graduate student at the History Department, Princeton University, helped greatly with the bibliography. Many thanks are due to the School of Historical Studies for making the last stages of the editorial work possible.

December 1992

Maya Shatzmiller

The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

HISTORY, THE CRUSADES
AND THE LATIN EAST, 1095–1204
A PERSONAL VIEW

Jonathan Riley-Smith

Much of the best work now being published on the histories of the crusades and the settlements established in their wake is concerned with the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, while great vistas are opening up in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. I intend, however, to survey the state of crusade studies with reference only to the period before 1204. The golden age of crusade scholarship, the period between 1860 and the First World War, when Mas Latrie, Röhrich, Hagenmeyer, Riant and Delaville Le Roulx were writing, was followed by four decades of consolidation, in which good research was done and three seminal works, Carl Erdmann's *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens*,¹ Michel Villey's *La croisade: Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique*² and Claude Cahen's *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche*,³ were published, but within the context of a stable and rather unadventurous framework. It is understandable that the multi-volume histories of René Grousset⁴ and Steven Runciman⁵ should have been written at that time, and that another, the so-called "Wisconsin History",⁶ should have been planned; it was easier to envisage the writing of comprehensive histories when the rate of advance was slow. Then from around 1950 crusade studies entered another phase of rapid development, and in considering it I will deal with the histories of the Latin East and the crusades themselves separately.

The first burst of creativity came from among historians of the

¹ (Stuttgart 1935). Translated by M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart as *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade* (Princeton 1977). See also E. Delaruelle, "Essai sur la formation de l'idée de croisade," *Bulletin de la littérature ecclésiastique publié par l'Institut Catholique de Toulouse* 42 (1941), 45 (1944), 54 (1953), 55 (1954).

² (Paris 1942).

³ (Paris 1940).

⁴ *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* 3 vols (Paris 1934–6).

⁵ *A History of the Crusades* 3 vols (Cambridge 1951–4).

⁶ K. M. Setton, ed. *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd ed. 6 vols (Madison 1969–89). The first two volumes were originally published in 1958–62. For its planning, see H. E. Mayer, "America and the Crusades," *Proceedings of the American Philological Society* 125 (1987) 41–3.

Latin East. It is not easy to explain why. The Mandates in Palestine and Syria had certainly made the Levant more newsworthy in France and England, and there is little doubt that they stimulated the old idea of the “first French Empire”: Grousset ended his *Croisades* as follows: “The Templars only kept until 1303 the little island of Ruad, to the south of Tortosa, from whence one day—in 1914—the ‘Franks’ were again to step on to Syrian soil”.⁷ On the other hand French scholarly interest in the region was very strong before the First World War and the flourishing of crusade studies in England followed the ending of the Mandate. The establishment of Israel was probably more important, because scholars trained in European medieval history were encouraged to write about the past of territories which they now considered to be their own.

At any rate, the two leading historians of the 1950's were a Frenchman and an Israeli. Jean Richard⁸ and Joshua Prawer were building on foundations laid by Maurice Grandclaude, whose works on the thirteenth-century lawbooks of the kingdom of Jerusalem and identification in them of laws which could be dated to the twelfth century had been virtually ignored since their publication in the 1920's,⁹ and by Claude Cahen, whose *Syrie du Nord* had been constructed solidly on a study of institutions and on a knowledge of the Arabic as well as the western materials: none of his successors have rivalled him in this. Richard and Prawer advanced scholarship on two fronts.¹⁰ They wrote institutional studies of lasting value and they rewrote the constitutional history of the kingdom of Jerusalem, initiating a period of constitutional debate that lasted for twenty years. The second aspect of their work appears now to have been the less important, although it caused the most excitement at the time, perhaps because a “Stubbsian” approach to constitutional history was out of step with developments elsewhere in historical scholarship, where historians were abandoning bird's-eye views and

⁷ Grousset *Croisades*, III 763.

⁸ His history of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem is still the best of its kind. J. Richard, *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris 1953) translated by J. Shirley as *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* 2 parts (Amsterdam 1979).

⁹ M. Grandclaude, *Étude critique sur les livres des Assises de Jérusalem* (Paris 1923); M. Grandclaude, “Liste d'Assises remontant au premier royaume de Jérusalem (1099–1187),” *Mélanges Paul Fournier* (Paris 1929) 329–45.

¹⁰ Their articles have been published in collections. J. Richard, *Orient et Occident au moyen âge: contacts et relations* (London 1976); J. Richard, *Les relations entre l'Occident et l'Orient au moyen âge* (London 1977); J. Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980).

concentrating more on what was happening on the ground.¹¹ In the last few years the interest of historians in general political, legal and constitutional developments has shifted to mainland Greece and Cyprus.¹² There has been interesting work on commerce¹³ and on the Latin Church, including a magnificent book by Professor Hans Mayer¹⁴, but the political history of twelfth-century Palestine and Syria appears to have entered a new phase, dominated by detailed studies of fiefs and their origins. Making use of the preparatory work he has done on the Jerusalem charters in advance of a new edition of them, Mayer is clarifying the way the crown used the feudal system in its government.¹⁵ Another approach to this issue has been employed by Dr. Steven Tibble. It is well known that very few charters from secular archives have survived and that the bulk of the documentary evidence at our disposal comes from the archives of religious orders or communities of Italian merchants who were able to export their deeds before the final collapse in 1291. By making a very simple methodological assumption—that on the day an endowment was made to a religious community a particular property was in the hands of its lay donor—Tibble has been able to shed light on

¹¹ Almost the last example of the genre was J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London 1973). See also P. W. Edbury, "The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268," *Camden Miscellany* 27 (Camden Fourth Series 22) (London 1979).

¹² See D. Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: Les "Assises de Romanie": sources, application et diffusion* (Paris 1971). P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191–1374* (Cambridge 1991).

¹³ M.-L. Favreau, "Graf Heinrich von Champagne und die Pisaner im Königreich Jerusalem," *Bollettino storico Pisano* 47 (1978) 97–120; M.-L. Favreau, "Die italienische Levante-Piraterie und die Sicherheit der Seewege nach Syrien im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 65 (1978) 461–510; M.-L. Favreau-Lilie, "Die italienischen Kirchen im Heiligen Land (1098–1291)," *Studi veneziani* NS 13 (1987) 15–101; M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe – début du XVe siècle)* (Rome 1978); M.-L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land (1098–1197)* (Amsterdam 1989).

¹⁴ H. E. Mayer, *Bistümer, Klöster und Stifte im Königreich Jerusalem* (Stuttgart 1977). See also B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States. The Secular Church* (London 1980).

¹⁵ See H. E. Mayer, "Die Kreuzfahrerherrschaft Arrabe," *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 93 (1977) 198–212; H. E. Mayer, "Die seigneurie de Joscelin und der Deutsche Orden," in *Die geistlichen Ritterorden Europas*, J. Fleckenstein and M. Hellmann, eds. (Sigmaringen 1980) 171–216; H. E. Mayer, "Die Herrschaftsbildung in Hebron," *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 101 (1985) 64–81; H. E. Mayer, "The Origins of the County of Jaffa," *Israel Exploration Journal* 35 (1985) 35–45; H. E. Mayer, "The Origins of the Lordships of Ramle and Lydda in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," *Speculum* 60 (1985) 537–52; M.-L. Favreau-Lilie, "Die Kreuzfahrerherrschaft Scandalion (*Iskanderune*)," *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 93 (1977) 12–29; M.-L. Favreau, "Landesausbau und Burg während der Kreuzfahrerzeit. Safad in Obergalilea," *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 96 (1980) 67–87.

the crown's policy towards, and the history of, the lordships.¹⁶

Other new gateways to the early history of the settlements are being opened up. In *The Red Tower* Dr. Denys Pringle has shown what can be done in crusade archaeology by placing a site comprehensively in its political, geographical, social and economic context;¹⁷ his forthcoming inventory of Latin churches in the kingdom of Jerusalem will set new standards of identifying and surveying buildings and is likely to give a boost to the study of art and architecture, which is beginning to emerge from the shadow cast early this century by the great French scholar Camille Enlart and has energetic protagonists in Professors Jaroslav Folda and Zehava Jacoby.¹⁸ In *Geography, Technology and War*, Dr. John Pryor has shown convincingly that if it could not take on water the operational range of the Egyptian fleet was severely limited. The loss of Tyre to the Christians in 1124 so reduced the range of the Egyptian warships that they could not hunt effectively in the northern half of the eastern Mediterranean, and the reconquest of the coast by the Latins from 1191 onwards had the same result.¹⁹ This has consequences for the study of merchant shipping and it gives the harbour fortifications of the Latin East a new significance, for if all that was needed to secure the lifeline to the West was the holding of the ports and if the purpose of the fortifications was to prevent a Muslim fleet breaking in, even temporarily to take on water, then these must have been just as important as those of the castles and towns in the hinterland. And Dr. Richard Cleave is now engaged in the production of maps of Latin Palestine and Syria using satellite imagery and remote sensing, which will put a completely new form of cartography at our disposal.

The history of the Latin East in the twelfth century would be transformed, moreover, were Islamic studies to be given the prominence they deserve. It is curious how peripheral they have

¹⁶ S. Tibble, *Monarchy and Lordship in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1099–1291* (Oxford 1989).

¹⁷ (London 1986).

¹⁸ See for instance, J. Folda, "Painting and Sculpture in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1099–1291," in *A History of the Crusades*, K. M. Setton, ed., 4 251–80; J. Folda, "Crusader Art and Architecture: A Photographic Survey," in *A History of the Crusades*, K. M. Setton, ed., 4 281–354; J. Folda, *Crusader Manuscript Illumination at Saint-Jean d'Acre, 1275–1291* (Princeton 1976); Z. Jacoby, "Le portail de l'église de l'annonciation de Nazareth au XIIIe siècle," in *Monuments et Mémoires* 64 (1981) 141–94; Z. Jacoby, "The Workshop of the Temple Area in Jerusalem in the Twelfth Century: Its Origin, Evolution and Impact," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 45 (1982) 325–94.

¹⁹ J. H. Pryor, *Geography, Technology and War* (Cambridge 1988) 112–34.

so far proved to be—how many crusade historians have bothered to learn Arabic?—in spite of some important works,²⁰ including major biographies of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin.²¹ This, of course, reflects the attitude of Islamicists themselves, to most of whom the crusades and the Latin settlements are of marginal significance. And it will be difficult to persuade most historians of the West to pay closer attention to the sources for Islamic history and to study Islamic institutions, because they find it hard to come to terms with what seems to be a different scale of priorities. A feature of medieval European history is that it is constructed primarily not on the evidence provided by narrative accounts, concerning which most historians tend to harbour suspicions, but on the evidence found in documents, because legal texts, letters and charters, as long as they can be demonstrated to be genuine, give firm points of departure. Most Islamic history, on the other hand, seems to be based on a searching analysis of narrative accounts. It is often said that the reason for this is that documents are not to be found in great numbers in the Near East, but even if it is the case that the archives have been largely destroyed, a major step forward would be the publication of calendars of the many documents which can be found incorporated into the Arabic narrative accounts and, although there are great problems with them, the chancery handbooks. That measure alone would be enough to convince more western historians of the value of the Arabic sources.

A new approach, which has evolved among historians of the crusades in the last twenty years, has influenced the kinds of questions they ask of the material, and even the material they choose to use. Many of its elements have been around for a long time—indeed a remarkable article on the Second Crusade written by Giles Constable and published in the early 1950's foreshadowed much of the work being done now;²² what is novel is their fusion into a coherent vision, which can be described as follows. Crusading, which was not confined to expeditions to the East, but was also waged in Spain, the Baltic region, North Africa and

²⁰ See particularly P. M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades* (London 1986); C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (London 1968); E. Sivan, *L'Islam et la croisade* (Paris 1968); M. G. S. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins* (The Hague 1955); R. S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260* (Albany 1977); S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society* 5 vols (Berkeley 1967–83).

²¹ N. Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din* (Damascus 1967); M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, *Saladin* (Cambridge 1982).

²² G. Constable, "The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries," *Traditio* 9 (1953) 213–79.

sometimes in the interior of western Europe, was an activity which reached its high point in the thirteenth century, remained appealing in the fourteenth and retained its popularity, at least among certain classes, well into the sixteenth century and perhaps beyond. Being extremely expensive for the participants, there was little to be gained in financial terms from it, and anyway long absences from home on campaign threatened disruption to estates and family; if one has to generalize about them, crusaders were so strongly motivated that they were prepared to make great sacrifices. Crusading, in fact, was rooted in the perceptions, ideals and emotions of European society and it is there that one should look for its origins and for the forces that maintained it. I will try to explain why I think that this consensus has been reached.

A decision to crusade involved choosing to engage in an act of collective violence. Until recently western liberal culture decisively rejected the idea that violence could be positively justifiable. The ideal of tolerance and the rule of reason, dominant since the eighteenth century, were reinforced in the face of Fascism and Marxism, both of which developed the ideas of positive violence, and western intellectuals justified the use of force only with respect to the reachievement of the status quo. Their conviction, magnificently expressed by Runciman in a tone of high moral outrage,²³ came naturally to the heirs of nineteenth-century protestant and anti-clerical liberalism, but it left little room for any comprehension of genuine idealism on the crusaders' part. The idea of holy war for the faith was alien and repugnant to many sensitive historians and, since they found it hard to believe that crusaders had been moved altruistically, it was more charitable and comprehensible to explain their motives in other ways. One was to interpret crusading in terms of a desire for land, spoil or profit. This still has a spirited and sophisticated exponent in Georges Duby, for whom the crusading movement awoke in the bloodbath of the sack of Jerusalem in 1099; thereafter it "became a habit, an institution that went hand in hand with the expectation of profit".²⁴ A second explanation, which I have already pointed out was very popular with French historians, but was not confined to them, was to treat the movement as proto-imperialism and the Latin settlements established by the crusaders on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean as colonial experiments. Grousset was a leading historian of this type and

²³ Runciman, *Crusades* 3 480.

²⁴ G. Duby, *The Three Orders. Feudal Society Imagined* (Chicago 1980) 200–1.

among his heirs is Joshua Praver.²⁵ A third type of response was to treat the crusaders as swash-buckling and simple-minded men, so backward and stupid that they could not be expected to comprehend the enormity of their actions. This approach, the master of which was Runciman, in less skilful hands reduces the history of the crusades to a string of good stories, peopled by cardboard heroes and villains.

Until thirty years ago these explanations and others like them presented themselves as the means by which reasonable men could come to terms with a subject that was fundamentally abhorrent to them. But, leaving aside the obvious point that in any society too sharp a distinction between idealistic motives and the prospects of material gain is misleading, developments in the last fifty years have made us all re-examine our attitudes to ideological violence. First, the Nuremberg Trials, viewed as legitimate responses to crimes against humanity, have led to a revival of interest in the consequences of obedience to state authority and in the concept of Natural Law and therefore in the idea of a Just Cause for war or resistance to oppression; it should be remembered that the nineteenth-century jurists had abandoned the idea of the Just Cause in despair and had concentrated instead on achieving practical measures to alleviate the suffering engendered by war. Secondly, the development of nuclear capability and the strategy of deterrence has reintroduced debate on Right Intention, in particular on "proportionality" and the problem of the innocent in warfare.²⁶ Thirdly, "Combat Psychiatry," which began in a small way in the First World War, now plays a large part in military thinking and has led all of us to revise our ideas about "courage" and "brutality" and the effects of stress on individuals and groups: few of us would still be convinced that cowardice in the face of the enemy should be punished by the firing squad.²⁷ Fourthly, and most important of all, Christian ideological violence has returned to the scene. It is no longer a distasteful blot on our past; it is a reality with which we all have to live. In South America, Africa and Asia there have arisen in the last thirty years violent movements of Christian Liberation, justified in terms of Christian charity and believed

²⁵ J. Praver, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London 1972) 503–33. There were echoes of this attitude in a debate at a colloquium in Jerusalem in May 1984, which was not in the end included in the proceedings: G. Airaldi and B. Z. Kedar, eds. *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme* (Genoa 1986).

²⁶ See especially C. J. Reid, ed., *Peace in a Nuclear Age* (Washington 1986).

²⁷ See P. Watson, *War on the Mind* (London 1978).

to be authorized by the presence of Christ himself. Participation in them is said by their protagonists to be mandatory for Christians. These are, of course, rebellions rather than wars and the types of enemy are different to those of the crusaders. The participants do not take vows or enjoy indulgences. But the language that surrounds them is entirely familiar to anyone working on the crusades, as are the fundamental notions of a “political” Christ and a morally neutral violence, which gains moral colouring from the intentions of the perpetrators.²⁸ The fact that militant Christian liberationists—intelligent contemporaries of ours, not medieval backwoodsmen—hold these views and that, however one might disagree with them, they are clearly altruistic, has made it easier for the present generation of historians, without condoning them in any way, to recognize that the crusaders could be altruistic, even saintly, and intelligent.

It is not surprising that modern scholars, prepared to admit that many crusaders were moved by ideals, should have been more concerned with theory than their predecessors were. But theory is a complicated matter, in the case of the crusades because they appealed at the same time to intellectuals and to the general public. The responses, cerebral and emotional, of men and women with a wide range of individual tastes have to be taken into account and anyone studying crusade ideas may find himself considering them on at least four levels. There were the ideas of the theologians and canonists, who could relate the justification of crusading to the traditional Christian theology of violence. Far removed from their cool abstractions were the ideas of the nobles and knights. Their Christianity was real, but was transformed by adaptation to a society in which feudal lordship, honour, family solidarity revealing itself in vendettas, reputation and commitment to extravagant social generosity played powerful parts. Between these groups was the intermediation of popes and preachers, whose business it was to sell crusading to the faithful. And at the far end of the spectrum were the ideas of the masses, the size of whose contribution to crusading armies is arguable, but was significant in the twelfth century. Thirty years ago, the subject of “popular crusading” was attractive to many young scholars, who were coming under the influence of Paul Alphandéry and Alphonse Dupront’s *La Chrétienté et l’idée de croisade*²⁹ and the work of Norman Cohn.³⁰ But the movement petered

²⁸ See G. Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (New York 1973).

²⁹ 2 vols (Paris 1954–9).

³⁰ Particularly *The Pursuit of the Millenium* (London 1957).

out, largely because very little evidence survives for what the people did and practically none at all for what they thought:³¹ only two historians in Britain are now working on the subject and they are concentrating on periods later than the twelfth century.³²

It has, in fact, proved to be more fruitful to concentrate on the ideas of churchmen, and the first stage of the road down which scholars have been edging their way was marked out by canon law, concerned, of course, with the rectitude of violence and the rules which govern it. When he picked up the subject where Villey had left it,³³ Professor James Brundage was probably much more aware of a general advance in canonistic studies than of the external influences which I have tried to describe, but the fact is that he was among the first in a field which is now becoming quite a popular place to work.³⁴ And this approach has had consequences far beyond the confines of the subject, for, perhaps inevitably, it has led to a debate about the nature of crusading itself. If the popes and canonists knew what it meant to proclaim a crusade, take a crusade vow and enjoy a crusade indulgence, they must surely have had some idea what a crusade was. And did their idea or did it not correspond to the view of crusading held by most of the faithful? Attempts to define crusades have led to a heated debate between the purists, particularly Professor Hans Mayer, who maintain that there could only have been one genuine type of crusade, that launched to Jerusalem or in aid of the Holy Land,³⁵ and those who argue that crusading found full expression in other theatres of war as well.³⁶ It is the party

³¹ See the sensible conclusions of B. McGinn, *Visions of the End* (New York 1979) 89.

³² M. Barber, "The Crusade of the Shepherds in 1251," *Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History*, J. F. Sweets, ed. (Lawrence 1984) 1–23; M. Barber, "The Pastoureaux of 1320," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32 (1981) 143–66; G. Dickson, "The Advent of the Pastores (1251)," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 66 (1988) 249–67.

³³ J. A. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (Madison 1969).

³⁴ See for instance F. H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1975); J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (London 1977); J. Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels* (Liverpool 1979); E.-D. Hehl, *Kirche und Krieg im 12. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart 1980); also M. Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy, 1244–1291* (Leiden 1975).

³⁵ H. E. Mayer *The Crusades* (Oxford 1972) 283–6; H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1988) 312–13; C. J. Tyerman, "The Holy Land and the Crusades of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," *Crusade and Settlement*, P. W. Edbury, ed. (Cardiff 1985) 105–12; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy* 11–22.

³⁶ J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. A Short History* (London 1987) xxviii–xxx; N. J. Housley, *The Italian Crusades* (Oxford 1982); N. J. Housley, "Crusades Against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development ca. 1000–1216," *Crusade and Settlement*, Edbury, ed.; N. J.

for pluriformity which has won the day. It is significant that Mayer's most vocal supporter, Dr. Christopher Tyerman, has abandoned him in his most recent book.³⁷ The issue is of some importance, since the position a historian takes will govern the use he or she makes of source-material, but in fact, the controversy has also forced us all to face up to wider issues as well. First, we are now beginning to understand just how complex crusading was as an institution. The proponents of pluriformity have moved from a rather crude position in which they tended to stress the similarities between different theatres of war to one in which they recognize and appreciate the differences in the movement's various manifestations, such as the power over crusading in Spain of the Castilian kings or the emergence in the thirteenth century of a perpetual crusade on the Baltic shore, and the subtle distinctions to be found in the privileges granted by the popes. Crusading is coming to have the appearance of a spectrum of enterprises, each with its own personality, united by common elements. Secondly, it has become increasingly clear that crusading is only definable from the very late twelfth century onwards, a conclusion that has been reinforced by valuable work done by Professor John Gilchrist,³⁸ Professor Benjamin Kedar³⁹ and Dr. Robert Fletcher⁴⁰ to illustrate the muddle that prevailed for most of the twelfth century. The crusade, in fact, only reached maturity in the thirteenth century and was in an inchoate state for most of the period 1095 to 1198. This conclusion disposes of one of the most persistent orthodoxies—that the pristine purity of twelfth-century crusading was perverted by developments in the thirteenth century—expressed in so many school and university courses, which end in 1204 as if everything after that date was merely a postscript.

Crusade ideas, of course, encompass many other fields of study, involving theological, intellectual and cultural issues in the broadest sense, the approach mapped out long ago by Erdmann and Delaruelle. In this respect, a landmark was the appearance in 1969, in the same year that Brundage's book was published, of a small collection of texts translated by Professor Jean Richard,

Housley *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford 1986); E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274* (Oxford 1985).

³⁷ C. J. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095–1588* (Chicago 1988).

³⁸ J. Gilchrist, "The Erdmann Thesis and the Canon Law, 1083–1141," *Crusade and Settlement*, Edbury, ed. 37–45.

³⁹ B. Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission* (Princeton 1984).

⁴⁰ R. A. Fletcher, "Reconquest and Crusade in Spain ca. 1050–1150," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th ser 37 (1987).

in the introduction to which Richard brilliantly encapsulated the state of knowledge of the moral theology that lay behind crusading.⁴¹ This was followed in the seventies and eighties by a series of studies, of which the most wide-ranging and authoritative was that by Ernst-Dieter Hehl,⁴² while, in a different field, Dr. Alan Forey has been treating the Military Orders primarily as religious Orders, which of course is what they were.⁴³

One of the books emerging from this stable was by me.⁴⁴ By training and inclination I am a traditional crusade historian with a concern for events in the Near East, but as I worked on that book I found my interest aroused more and more by the social milieu in which crusade ideas flourished, particularly as a much clearer picture of the life and attitudes of nobles and knights in France and the French-speaking imperial territories is beginning to be drawn in local studies⁴⁵ and in works of synthesis.⁴⁶ In other words I found myself drawn, like many modern crusade historians, back into the roots of western society. I have no doubt that this is the direction in which scholarship is moving generally: a striking example is the recent appearance of two good books on England and the crusades;⁴⁷ another is the fact that much of the best work on the Military Orders, undertaken by scholars like Michael Gervers and Anne-Marie Legras, concentrates on the brothers' management of their European commanderies, without which, of course, they could never have fulfilled their

⁴¹ J. Richard, *L'esprit de la croisade* (Paris 1969) 9–54.

⁴² *Kirche und Krieg*. See also J. S. C. Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," *History* 65 (1980); J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London 1986); Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*; Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*; R. H. Schmandt, "The Fourth Crusade and the Just-War Theory," *Catholic Historical Review* 61 (1975); F. Lotter, *Die Konzeption des Wendenkreuzzugs* (Sigmaringen 1977).

⁴³ A. J. Forey, "Recruitment to the Military Orders," *Viator* 17 (1986); A. J. Forey, "Novitiate and Instruction in the Military Orders During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Speculum* 61 (1986).

⁴⁴ Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade*.

⁴⁵ This is particularly true of Burgundy, for which we have G. Duby, *La société aux XI^e et XII^e siècles dans la région mâconnaise* (Paris 1971) and C. B. Bouchard, *Sword, Miter and Cloister* (Ithaca 1987). But it is also true elsewhere, for instance Champagne: M. Bur, *La formation du comté du Champagne* (Nancy 1977); the Limousin: G. Tenant de la Tour, *L'Homme et la terre de Charlemagne à Saint Louis* (Paris 1943); Provence: J. P. Poly, *La Provence et la société féodale* (Paris 1976); and Picardy: R. Fossier, *La terre et les hommes en Picardie jusqu'à la fin du XIII^e siècle* (Paris 1968).

⁴⁶ Especially G. Duby, *The Chivalrous Society* (London 1977); G. Duby, *The Knight, the Lady and the Priest* (London 1984); J. Flori, *L'essor de la chevalerie XI–XII^e siècles* (Geneva 1986).

⁴⁷ Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*; S. D. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade, 1216–1307* (Oxford 1988).

obligations in the East;⁴⁸ and I find the same message in a critical review of my book on the First Crusade by Professor Gilchrist, who is engaged in a campaign to rid the world of “Erdmanism”.⁴⁹ Professor Gilchrist takes me to task on two main points. The first of them, that there was nothing new about Christian eleventh-century militarism, is one, in fact, about which we are in agreement—I should perhaps have expressed myself more clearly—but we differ on the second, that the story of Christian holy violence at the time of the eleventh-century reform movement is not so much one of the Church taking an initiative, as Erdmann believed and I accept, as one in which it was overwhelmed by a “secular militarism”. Popes, bishops and abbots on the one hand, and counts and knights on the other, were, of course, members of the same society and often grew up together. But, allowing for the differences in perception that arose from education, training and professional *esprit de corps*, were some churchmen taking advantage of a situation that they thought they could use beneficially, or were they drowned in secular ideas which were boiling up from below and to which they themselves had been exposed from their youth? The real problems and genuine differences which can arise when trying to interpret the surviving evidence can be illustrated by considering a famous sequence of events, Pope Urban II’s preaching tour of France in the years 1095–6.

The steps in Urban’s long itinerary from Valence in early August 1095 to Gap a year later, are well known.⁵⁰ What I want to stress is the dramatic quality of what must have been an exhausting journey by this elderly man—he was about sixty years old⁵¹—through his homeland, by way of country towns, which had never, or had hardly ever, seen a king in living memory.

Urban had brought an impressive entourage with him from Italy and he seems to have been accompanied everywhere by several of the senior officials of the Roman curia. For instance he entered Limoges on 23 December 1095 with a following that included two cardinals, Ranger, archbishop of Reggio, and Bruno, bishop of Segni. He was also accompanied by Archbishop

⁴⁸ M. Gervers, ed. *The Hospitaller Cartulary in the British Library* (Cotton MS Nero E VI) (Toronto 1981); M. Gervers, *The Cartulary of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in England*. *Secunda Camera* Essex (Oxford 1982); A.-M. Legras, *Les Commanderies des Templiers et des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem en Saintonge et en Aunis* (Paris 1983).

⁴⁹ *Speculum* 63 (1988) 714–17.

⁵⁰ See now A. Becker, *Papst Urban II* 2 vols (Stuttgart 1964–88) II 435–58.

⁵¹ Becker, *Papst Urban I* 31.

Daimbert of Pisa, who was to be sent out to the East as papal legate and became the first canonical Latin patriarch of Jerusalem, by the great abbot Hugh of Cluny and by a flock of French archbishops and bishops: the archbishops of Lyons, Bourges and Bordeaux, and the bishops of Poitiers, Périgueux, Saintes and Rodez, together, of course, with the bishop of Limoges, Humbald of St-Sévère.⁵² If one allows for the riding households that accompanied these personages, the pope's train must have been enormous.

That would have been exciting enough, but the theatricality displayed by the pope must have heightened the dramatic impression given by his entourage. Everywhere he went he dedicated cathedrals, churches and altars—including two altars consecrated to the Holy Cross, presumably under the influence of embryonic crusade ideas—giving his *imprimatur* in the most solemn way to the massive building programme that had been undertaken by the French Church.⁵³ He presided over councils at Clermont (November 1095), Marmoutier near Tours (March 1096) and Nîmes (July 1096), at which his already impressive entourage was greatly augmented. He first preached the crusade in the open air, in a field outside the town of Clermont: this, it should be remembered, was in late November. It fell a little flat because the number of important lay men in his audience was relatively small, but that had not been his intention, for it seems that he had instructed bishops to bring with them to the council the leading nobles in their dioceses.⁵⁴ He also preached in the open air at Tours on the banks of the Loire: this was in March.⁵⁵ He made a detour to celebrate the feast of the Assumption at the great Marian shrine of Le Puy⁵⁶ and he celebrated the feasts of St. Giles and St. Hilary at St. Gilles and Poitiers respectively.⁵⁷ At Limoges he celebrated two Christmas masses, at the abbeys of Notre Dame de la Règle and St. Martial. He was “triumphantly crowned”, presumably with his tiara, at this

⁵² “Notitiae duae Lemovicenses,” *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Historiens occidentaux* (hence forward RHC Occ) 5 352; R. Crozet, “Le voyage d’Urbain II et ses négociations avec le clergé de France,” *Revue historique* 179 (1937) 281. For Ranger, see R. Somerville, “The Council of Clermont (1095) and Latin Christian Society,” *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 12 (1974) 73, 80 n 175.

⁵³ R. Crozet, “Le voyage d’Urbain II en France,” *Annales du Midi* 49 (1937) 42–69.

⁵⁴ PL 162 645; Somerville, “The Council of Clermont,” 57–8, 78–9.

⁵⁵ See Crozet, *Revue historique* 298.

⁵⁶ Crozet, *Revue historique* 276.

⁵⁷ Crozet, *Revue historique* 278, 294.

time a conical white hat with one circlet of gold and gems around the base,⁵⁸ and he then processed, wearing his tiara, to the cathedral of St. Stephen, where he presided over the rest of the day's office. He dedicated the cathedral church on 29 December and on the following day the basilica of St. Martial; he celebrated mass and then he preached the cross.⁵⁹ St. Geoffrey, the founder of the priory of Chalard, who himself wanted to crusade but was prevented by his community,⁶⁰ wrote,

(At Limoges) we saw (the pope) with our own eyes and we were in the crowds of the faithful at his consecrations. . . . In a good sermon he encouraged the people standing there to take the road to Jerusalem. Thanks be to you, Oh Christ; for you watered the swelling corn which grew from the seed sown by him, not only in our region, but also throughout the world.⁶¹

Forty-one, perhaps forty-three, of the earliest crusaders in my own lists came from the Limousin. They included the holders of two of the five principal fiefs, the viscounts of Limoges and Turenne, together with representatives of seven of the twenty-nine castellan families in the viscounty of Limoges.⁶²

On the pope's arrival at Angers in early February 1096, we can see his progress through the eyes of one of the nobles. There survives a fragment of a history of the counts of Anjou dictated by Count Fulk IV. Fulk did not take the cross himself, but his description of Urban's visit is revealing.

At the approach of Lent the Roman pope Urban came to Angers and encouraged our people to go to Jerusalem to drive out the heathen who had occupied that city and all christian territory as far as Constantinople. Then on Septuagesima Sunday (10 February 1096) the church of St. Nicholas was dedicated by the pope and the body of my uncle Geoffrey was translated into the same church. . . . Then he left and went to Le Mans and from thence to Tours. There. . . in the middle of Lent he was crowned and was led in solemn procession from the church of St. Maurice to the church of St. Martin, where he gave me the golden flower he carried in his hand. In loving memory of this I have ordered the flower to be borne on Palm Sunday by me and by my successors.

The count had been accompanied to Tours by some of his vassals, including Hugh of Chaumont-sur-Loire and Aimery of

⁵⁸ *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* 15, 2 (1953) 2294.

⁵⁹ "Notitiae duae Lemovicenses" 350–3; Geoffrey of Chalard, "Dictamen de primordiis ecclesiae Castaliensis," *RHC Occ* 5 348.

⁶⁰ *Tenant de la Tour*, 357–60.

⁶¹ Geoffrey of Chalard, 348.

⁶² Adhémar II of Limoges and Raymond of Turenne; Aimery of Rochechouart, Peter II of Pierre-Buffière, Gouffier and Guy III of Lastours, Jordan of Chabanais, Hugh of Salagnac, Guy of Bré and Arnold the Red III of Nontron.

Courron, who both took the cross at a ceremony at Marmoutier presided over by Urban himself.⁶³ The events Fulk thought worth recording are significant: the preaching of the cross at Angers; the dedication of the abbey church of St. Nicholas, a monastery founded by his family, and the transference into the body of the church of the corpse of his uncle, who had ended his days as a member of the community; the pope in procession at Tours, wearing his tiara, and his gift to Fulk of the golden rose carried by popes in procession on the Fourth Sunday in Lent: this is probably an early example of the practice by twelfth-century popes of solemnly presenting the rose to those they wished to honour. The marks of favour to the count are usually explained as Urban's reaction to a scandal that was sweeping France at the time, for the king had run off with the count's wife. But were they unique? This is the only eyewitness account dictated by a magnate; we cannot tell whether the pope made equally extravagant gestures to nobles who took the cross like Raymond of St. Gilles or Helias of Maine.⁶⁴

In so far as we can tell from the fragmentary references that survive, the pope's language matched his deeds. At Clermont he probably drew attention to the exploits of the Franks under their Carolingian rulers.⁶⁵ In the Limousin, it was believed that "he had come to Gaul to summon its people, disciplined in arms and war".⁶⁶ We have seen that in his sermon at Angers he "encouraged our people to go to Jerusalem". If educated clergy could be struck by the fact that this was an appeal to the Franks like those made by the popes in the days of the Carolingians⁶⁷—it was, in fact, the first since then, and Urban's solemn crown-wearing in procession through the streets carried echoes of the forged historical document, the Donation of Constantine, with its

⁶³ "Gesta Andegavensium peregrinorum," RHC Occ 5 345–6 (see "Fragmentum historiae Andegavensis," L. Halphen and R. Poupardin, eds., *Chroniques des comtes d'Anjou et des seigneurs d'Amboise* (Paris 1913) 237–8); "Gesta Ambaziensium dominorum," Halphen and Poupardin, eds., *Chroniques* 101; L. Halphen, *Le comté d'Anjou au XIe Siècle* (Paris 1906) 326; see also 324–5. See also Crozet, *Revue historique* 295–300. The taking of the cross marked the end of a bitter dispute between Hugh and Aimery, which had followed Aimery's marriage to Hugh's cousin Corba of Thorigné. The marriage had been arranged by Fulk of Anjou himself, but had threatened the dismemberment of Hugh's property.

⁶⁴ Hugh the Great was carrying a *vexillum sancti Petri* when he entered Greece on the First Crusade, but he had presumably been given this during his journey through Italy. A. Comnena, *Alexiade*, B. Leib, ed. 4 vols (Paris 1937–76) 2 213–4.

⁶⁵ Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade* 25–6.

⁶⁶ "Notitiae duae Lemovicenses" 352.

⁶⁷ See Guibert of Nogent, "Gesta Dei per Francos," RHC Occ 4 135–6.

implications of papal *imperium*—then surely the symbolism would not have been lost on the nobles and knights, brought up on legends of Carolingian greatness, whom the pope appeared to be summoning to reconquer lands that had once belonged to the Roman empire.⁶⁸

Urban later wrote that he had been “stimulating the minds of knights to go on this expedition”,⁶⁹ and my reaction has been to see the itinerary as a clever propaganda exercise in which the old pope was deliberately playing on the senses of an audience he knew well, packaging his message in emotional and attractive terms that people would find appealing. But I have not reintroduced it to justify a line I have taken, but to demonstrate that in fact various interpretations are possible. Urban’s preaching tour, with its emphasis on rhetoric and theatre, its appeal to the guts rather than to the head, was the first in a line of similar displays, which stretched at least as far as the prodigious efforts of St. John of Capistrano in the middle of the fifteenth century.⁷⁰ But it *was* an appeal to the guts, and since the pope, and the bishops and abbots who accompanied him, came from the very class he was addressing, what went through their minds when he acted in so histrionic a way? He would, of course, have been familiar with the social, familial, feudal and devotional pressures on his audience, but were they really in the forefront of his mind, any more than we are conscious of the social pressures on us? Could he simply have been quite unselfconsciously behaving as any person of his standing would in that melodramatic society? Was he intent on seizing some initiative, or was he simply being swept along by a movement which came from below and over which the church had never had, and never would have, control? These questions can only be answered when we know much more about the minds of the class to which both pope and knights belonged; and that means delving into religious politics at a local level, looking closely at chivalric culture and concerning ourselves

⁶⁸ See Ibn al-Athir, “Sum of World History,” *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens orientaux*. (henceforward RHC Or) I 193; also *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum* R. Hill, tr. and ed. as *The Deeds of the Franks and the other Pilgrims to Jerusalem* (London 1962) 66; P. Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere* J. H. and L. L. Hill, eds. (Paris 1977) 108; H. Hagenmeyer, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088–1100* (Innsbruck 1901) 160.

⁶⁹ W. Wiederhold, “Papsturkunden in Florenz,” *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Phil.-hist. Kl.* (1901) 313.

⁷⁰ See K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant* 4 vols (Philadelphia 1976–84) II 173–83.

with the motives and background of individual crusaders.⁷¹

I believe, in fact, that the study of crusade ideas before 1200 cannot be carried much further until more work has been done on the roots of crusading and on the motivation of crusaders, and that means concentrating on the crusaders themselves and on the society in which they grew up, which provides an opportunity for collaboration with scholars of vernacular literature, who for far too long have been virtually ignored by historians. But if I am right in thinking that for this and other reasons many crusade scholars will find themselves working in the European mainstream—and it is extraordinary that the crusades have so often been treated as though they were something exotic—then the gap between historians of the crusades proper and those of the Latin East may widen over the next few years, perhaps to the extent that they will be perceived to be working in quite different fields. It will be up to some young historian in the future to draw attention to the fact that the association between them *is* close and should be restored.

⁷¹ I am engaged in a project to establish a computerized prosopographical data base covering the whole field of crusading, settlement and membership of the Military Orders from 1095 to 1798.

LATIN JURISTS IN THE LEVANT THE LEGAL ELITE OF THE CRUSADER STATES

James A. Brundage

Historians have often remarked on the passion with which the nobility of the Latin Levant embraced the study of jurisprudence. Noblemen in the crusader states prized legal learning and forensic ability as vital assets and cultivated a juristic expertise unusual among the military elite of western societies.¹ Courtroom skill, according to Philip of Novara, one of the greatest of the noble Latin jurists, was essential in order to preserve intact one's body, honour, and property.² Jonathan Riley-Smith has described the development of a veritable school of law in the Latin East, a close-knit group of jurists whose members formed a cross-section of the power elite in the crusader states.³

The law that these noble jurists cultivated was based on the customs that they and their predecessors had adopted in the process of settling in the Holy Land and organizing the conquests of the First Crusade, customs that the kings of Jerusalem and their counsellors supplemented and enlarged through subsequent statutes and ordinances. The relationship between the legal system of the Latin States and the families of law current in the West during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries presents

¹ E. G. Rey, *Les Colonies franques de Syrie aux XIIe et XIIIe Siècles* (Paris 1883; repr. New York 1972) 171–72; H. Prutz, *Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Berlin 1883; repr. Hildesheim 1964) 213–15; J. Prawer, *The Crusaders' Kingdom: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (New York 1972) 75–6; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1174–1277* (London 1973) 124, 128. Although unusual in its intensity, the interest of the Latin nobility in legal processes was not unique. Noble warriors often delighted in forensic duels nearly as much as in the cut and thrust of martial combat and both types of encounter furnished genteel entertainment; P. R. Hyams, "Henry II and Ganelon," *Syracuse Scholar* (1985) 35; R. V. Turner, *The English Judiciary in the Age of Glanvill and Bracton, ca. 1176–1239* (Cambridge 1985); R. C. Palmer, "The Origins of the Legal Profession in England," *Irish Jurist* 11 (1976) 128, 142–4.

² *Le livre de Philippe de Navarre in Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois: Les Assises de Jérusalem* (henceforward RHC Lois) 2 vols. (Paris 1896–1906) 1 569; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility* 133.

³ Its members included Ralph of Tiberias, Raymond of Tripoli, John of Beirut, Balian of Sidon, Philip of Novara, John of Jaffa, Jean d'Ibelin, Jacques d'Ibelin, King Aimery of Jerusalem, and Bohemund IV of Antioch and Tripoli, among others; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility* 121–8.

intriguing problems. Joshua Prawer has addressed several of these and has illuminated some previously murky corners of the picture.⁴ A great deal still remains in shade and shadow, however, although current research may clarify the scene further.⁵

My purpose here, however, is to consider some matters that are tangential, though related, to those that Prawer has dealt with. I wish to focus on two problems that have occasionally been mentioned, but never explicitly examined, in previous research, namely the place of the ecclesiastical courts and the roles of jurists learned in civil and canon law in the Latin states. While I do not have definitive solutions, I will at least raise some questions and propose tentative answers to them. This paper is a report on work in progress, rather than on a completed project.

I should place this paper in context by telling you that it forms part of my larger study of the process whereby canon law became an independent discipline, distinct from theology and civil law, a study in essence of the emergence of canon lawyers as a professional group in high medieval society.⁶ In this paper I will address five questions that form part of my larger inquiry. My questions this afternoon are: Did any professional canonists practise in the Latin states? If so, when did they begin to appear there? How many of them were there? Who were they? And what did they do?

We have *prima facie* reason to believe that trained canonists did practise in the Holy Land under Latin rule because we have evidence that Latin settlers in the East litigated extensively about such matters as marriage, annulment, separation, testaments, tithes, and the property interests of clerics, churches, and monasteries. All of these issues were justiciable in the Courts

⁴ See especially J. Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980) 358–412, 431–68.

⁵ I refer particularly to the research of W. Zajac at Cambridge University on the laws of war in the Crusades.

⁶ The present paper grows out of my earlier studies “The Ethics of the Legal Profession: Medieval Canonists and Their Clients,” *Jurist* 33 (1973) 247–58; “The Monk as Lawyer,” *Jurist* 39 (1979) 423–36; “English-Trained Canonists in the Middle Ages: A Statistical Analysis of a Social Group,” in *Law-Making and Law-Makers in British History*, A. Harding, ed. (London 1980) 64–78; and “The Profits of the Law: Legal Fees of University-Trained Advocates,” *American Journal of Legal History* 32 (1988) 1–15. Two additional studies are: “The Medieval Advocate’s Profession,” in *The Law and History Review* 6 (1988) 439–64; and “Legal Aid for the Poor and the Professionalization of Law in the Middle Ages,” in the *Journal of Legal History* 9 (London 1988) 169–79. My study of “The Ecclesiastical Bar at Ely in the Fourteenth Century: The Oaths of Admission,” presented at the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (San Diego 1988) 531–544, also bears on these themes.

Christian and these cases often raised sufficiently complex technical problems that expert counsel and advice were almost certainly necessary to cope with them.⁷

Although no *acta*, cause papers, or other formal records now survive from any court in the region (at least none are known to me), papal decretals addressed to prelates in the Latin states plainly show that canonical tribunals not only existed there, but that they were busy. No less than twenty decretals in the *Liber Extra* of Gregory IX determined points of law that arose in cases referred to the pope from the Latin East (see Table 1).⁸

These decretals ranged over a wide variety of topics: the translation of bishops, clerical non-residence, the property rights of bishops, disputed elections, bribery, non-Christian marriage, the law of evidence, and several technical procedural issues.⁹ It is unthinkable that cases that produced so much new law on such varied matters could have been raised, argued, and often times determined in first instance by canonical courts in the Holy Land unless trained and competent canonists were at work in the region. It would seem, therefore, that some trained canonists must have been at work among the Latin settlers in the East as early as the

⁷ Thus, for example, as early as 1126, litigation over the tithe obligations of the Hospitallers in Tripoli required the intervention of Master Philip, Chanter of the cathedral of Tripoli, who may well have had some expertise as a canonist; *Regesta regni Hierosolimitani* R. Röhrich, ed. (Innsbruck 1893–1904; repr. New York, Ben Franklin n. d., hereafter cited as RRH) No. 117; likewise the territorial claims of the Venetians at Tyre involved a cluster of canonical issues, RRH 102; H. E. Mayer, *Bistümer, Klöster, und Stifte in Königreich Jerusalem, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Schriften*, vol. 26 (Stuttgart 1977) 106–7. One deed of gift in 1182 expressly mentioned that both parties to the transaction had consulted legal experts: *Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem* 167, G. Bresc-Bautier ed. *Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades* vol. 15 (Paris 1984; hereafter CSS) 320. See also J. G. Rowe, "The Papacy and the Ecclesiastical Province of Tyre (1100–1187)," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 43 (1960) 160–189; M. W. Baldwin, "Ecclesiastical Developments in the Twelfth-Century Crusaders' State of Tripolis," *Catholic Historical Review* 22 (1936) 166–7; Rey, *Colonies franques* 268–9; R.C. Smail, *The Crusaders in Syria and the Holy Land* (London 1973) 39; B. Hamilton, *The Latin church in the Crusader States: The Secular church* (London 1980) 241–2.

⁸ The twenty decretals represent in fact only fifteen papal letters, since Ramon de Penyafort divided five of the letters into two parts and treated each part as a separate decretal. The divided letters are: X 2.12.4 + 2.18.2; X 2.20.29 + 5.34.13; X 3.10.4 + 3.10.5; X 4.17.15 + 4.19.8; X 5.33.20 + 5.33.21. Canon law texts are cited throughout from the standard edition in 2 vols. by E. Friedberg (Leipzig 1879; repr. Graz 1959).

⁹ In addition to the decretals listed in Table 1, additional twelfth-century papal decretals that dealt with cases that reached the curia from the Latin states may be found in *Decretales ineditae saeculi XII, from the Papers of the Late Walter Holtzmann*, S. Chodorow and C. Duggan, eds. and rev. No. 92–94 *Monumenta iuris canonici* [cited hereafter as MIC] Series B, *Corpus collectionum* vol. 4 (Città del Vaticano 1982) 164–7.

mid-twelfth and throughout the thirteenth centuries.

Records from the Levant bear out this initial hypothesis. A few men with sufficiently substantial educational qualifications to entitle them to the designation *magister* began to appear in documents from the Latin states during the second quarter of the twelfth century: the earliest was Master Philip, Chanter of Tripoli, who was named as plaintiff in a lawsuit in 1126.¹⁰ References to three other *magistri*, Robert, Giselbert, and Bede, appear in documents on the 1130's and 1140's.¹¹ Numbers of *magistri* active in the Latin East increased substantially during the half-century following 1150: documents from the region record the presence of twenty-two *magistri* in the period between 1150 and 1174, while eleven others made their first appearances between 1175 and 1199 (see Table 2). The numbers of *magistri* documented in the records of the crusader states grew further between 1200 and 1291: I have noted in Table 3 the names of seventy-two other masters who appeared in documents from the Holy Land during that period. Presumably this reflects the enhanced availability of advanced training and the growth of universities in Western Europe during the thirteenth century.

Clearly not all of these *magistri* were trained in law—a few were physicians,¹² while others were teachers of the liberal arts,¹³ and some were presumably trained in theology.¹⁴ It is likely, however, that many of the masters who served as chancellors of bishops¹⁵ or as archdeacons¹⁶ had some formal legal training.

¹⁰ RRH 117. On the significance of the title *magister* in this period see E. Cortese, "Legisti, canonisti, e feudisti: La formazione di un ceto medievale," in *Università e società nei secoli XII-XVI* (Pistoia 1982) 225–6; J. Fried, *Die Entstehung des Juristenstandes im 12. Jahrhundert: Zur sozialen Stellung und politischen Bedeutung gelehrter Juristen in Bologna und Modena, Forschungen zur neueren Privatrechtsgeschichte*, vol. 2 (Köln 1974) 9–12.

¹¹ RRH 152, 193, 226, CSC 21, 28, 82, Bresc-Bautier, ed. 78, 109. Master Robert, canon of the Holy Sepulchre, mentioned in a document of 1134, may still have been active in 1178; RRH 569.

¹² E.g. Bernard the Physician (RRH 723; *Documents et mémoires servant de preuves à l'histoire de l'île de Chypre sous les Lusignans*, L. de Mas Latrie, ed. (Paris 1853) vol. 3 of his *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*), Adjutus the physician, and Lambert the Physician (RRH 775, 824) among others.

¹³ E.g. Master Obert, canon of Antioch and *magister scholarum* (RRH 1043).

¹⁴ The boundary between theology and canon law was not clearly fixed in this period, although contemporaries were certainly conscious that the disciplines were diverging from each other. Canonists, in any case, were likely to have been exposed to some training in theology, and theologians usually studied some canon law. On this whole problem see esp. H. Kalb, "Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis zwischen Theologie und Kanonistik am Beispiel Rufins und Stephans von Tournai," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, kanonistische Abteilung* 72 (1986) 338–48; L. Schmugge, "Rechtsprobleme im Werk des Radulfus

Certainly their counterparts in Western Europe at this period often did so, and of course we know that Master William, Archdeacon of Tyre, who was later to become Archbishop of Tyre and chancellor of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, had studied civil law at Bologna with Hugo and Bulgarus, two of Innerius's most notable students.¹⁷ Likewise Master Heraclius, who became Archbishop of Caesarea and later Patriarch of Jerusalem (d. 1190), had been a fellow-student with Stephen of Tournai in the law faculty at Bologna.¹⁸

A master who was appointed the Official-principal (*Officialis*) of a bishop or other prelate was almost certain to have some formal legal credentials. Officials do not appear in the Latin states, however, until the second half of the thirteenth century, roughly a century after they first surfaced in European dioceses; and bishops in the Levant apparently never did appoint Officials as routinely as western bishops did.¹⁹ The earliest Official I have noted in the Latin East was Master Robert of Santonge, who was described in 1262/63 as Dean of Acre and Official of the papal legate.²⁰ In 1280 one Master Fulk was recorded as Official of Archbishop Ralph of Nicosia, and in 1285/86 Master Nicholas of Palermo, who appears earlier as a notary, was *Officialis* of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, but I have encountered no other Officials-

Niger: Ein Beitrag zur Verbindung von Theologie und Jurisprudenz im 12. Jahrhundert," in *Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, S. Kuttner, ed. MIC, Subsidia, vol 5 (Città del Vaticano 1976) 495-509; R. Weigand, "Ein Zeugnis für die Lehrunterscheide zwischen Kanonisten und Theologen aus des 13. Jahrhundert," *Revue de droit canonique* 24 (1974) 63-71.

¹⁵ Such as Master Aimery the Monk (RRH 435, 490, 532, 780), Master Simon (RRH 594), or Master Geoffrey (RRH 1102).

¹⁶ E.g. Master Guy, Archdeacon of Caesarea (RRH 824), Master Stephen of Provino, Archdeacon of Acre (RRH 1074), Master Hubert, Archdeacon of Tripoli and Canon of Antioch (RRH 1102), Master John, Archdeacon of Lydda (RRH 1293b), or Master Adam, Archdeacon of Acre (RRH 1314).

¹⁷ William of Tyre, *Chronicon* 19. 12, R. B. C. Huygens, ed., 2 vols *Corpus Christianorum, continuatio medievalis* vols. 63-63A (Turnhout 1986) 2, 880-1; William appears as archdeacon in RRH 1242 and 1269.

¹⁸ Stephen of Tournai, *Lettres* No. 78, J. de Silve, ed. (Paris 1893) 92-3. Heraclius was in the Latin East by 1167/68, RRH 455-6; CSS 147-8.

¹⁹ Paul Fournier, *Les officialités au moyen âge: Étude sur l'organisation, la compétence et la procédure des tribunaux ecclésiastiques ordinaires en France de 1180 à 1328* (Paris 1880; repr. Aalen 1984) 7-10. [As Jonathan Riley-Smith pointed out during a discussion of this paper, the infrequency with which Officials appear in the Latin East may well reflect the simple fact that the Latin christian population of the crusader states was never very large and that bishops in this region therefore felt less need to delegate their judicial functions to Officials than did their counterparts in the West.]

²⁰ RRH 1314.

principal in the Latin states.²¹

Three men entitled *magister* are also described as judges in documents from the 1220's and 1230's. It is reasonable to assume that these masters probably had some formal legal training, very likely at a university.²² Two of the three, Master Henry and Master Robert, seem to have been judges for the Pisan merchant colony at Acre.²³

It is even more likely that four *magistri* who bore the title of advocate had some formal legal education—they were Master Peter, Master Bonnanus, Master John of Piacenza, and Master Vinault—all of whom were active between the 1250's and the 1270's.²⁴ A few of the men named as proctors (*procuratores*) in the documents of the Latin East may well have had some legal credentials. Proctors were typically general-purpose business agents, empowered through a mandate contract to represent the interests of their principals primarily in commercial transactions, but men such as Master Hugolinus Romanus, who appears as proctor and syndic of the Abbot and Convent of St. Mary of Josaphat, and Robert of Auvergne, a cleric of the Archbishop of Nicosia, who appeared on behalf of their principals in litigation, almost certainly had some legal expertise.²⁵

By far the commonest legal functionary in the records of the Latin states was the notary. It is scarcely surprising that our documents show an abundance of notaries, since these professional draughtsmen of legal documents (similar to common law scribes) were widely employed throughout the Mediterranean world. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) required that all canonical judicial proceedings be recorded by a notary public or, if men with notarial qualifications were unavailable, by two “suitable men” (*idonei*).²⁶ Judges who failed to employ a notary might be subject to disciplinary action.²⁷

A few notaries appear in twelfth-century records from the Latin

²¹ RRH 1298, 1323, 1323b, 1455a, 1467 (Nicholas of Palermo); 1437 (Fulk).

²² Fried, *Entstehung des Juristenstandes* 24–44.

²³ RRH 958, 960, 1057, 1074, running from 1222 to 1236.

²⁴ RRH 1226, 1314–15, 1323, 1337, spanning the decade 1255–1265.

²⁵ RRH 1057 (Robert of Auvergne, 1234), 1292–93, 1315, 1323 (Hugolinus, 1260–3). Other proctors and syndics who were not styled *magistri* but who probably functioned as litigation agents include Fresonus (*alias* Frixonus) Malocellus (RRH 1294, 1297a, 1298), John of Rovegno (RRH 1294, 1297a, 1298), Colardus (RRH 1323), Belengarius (*sic* in RRH 1353), Simeon, who represented the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and J. de Wacholt, who acted on behalf of the Teutonic Knights, in 1286 (RRH 1467).

²⁶ *Idoneus* in this context may well imply that the person so described had some legal training; Fried, *Entstehung des Juristenstandes* 34.

²⁷ 4 Lat. c. 38 in *Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum commentariis*

states, but the earliest of them may well have had Byzantine qualifications.²⁸ Other notaries who appear from time to time in twelfth-century records were often the chaplains of secular or ecclesiastical dignitaries and how much formal legal training, if any, they may have had is impossible to determine.²⁹

Thirteenth-century notaries, on the other hand, are not only far more numerous, but also seem to have had substantial academic credentials. Master Baldwin, the royal notary who appears in documents between 1207 and 1217, for example, was probably trained in law.³⁰ The same may be true of a handful of men who are described as both notaries and judges from 1200 onward (see Table 4).³¹ At least one thirteenth-century notary, Obert of Brabant, a canon of Antioch, was also a schoolmaster.³² The term *scholasticus*, incidentally, was commonly used to designate legal experts and advocates.³³

The legal expertise of the men we have looked at thus far, however, remains largely speculative—it seems reasonable to deduce from combinations of title and function that many or most of them had a more than casual acquaintance with civil or canon law, but the evidence remains circumstantial. Occasional documents from the Latin states, however, refer explicitly to legal experts (see Table 5). Thus Patriarch Aimery of Antioch, for

glossatorium, António García y García, ed., MIC, Corpus glossatorium vol 2 (Città del Vaticano 1981) 80–1.

²⁸ Thus Fattis the notary, who appears together with Samuel the interpreter, in a document of 1114, and Theodore the notary (appears in 1140, apparently died by 1166) may well have been Greeks; RRH 76a, 195, 199, 424; CSS 76–8. An exception might have been George the notary, who served Abbess Stephanía of St. Mary the Great and who may be the “magister Georgius” who appears in RRH 609.

²⁹ RRH 247, 253, 257, 623a, 630, 639, 707, 719, 746, 1003; Hamilton, *Latin Church* 92. Notaries could, and often did, learn their trade through apprenticeship, however, rather than through academic training, while those who did attend a university were at least as likely to have studied the *ars dictaminis* there as they were to have frequented lectures in law.

³⁰ RRH 824, 853, 871. He had apparently become a canon of Nicosia by 1217; RRH 896. By that date the King of Jerusalem was employing another notary, John of Vindopera; RRH 892.

³¹ Men who are described simply as judges (such as Grillus de Messana [RRH 1314, 1337] or Adelard [RRH 1184]) and who lacked either the title *magister* or the function of notary are not likely to have had much formal training in the learned laws.

³² RRH 956, 958, 1043 (1222–1233); Master Obert was the recipient of a letter from Pope Honorius III in 1226 concerning the selection of a canon at Tripoli; *Regesta Honorii III*, No. 6030, P. Pressutti ed. 2 vols (Roma 1888–1895; hereafter Pressutti).

³³ J. von Ficker, *Forschungen zur Reichs und Rechtsgeschichte Italiens* 4 vols. (Innsbruck 1868–74; repr. Aalen 1961) 3, 104–5.

example, had in his household one Master John who was characterized as *legis peritus* in a charter of 1174, while a century later one Giles, a full-fledged *magister decretorum*, served as a parish priest in Tripoli.³⁴ In the late 1260's Master John of Ancona (son of Guido of Ancona), professor of civil law, wrote a *Summa iuris canonici*, which he dedicated to Patriarch William of Jerusalem and in which he acknowledged help from William of Lautario, Archdeacon of Acre. John's *Summa* demonstrated a wide, if not always deep, acquaintance with contemporary canonistic scholarship and its author was unquestionably active in the Holy Land for at least part of his career.³⁵ A few years later, in 1286, Peter of Brindisi, a law professor, was living in Tripoli, where he engaged in money lending operations.³⁶

In addition, Western sources also document the presence in the Latin states of at least three well-known canon lawyers, two of whom served briefly as bishops in the Levant. The first of these eminent canonists, John of Faenza, was an important commentator on Gratian's *Decretum* who came to the Latin East with the army of Frederick Barbarossa on the Third Crusade and died there. There is no reason to think that he conducted much professional business while in the Latin states, and he is unlikely to have had much significant influence upon the canonists of the region.³⁷ The second, Albert of Vercelli, was translated in 1205 by Pope Innocent III from the see of Vercelli, which he had held for twenty years, to become Patriarch of Jerusalem. Albert was an Austin canon, trained in both theology and canon law, who had frequently held appointments as a mediator and diplomat in the papal service. As Patriarch of Jerusalem he also

³⁴ RRH 513 (Master John), 1444, as well as *Documents et mémoires*, Mas Latrie, ed., 3, 667 (Master Giles). This Master Giles may perhaps be identical with Gille le Cla of Acre, identified as a papal judge and notary in RRH 1383a (1271).

³⁵ M. Bertram, "Johannes de Ancona: Ein Jurist des 13. Jahrhunderts in den Kreuzfahrerstaaten," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* 7 (1977) 49–64; D. Abulafia, "The Anconitan Privileges in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Levant Trade of Ancona," in *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, G. Airdi and B. Z. Kedar, eds., *Collana storica di fonti e studi* vol 48 (Genova 1986) 545.

³⁶ RRH 1462; Peter had loaned 200 besants to one Bertocius, son of Latinus Valensanus, who failed to pay the debt as scheduled; the parties agreed on a modified repayment scheme at Acre on 13 April 1286.

³⁷ J. F. von Schulte, *Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf die Gegenwart* 3 vols (Stuttgart 1875–7; repr. Gras 1956; hereafter Schulte, QL) 1 137–40; N. Höhl, "Neue Erkenntnisse zu Leben und Werk des Glossators Johannes Faventinus," and Karl Borchardt, "Archbishop Gerhard of Ravenna and Bishop John of Faenza," both in *Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, MIC Series C: Subsidia, vol. 9, pp. 189–203 and 573–592.

functioned as papal legate. Albert was assassinated during a procession on the Feast of the Holy Cross in 1214 by a disappointed litigant, a cleric who believed that the patriarch had deposed him unjustly from his position.³⁸

The other eminent canonist to hold a bishopric in the Latin States was Bernard of Montmirat, abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Montmajour, who was appointed Bishop of Tripoli in 1286. Bernard had studied canon law with Petrus de Samsone and later taught law at Béziers. He wrote a well-known *Lectura* on the *Liber Extra* and a systematic commentary on the *Constitutions* of Innocent IV. Later canonists commonly referred to him as *Abbas antiquus*.³⁹ Although he was appointed to the See of Tripoli in 1286, Bernard did not set out for the East for four years, since he first needed to tidy up various matters in which he represented the pope; meanwhile in 1289 Tripoli itself was conquered by the Mamlûks. Bernard finally set sail for Syria in 1290 as commander of a papal fleet and reached Acre in 1290, as part of a relief force that endeavoured to stave off attacks on that last Latin stronghold. When Acre fell in 1291, Bernard escaped to Cyprus, where he was named administrator of the See of Famagusta. He returned to Europe within a few months, however, and Boniface VIII appointed him administrator of the Abbey of Monte Cassino, where he died in 1296.⁴⁰ Given the tumultuous events that surrounded his brief stay in the Levant, Bernard could scarcely have had much influence on juristic practices and institutions in the Latin East.⁴¹ Patriarch Albert and Bishop Bernard were certainly not typical of trained jurists in the Latin states, but then they were scarcely typical of contemporary canonists in the West either.

³⁸ Among his many other activities in the Latin East, Albert drew up a rule of life for a group of hermits living on Mount Carmel: this was the first rule of the Carmelite order and was later approved by Pope Honorius III. Partly on this account, no doubt, the Carmelites revered Albert as a saint and his cult received papal approval, although it was never extended to the universal church; Hamilton, *Latin Church* 249–51.

³⁹ S. Kuttner, "Wer war der Dekretalist 'Abbas antiquus'?" *Zeitschrift der Savigny-stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, kanonistische Abteilung 26 (1937) 471–89, Schulte, *QL* 2, 130–32; J. A. Clarence Smith, *Medieval Law Teachers and Writers, Civilian and Canonist*, University of Ottawa, Publications of the Faculty of Law, Monographs vol 9 (Ottawa 1975) 67–8.

⁴⁰ Hamilton, *Latin Church* 239–41.

⁴¹ A century earlier, a distinguished Orthodox canonist, Theodore Balsamon, appeared nominally as Greek Patriarch of Antioch in the 1180's. His appointment was purely titular, however: there is no evidence that he ever attempted to take possession of the See of Antioch and he continued to live at Constantinople; Hamilton, *Latin Church* 178.

One striking characteristic of the legally trained men whose names flit in and out of the records of the Latin Levant is that they so often appear only for brief periods of time. The overwhelming majority appear in the records only for a single year, while a few enter the records in two or three sequential years (see Table 6). This pattern of appearances suggests that many legally trained men may have come to the Latin East only temporarily, for just a year or two. Some no doubt accompanied merchant venturers and assisted their principals in commercial transactions during the brief period when they were in the Holy Land. This was certainly true, for example, of the Genoese notary, Manuele Loco, who redacted thirteen contracts at Tyre in June and July, 1265, and was back in Genoa by September of that year. Manuele was part of the company that the merchant, Lanfranco de Carmadino, brought with him on a profitable voyage that summer.⁴² Others may have visited the Holy Land on pilgrimage, arriving in the spring of one year and returning to Europe either that same autumn or in the spring of the following year. Such a pattern would be consistent with what we know of the itineraries of other pilgrims and suggests that some legal professionals, like many knights and merchants, may have come to the East for limited periods, both as an act of piety and as a stage in their own professional development. A sojourn in the Latin East may have afforded them an opportunity to gain useful experience in practice, while at the same time they reaped spiritual benefits as well.⁴³ Some *iurisperiti* who appeared briefly in the Latin East were probably there as legal advisers or assessors to mercantile courts. It was common practice in Italy and elsewhere for commercial tribunals to employ a trained jurist to advise the merchant-judges on technical legal matters.⁴⁴ Only a few of the jurists mentioned in the documents of the Latin states were clearly permanent settlers who made long-term careers in the East, either as independent practitioners or in the service of one of the princes or prelates of the Latin establishment.

All of these jurists, no matter how long they spent in the Levant, probably received their legal training in the West. Little canon

⁴² L. Balleto, "Fonti notarili genovesi del secondo Duecento per la storia del Regno Latino di Gerusalemme," in *I comune italiani* 197, 255–66, docs. 5–17.

⁴³ R. C. Smail, "Latin Syria and the West, 1149–1187," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser. 19 (1969), 1–20.

⁴⁴ K. W. Nörr, "Procedure in Mercantile Matters: Some Comparative Aspects," in *The Courts and the Development of Commercial Law*, V. Piergiovanni, ed. (Berlin 1987) 195–6.

or civil law was taught in the schools of the Latin East. True, the Third Lateran Council (1179) required every cathedral to maintain a schoolmaster, who was to instruct the clergy and poor scholars in the liberal arts free of charge,⁴⁵ and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) also required each cathedral chapter to assign a prebend to someone competent to teach theology.⁴⁶ Although the councils did not provide expressly for instruction in canon law, teachers of theology at the cathedrals were expected to instruct their students in the skills required for exercising the cure of souls, and that certainly included some elementary canonistic learning.⁴⁷

Cathedral chapters in the Latin East evidently complied with these prescriptions. Just three years after the Fourth Lateran Council mandated the teaching of theology, the chapter of Acre was offering theological instruction to the clergy there, while the Holy Sepulchre had maintained a prebend for a schoolmaster since shortly after the Latin conquest of Jerusalem.⁴⁸ Other evidence indicates that cathedral schools were operating at Antioch and Beirut, although the scope of their curricula remains unknown.⁴⁹ The services of resident teachers may also have been supplemented from time to time by visiting scholars, such as Master Fulk, who taught at the Cathedral of Le Mans, but who appears as a witness to a deed of sale in 1204 in Tripoli.⁵⁰ Both canon and civil law were being taught at Tripoli by the mid-thirteenth century, and it is likely that at least some basic instruction in the two learned laws was available elsewhere in the

⁴⁵ 3 Lat. c. 18 in *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta* 2d ed., G. Alberigo, P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi, and H. Jedin, eds. (Basel 1962) 196. This canon was incorporated in the *Liber Extra* as X 5.5.1; the principle was already established in canon law prior to this time (*Decretum Gratiani* D. 37 c. 12), but the conciliar canon made the requirement more pointed and specific.

⁴⁶ 4 Lat. c. 11 Garcia 59–60. This canon appears in the *Liber Extra* as X 5.5.4.

⁴⁷ Thus Geoffrey of Trani, *Summa super titulis decretalium* to X 5.5 pr. (Lyon, Joannes Moylin, alias de Cambrai, 1519; Aalen 1968), fol. 204rb-va.

⁴⁸ Jacques de Vitry, *Lettres* 4.238–40, R. B. C. Huygens, ed. (Leiden 1960) 110, writing to Pope Honorius III in 1218 referred to a Master Leonius who was teaching theology at Acre, while a charter of Patriarch Ebremer of Jerusalem in 1102/03 assigned a prebend plus an additional 150 besants per year to the schoolmaster of the Holy Sepulchre, a position that in 1136 was held by John the Pisan; RRH 40, 166; CSS 19, 103 Bresc-Bautier, ed., 223; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility* 130. An unnamed *magister scholarum Antiochenus* appeared (apparently as an advocate) in a marriage case before Honorius III in 1227; Honorius III *Regesta* 6272, Pressutti 2, 485.

⁴⁹ RRH 144 (Beirut 1133), 636, 840, 1043 (Antioch 1243); Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility* 130.

⁵⁰ RRH 800.

Latin Levant as well, for evidence of at least a casual acquaintance with the technicalities of civil law transactions occasionally appears in Latin charters.⁵¹ Thus, for example, in two charters written at Acre, one dated in 1255, the other in 1260, we find female donors expressly renouncing the immunity from liability that the *Senatusconsultum Velleianum* (ca. A.D. 46) afforded to women, and doing so in the fashion prescribed in Justinian's Code.⁵²

The advocates, judges, and legal experts who worked in the Latin East almost certainly received their advanced professional training in law at Bologna and elsewhere in Western Europe, as William of Tyre did, rather than in the Latin states themselves. Families who sought professional education in law for their members needed to finance their training in the West, as Patriarch Peter I of Antioch did for his two nephews.⁵³ Other law students doubtless financed their education from the income of benefices in the Latin East. In 1223, a papal legate explicitly authorized the bishops of Cyprus to grant leave to their cathedral canons to spend up to five years studying at a university, and while the legate clearly intended to restrict this permission to students of theology, it is likely that some of its beneficiaries studied canon law as well.⁵⁴ Law students from the Latin Levant appear in university records from time to time and some of them at least seem to have been amply provided with funds, as was Simon of Tripoli, who bought a glossed copy of the *Decretum* at Bologna in 1266 for the substantial price of £135 *Bononiensis*.⁵⁵

There is no evidence that advanced legal training of any sort was ever available in the Latin Levant. But the Latin states could

⁵¹ *Les registres d'Innocent IV*, 7116, E. Berger, ed., 4 vols Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome ser 2 (Paris 1884–1921); *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem (1100–1310)*, 2280, J. Delaville le Roulx, ed., 4 vols (Paris 1894–1897; hereafter CGH) 2, 596; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility* 130.

⁵² RRH 1232 (1255), 1291 (1260). Both documents were drafted by the judge and notary, Aliotto Uguccione. For the *SC Velleianum* see Cod 4.29.23 and generally Dig 16.1, in the *Corpus iuris civilis*, Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, Rudolf Schoell, and Wilhelm Kroll, eds., 3 vols (Berlin 1872–95; often reprinted).

⁵³ RRH B59a (1212); Innocent III, *Registrum* 15.181, in PL 216 697–B; Hamilton, *Latin Church* 222–3.

⁵⁴ *Documents et mémoires*, Mas Latric, ed., 3, 623.

⁵⁵ *Memoriali del Comune Bolognese, 1265–1266* No. 504, G. Zaccagnini, ed., in *Chartularium studii Bononiensis*, 13 vols (Bologna 1909–1940) 5, 236–37. This copy of the *Decretum* must have been a deluxe edition, for the price was quite substantial indeed; by way of comparison, a judge in the previous year received £90 Bon. as his annual salary, while in 1266 a house in Bologna could be had for as little as £32 Bon., and a woman's marriage dowry amounted to £60 Bon.; *Memoriali*

and did provide men trained in law with practical experience in the application of law to administrative problems and to the realities of litigation. Cathedral chapters in particular seem often to have functioned as virtual training academies for ecclesiastical administrators, many of whom very likely had some previous academic training in law.⁵⁶

Further, every cathedral chapter and monastery necessarily possessed a library. While some collections presumably consisted of little more than multiple copies of the service books needed for liturgical functions, others were likely to have been far more extensive. Occasional appearances in the records of clerics designated as librarians point to the presence of more substantial book collections and it is highly probable that these included at least some canon and civil law texts.⁵⁷ Bishops and chapters, after all, needed to have legal texts and reference books at hand in the normal course of their administrative work, as well as for use in their courts.

To return, then, to the five questions I posed at the outset, I find that there can be no reasonable doubt that trained canonists were at work in the Latin states at least from the mid-twelfth century onward. I further find that the numbers of trained jurists increased slowly during the second half of the twelfth century and continued to increase, but at a sharply accelerated rate, during the thirteenth century. It is impossible to say precisely how many men with substantial legal training spent part of their careers in the Latin East, but their numbers may have been fairly considerable. More than a hundred men who seem likely to have been jurists appear in the records I have examined, while a further hundred or so may have had some formal legal training. We know little or nothing about the personal histories of most of those jurists, but we can be reasonably sure that they received their legal education in the West; for many of them their period

1265–6, No. 148, 196, 207. Twenty years later, in 1286, the rector of the Church of Sts. Philip and James at Bologna contracted to supply two German students with room and board for a year, a fire during the winter, and a servant to carry their books to and from lectures, all for 50 *bolognini piccoli*; G. Zaccagnini, *La vita dei maestri e degli scolari nello studio di Bologna nei secoli XIII e XIV*, Biblioteca dell, Archivum Romanicum, ser 1, vol. 5 (Geneva 1926) 74–5.

⁵⁶ Hamilton, *Latin Church* 114–15.

⁵⁷ RRH 129a (Bethlehem 1129), 780; and *Cartulaire du St. Sépulchre* no. 177 in PL 155, 1254 (Holy Sepulchre 1201). Explicit designation of a librarian is unusual; chapter libraries were most commonly administered by the chanter, as a minor part of his duties. A. Maier identified eight manuscripts that survive from the library at Sidon and three of these contain canonistic texts: “Die Handschriften der ‘Ecclesia Sidonensis’,” *Manuscripta* 11 (1967) 39–45.

in the Levant was probably only a brief interlude in their careers. Legally trained men who spent substantial periods in the Latin states usually held ecclesiastical appointments as archdeacons, bishops' Officials, and the like, and a goodly number were members of cathedral chapters. While some men with legal training functioned as chaplains to dignitaries both ecclesiastical and secular, a few may have been in private practice, and a very few taught law. Learned jurists, of course, never comprised more than a small fraction of the Latin population of the crusader states. The primary purpose of this paper has been to call attention to the fact that they were there at all and to suggest that their presence in the Latin outposts in the East was a significant element both in the internal life of the Frankish population and in relationships of the Latin settlers with the papacy and other western interests. The lawyers of the Latin Levant were important out of all proportion to their numbers.

TABLE 1
PAPAL DECRETALS CONCERNING THE LATIN EAST IN THE
LIBER EXTRA

X	From	To	Date	Title
1.7.1	Innocent III	Patriarch of Antioch	1198	De translatione episcopi
1.22.3	Innocent III	Patriarch of Jerusalem	1207	De clericis peregrinis
1.30.8	Gregory IX	Patr. Jerusalem	1277–34	De officio legati
2.6.2	Innocent III	Patr. Jerusalem & Abp. of Cassensi	1200	Ut lite non contesta non procedatur
2.12.4	Innocent III	Canons of Bethlehem	1200	De causa possessionis
2.18.2	Innocent III	Canons of Bethlehem	1200	De confessis
2.20.29	Innocent III	Bp. of Tyre	1199	De testibus et attestationibus
2.24.31	Honorius III	Canons of Antioch	1216–27	De iureiurando
2.30.8	Honorius III	King, Barons etc. of Cyprus	1223–25	De confirmatione utili vel inutili
3.4.16	Gregory IX	Patr. of Antioch	1227–34	De clericis non residentibus
3.4.17	Gregory IX	Patr. of Antioch	1227–34	De clericis non residentibus
3.10.4	Alexander III	Patr. of Jerusalem	1168	De his que fiunt a prelato
3.10.5	Alexander III	Patr. of Jerusalem	1170–71	De his que fiunt a prelato
3.31.17	Innocent III	Bp. of Acre	1198	De regulariis

(Table 1, *continued*)

4.14.4	Innocent III	Abp. & Chapter of Tyre	1198	De consanguinitate et affinitate
4.17.15	Innocent III	Bp. of Tiberias	1201	Qui filii sint legitimi
4.19.8	Innocent III	Bp. of Tiberias	1201	De divortiis
5.33.20	Innocent III	Bp. & Chapter of Tripoli	1212	De privilegiis
5.33.21	Innocent III	Bp. & Chapter of Tripoli	1212	De privilegiis
5.34.13	Innocent III	Abp. of Tyre	1199	De purgatione canonica

TABLE 2
MASTERS IN THE LATIN EAST, 1150–1199

Name	Date(s)	Document(s)
William, canon of Sidon	1152	RRH 277
George	1152, 1181, 1183	RRH 277, 609, 630
Lucas Veneticus	1156	RRH 302; CSS 117
Anschetinus	1160	RRH 358; CSS 52, 53
Achilles	1160	RRH 358; CSS 52
Stephen of Nablus	1160, 1168	RRH 359, 450, 455
Girard, canon of Tyre	1160/61	RRH 370; CSS 56
Hugh, canon of St. Abraham	1163, 1175, 1184	RRH 379, 532, 636
Pagan	1163	RRH 379
Aimery the monk (later chancellor, then Abp. of Caesarea & Patriarch of Jerusalem)	1167, 1171, 1175 1177, 1201	RRH 435, 490, 492, 532, 543, 780; CSS 141, 158, 162
Roger	1167	RRH 435; CSS 141
Raymond	1168, 1177	RRH 454, 551
Martin	1168, 1177	RRH 454, 551
Heraclius (later Abp. of Caesarea and Patriarch of Jerusalem)	1167/68, 1170/71	RRH 455, 456, 490; CSS 147, 148, 158
Stephen	1167/68	RRH 455; CSS 147
Gonscelinus	1173, 1174	RRH 504, 516
Thomas	1171	CSS 155
Bartholomew	1174	RRH 513
Peter of Genoa	1174, 1190	RRH 513, 691
John	1174	RRH 513

(Table 2, *continued*)

William, archdeacon (later Abp.) of Tyre and royal chancellor	1174	RRH 518
Matthew, chancellor of Tripoli	1174	RRH 519
Salomon	1175	RRH 532
Bernard	1178, 1180	RRH 559, 579
Morellus	1178, 1181	RRH 568, 609
Simon	1180	RRH 594
Geoffrey	1180	RRH 594
Arnold	1185	RRH 645
Albert, Abp. of Tarsus	1190	RRH 689, 695
Odo	1190	RRH 691
Blancus, canon of Genoa	1190	RRH 692
Peter the Basque	1195	RRH 723; Mas Latrie 3:599
Bernard the Physician	1195	RRH 723; Mas Latrie 3:599

TABLE 3
MASTERS IN THE LATIN EAST, 1200–1291

Name	Date(s)	Reference(s)
Ralph, canon of Acre and treasurer of Tyre	1200	RRH 771
Alberic	1200, 1238/39	RRH 192, 771; CSS 80
Adjutus the Physician	1200	RRH 775
Lambert the Physician	1200, 1207	RRH 775, 824
John de Borbonio, chancellor of Antioch	1202, 1204, 1205	RRH 792, 799, 807
Guy, archdeacon of Caesarea	1207	RRH 824
William the physician	1207	RRH 824
Baldwin, royal notary	1207, 1211, 1214 1217	RRH 824, 853, 871, 896
Otto Fulcher	1212	RRH 858
Bovo, Latin chancellor of Armenian king	1214	RRH 869–70
Peter vicar of the Patriarch of Jerusalem (perhaps the same as Peter of Genoa or Peter the Basque)	1219, 1222, 1225	RRH 922, 959, 959a, 973; Pressutti, 5658, 5660
Prando, Chancellor of Antioch	1219	Pressutti 2305
Bertrand	1221, 1222	RRH 949a, 959, 959a
Everardus, Canon of Tripoli	1222	Pressutti 4107, 4129
Robert the Judge	1222, 1234	RRH 958, 1057
Henry the Judge	1222	RRH 958, 960
Maurinus the Physician	1222	RRH 959
Peter, Canon of Antioch	1225	Pressutti 5658
Peter the Physician	1226	RRH 975
Obert, Canon of Antioch	1226, 1233	Pressutti 6030; RRH 1043
William Durandus (perhaps the same as Master William, canon of Nicosia)	1233, 1246	Mas Latrie 3:637, 647
Robert of Auvergne	1234	RRH 1057

(Table 3, *continued*)

Stephen of Provino, archdeacon of Acre	1236	RRH 1074
Ansaldus the Judge	1236	RRH 1074
Geoffrey, Chancellor of Antioch, later Bishop of Tiberias	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
James, Canon of Antioch	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
Gerard	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
Moyne, Canon of Antioch	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
André, Canon of Antioch and Tripoli	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
William d'Yvorie et d'Oste	1241	RRH 1102
Ogier, Hospitaller chaplain	1241	RRH 1102
Damian	1241	RRH 1102
Hubert, Archdeacon of Tripoli, Canon of Antioch	1241	RRH 1102; CGH 2280
Matthew the Physician	1242	RRH 1106
John the Physician	1244	RRH 1122
Nicholas, Pisan chaplain	1248	RRH 1157–58
Simon Cimentarius	1250	RRH 1194
Peter the Advocate	1255	RRH 1226; Meijers, "Université d'Orléans," 105
William, Dean of Acre, Archdeacon of Tyre	1255, 1258, 1262	RRH 1242, 1269, 1282 1314
Philip, Chanter of Tripoli	1259	RRH 1274
Bartholomew	1259	RRH 1274, 1276, 1278
William, Archdeacon of Nazareth	1259, 1262/63	RRH 1282, 1314
Bonnanus, Advocate	1259, 1262, 1265	RRH 1280–81, 1314, 1323
Arnulf de Perona	1260	RRH 1291
Hugolinus Romanus	1260, 1262, 1263	RRH 1292–93, 1323, 1323b

(Table 3, *continued*)

Cosmas, Canon of Ancona	1260	RRH 1293b
Nicholas, Chanter of Caesarea	1260	RRH 1293b
William, Treasurer of Caesarea	1260	RRH 1293b
John, Archdeacon of Lydda	1260	RRH 1293b
John de Pascha, Chanter of Famagusta	1261	RRH 1298
Peter Faber	1261	RRH 1302
Peter de Biauvais	1261	RRH 1302
Alain	1261	RRH 1302
Robert	1261	RRH 1302
Robert of Santonge, Dean of Acre	1262	RRH 1314
John, brother of the papal legate	1262, 1263	RRH 1314, 1320
Adam, Archdeacon of Acre	1263	RRH 1314
John, Advocate of Lentino	1262	RRH 1315
James, Canon of Lydda	1263	RRH 1323b
Richard, Chanter of Tripoli and Canon of Tyre	1265	RRH 1341
Bertrand, Canon of Nicosia	1267	RRH 1345
John of Ancona, professor of Civil Law	1267, 1273	RRH 1356, 1388; Bertram, "Johannes de Ancona"; Herde, <i>Beiträge</i> , 143–46
Nicholas of San Geminiano	1267	RRH 1356
William of Lautario, archdeacon	1265–1268	Betram, "Johannes de Ancona," 54, 61
Raymond, Canon of Nicosia, vicar of the Patriarch of Jerusalem	1271	RRH 1373, 1378
Jordan, Treasurer of Beirut	1279	RRH 1430–31
Roland the Physician	1279	RRH 1434
Fulk, <i>Officialis</i> of Nicosia	1280	RRH 1437
Dye	1286	RRH 1467
Baldwin, Canon (of Nicosia?)	1287	RRH 1472

(Table 3, *continued*)

Matthew the Physician	1290	RRH 1501b
Bernardus de Montemirato, Bishop of Tripoli	1290	Meijers, “Première époque,” 172–73

TABLE 4
NOTARIES WHO WERE ALSO JUDGES IN THE LATIN EAST

Name	Date(s)	Reference(s)
Peter of Pisa	1200	RRH 775
Bonaccursus of Pisa	1200	RRH 775
Gerard of Pisa	1233	RRH 1045
Benencasa of Pisa	1248–49	RRH 1157–62
John de Bucea de Manzo	1251	RRH 1197a
Aliotus Uguicionis	1253–1263	RRH 1209, 1212, 1232, 1237, 1259, 1280–82 1291
Aegidius	1259	RRH 1277
Master Hugolinus	1260, 1263	RRH 1293b, 1323b
Gerard Bonisani	1260, 1264	RRH, 1323b, 1334
Gille de Cla	1271	RRH 1383a
James Biddedi	1283–84	RRH 1452–54

TABLE 5
LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE LATIN EAST

Name	Description(s)	Date(s)	Reference(s)
Heraclius	Abp. of Caesarea, Patriarch of Jerusalem law student at Bologna	1167–1190	Stephen of Tournai, <i>Lettres</i> , 78
John	Magister, legis peritus	1174	RRH 513
Rainerius	Juris peritus	1254, 1255	RRH 1212, 1234
Peter	Advocate at Acre	1258–1266	Meijers, "L'université d'Orleans," 105
Ubaldu	Juris peritus, presbyter	1255	RRH 1228
Boannus	Magister, juris peritus	1259, 1262, 1265	RRH 1280–81, 1314, 1323, 1327
John of Ancona	Ciivilis iuris professor	1267, 1273	RRH 1356, 1388; Bertram, "Johannes de Ancona"
Jacobus Vitalis	Juris peritus	1271	RRH 1373
Acursus de Arisio (or Aretio?)	Magister, juris peritus, advocate	1271–73	RRH 1373, 1384, 1390, 1413
Vivaldu	Juris peritus	1271	RRH 1373
Richard of Brindisi	Magister, juris peritus	1277, 1286	RRH 1413, 1466
Aldobrandino of Florence	Juris peritus	1277	RRH 1413
Gille	Magister decretorum, assisius Tripolitanus	1282	RRH 1444; Mas Latrie 3:667
Peter of Brindisi	Legum professor	1286	RRH 1462
Sanctorius de Messana	Juris peritus	1296	RRH 1467
Bernard of Montemirato	Bishop of Tripoli	1290	Meijers, "Pre- mière époque," 172–73

TABLE 6
DOCUMENTED APPEARANCES OF JURISTS IN THE
LATIN EAST

	Masters	Judges and Notaries	Notaries only	Juris- periti	Total
1 year only	78	7	57	11	153
2-3 years	6	3	6	2	17
4-6 years	6		2	1	9
7-10 years	7	1		2	10
11-20 years	3		4	1	8
21+ years	4		2		6
TOTALS	104	11	71	17	203

COMMUNES ITALIENNES, POUVOIR ET HABITANTS DES ÉTATS FRANCS DE SYRIE-PALESTINE AU XII^E SIÈCLE

Michel Balard

"In the history of Italian expansion the Crusades are a favorite topic. Yet even in this domain, current studies deal mainly with the privileges of the communes, the political history of their expansion and the volume and variety of their commerce. Very little is devoted to the colonists themselves".¹ Le jugement de Joshua Prawer est catégorique: peu de travaux ont été consacrés à l'histoire des colons italiens dans les États Francs de Syrie-Palestine; la rareté des sources dont nous disposons explique sans doute cette lacune dans nos connaissances. L'argument retenu serait-il impossible à traiter? Pas tout à fait, cependant. On peut établir quels étaient les droits et le réseau de relations des colons italiens, en comparant terme à terme les textes des privilèges obtenus par Gênes, Venise et Pise, auprès des rois de Jérusalem, des princes d'Antioche et des comtes de Tripoli au cours du XII^e siècle. Un tableau comparatif permet de saisir la chronologie des concessions, le lieu où elles s'appliquent, la nature des privilèges accordés, l'organisation des colonies et leurs rapports avec la population latine et indigène.

L'entreprise est toutefois redoutable: que pèse en effet une communication dans un colloque, alors que Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie annonce la publication prochaine d'un volume sur les Italiens en Terre Sainte au XII^e siècle?² La tâche est d'autant plus difficile que les principales sources, si l'on se limite strictement au XII^e siècle, se réduisent aux textes des privilèges accordés aux républiques maritimes italiennes,³ aux actes, bien décevants pour notre

¹ J. Prawer, "The Italians in the Latin Kingdom," dans *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980) 217.

² Ce volume a été publié quelques mois après la tenue du colloque de London (Ontario): M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land vom ersten Kreuzzug bis zum Tode Heinrichs von Champagne* (Amsterdam 1989).

³ Pour Gênes C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, éd., *Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova* 3 vols. (Rome 1936-1942); pour Pise, G. Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'Oriente cristiano* (Florence 1879) réimpr. Rome 1966; pour Venise, G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Berücksichtigung auf Byzanz und*

propos, inclus dans le cartulaire du chapitre du Saint Sépulcre, récemment édités, et à quelques textes des *Libri Jurium*.⁴ Aucun acte notarié instrumenté dans les villes de Terre Sainte n'a été conservé pour cette époque, non plus qu'aucune description des possessions italiennes, comme nous en possédons pour le XIII^e siècle. Les minutiers génois du XII^e siècle et les débris de minutiers vénitiens édités par Morozzo della Rocca et Lombardo,⁵ intéressent davantage le mouvement des affaires entre l'Italie et la Terre Sainte que la vie même des établissements italiens sur la côte syrienne. L'apport des chroniques n'est pas négligeable; les Annales de Caffaro et de ses continuateurs pour Gênes, celles de Maragone pour Pise célèbrent les hauts faits de leurs concitoyens lors des phases de la conquête, mais sont d'une rare discrétion sur leur installation en Terre Sainte.⁶ Guillaume de Tyr, témoin privilégié de l'histoire du royaume de Jérusalem, souligne l'apport des flottes italiennes dans la conquête et le maintien des États Francs, mais passe sous silence la participation des colons italiens à la vie politique et sociale des villes de Terre Sainte.⁷ Bref, au XII^e siècle la mémoire des témoins retient beaucoup mieux les hauts faits militaires et navals que l'existence des colonies italiennes, pourtant déterminantes dans le devenir des États Francs.

Les premiers contacts des Italiens avec la Terre Sainte se placent, bien entendu, sous le signe de la violence. Les annalistes rappellent la participation aux combats de la conquête et l'appoint indispensable des flottes italiennes pour l'investissement et la capture des cités côtières. Les navires privent les assiégés de tout

die Levante t. 1 (Vienne 1856) réimpr. Amsterdam 1964, et naturellement R. Röhrich, *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani* 2 vols. (Innsbruck 1893–1904) réimpr. New York 1960.

⁴ G. Bresc-Bautier, éd., *Le cartulaire du chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem*, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des Croisades publiés par l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (Paris 1984).

⁵ M. Chiaudano et R. Moresco, eds., *Il cartolare di Giovanni scriba* (Turin 1935); M. Chiaudano et M. Morozzo della Rocca, eds., *Oberto scriba de Mercato 1190* (Gênes-Turin 1938); J. E. Eierman, H. C. Krueger et R. L. Reynolds, eds., *Bonvillano* (Gênes-Turin 1939); M. W. Hall Cole, H. C. Krueger, R. G. Reinert et R. L. Reynolds, eds., *Giovanni di Guiberto*, 2 vols. (Gênes-Turin 1939–1940); M. Chiaudano, éd., *Oberto scriba de Mercato 1186*, (Gênes-Turin 1940); H. C. Krueger et R. L. Reynolds, eds., *Lanfranco*, 3 vols. (Gênes 1953); R. Morozzo Della Rocca et A. Lombardo, eds., *Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII* (Turin 1940).

⁶ L. T. Belgrano et C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, eds., *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori*, 5 vols. (Rome 1890–1929); B. Maragone, *Annales Pisani*, M. Lupo Gentile, éd., *R.I.S.* 2, t. VI, parte 2 (Bologne 1930–1936).

⁷ Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique*, R. B. C. Huygens, éd., 2 vols. (Turnhout 1986).

secours et de tout ravitaillement par la voie maritime. Démontés, comme c'est le cas pour les galères génoises arrivées à Jaffa, leur bois sert à la construction des tours mobiles, nécessaires engins de siège.⁸ Toutefois, les trois républiques maritimes ne partagent pas les mêmes ardeurs guerrières. A Gênes, la prédication de la croisade a un succès immédiat. Les citoyens regroupés en *compagna* arment plusieurs flottes successives. Débarqués à Port Saint-Syméon, ils combattent vigoureusement sous les murs d'Antioche et de Laodicée, répandant le sang des Sarrasins et participant au pillage. Caffaro a peut-être vu l'argent, l'or, les vêtements de prix et les troupeaux qui accompagnent l'armée de Kerbogha; sa description est celle d'un témoin oculaire ébloui par tant de richesses, alors que les croisés enfermés dans Antioche manquent de tout.⁹ Lors du siège de Jérusalem en 1099, parmi les Génois qui s'illustrent, figurent les deux frères Guglielmo et Primo Embriaci, capitaines de deux galères et constructeurs des machines de siège.¹⁰ L'enthousiasme du chroniqueur pour les hauts faits de ses concitoyens est tel qu'il leur attribue la conquête de la ville et le massacre d'innombrables Sarrasins.¹¹ De même la prise de Césarée est due, sans conteste, aux exploits de Wilielmus Caputmalli consul de l'armée génoise.¹² La ville est saccagée et les Génois emportent un énorme butin qu'ils vont se partager près de l'embouchure de l'Oronte, à Port Saint Syméon.¹³ De 1098 à 1101, les Génois ont été aux avant-postes de la conquête franque et en ont tiré des profits immédiats.

Du côté pisan, on ne peut accorder foi au récit de Roncioni qui mentionne le départ pour la Syrie d'une cinquantaine de vaisseaux en 1097; en effet deux sources vénitiennes, le *Chronicon venetum* d'Andrea Dandolo et les *Historiae translatione sanctorum magni Nicolai*... placent cette expédition en 1099–1100. En fait Pise semble avoir armé trois flottes successives, celle de Daimbert qui arrive en Terre Sainte après la prise de Jérusalem en juillet

⁸ Guillaume de Tyr, t. 1, 1 8,9; Caffaro, "Di liberatione civitatum Orientis liber," dans *Annali genovesi*, t. 1, 110.

⁹ Guillaume de Tyr, t. 1, 1006. Voir G. Pistarino, "Genova e il Vicino Oriente nell'epoca del Regno Latino di Gerusalemme," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, G. Airdi et B. Z. Kedar, eds. (Gênes 1986), 57–139; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 43–48.

¹⁰ Sur ceux-ci, voir F. Cardini, "Profilo di un crociato, Guglielmo Embriaco", dans *Archivio Storico italiano*, t. 136 (1978) 405–446; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 50–51.

¹¹ L. T. Belgrano et C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Annali genovesi*, t. 1, 110.

¹² L. T. Belgrano et C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, 9–12.

¹³ L. T. Belgrano et C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, 13. Chaque soldat reçoit 48 sous de Provins et 2 livres de poivre.

1099, aide Bohémond lors du siège de Laodicée alors occupée par les Grecs, et repart, sans son chef, pour l'Occident après Pâques 1100; celle qui s'oppose aux Vénitiens dans les parages de l'île de Rhodes au cours de l'hiver 1099–1100; enfin une autre qui, jointe à une flotte génoise, hiverne à Laodicée en 1100–1101 et arrive à Jaffa à Pâques 1101. Ces diverses forces pisanes participent au siège de Laodicée, à la prise d'Arsuf et de Césarée en avril et mai 1101, à celle de Gibelet en avril 1104, à celle d'Acre en mai 1104.¹⁴ Bref, les Pisans, venus après les Génois, s'illustrent néanmoins dans la conquête des villes côtières; ils ont dû obtenir, comme leurs rivaux, des assurances de dédommagement. Si plusieurs chroniques de la première croisade affirment que Baudouin I^{er} leur aurait promis à Jaffa le tiers du butin et des prisonniers en échange de leur participation aux sièges d'Arsuf et de Césarée,¹⁵ il faut attendre 1108 pour qu'un premier diplôme leur accorde des privilèges à Antioche et Laodicée, et les années 1125–1130 pour les mêmes avantages dans le royaume de Jérusalem.

Quant aux Vénitiens, ils apparaissent plus tardivement et plus sporadiquement dans les épisodes de la conquête franque, bien que des témoignages tardifs évoquent la participation de quelques Vénitiens au siège d'Antioche en 1097–1098.¹⁶ En juillet 1099 part une première expédition, conduite par l'évêque de Castello, Enrico Contarini, et le fils du doge, Giovanni Michiel: deux cents vaisseaux peut-être prennent la mer, pour répondre à l'appel pontifical, avec le soutien unanime des autorités communales.¹⁷ La flotte hiverne à Rhodes, après s'être débarrassée d'une cinquantaine de vaisseaux pisans qui voulaient également y jeter l'ancre; en juin 1100 elle arrive à Jaffa où Godefroy de Bouillon requiert son aide pour assiéger Acre, en échange de concessions territoriales et fiscales dans les villes qui seraient prises avec son aide. Les forces vénitiennes se détournent vers Haïfa, mais ne semblent pas jouer un grand rôle dans la prise de cette ville.¹⁸

¹⁴ C. Otten-Froux, *Les Pisans en Orient de la première Croisade à 1406*, thèse de 3^{ème} cycle, Université de Paris I (1981) t. 1, 19–38; voir également M. Tangheroni, "Pisa e il regno crociato di Gerusalemme," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, G. Airdi et B. Z. Kedar, eds. (Gênes 1986) 497–521; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 51–61.

¹⁵ *Gesta Francorum*, RHC Occ., t. 3, 527; Foucher de Chartres, ibidem 385, 387; *Historia Hierosolymitana*, ibidem 558.

¹⁶ D. E. Queller et I. B. Katele, "Venice and the conquest of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem," dans *Studi Veneziani*, t. 12 (1986) 17.

¹⁷ D. E. Queller et I. B. Katele, 19–20, et M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 62–79.

¹⁸ D. E. Queller et I. B. Katele, 23, 26.

Dix ans s'écoulaient sans que Venise intervienne dans les affaires de la Terre Sainte. Dans les derniers mois de l'année 1110, une centaine de navires placés sous le commandement du doge Falier coopère avec la flotte du roi Sigurd de Norvège à la prise de Sidon.¹⁹ Les Vénitiens reçoivent alors du roi Baudouin Ier une rue et un marché à Acre. Enfin, répondant à l'appel de Baudouin II, le doge Domenico Michiel exhorte son peuple à prendre la croix; en août 1122 une nouvelle flotte de 120 navires prend la mer. Après avoir pillé les îles grecques, les Vénitiens s'entendent avec le patriarche de Jérusalem Gormond, pour prendre Tyr d'assaut. Le traité négocié à cette occasion, connu sous le nom de *pactum Warmundi*, est la première concession d'une véritable exterritorialité dans le Levant.²⁰

L'engagement militaire et naval des trois républiques maritimes italiennes n'a donc pas eu la même ampleur. Bien qu'arrivés après la prise de Jérusalem, les Pisans se mêlent comme les Génois à tous les combats de Terre Sainte; les Vénitiens, en revanche, fournissent aux croisés une aide plus mesurée; on les rencontre devant Haïfa, Sydon et Tyr, mais peu dans les combats pour la conquête d'Antioche, de Jérusalem, d'Acre ou de Tripoli. Pourtant, les privilèges obtenus par chacune des trois républiques ne sont pas proportionnels à l'effort naval qu'elles ont consenti. Gênes et Pise, bien que plus tôt récompensées par les autorités franques, apparaissent moins bien pourvues que Venise qui a su obtenir des concessions plus larges et plus diversifiées. À quels facteurs attribuer ces succès?

Il est difficile d'y voir la marque d'une plus longue expérience de Venise en matière coloniale; certes les Vénitiens commercent à Constantinople depuis la fin du Xe siècle, et obtiennent en 1082 un premier comptoir dans la capitale byzantine. Mais le chrysobulle d'Alexis Comnène, si important pour l'exemption des impôts de transaction et des droits de douane, ne confère aux Vénitiens aucun privilège d'exterritorialité; ils sont considérés comme des fidèles sujets du *bastileus* et relèvent des juridictions impériales pour leurs différends.²¹ Si le gouvernement ducal

¹⁹ D. E. Queller et I. B. Katele, 28–29 et M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 130–133.

²⁰ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 84–89. Une meilleure édition est donnée par M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme dagli Svevi agli Angioini," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, 373–379. Voir aussi D. E. Queller et I. B. Katele, *Venice and the conquest*, 32–38 et M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 137–149.

²¹ F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen-Age* (Paris, 1959) 39.

remporte de grands succès diplomatiques auprès des princes francs et fait preuve d'une largeur de vues peu commune, il le doit surtout à sa forme même, qui assure au doge, assisté d'un conseil, une permanence dont ne peuvent en aucun cas se prévaloir les autres républiques maritimes italiennes à cette date. G. Pistarino a justement remarqué que les premiers privilèges accordés aux Génois le sont soit aux communautés génoises de soldats et de marchands établies dans les villes conquises, soit à l'Eglise de Gênes et à son évêque qui représente la ville dans les négociations internationales jusqu'au milieu du XIIe siècle, au moins. Ce n'est que tardivement que les consuls de Gênes apparaissent parmi les destinataires des chartes concédées à leurs concitoyens.²² La Commune, née de la *Compagna* de 1097, devient lentement un organisme public. Il est hors de doute que les rapports directs entre les princes francs et les communautés naissantes des Génois d'outre-mer ne sont pas favorables à l'extension des droits de Gênes. Même constituée en État, la Commune consulaire, sujette aux mutations fréquentes de ses élites dirigeantes, ne peut avoir la même volonté politique et la même continuité de vues que le gouvernement d'un doge, élu à vie. En ce qui concerne Pise, la même faiblesse structurelle a pu jouer, et aussi la rivalité de Daimbert avec Baudouin Ier. Ainsi pourrait s'expliquer le décalage important entre le privilège accordé par Tancred et le diplôme de Baudouin II concernant Tyr, à moins d'admettre que les Pisans aient obtenu, antérieurement à celui-ci, des concessions dans le royaume de Jérusalem, dont le texte n'a pas été conservé.²³

Les chartes délivrées aux trois républiques maritimes italiennes ne se répartissent pas indifféremment tout au long du XIIe siècle. Des temps forts succèdent à une longue inertie diplomatique.

Les premiers textes sont liés directement à la conquête franque; ils sont issus de la chancellerie des premiers souverains de Jérusalem et des premiers princes d'Antioche et de Tripoli; ils vont des premiers temps de l'occupation occidentale — conquête d'Antioche — aux dernières années du règne de Baudouin II. La majorité des diplômes se regroupe entre 1098 et 1130; on y rencontre les chartes accordées aux Génois dans les trois États, et particulièrement le grand texte de 1104, dont l'authenticité a été remise en question à l'aide d'arguments peu convaincants,

²² G. Pistarino, *Genova e il Vicino Oriente*, 76–82.

²³ Le problème est esquissé par C. Otten-Froux, *Les Pisans*, t. 1, 37–38.

si on replace celui-ci dans le contexte général de la conquête franque.²⁴ On y trouve aussi les premières concessions faites aux Vénitiens, dont l'existence ne nous est connue que par les références qu'y font les chartes postérieures, et surtout le célèbre *pactum Warmundi*, confirmé par Baudouin II en 1125 et qui sert d'assise aux droits de la Sérénissime dans l'ensemble du royaume. Les Pisans sont les plus mal servis au cours de cette première période: ils n'obtiennent qu'une charte de Tancrede en 1108 et une autre de Baudouin II, à une date incertaine, mais proche de 1130.

Ce premier groupe de privilèges est aisément explicable par les conditions de la conquête. Les premiers rois de Jérusalem réduits à leurs seules forces sont impuissants; le concours des flottes italiennes leur est indispensable pour s'emparer des places côtières. Faut-il rappeler qu'en 1100 Godefroy de Bouillon cherche à s'emparer d'Arsuf avec la seule armée du royaume; il échoue. L'année suivante, Baudouin Ier conquiert la ville avec l'aide des Génois. En 1103 ce dernier met le siège devant Acre; il échoue. L'année suivante, il s'empare de la ville avec l'aide de la flotte génoise, dont la coopération est encore requise en 1109–1110 contre Beyrouth, Sidon, Ascalon et Tripoli.²⁵

Le lien entre la guerre et les concessions faites aux Italiens doit être fortement souligné. Les princes francs, si les textes avaient été appliqués à la lettre, se seraient ainsi dépouillés de la plupart des villes côtières en faveur de leurs alliés. Et les républiques maritimes italiennes auraient été bien incapables de tenir avec une poignée de ressortissants les quartiers urbains ou même les villes entières qu'on leur avait imprudemment accordées.²⁶

La phase de stabilisation qui s'ouvre dans les dernières années du règne de Baudouin II et les premières de Foulque d'Anjou, son successeur, sont beaucoup moins favorables aux républiques maritimes italiennes. Souverains et princes francs cherchent à reprendre en temps de paix ce qu'ils avaient concédé au moment

²⁴ H. E. Mayer et M. L. Favreau, "Das Diplom Balduins I für Genua und Genuas Goldene Inschrift in der Grabeskirche," dans *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, t. 55/56 (1976) 22–95. Contre l'hypercriticisme de ces deux auteurs voir B. Z. Kedar, "Genoa's Golden Inscription in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre: a case for the defence," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, 317–335 et particulièrement 326–327.

²⁵ B. Z. Kedar, "Genoa's," 326–327 et M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 116–127.

²⁶ J. Prawer, *The Italians in the Latin Kingdom*, 218–219; J. Prawer, *Colonialismo medievale*, (Rome, 1982) 114–115.

des combats. De fait, de 1103 à 1153 environ, les chartes en faveur des communes se font rares: aucune dans le royaume de Jérusalem, aucune dans le comté de Tripoli. Deux privilèges seulement émanent de Raymond de Poitiers, l'un en faveur de Venise, l'autre au profit de Gênes.²⁷ Ils ne font que confirmer des chartes antérieures, à un moment où la principauté d'Antioche, menacée par la reconquête byzantine éprouve la nécessité de resserrer ses liens avec les communes italiennes. Après 1150 les chartes de concessions se trouvent groupées en deux brèves périodes, 1153–1157 et 1167–1169, séparées par de longues années d'inertie diplomatique. La première correspond aux attaques de Nûr al-Din contre Antioche, mal défendue par la veuve de Raymond de Poitiers, Constance, avant que n'entre en scène Renaud de Châtillon. La seconde phase de concessions est liée aux campagnes d'Égypte du roi Amaury, auquel le concours des Occidentaux est indispensable; il cherche à se l'assurer par des confirmations et des élargissements des chartes antérieures.

En dehors de ces périodes de générosité intéressée, les souverains cherchent plutôt à restaurer l'intégralité de leur pouvoir, diminué par les exemptions et prérogatives dont jouissent les Italiens. Deux incidents le montrent. Le premier a trait à l'inscription en lettres d'or que les Génois ont fait placer dans le chœur du Saint Sépulcre en 1105, pour rappeler aux générations futures la teneur des concessions que Baudouin Ier venait de leur accorder.²⁸

La réalité de l'épithaphe, mise en doute par l'hypercritique d'Hans Mayer et de Marie-Luise Favreau, nous semble être démontrée par les arguments de B.Z. Kedar.²⁹ Dès 1155, Gênes vient se plaindre auprès du Saint-Siège des tentatives faites par Baudouin III pour réduire ses privilèges. Pendant le règne d'Amaury, l'inscription est déposée par les chanoines du Saint-Sépulcre, sans doute sur ordre du roi. Gênes fait alors intervenir la papauté: Adrien IV en 1155, puis Alexandre III en 1167 et 1179, Urbain III enfin en 1186 prennent la défense des Génois qui, pour soutenir leurs droits, demandent à leur vieil annaliste Caffaro de se remettre à l'ouvrage. Une première rédaction du *Liber de liberatione civitatum Orientis* majore la participation génoise aux entreprises de la conquête, pour justifier l'obtention des privilèges remis en question. Les interventions pontificales sont

²⁷ M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 157–160.

²⁸ L. T. Belgrano, *Annali genovesi*, t. 1, 121 et 129.

²⁹ B. Z. Kedar, "Genoa's".

infructueuses; il faut attendre 1192 pour que Conrad de Montferrat, soutenu par les Génois dans ses prétentions au trône royal, confirme les privilèges de ses alliés et les autorise à restaurer l'inscription du Saint-Sépulcre.³⁰

Les Pisans subissent le même type de mésaventure. Bien qu'ils aient aidé Amaury dans ses campagnes d'Égypte, le souverain cherche à restreindre leurs privilèges à leurs concitoyens venus temporairement dans le royaume de Jérusalem pour leurs affaires. La distinction entre Pisans résidents et non-résidents n'a d'autre objectif que de limiter à ces derniers les droits d'exterritorialité et de soumettre tous les autres à la loi commune du royaume.³¹ C'est ce que cherche aussi Henri de Champagne; à la suite de démêlés avec les Pisans, il reprend la même distinction dans un diplôme de mai 1192 et limite à trente le nombre de Pisans autorisés à résider à Tyr de manière permanente.³² Vers la même époque, des actes de piraterie servent de prétexte pour restreindre les droits des Pisans dans le comté de Tripoli; ceux-ci doivent payer 12.000 besants de dédommagement en août 1199 pour retrouver leurs maisons, leur *curia* et leurs libertés.³³ Seule Venise semble avoir échappé à ces soustractions de droits. Mais le gouvernement ducal n'en prend pas moins soin de faire confirmer par le Saint-Siège les privilèges dont jouissent ses ressortissants en Terre Sainte; tour à tour Alexandre III en 1165, puis Innocent III en 1200 prennent la défense des intérêts de la Sérénissime.³⁴

Relevant leur sceptre en période de paix, les souverains et les princes francs sont contraints de recourir aux services des Italiens, dès que leur territoire est menacé. Ils ne peuvent plus alors abolir leurs privilèges, mais se voient au contraire obligés de les confirmer, voire même de les élargir. C'est le cas à partir de 1186 quand le royaume est à la merci des forces de Saladin et ne doit sa survie qu'à la résistance de Conrad de Montferrat et des troupes occidentales amenées par les flottes italiennes. De 1186 à 1195,

³⁰ B. Z. Kedar, "Genoa's," 332–333 et M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 169–177.

³¹ G. Müller, *Documenti*, doc n° 11, 14; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 187–205.

³² G. Müller, *Documenti*, doc n° 37, 60; R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 191; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 301.

³³ G. Müller, *Documenti*, n° 49, 79–80; Cf. M. L. Favreau, "Die Italienische Levante-Piraterie und die Sicherheit der Seewege nach Syrien im 12 und 13 Jahrhundert," dans *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, t. 65, heft 4 (1978) 494–495.

³⁴ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 145–146 et 281–286.

les diplômes se succèdent, plus en faveur des Génois et des Pisans que des Vénitiens. Ils promettent de grands avantages dans les villes à reconquérir, Ascalon, Jérusalem, Jaffa et surtout Acre; après la reddition d'Acre en juillet 1191, les communes italiennes savent jouer des rivalités entre Guy de Lusignan et Conrad de Montferrat pour accroître leurs droits dans le nouveau royaume et les renforcer à Antioche et à Tripoli.

À la fin du XII^e siècle, le bilan est clair. Le pouvoir royal a sombré devant les exigences des communes. Celles-ci, confortées dans leurs privilèges, ont tendance à devenir un État dans l'État. Mieux même, non contents de leurs exemptions et de leurs droits d'exterritorialité, leurs membres s'ingénient à acquérir des fiefs et des seigneuries à la faveur d'heureuses transactions ou successions, et à revendiquer sur ces terres les mêmes exemptions qu'à l'intérieur des quartiers urbains accordés aux communes. En vain, princes et souverains cherchent-ils à les contraindre de choisir entre les privilèges dérivant de leur nationalité ou le paiement des taxes royales sur leurs nouvelles propriétés. Un choix qu'au cours du XIII^e siècle la couronne de Jérusalem affaiblie ne réussit pas réellement à imposer. Les graves différends entre le pouvoir royal et les communes italiennes et entre celles-ci elles-mêmes sont en germe à la fin du XII^e siècle. Pour sauver leurs villes de la reconquête sarrasine, princes et rois les ont presque aliénées d'avance aux républiques maritimes italiennes. La guerre a rompu l'équilibre qu'ils s'étaient efforcé de restaurer dans les années 1150.

Les divers États Francs ne lâchent pas également pied devant les communes italiennes. Il importe donc de voir maintenant où celles-ci détenaient les privilèges les plus importants. Éliminons d'abord le comté d'Edesse; aucune charte en faveur des communes n'en émane. Sans débouché sur la mer, peuplé d'un nombre infime d'Occidentaux, détenu par les Latins pendant moins de cinquante ans, le comté n'intéresse pas les hommes d'affaires italiens.³⁵ Ceux-ci, pour remplir leur rôle d'intermédiaires entre la Terre Sainte et l'Occident, ont besoin de bases maritimes sûres où faire relâcher leurs navires. Pour les mêmes raisons les villes de l'intérieur des États Francs n'attirent guère les Italiens, si l'on excepte les pèlerins venant visiter les Lieux Saints. Malgré tous les efforts déployés par les premiers souverains du royaume pour peupler Jérusalem d'Occidentaux, bien peu d'Italiens ont répondu à leur appel. Le cartulaire du chapitre

³⁵ M. Amouroux-Mourad, *Le comté d'Edesse 1098–1150* (Paris 1988) 135.

du Saint-Sépulcre ne cite qu'un seul Vénitien, Lucas Veneticus, bourgeois de la Mahomerie en 1156. A côté de lui, deux Padans, Godefridus et Bernardus Lombardus et peut-être trois autres Italiens, Giraldus, Wilielmus et Theobaldus Ruffus; en tout cas un seul ressortissant certain des républiques maritimes, aucun Pisan, aucun Génois.³⁶ Il en est vraisemblablement de même dans les petits centres de l'intérieur, tels Tibériade ou Naplouse, dont les marchés limités à quelques productions agricoles n'intéressent en rien les marchands.

Est-ce à dire qu'on les rencontre dans toutes les villes de la côte? La question revient à celle, plus complexe, de la réalité des avantages consentis aux communes italiennes. Les concessions ne donnent pas en effet la certitude d'une totale et pleine utilisation des droits acquis. Il ne suffit pas que Baudouin Ier ait autorisé les Génois à s'établir à Jaffa, Arsuf ou Césarée ou que son successeur ait accordé aux Vénitiens des privilèges à Sidon pour que ces petits centres voient se développer une colonie italienne. Les infrastructures portuaires y sont trop sommaires, les réseaux de relations trop étriqués, pour qu'ils s'éveillent à une vie économique intense. Les hommes d'affaires italiens ont besoin de hâvres sûrs pour leurs vaisseaux, de logements et d'entrepôts au sein d'une collectivité active, de liaisons faciles avec l'arrière-pays caravanier. Seuls les ports de quelque importance offrent ces avantages: Acre et Tyr dans le royaume de Jérusalem, Tripoli et Laodicée plus au nord, auxquels s'adjoint Antioche, capitale de principauté, reliée par l'Oronte à Port Saint-Syméon.³⁷ Ce sont là au XII^e siècle les principaux établissements occupés par les Italiens, en même temps que deux seigneuries, Gibelet aux mains de la famille génoise des Embriaci et Botron, possession du Pisan Plebanus.

Mais, de la principauté d'Antioche au royaume de Jérusalem, les intérêts des diverses communes ne sont pas identiques. Antioche est la première colonisée par les Italiens; les Génois s'y installent dès 1098, suivis par les Vénitiens et dix ans plus tard par les Pisans.³⁸ Dans le comté de Tripoli, les Vénitiens cités en 1100 sont les premiers privilégiés, mais ne s'y maintiennent pas. Les Génois qui transportent en 1108–1109 l'armée de Bertrand

³⁶ G. Bresc-Bautier, *Le cartulaire du chapitre*, 238–240.

³⁷ J. Prawer, *Colonialismo medievale*, 115; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 497–528.

³⁸ C. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris 1940) 490–500; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 486–493.

de Saint Gilles se voient accorder Gibelet en toute propriété et le tiers de Tripoli. Ils concèdent la première aux Embriaci, illustre famille de Gênes, et perdent leur part dans la seconde. Les Pisans doivent attendre le règne de Raymond III pour obtenir un quartier à Tripoli où leur brouille avec Bohémond IV leur fait perdre temporairement leurs avantages.³⁹

Reste le royaume de Jérusalem, où les positions des trois républiques sont plus mélangées. Les Vénitiens défendent tout au long du XII^e siècle leurs droits sur le tiers de la ville de Tyr, que Baudouin II leur a accordé en 1125. A Acre, leurs possessions remonteraient à l'année 1110, si l'on en croit un passage du diplôme de Baudouin II précédemment cité: les deux tiers d'une *ruga*, ou quartier, constituent le noyau primitif de leur établissement agrandi par le *pactum Warmundi* de 1123. Les limites du XII^e siècle ne coïncident pas nécessairement avec celles de l'inventaire dressé par Marsilio Zorzi en 1244. Les Génois ne semblent pas avoir occupé toutes les places que leur concède Baudouin I^{er} en 1104: Arsuf, Césarée, Jaffa et Acre. Seul ce dernier port les intéresse; mais leur établissement se développe à l'écart du rivage dont le sépare le quartier de la Chaîne. Pas moins de huit diplômes ont trait à leur colonie d'Acre, au cours du XII^e siècle; Guy de Lusignan, Conrad de Montferrat et Henri de Champagne leur en confirment tour à tour la possession entre 1186 et 1195. Quant aux Pisans, leurs intérêts se concentrent d'abord à Tyr, où Baudouin II leur accorde cinq maisons en 1130. Ils n'apparaissent à Acre qu'en 1168, lorsqu'ils obtiennent du roi Amaury un petit quartier dans le sud de la ville, proche de celui des Templiers. En 1187, puis en 1189, Conrad de Montferrat et Guy de Lusignan élargissent cette concession pour le cas où la ville serait recouvrée par les Chrétiens.⁴⁰ Une fois reconquise, des chartes délivrées par Richard Cœur-de-Lion et Henri de Champagne viennent confirmer les droits acquis par les Pisans. Bref, dans le royaume de Jérusalem, seules Tyr et Acre comptent vraiment pour les communes italiennes. En revanche, Jaffa, Arsuf, Sidon et Césarée, citées dans les diplômes des premiers temps de la conquête, disparaissent des textes postérieurs, sauf toutefois dans ceux qui sont accordés aux Génois en 1186 et 1192; ce peut être, il est vrai, par l'effet de la répétition mécanique des clauses inscrites dans la charte de Baudouin I^{er} de 1104.

³⁹ J. Richard, *Le comté de Tripoli sous la dynastie toulousaine* (Paris 1945) 884–85; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 483–486.

⁴⁰ Sur ces problèmes, cf. D. Jacoby, "Crusader Acre in the thirteenth century: urban layout and topography," dans *Studi medievali*, 3^e s., t. XX/1 (1979) 19–30.

Antériorité des Génois, ampleur des privilèges acquis par les Vénitiens, affirmation tardive des droits des Pisans, autant de situations diverses qui tiennent à la politique méditerranéenne de chacune des Communes. La Terre Sainte ne représente en effet pour elles qu'un domaine d'expansion possible, à côté de l'empire byzantin et de l'Égypte. Selon leurs intérêts propres dans ces deux domaines, chaque république maritime mesure son aide aux États Francs et en recevra donc des avantages différents. Il faut maintenant en voir la nature précise, afin de pouvoir déterminer l'influence des colonies italiennes dans les États nés de la première Croisade.

L'étude comparative des privilèges se heurte à une difficulté qui tient à la rédaction des chartes. En effet dans la première moitié du XII^e siècle, les concessions accordées aux Italiens sont formulées de manière très générale; on n'y trouvera aucune description précise des maisons ou des quartiers qui leur sont affectés. L'exemption des droits commerciaux se résume à la licence qui leur est donnée d'entrer et de sortir librement du territoire concerné. Ce n'est qu'à la fin du XII^e siècle que les chartes deviennent plus précises: face aux empiètements répétés des hommes des communes, les pouvoirs locaux cherchent à mieux délimiter leurs droits et à restreindre l'abandon partiel de leur souveraineté sur des quartiers autonomes. Il faut donc étudier précisément le vocabulaire utilisé dans ces concessions pour voir ce que celles-ci recouvrent.

Marchands avant tout, les ressortissants des républiques maritimes cherchent essentiellement à obtenir des avantages qui puissent faciliter la bonne marche de leurs affaires. Une première catégorie de droits porte ainsi sur l'exemption des taxes sur les transactions et des droits de douane, regroupés sous le terme de *comerchium*, par lequel on désignait cet ensemble de taxes commerciales dans le monde byzantin.⁴¹ A cet égard, le traitement dont font l'objet les trois communes n'est pas exactement identique. Gênes attache la plus grande importance à ce type d'exemption qui est toujours cité dans les diplômes qu'elle obtient dans les États Francs au cours du XII^e siècle: avec trente-cinq mentions il vient largement en tête de toutes les revendications et de toutes les concessions et figure souvent en première place dans le texte des chartes. Les Vénitiens s'en préoccupent tout autant, mais n'obtiennent pas partout, comme leurs rivaux, une exemption totale. Dans le royaume de Jérusalem, le *pactum War-*

⁴¹ H. Antoniadis Bibicou, *Recherches sur les douanes à Byzance* (Paris 1963) 107–108.

mundi (1123) et la charte de Baudouin II de 1125 exceptent du bénéfice de l'exemption les navires vénitiens chargés de pèlerins.⁴² Dans la principauté d'Antioche les sujets de la 'Sérénissime' continuent à payer des droits jusqu'à la fin du XIIe siècle au taux de 4 à 5% en 1153, réduit de moitié en 1167, et fixé finalement à 1% en 1183.⁴³ Quant aux Pisans, après avoir joui dans cette même principauté d'une exemption totale du *comerchium* en 1108, ils sont astreints en 1154 à payer la moitié des droits: recul significatif qui marque le souci de Renaud de Châtillon et de son épouse Constance de retrouver quelques sources de revenus. En revanche, dans le comté de Tripoli et dans le royaume de Jérusalem, l'exemption est totale, mais elle n'intervient qu'au moment de la IIIe croisade. Les rois et les princes des États Francs ont moins de réticence à abandonner leurs droits sur les épaves et sur les biens des marchands morts intestats. Les trois communes bénéficient de cet abandon ainsi que de promesses répétées d'une sécurité garantie pour leurs marchands.

Ceux-ci sont intéressés par un autre avantage: pouvoir utiliser leurs propres poids et mesures et non ceux des pouvoirs locaux qui perçoivent une taxe pour cet usage. Les Vénitiens sont ici précurseurs. Dès 1123, ce droit leur est acquis dans le royaume de Jérusalem et à Acre en particulier, sauf lorsqu'ils achètent des marchandises à des tiers: ils doivent alors utiliser les poids et mesures des officiers royaux. Ce privilège est accordé plus tardivement aux Génois et aux Pisans: aux premiers en 1190 à Tyr, aux seconds en 1187 dans cette même ville.⁴⁴

Cet abandon de revenus, consenti par les pouvoirs locaux, peut être complété par des concessions financières. En 1123 le patriarche Gormond et les barons du royaume, en l'absence de Baudouin II, promettent au doge de Venise un revenu annuel de 300 besants sarracénats, provenant de la fonde de Tyr. Les Vénitiens défendent au cours du XIIe siècle ce droit dont l'assise passe de Tyr aux revenus de la chaîne d'Acre; en 1164 le doge Vitale Michiel en fait donation à la basilique Saint-Marc, mais en 1175 son successeur Sebastiano Ziani le reprend au bénéfice de la commune⁴⁵. Plus tôt encore, les Génois ont obtenu cette

⁴² M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," dans *I Comuni italiani*, 375 et 381; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 462–468.

⁴³ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 133, 148 et 176; cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 489–493.

⁴⁴ M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 375 et 381; C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 2, 370; R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 177.

⁴⁵ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 141 et 168; M. Pozza, "Venezia

sorte de cens récongnitif des éminents services rendus à la Terre Sainte. Dès 1101, Tancrede, régent de la principauté d'Antioche, leur accorde le tiers des revenus du port Saint-Symeon (Solino). Trois ans plus tard, Baudouin I^{er} leur fait don de trois cents besants et du tiers des revenus du port d'Acre.⁴⁶ La première concession est plusieurs fois renouvelée, la seconde n'a peut-être jamais reçu pleine exécution, bien que sous les contraintes de la guerre, Conrad de Montferrat ait à nouveau consenti à abandonner aux Génois le tiers des revenus de la chaîne d'Acre en 1192, et ce même tiers de la chaîne de Tyr en 1190.⁴⁷ A la même époque, il élève à 2.000 besants par an la somme attribuée aux Pisans sur les revenus de la fonde et de la chaîne d'Acre.⁴⁸ Les rois de Jérusalem, pressés par la nécessité, abandonnent ainsi aux communes une part, pas toujours symbolique, de leurs revenus.

Les concessions foncières représentent une étape de plus dans l'abandon de souveraineté. Elles prennent au cours du XII^e siècle de plus en plus d'importance, au point que l'on a pu mettre en doute la réalité de leur attribution aux communes italiennes. La première en date est du 14 juillet 1098, lorsque Bohémond concède aux Génois trente maisons à Antioche, donation confirmée par Tancrede en 1101.⁴⁹ Les autres communes suivent la même voie: Ponce de Tripoli accorde une maison aux Vénitiens près du port en 1117; les Pisans en reçoivent cinq à Tyr vers 1130.⁵⁰

Mais, dans le même temps, des quartiers entiers passent aux mains des communes: une *ruga*, mot qui désigne plus un îlot urbain qu'une simple rue,⁵¹ parfois même le tiers de la place à conquérir et exceptionnellement la totalité d'une ville. Les Génois réussissent à obtenir un quartier à Antioche et à Laodicée en 1101, à Acre et à Jaffa en 1104, le tiers de Tripoli en 1109 et tout Gibelet à la même date, ville qu'ils remettent en fief à la famille Embriaci.⁵² Les Vénitiens se voient accorder la moitié de Tripoli en 1100, le tiers de Tyr et d'Ascalon en 1123, mais ces

e il regno di Gerusalemme," 376; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 464.

⁴⁶ C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 1, 18 et 21.

⁴⁷ C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 2, 371 et t. 3, 49.

⁴⁸ R. Röhricht, *Regesta*, 180; cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 471-475.

⁴⁹ C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 1, 11 et 16.

⁵⁰ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 76-77; G. Müller, *Documenti*, 377; R. Röhricht, *Regesta*, 82 note 1; cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 421-424.

⁵¹ D. Jacoby, *Crusader Acre*, 15.

⁵² C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 1, 31-32, 296-297.

places sont encore à prendre.⁵³ Quant aux Pisans, ils doivent se contenter de quartiers à Laodicée et Antioche en 1108, à Acre en 1168, à Tripoli en 1179.⁵⁴ Comme l'a remarqué Joshua Prawer, de tels privilèges, s'ils avaient été exécutés à la lettre, n'auraient laissé aucune cité du royaume au pouvoir du roi et de ses vassaux.⁵⁵ Mais, dans des conditions difficiles à saisir, faute de documents, les souverains réussissent à limiter dans les faits la portée des concessions territoriales, qui correspondent d'ailleurs assez mal aux besoins des communes italiennes. Arsuf, dont les Génois s'étaient assuré le tiers, devient une seigneurie autonome, sous l'autorité d'un certain *Iohannes*; de même, les Génois perdent le tiers de Césarée, accordé par Baudouin Ier en 1101, au profit d'Eustache Garnier qui en fait le siège d'une seigneurie autonome.⁵⁶ Les seuls quartiers réellement utilisés par les marchands italiens demeurent ceux des grands ports, Acre, Tyr, Tripoli et Laodicée et de la capitale de la principauté du nord, Antioche.

Dans ces quartiers, les ressortissants des républiques maritimes cherchent à obtenir tout ce qui est indispensable à leur vie quotidienne: une église, des entrepôts ou fondouks, une place, un four, un moulin, un abattoir, des bains. Dès 1098, les Génois disposent à Antioche d'une église Saint-Jean, en 1101 d'une autre à Laodicée. Il leur faut attendre 1190 pour recevoir le droit d'édifier une chapelle à Tyr, placée sous l'obédience de l'église de Gênes, et la promesse d'obtenir un édifice du culte dans toutes les villes du royaume de Jérusalem à conquérir.⁵⁷ Le *pactum Warmundi* autorise les Vénitiens à disposer d'une église dans toutes les villes du royaume de Jérusalem; à Tyr et à Acre, elles passent sous le patronage de saint Marc.⁵⁸ Quant aux Pisans, on leur reconnaît tardivement la possession d'un lieu de culte, à Jaffa en 1157 et à Acre en 1168.⁵⁹ Ces divers édifices, placés sous l'autorité de l'église métropolitaine, prennent naturellement la titulature de celle-ci.

⁵³ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 76–77; M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 376; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 385.

⁵⁴ R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 117, 155; G. Müller, *Documenti*, 3 et 377.

⁵⁵ J. Prawer, *The Italians in the Latin Kingdom*, 219.

⁵⁶ M. Benvenisti, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem 1970) 132 et 137.

⁵⁷ C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 1, 11–12 et 18; t. 2, 366 et 372; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 268–272.

⁵⁸ M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 375; G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 140 et 145.

⁵⁹ R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 83 et 117. Sur les églises italiennes en Terre Sainte, voir l'exposé détaillé de M. L. Favreau-Lilie, "Die Italienischen Kirchen im Heiligen Land (1098–1291)," dans *Studi Veneziani*, t. 13 (1987) 15–101.

Les espaces nécessaires à l'activité commerciale—entrepôts pour les marchandises, logements pour les marchands de passage, demeures des gardiens—forment un fondouk. La première mention remonte à 1098, dans la charte de Bohémond en faveur des Génois; un autre s'ajoute à leur profit à Laodicée en 1101. Le mot *fundacus* n'est pas cité dans le diplôme de Baudouin Ier de 1104, ni dans le *pactum Warmundi* de 1123, mais il est vraisemblable que chacun des quartiers concédés aux Génois et aux Vénitiens, dans Acre, Jaffa, Arsuf, Césarée, Tyr et Sidon, devait disposer de quelque infrastructure commerciale; les expressions *intera ruga* et *vicus Venetorum* le sous-entendent.⁶⁰ A Antioche en 1143, les Vénitiens obtiennent un fondouk, dont la possession leur est de nouveau confirmée en 1153, 1167 et 1183.⁶¹ Les Pisans doivent attendre 1187 pour qu'un fondouk leur soit reconnu à Tyr.⁶² Les édifices nécessaires à l'existence quotidienne d'une communauté solidement établie ne sont mentionnés que dans les chartes de la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle pour les Génois et les Pisans. En revanche, dès 1123, le *pactum Warmundi* se préoccupe des fours, des bains et des moulins à Acre et dans les autres villes du royaume de Jérusalem.⁶³ Il semble bien à cet égard que plus tôt que leurs concurrents occidentaux les Vénitiens aient conçu leurs nouveaux établissements en terme de colonie permanente, devant disposer de tous les édifices nécessaires à la vie sociale et économique d'une communauté établie à demeure et qui cherche à échapper à toute dépendance extérieure.

Cela implique la possession non seulement de maisons urbaines, mais aussi de jardins, de terres, de villages hors des enceintes fortifiées, qui puissent assurer aux colons les ressources vivrières indispensables. C'est le cas dès le XIIe siècle, et nous sommes ici, malgré la minceur des sources, au coeur du thème général de notre colloque. Que disent les chartes à ce propos ? en vérité peu de choses. Dès 1123, le *pactum Warmundi* accorde aux Vénitiens non seulement le tiers de la ville de Tyr à conquérir, mais aussi le tiers des dépendances extérieures, terres et casaux

⁶⁰ M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 375–376.

⁶¹ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 102, 134, 149, 176; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 421–422.

⁶² R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 177; G. Müller, *Documenti*, 26–28; cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 240–244.

⁶³ M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 375. Au début du XIIIe siècle, Jacques de Vitry raille d'ailleurs les Italiens qui se complaisent, hommes et femmes réunis, aux plaisirs alanguissants des bains: J. Praver, "The Italians in the Latin Kingdom," dans *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980) 220.

rattachés à la ville: au total 21 villages en pleine propriété et le tiers de 51 autres. En 1140, les Vénitiens disposent de jardins à Antioche; en 1165 de terres et de champs à Tyr, qui sont concédés pour cinq ans par le doge Sebastiano Ziani à l'église Saint-Marc en 1175. Un privilège d'Alexandre III en 1165 mentionne les biens fonciers appartenant aux Vénitiens, de Jérusalem, Tripoli, Antioche et Haïfa. La donation de Sebastiano Ziani réserve à la Commune un jardin et deux casaux à Tyr, ce qui sous-entend qu'elle en possédait d'autres, remis au pouvoir de l'église Saint-Marc.⁶⁴ Du côté génois il en est de même; la concession de Baudouin Ier en 1104 comprend le tiers des dépendances urbaines, à Acre, Arsuf et Césarée, des jardins à Acre, des casaux à Arsuf et Césarée. La donation de Gibelet inclut des terres extérieures à la ville. A Tyr, un casal au moins, portant le nom de San Giorgio, est possession génoise. La découverte récente de trois bornes portant le nom IANVA, dans un kibboutz au nord-est d'Acre, confirme que les Génois y détenaient une vaste propriété d'un kilomètre et demi de côté, au nord des terres appartenant au Temple et aux Hospitaliers.⁶⁵ Les biens ruraux les mieux connus sont ceux des Pisans qui reçoivent cinq charruées à Tyr en 1157, des jardins à Jaffa et à Acre en 1187, et surtout des casaux précisément nommés: Talobia, Rasalma, Sydium et Ainebeddelle près de Tyr en 1187, le village du patriarche près de Jaffa à la même date, Cabor et San Giorgio près d'Acre en 1187 et 1188.⁶⁶ Il y a là tout un ensemble de possessions foncières, destinées sans nul doute à pourvoir au ravitaillement des communautés italiennes.

Il va de soi que ce ne sont pas les colons qui les cultivent eux-mêmes. S'ils reçoivent des tenures ou des fiefs des autorités métropolitaines comme dans le cas des Pantaleone, Jourdain et Contarini à Tyr, ils les accensent à des bourgeois, sous forme de tenures en bourgeoisie, ou à des indigènes. Malheureusement nous ignorons les noms de ces dépendants, autant que les sommes ou les parts de récoltes versées chaque année. Les inventaires des

⁶⁴ G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 102, 146, 168; M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 375; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 424-435.

⁶⁵ C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 1, 21; t. 2, 370; R. Frankel, "I cippi confinari genovesi del Kibbutz Shomrat," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato*, 691-695 et carte et photos vis-à-vis de la page 337.

⁶⁶ R. Röhricht, *Regesta*, 177, 178 et 180; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 426-427. Sur la charruée (*carruca*) cf. J. Prawer, "Palestinian Agriculture and the Crusader Rural System," dans *Crusader Institutions*, 187-195.

possessions des Génois à Tyr et à Acre rédigés en 1250 donnent la position exacte des biens de la commune, leurs confins, mais passent sous silence le loyer de la terre et les cens, qui, dit le scribe, ont fait l'objet d'un inventaire alphabétique qui ne nous est pas parvenu.⁶⁷ Il faut s'en tenir à la description classique d'Ibn Djobaïr, étonné de voir Chrétiens et Musulmans vivre en bonne intelligence sur les terres qu'ils exploitent à proximité de Tyr:⁶⁸ tolérance, non généralisable, remarque J. Prawer, mais aisément explicable, dans la mesure où le noble franc, le bourgeois de Terre Sainte ou le colon italien, dépendent pour leur subsistance de la bonne volonté des paysans musulmans.⁶⁹ Les communes italiennes ne partagent toutefois pas les mêmes contraintes que les autres croisés, puisque pour elles la terre est une source de revenus secondaire, alors qu'elle est primordiale pour les Francs établis en Terre Sainte.

De tous ces biens, urbains ou ruraux, arrachés au pouvoir défaillant des souverains et des princes, les ressortissants des communes souhaitent avoir la libre gestion, régler par eux-mêmes les différends qui peuvent surgir, bref ne dépendre en rien des pouvoirs locaux. Ce pas est franchi lorsque les communes bénéficient de privilèges d'exterritorialité. Ici encore, les Vénitiens précèdent leurs rivaux: leur *curia* existe à Antioche en 1140, à Tyr dès la conquête de la ville, puisque le *pactum Warmundi* en reconnaît à l'avance l'existence, et peut-être à Acre dans les années 1130. Une *curia* des Pisans est signalée à Antioche et Laodicée en 1154, à Tyr deux ans plus tard, à Acre en 1168, à Tripoli en 1187. Les Génois imitent tardivement cet exemple, puisque la première mention d'une *curia* n'est pas antérieure à 1187.⁷⁰

Le retard "institutionnel" de Gênes vient sans doute des concessions faites aux Embriaci qui en 1147, pour les possessions génoises de la principauté d'Antioche, et en 1154, pour le reste des colonies génoises de Terre Sainte, en obtiennent la gestion

⁶⁷ C. Desimoni, "Quatre titres des propriétés des Génois à Acre et à Tyr," dans *Archives de l'Orient latin*, t. 1 (1884) 223–224.

⁶⁸ Ibn Djobaïr, *Voyages*, M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, éd., *Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades*, Paris, 4 vols., 1949–65, t. 3, 352–354.

⁶⁹ J. Prawer, "Colonization activities in the Latin Kingdom," dans *Crusader Institutions*, 117.

⁷⁰ M. Pozza, "Venezia e il regno di Gerusalemme," 374–377; G. L. F. Tafel et G. M. Thomas, *Urkunden*, t. 1, 102, 133–135; R. Röhrich, *Regesta*, 74–82, 117, 176; C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 2, 318–319; t. 1. 218–219,

moyennant le versement d'un cens annuel.⁷¹ Dans ces conditions, il est inutile de créer une administration publique dirigée par des *vicecomites* ou *consules*, fonctions qu'établissent en revanche plus tôt Pise et surtout Venise pour la défense de leurs droits et de leurs ressortissants. La tâche principale de ces représentants, choisis à l'origine par les colons résidents, puis envoyés par la métropole, est en effet de rendre la justice selon les lois propres des communes, sauf les cas d'homicide, de vol ou de rapine, que les rois de Jérusalem réussissent à réserver à la compétence de leur cour. Naturellement la propension des colons à acquérir des biens hors des quartiers des communes fait naître des conflits inextricables de juridiction qui aggravent les rapports difficiles entre les communes et les pouvoirs locaux. Les tentatives faites par les souverains de Jérusalem pour distinguer parmi les Italiens les résidents, considérés comme "bourgeois du roi", et les marchands de passage, jouissant des privilèges accordés aux communes, tournent rapidement court devant les résistances de celles-ci.⁷²

En effet, elles sont devenues de véritables puissances au sein des États Francs. Les colonies qui étaient au début du XII^e siècle réduites à une poignée de résidents permanents, renforcés pendant les mois d'hiver par les marchands du *passagium* annuel, se sont développées avec le temps. Des familles entières ont pris racine: rameaux des clans familiaux de la métropole, facteurs des grandes sociétés actives dans le commerce du Levant, marins ou artisans en quête d'aventure ou de fortune. Joshua Prawer a mis en évidence les représentants de l'aristocratie vénitienne établis en Terre Sainte: Rolando Contarini, Domenico Acontano, Jacopo Dandolo, les familles Dulce et Falieri, bénéficiaires des inféodations effectuées par la commune, officiers vénitiens se fixant en Orient, après leur sortie de charge.⁷³ Le cas paraît moins fréquent dans le domaine génois, à l'exception des Embriaci, famille d'origine vicomtale, qui fait souche en Orient. Guglielmo II, petit-fils du concessionnaire de Gibelet, est à l'origine de trois branches des Embriaci de Terre Sainte, dont celle des seigneurs de Besmedin. Ils s'allient aux grandes familles latines et forment

296–298; cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 438–462.

⁷¹ E. M. Byrne, "The Genoese colonies in Syria," dans *The Crusades and other historical essays presented to Dana C. Munro* (New York 1928) 147–158; G. Pitarino, *Genova e il Vicino Oriente*, 84; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 169–172.

⁷² J. Prawer, *The Italians in the Latin Kingdom*, 243–246.

⁷³ J. Prawer, *The Italians in the Latin Kingdom*, 226–228; cf. également M. L.

l'un des plus puissants baronages de Terre Sainte.⁷⁴ A côté d'eux, les Génois d'Outre-Mer font bien pâle figure au XII^e siècle. Les contrats notariaux citent un certain Bonvassalo d'Antioche, un Giovanni Andrea de Tripoli, un Giovanni d'Acre, tous d'origine génoise, mais sur lesquels on ne sait pratiquement rien.⁷⁵ Parmi les Pisans qui se fixent en Terre Sainte au XII^e siècle, une trentaine de noms sont connus: Lambertus de Ioppen possède un bain et un four à Jaffa en 1187, Guido Pisanus des maisons à Tyr à la même date. Une dizaine de Pisans sont mentionnés à Tripoli entre 1179 et 1184. Lors de la troisième Croisade, deux Pisans, Jacobus de Jhota et Waleranus de Casanova, avancent des fonds aux croisés anglais et français. Le plus célèbre des expatriés est sans conteste Plebanus qui achète la main de l'héritière de la seigneurie de Botron et devient vassal du comte de Tripoli.⁷⁶ Personnalités célèbres ou immigrants, qu'un bref contrat notarié fait échapper à l'oubli, constituent ainsi une véritable société coloniale d'outremer qui se distingue à la fois de la noblesse franque et de la bourgeoisie latine.

A la fin du XII^e siècle, la balance entre pouvoir en place et communes italiennes penche incontestablement en faveur de celles-ci. C'est le résultat d'une lente érosion de la souveraineté royale et princière, sous l'influence de la guerre, de l'instabilité du pouvoir, particulièrement dans le royaume de Jérusalem, et des pressions insistantes des communes pour obtenir davantage de droits. La politique menée par les trois républiques maritimes italiennes n'est pas toujours semblable; de l'une à l'autre, les inflexions changent, les résultats aussi. Gênes, la première venue au temps de la conquête, met en avant le maintien de privilèges commerciaux et accessoirement la possession d'un quartier dans les villes portuaires qui l'intéressent. Elle ne semble pas avoir favorisé une émigration de grande ampleur, comme ce sera le cas au XIII^e siècle pour les colonies de Constantinople et de la

Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 498–508.

⁷⁴ E. Rey, "Les Seigneurs de Giblet," dans *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, t. 3 (1895) 398–422; *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, t. 3, fasc 9, col 1877–1878.

⁷⁵ Il faut ajouter les souscripteurs des diplômes accordés aux Génois par les princes latins d'Orient; mais il est impossible de distinguer parmi eux les Génois de passage et les résidents. A titre d'exemple, voir la concession faite aux Génois par l'archevêque de Tyr en 1190 (C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo, *Codice diplomatico*, t. 2, 372–374): parmi les témoins figurent Ruffo della Volta, Ansaldo di Negro, Oppizone di Sori et deux chanoines génois de la cathédrale de Tyr qui s'ajoutent au consul Guido Spinola. Cf. M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 509–513.

⁷⁶ C. Otten-Froux, *Les Pisans en Orient*, t. 1, 309–313; M. Tangheroni, "Pisa e il regno crociato di Gerusalemme," dans *I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di*

mer Noire.⁷⁷ Pise, bien que présente elle aussi aux premières heures des combats, est tardivement récompensée de ses efforts et n'occupe vraiment le terrain qu'après la troisième Croisade. Seule Venise a été capable de définir et d'appliquer une véritable politique coloniale, dont témoignent dès 1123 la rédaction du *pactum Warmundi*, dès 1117 la présence en Orient d'un représentant permanent. L'établissement précoce de communautés stables dans les principaux ports de la côte syrienne, la revendication de propriétés urbaines assorties de dépendances rurales, la mise en place de *curie* et de *vicecomites* pour défendre les droits de la Sérénissime, tout indique une vision politique à long terme, que ses deux rivales n'acquiesceront qu'avec le temps et une longue expérience de la Terre Sainte. Le processus s'achève à la fin du XII^e siècle: les communes italiennes, sont devenues un véritable État à l'intérieur des États francs, "colonies within the colonies", pour reprendre l'intitulé d'un débat lancé par J. Prawer en 1985.⁷⁸

Gerusalemme, 513–521; M. L. Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land*, 513–528.

⁷⁷ M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XII^e—début du XV^e siècle)* 2 vols. (Gênes-Rome 1978) t. 1, 229–264.

⁷⁸ Voir, en dernier lieu, "The Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem – The First European Colonial Society? A Symposium", *The Horns of Hattin*, B. Z. Kedar éd., Londres-Jérusalem 1992, 341–366.

THE LORD'S WAR AS THE PROVING GROUND OF
FAITH: POPE INNOCENT III
AND THE PROPAGATION OF VIOLENCE (1198–1216)

John Gilchrist

In a recent study I argued that the papacy from the ninth through the twelfth century regularly conducted aggressive warfare against its enemies and that it justified its actions in the metaphor of waging the Lord's war.¹ I dissented from those historians who treat the popes of the tenth and early eleventh centuries as averse to the profession of arms, and attribute to their successors, notably Gregory VII and Urban II, much of the blame or credit for abandoning this policy. I suggested that the evidence of the canon law usually cited in support of this interpretation is quite unreliable, and I proposed that if we are to understand papal policy in regard to the soldiery we must take into account the actual state of affairs as well as the normative one, and that we must assign more weight to what the popes themselves said and to how they acted.

When we examine the actuality, allowing for the problem of the availability of evidence, it becomes clear that the papacy throughout this period consistently resorted to arms as a means of defending and expanding its territorial, political, and ideological interests. The process was not static. During the ninth and tenth centuries the papal interests were largely confined to Italy, to protecting the emergent papal states from a rebellious Roman nobility, the "accursed race" of Saracens,² the squabbling petty Christian states of southern Italy, and from the competing claims of the western and eastern emperors. Popes on occasion led their troops into battle,³ and offered them the spiritual reward of a speedier entry into the kingdom of heaven.⁴

These local campaigns of territorial aggrandizement continued

¹ J. Gilchrist, "The Papacy and War Against the 'Saracens', 795–1216," *The International History Review* 10 (1988) 174–97, esp. 196–7.

² Benedict IV (900–903) ep 3 (PL 131 4A; JL 3530).

³ For a description of Pope John XII (955–64) in armour see Liutprand, *Historia Ottonis* c 10 (MGHS 3.343) and c 14 (345.8–9).

⁴ Hadrian II (867–872) ep 6 (MGH Epp 6 p 703.13–18, 704.2–3, 707.4–11; JE 2895). See Gilchrist, "The Papacy and the 'Saracens'," 182–3.

through the eleventh and twelfth centuries. However, the popes added a new dimension to their warfare by extending it outside Italy, at first against the Muslims but subsequently against pagans, heretics, and any who, with the exception of Jews, did not adhere to their interpretation of the Roman primacy. This interpretation established obedience to Rome as the criterion of membership of the Church. The ensuing wars, especially the crusades, produced a flood of popular literature, chronicles, and correspondence, but what is significant for our purposes is that the writers did not use patristic texts or canonistic norms to justify the Christian use of force. In an age when authorities were widely cited in defence of particular positions, it is glaringly obvious that the texts of St. Augustine dealing with the just war, which re-entered the canonistic tradition from the 1080's onwards, were hardly known outside the collections themselves. This is especially true of the papal statements on war as found in their letters. They show little trace or knowledge of texts relating to the just war doctrine, instead they rest heavily on arguments drawn directly from the Bible and from contemporary feudal custom. The notion of divine war is the dominant theme.⁵

In general, the popes throughout those four centuries envisaged only one kind of morally acceptable warfare, that between God and his enemies, between Christians and unbelievers. In terms of the crusades this conclusion suggests that too sharp a distinction should not be drawn between the ideology of the holy war and that of the crusade. Also, contrary to the impression conveyed by modern works on the history of the just war doctrine, the western ethic of war and soldiering, which emerged in that period of the Middle Ages and which endured down to the present century, should be seen as fundamentally a theology of war in which true warfare forms an extension of God's war against unbelievers.⁶ Somewhat tentatively I proposed that the period of Pope Innocent III marked the final stage by which this doctrine became fixed in the European consciousness. The proposal that

⁵ The terms "sacred war" and "holy war" are modern usages. The rubrics to Innocent's letters in the Migne edition often refer to the "sacrum bellum" (see *Reg* 2.272, PL 214.835C) but the term does not occur in the letters themselves. The theme has its roots in the Carolingian period, but the general concept originated in the age of Constantine when the Church adopted "an accommodationist stance vis-à-vis the state," according to B. Miller, "Christian Pacifism and Just-War Tenets: How Do They Diverge?," *Theological Studies* 47 (1986) 448–472, esp. 461. For the Carolingian contribution see Gilchrist, "The Papacy and the 'Saracens'."

⁶ Gilchrist, "The Papacy and the 'Saracens'," 197.

this notion of God's war reached its high point with Innocent III may seem implausible to those who are aware of his reputation as a jurist. Indeed, this and other questions can be raised against my original thesis. Perhaps Innocent adopted God's war for propaganda purposes in his official utterances to the laity but placed warfare on more secure normative grounds in his considered responses to churchmen, especially to the theoreticians? Did the thesis rest on too narrow a data base because it drew its evidence largely from the early years of Innocent's pontificate? If canon law did not underlie the pope's ideology of war, what did? Theology may have done so but I had barely alluded to this as a solution to the problem.⁷ The present paper will try to resolve these difficulties by placing Innocent's views on crusading warfare in the wider context of his theology.⁸

Although other historians such as Powell,⁹ Schwerin¹⁰ and Roscher¹¹ have studied Innocent III and the crusades, their approach was different from my own. Their main concern was

⁷ "The Papacy and the 'Saracens'," 194 note 116.

⁸ Recent studies tend to place less emphasis upon Innocent's formation as a jurist and more on the role of his theological training. Doubt on Innocent's legal education was first cast by K. Pennington, "The Legal Education of Pope Innocent III," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* NS 4 (1974) 70–77 and more recently his review of W. Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild Innocenz' III* (1198–1216), Pápste und Papsttum 22 (Stuttgart 1983) in *ZRG Kan Abt* 72 (1986) 417–28. The canonistic just war doctrine is absent from Innocent's writings. See J. M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (Philadelphia 1986) 47. Also H. Roscher, *Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge*, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 21 (Göttingen 1969) 19. There are occasional references in Innocent's letters to the right of defence but these should not be confused with the aggressive, offensive warfare allowed by the canonistic just war doctrine. In *Regesta (Reg)* 1.555(558), 10–25 January 1199, Innocent summons the faithful of Capua to the crusade against Markward of Anweiler: they will win easily because the enemy is moved by greed for spoils but they by justice, he inflicts violence, they repel it, they have all suffered some loss (Hageneder I 808.27–30, 809. 6–8, PL 214.514A; Potth 615). In 8.114 he accuses Henry de Lacy of unjustly waging war on John de Courcy (PL 215.682A; Potth 2556). See also 11.26 & 28 (PL 215.1354 & 1358; Potth 3324 & 3353). In *Reg* 12.45 (PL 216.54–6; Potth 3738) to the King of Armenia, June 1, 1209, concerning the Templars, Innocent expresses the right of a group to defend itself from attack "cum vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant, ab iis maxime qui vim repellendo irregularitatem non contrahunt, cum clerici non existant, videtur plerisque quod contra te offendentem se possint defendere tibi que impugnanti valeant repugnare." There is a glimpse of the doctrine in *Reg* 16.81 (PL 216.884A, Potth 4777) "qui pugnam exercuere legitimam, palmam consequantur optatam."

⁹ Above note 8.

¹⁰ U. Schwerin, *Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis auf Innocenz IV*, *Historische Studien* 301 (Berlin 1965).

¹¹ See above note 8. I disagree with the fundamental premise of Roscher's argument that the inner religious aim of earlier popes recedes into the background

to examine the propaganda effect of the papal summons, so they tended to let the ideas themselves take second place to the political and organizational aspects of the military ventures to the Holy Land. My concern is with the pope's own statements as found in his Register and other sources. Papal registers, and Innocent III's is no exception, present difficulties especially in matters of authorship and distribution. Who drafted the letters, whose voice do we hear? Who received them? These are weighty questions. In a different context they would call for answers, but here this is hardly necessary. The examples of the pontiff's ideology are too numerous and too consistent in their thrust for them to be any other than Innocent's own "current viewpoints," even if the chancery clerks had a hand in their formulation.¹²

When I began my studies on the eleventh-century canon law, with somewhat youthful enthusiasm I identified the popes' main aim to be the application of canonistic norms to the reform of the Christian society. Today, hopefully, I take a more balanced approach that gives considerable weight to the role of biblical and theological concepts in forming the ideology of the reformed papacy. Throughout the period of reform these concepts provide essential clues to the papal mind. This is especially true of Innocent himself. According to Imkamp, this pope was not a profound

with Innocent III, its place taken by the external, military end, the recapture of the Holy Land, which he terms a revolution (270ff). Mine is the opposite argument: Innocent belongs to the same tradition as Gregory VII, St. Bernard, and Alexander III, but he is revolutionary in extending the *militia dei* to the whole people of God. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 52ff is of the same view.

¹² Some 6,000 letters of Innocent III are known of which 3,700 are in the six extant volumes of the Register. The volumes for the last three years of the pontificate are missing. The printed text of the Register is available in the inferior edition of Migne PL 214–218. The first two volumes covering 1198–1200 appear in a modern edition, *Die Register Innocenz' III, 1. Pontifikatsjahr, 1198/99 Texte*, eds. O. Hageneder and A. Haidacher (Graz-Köln 1964) and 2. *Pontifikatsjahr, 1199/1200 Texte*, eds. O. Hageneder, W. Maleczek and A. A. Strand (Roma-Wien 1979). See W. Imkamp, "Sulla nuova edizione dei registri di papa Innocenzo III," *Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia* 35 (1981) 140–149. The elaborate chancery organisation of Innocent's pontificate and the sheer volume of letters issued under the pope's authority did not allow the pope to have a hand in all his letters. C. R. Cheney and W. H. Semple, *Selected Letters of Pope Innocent III concerning England (1198–1216)*, Nelson Medieval Texts (London 1953) think that Innocent III probably had a hand in drafting his crusade letters, but we have no positive proof for any one letter. M. Markowski, "Crucesignatus: its origins and early usage," *Journal of Medieval History* 10 (1984) 162 concludes that "documents of importance ... are almost certainly from Innocent's own hand, while less important documents were routinely composed by chancery clerks who might not perfectly follow Pope Innocent's use of terminology." In 1965 Professor J. Brundage called for a thorough study of the textual history of Innocent's crusade appeal of 10 April 1213. This has not yet been done.

theologian but he was remarkably consistent in his thinking.¹³ Underlying his thought was the notion that this world is transitory, a place of suffering, of preparation for the heavenly kingdom, as the following excerpt from Innocent's treatise *De miseria humane conditionis*, written c. 1195,¹⁴ makes clear:

For the just man 'denies himself' [Luke 9.23] crucifying his body on the cross of its own vices and concupiscences, so that the world is crucified to him and he to the world. He does not have in this life a lasting city of this world, but seeks the future city of God.¹⁵

These three themes—the corrupt state of human nature, the escape by way of the cross, and the pursuit of the final goal of the heavenly kingdom—govern Innocent's mystical theology. They penetrate his thought at all levels, literal as well as metaphysical. The cross is the central theme. In the *De miseria* the vision of Christ on the cross is what greets the Christian at the moment of death, before the soul leaves the body. The good soul sees it to its salvation, the bad to damnation.¹⁶ The good soul has carried the cross through the earthly agony. The metaphor of the cross also becomes the foundation of Innocent's theology of war. To understand this process it is necessary to grasp that he firmly grounded his ecclesiology in the traditional fourfold exegesis—historical, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical—of scripture, four levels of interpretation forming a single reality.¹⁷ His exegesis of the term "Jerusalem" is virtually a statement of the Innocentian ideology of the crusade. The wretched Jerusalem of Matthew 23.37 is the exterior, historical, corporal city in Syria where Christ walked and died on the cross, now in the possession of the Muslims. Allegorically it is the Church militant

¹³ See above note 8. Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 330 calls Innocent "Theologe von einer Aktualität." For the older viewpoint see E. Kennan, "Innocent III and the first political crusade: a comment on the limitations of papal power," *Traditio* 27 (1971) "a lawyer and a politician" (232).

¹⁴ *Lotharii Cardinalis (Innocentii III) De miseria humane conditionis*, M. Maccarrone, ed. (Lucca 1955). It is available in English translation (M. M. Dietz, tr. and D. K. Howard, ed.), *On the Misery of the Human Condition* (Indianapolis 1969). The *De miseria* was composed ca. 1195 and survives in over 500 MSS from the Middle Ages and down to the seventeenth century. See especially 1.19 *De hostibus hominis* (Maccarrone 27.6–9), 2.1 on the pursuit of riches, pleasures and honours (39.3–4).

¹⁵ *De miseria* 1.18 (Maccarrone 26.20–23; Dietz/Howard 22 ff.).

¹⁶ *De miseria* 3 3(1) (Maccarrone 78.3–4).

¹⁷ Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 105. See also C. M. Munk, *A Study of Pope Innocent III's Treatise De Quadripartita Specie Nuptiarum* 2 vols (University of Kansas Ph.D. Diss. 1975); Xerox University Microfilms (Ann Arbor 1976) 39–40 for the illustration of Marriage: historical (literal) = man and wife, allegorical = Christ and Church, tropological (moral) = God and the just soul, anagogical (mystical) = Word and human nature.

of Isaiah 60.1 here on earth, on route to its spiritual goal. Tropologically or interiorly it denotes the faithful soul. Anagogically the final Jerusalem is the heavenly city, the goal of the Church triumphant of Galatians 4.26.¹⁸ It is no surprise that Innocent called upon the Christian people to come to the aid of the Holy Land in terms of Matthew 16.24. "He who wishes to come after me let him take up his cross and follow me."¹⁹ Nor is it surprising that he was "the first pope to use the term *crucesignatus* officially and regularly in its fullest, substantive meaning of crusader."²⁰

Presenting a paper on Innocent's theology of war implies that physical warfare played an important role in his programme.²¹ It is certainly true that, on occasion throughout his pontificate, Innocent devoted enormous energy and resources to raising armies and preaching God's war: he sought to use it against the German adventurer, Markward of Anweiler in Sicily in 1199,²² he planned the Fourth and Fifth Crusades, and it became a major weapon in the struggle against the Albigensians from 1207 onwards²³. Some historians, for example Maccarrone, claim that the crusade—meaning the physical recovery of the Holy Land—dominated the entire pontificate of Innocent III, including the summons to the general council of Lateran IV.²⁴

¹⁸ Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 117 ff. On the earthly and heavenly Jerusalem, see R. Konrad, "Das himmlische und das irdische Jerusalem im mittelalterlichen Denken. Mystische Vorstellung und geschichtliche Wirkung," in *Speculum historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsdeutung*, C. Bauer, L. Boehm and M. Müller, eds. (Freiburg-München 1965) 523–540. The typology was regularly used by preachers, e.g., Jacques de Vitry (d 1240); see R. C. Finucane, *Soldiers of the Faith: Crusaders and Moslems at War* (London 1983) 32–4.

¹⁹ *Reg* 1.13 (Hageneder I 22.27–29, PL 214.11B; Potth 20) to Henry, Archduke of Brabant and other German princes in the Holy Land. See also 2.259 (Hageneder 2 498.14, 16, PL 214.833A; Potth 935), 16.28 (PL 216.817C; Potth 4725).

²⁰ M. Markowski, "Crucesignatus," 160.

²¹ This is common doctrine that the material sword supplements the spiritual, see *Reg* 6.191 (PL 215.211B/C; Potth 2064) to the people of Brindisi 18–23 December 1203 "Ut autem spirituali gladio gladius materialis accedat, universis comitibus... mandamus ut... contra vos viriliter et potenter assistant"; also 7.79 (PL 215.362C; Potth 2225) and 212 (PL 215.528A; Potth 2404); 9.185 (PL 215.1024D; Potth 2912); 10.141 (PL 215.1235D; Potth 3199).

²² *Reg* 1.554(557) to various bishops in South Italy, 25 January 1199 *Si diligenter* (Hageneder I 802–806, PL 214.512D; Potth 577), also 2.221 (PL 214.781–2; Potth 877).

²³ *Reg* 10.149 to King Philip of France, 17 November 1207, granting the crusade indulgence to those fighting the Albigensians (PL 215.1247D; Potth 3223).

²⁴ M. Maccarrone, *Studi su Innocenzo III*, Italia sacra (Padova 1972) 87. See H. Tillmann, *Papst Innocenz III* (Bonn 1954) 230–2 and C. R. Cheney, *Pope Innocent III and England*, Päpste und Papsttum 9 (Stuttgart 1976) 259–60 "the recovery of the holy places was ever present among Innocent's aims, [even though] it

Others reject that dominance. They point out that for some six years, from 1207 to 1213, Innocent was preoccupied with the need to combat heresy in the south of France, and even when he again turned his attention to the Holy Land by issuing the call for the Fifth Crusade he had other, more urgent matters on his mind.²⁵ Imkamp put reform not crusade as the primary motive for Innocent assembling churchmen at the Fourth Lateran Council; the crusade constitutions were passed only after a majority of its members had left the assembly.²⁶

Yet both groups are wide of the mark.²⁷ The physical warfare of the crusade and reform of the Church are not antithetical but part of the relentless struggle of the Church militant against the power of the demon.²⁸ This is the metaphysical, perpetual conflict between good and evil, which for Innocent is an eternally present reality. It is a struggle in which all Christians are engaged and to which all are committed, whatever their vocation.²⁹

In the first two years of his pontificate, Innocent, in an attempt to drum up support for the crusade, issued a stream of letters to various ecclesiastical and lay leaders throughout Christendom. These letters establish the basic ideology that persisted throughout his pontificate. The first step was to eradicate wars among Christians. He castigates the princes, urging them to abandon their quarrels.³⁰ In the tradition of his predecessors Innocent

was at times driven from the forefront of his policy by more pressing concerns." These historians draw no connection between the crusade and the eschatology of Innocent III.

²⁵ Roscher, *Innocenz III* 51–4.

²⁶ W. Imkamp, "Sermo ultimus, quem fecit Dominus Innocentius papa tercius in Lateranensi concilio generali," *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte* 70 (1975) 149–179 esp. 156. But in his later work he places crusade and reform as indissolubly connected (*Das Kirchenbild* 120).

²⁷ A simple test shows how little *direct* attention Innocent gave to the crusades. C. R. Cheney and M. G. Cheney, *The Letters of Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) concerning England and Wales. A Calendar with an Appendix of Texts* (Oxford 1967) list 1188 numbered items; in the General index under "Crusade" are 47 separate entries, that is, approximately 4% of the total. My own reading of the registers of Innocent suggests that this figure holds good for the whole of his correspondence.

²⁸ The point was made by Imkamp, above note 26. For the demon see J. M. Ozaeta, "La doctrina de Innocencio III sobre el demonio," *Ciudad de Dios* 192 (1979) 319–36. Innocent held the traditional doctrine.

²⁹ Innocent reserved the term "militare" for the relentless struggle by all groups—monks by their prayer, soldiers by the shedding of blood, students and so on—to fulfil their Christian vocation. See Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 156–7. See *Reg* 1.291 (Hageneder 1 411; PL 214.249; Potth 303). He rarely used the verb of secular conflict.

³⁰ *Reg* 1.343 30 August 1198 to the Bishop of Lydda (Hageneder 1 513.22, PL 214.313B; Potth 359).

applies the term *guerra* almost exclusively to the secular leaders' dissensions and scandals.³¹ In place of this unchristian warfare Innocent enjoins peace, but it is not a universal peace. It signifies an end to schism³² and the achievement of the fraternal co-operation needed to deal with the enemies of the faith.³³ They require our attention. They are the antichrist.³⁴

To motivate the faithful to take up arms, Innocent employs a variety of arguments, chief among them being the sins of Christians. Our sins are to blame for past failures and for the present despoliation of the Holy Land.³⁵ The authority of the prophet tells us "that if we had walked in the law of the Lord and truly placed our hope and trust in him, who looks at the

³¹ *Reg* 1.270 "guerram potius quam pacem amantes" (Hageneder I 373.20, PL 214.227B; Poth 290) 1 ep 355 "propter guerram quam tu et... rex Anglorum adinvicem exercetis" (conflict between Philip of France and Richard of England) (Hageneder I 531.1–2, PL 214.329B; Poth 351), *Reg* 2.180(189) (Hageneder 2 346.1–2, PL 214.737; Poth 851), and 8.126 (PL 215.699C; Poth 2564). The terms *bellum* and *praelium* were normally reserved for God's war, e.g., "ad bellum Domini preliandum" in the encyclical letter of 31 December 1199, sent throughout the Western world (*Reg* 2.258 [270], Hageneder II 496.10–11, PL 214.831C; Poth 922). In the same letter he calls the crusaders "bellatores" (Hageneder 2 495.35), a common usage with him. See also 1.12 to Konrad of Wittelsbach, Archbishop of Mainz, leader of the German crusade contingent in the Holy Land "prelium Domini studeatis viriliter et efficaciter preliari" (Hageneder I 21.6; Poth 19). There are numerous other examples of this usage which had gradually become fixed in the papal correspondence during the twelfth century. Occasionally, Innocent used the term of God's war—e.g., *Reg* 9.103 referring to a war against heretics (PL 215.916C; Poth 2800), and "Saracenorum guerra" in *Reg* 15.15 (PL 216.553A; Poth 4417). Likewise there is the rare use of "bellum" applied to war among Christians—e.g., 2.243(253) "nec ob hoc adversus comitem vel alium bellum moveas" referring to the conflict between King Leo of Armenia and the Count of Tripoli (Hageneder 2 467.26, PL 214.814D; Poth 908) and 8.203 (PL 215.783A; Poth 2671).

³² *Reg* 2.39 "ex dissensione ... inter Placentinos et Parmenses" (Hageneder II 73.5–6, PL 214.581B; Poth 676). See Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 120–1 and Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 201.

³³ Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 43, Roscher, *Innocenz III* 275. In Innocent's time new ideas, namely, peace by diplomacy and conversion by the mission, were emerging vis-à-vis the Muslims. Some traces appear in the pope's plans, e.g. *Reg* 16.37 to the Sultan of Egypt, requesting return of the Holy Land and the release of Christian captives, which would result in a cessation of hostilities between Muslims and Christians (PL 216.832A; Poth 4719). However, Innocent did not reveal these negotiations to those summoned to the crusade.

³⁴ Innocent's denunciation of Markward of Anweiler marks the beginning of the identification of the papacy's opponents as the disciples of the antichrist. See E. Kennan, "Innocent III," 248. For heretics as the followers of the antichrist see *Reg* 12.129 (PL 217.156B; Poth 3858).

³⁵ *Reg* 1.353 August–September 1198 to the Emperor Alexius III (Hageneder I 525–528, PL 214.325; Poth 349). Also 2.241 (251) "peccatis exigentibus" (Hageneder 2 460.6–7, PL 214.809B; Poth 924). The idea of satisfaction goes back at least to Bernard of Clairvaux who saw the crusade as the great opportunity for penance. See Imkamp, "Sermo ultimus," 165.

land and makes it tremble, touches mountains and they pour forth smoke, one of us would have put to flight a thousand of the enemy and two ten thousand" [Deut. 32.30]. Unless we placate the divine wrath "by our pious prayers and actions, " things will get worse. We must satisfy God lest "his inheritance falls into opprobrium and under the dominion of nations."³⁶ The death of Christ on the cross and the loss of Jerusalem as the Christian inheritance explain the summons to war.³⁷ The immediate goal is to defend or liberate the Holy Land,³⁸ but Innocent employs aggressive language that must appeal to the feudal audience.³⁹ They are not to trust in mere numbers or brute strength. Instead, if their hearts are purged with the medicine of penance and they place their hope in God, "the Israelites will put to flight the Philistines and unarmed David will prevail with his sling and stone against the armed Goliath."⁴⁰

Reinforcing this appeal are two sets of metaphor which can be taken to represent the literal and metaphysical elements in Innocent's theology. The literal metaphor is drawn from the feudal world.⁴¹ In his letter, *Post miserabile*, to Archbishop Berengar of Narbonne, other prelates and the lay nobility Innocent enlarges on the feudal obligations of lordship and service, "Christ is our lord and we his men who must avenge the insult to Him crucified." Jerusalem is "our inheritance ... our Lord Jesus Christ by his death

³⁶ *Reg* 1.11 announcing his election to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and his suffragans (Hageneder 1 20.8–11, 14–18, 23–24, PL 214.9; Potth 18).

³⁷ *Reg* 1.397 (Hageneder 1 596.12, PL 214.374; Potth 407), 407 to Count William of Forcalquier, 1–10 November 1198 (Hageneder 1 610.17, PL 214.384–5; Potth 546).

³⁸ *Reg* 1.11 (Hageneder 1 20.27–28, PL 214.10B; Potth 18), ep 439 (Hageneder 1 662.2 20–21), ep 555(558) (Hageneder 1 809.15–16; Potth 615), 561(567) (Hageneder 1 818.23–24; Potth 595).

³⁹ *Reg* 1.336 "ad expugnandam paganorum barbariem et servandam haereditatem Domini quam ipse proprio sanguine comparavit" (Hageneder 1 502.29–503.2, PL 214.311A; Potth 347), 1.397 "funiculum hereditatis Christi et defendas et impugnes barbariem paganorum" (Hageneder 1 596.31–32), 1.561(567) (Hageneder 1 818.23–24, PL 214.522A; Potth 595), and 2.211 (220) (Hageneder 2 411.3–4, 11, PL 214.780A; Potth 878).

⁴⁰ *Reg* 1.12 (Hageneder 1 21.6–11, PL 214.10; Potth 19). For the scriptural allusions see Jdt 9.16; Ps 32.16, 51.8ff; 1 Macc 3.19; Sam 17.50–1. See also *Reg* 1.13 (Hageneder 1 22.29–33, 36–39, PL 214.2D; Potth 20), 1–10 February 1198 to Henry, Duke of Brabant and other German princes in the Holy Land. In 1.302 (Hageneder 1 430.18–19, PL 214.264B; Potth 320), Innocent appeals to the example of the tribe of Israel at war with the tribe of Benjamin, who did not gain victory until they had expiated their sins with the enemy's sword.

⁴¹ J. Riley-Smith, "Crusading as an Act of Love," *History* 65 (1980) 177–192, here 181 noted Innocent's use of feudal similes. Innocent used such terms as "pro servitio Jesu Christi" = *Reg* 1.300 [Hageneder 1 427.13, PL 214.261B; Potth 310].

redeemed us from our captivity, and now like a prisoner he is forced by unbelievers to depart from his own land." The Christian leaders wallow in sin, and "while they persecute each other with implacable hatred ... there is none moved by the insult to him crucified." The enemy taunts our failures and they speak the truth, says Innocent. The pope calls upon his audience to take up the "sword of strength, the shield of faith and the helmet of salvation, put your trust not in numbers or force but in the Lord's power. He gave up his life for you, he took on the nature of a servant, he obeyed unto death, the death of the cross." God died for man, will man refuse to die for God? Will the servant deny the Lord temporal riches, when the Lord offers the servant eternal riches beyond all measure? He then switches into prosaic details of the crusade's organisation but ends by urging his audience not to despair, set out on the crusade in humility of heart and body "for if you walk in the law of the Lord, spurning the vanities and sins of the earlier crusaders, who for that reason failed, the Lord will wipe out your enemies."⁴²

Innocent exploits the feudal analogy in various ways. He calls upon the magnanimity of the knights, stressing the duty of fraternal love and the need to recover Christ's inheritance.⁴³ But he can follow this with the threat of punishment for those who do not give their support. He cites the example of a ruler who loses his lands and recovers them without the help of his vassals. How will he treat his men? He will count them traitors. If this is the case with secular princes, then surely, Jesus Christ, who has endowed them with all that they have, will judge them guilty of the crime of infidelity if they fail to aid him in these dire times.⁴⁴ From the literal, feudal world Innocent switches easily to the metaphor drawn from a metaphysical, eschatological reality. The earthly goal may be the recovery of Jerusalem but the final goal is the "encounter with Christ in the heavenly Jerusalem, which is interpreted as the vision of peace."⁴⁵ The pope is said

⁴² *Reg* 1.336 15 August 1198 (Hageneder 1 499.24–26, 500.1–3, 14–16, 501.24–29, 504.6–10, PL 214.308–12; Potth 347).

⁴³ *Reg* 5.161 (PL 214.1178C; Potth 1848) cites the Joannine text, "greater love has no man than that he lay down his life for his friends," instead the crusaders have become corrupted by the devil who makes you "move war against your brothers."

⁴⁴ *Reg* 2.241(251) to Philip of France, 10–31 December 1199 (Hageneder 2 460.6–7, 461.12–13, PL 214.810A; Potth 924). See also his letter to the faithful in the province of Vienne *Reg* 2.259(271) 4 January 1200 (Hageneder 2 498, PL 214.833C; Potth 935).

⁴⁵ *Reg* 1.407 (Hageneder 1 610.32–35, PL 214.384–5; Potth 546), also 2.259(271)

to have made little use of the Book of Maccabees, probably because it had received few commentaries.⁴⁶ But this overlooks his constant allusion to the crusaders as “the new Maccabites, who for their Father’s laws and for the Holy City wage holy warfare, and although they may think themselves conquered, they ascend as victors to win an unspeakable glory which the King of Glory has prepared for his soldiers.”⁴⁷ The road to this goal is not easy. Writing to the clergy in Magdeburg he explains that Christ allows the disasters in the Holy Land “in order to test our faith more strongly and to learn more fully who are his own people.”⁴⁸

The letters of 1198 and 1199 reveal a pope with a sweeping vision of a dualist world that must be brought under the sway of the Roman Church. Fighting God’s war was the main instrument to accomplish this, and participation by the faithful became a testing ground of their faith, a faith solidly embedded in obedience to Rome. The theology is primitive and unsophisticated. Innocent either ignored or passed over the logical contradictions of a process by which the deity alternately rewarded and punished the faithful, thus seeming to lack those very qualities of majesty that made the burden of the cross worthwhile. Only once did he come to grips with the problem.⁴⁹ In the encyclical letter to the faithful of Vienne, 4 January 1200, Innocent raised the issue in the following terms:

Although nothing can resist the Almighty, he has decided to put to the test his followers in this world, even though he knows the fate to which they are eternally predestined. No mortal is allowed to scrutinize the secret of the divine judgment, but perhaps the merciful God, at a time when iniquity abounds and charity of the multitude grows cold, has wanted to offer the faithful a chance of

(Hageneder 2 499.14–16, PL 214.834A; Potth 935). Similar language in Leo of Armenia to Innocent, Reg 2. 242 (252) (Hageneder 2 465.22–24, PL 214.812C–D). See Imkamp, *Das Kirchenbild* 119 ff.

⁴⁶ According to Imkamp, “Sermo ultimus,” 166, Innocent’s sole use is in his final sermon at the opening of Lateran IV (text in PL 217.673–80 = Sermo VI).

⁴⁷ Reg 2.259(271) (Hageneder 2 499, PL 214.834A; Potth 935). The pope also cites 1 Macc 3.58, 59 in *De quadripartita specie nuptiarum*: “Accingimini, et estote filii potentes ... quoniam melius est nobis mori in bello, quam videre mala gentis nostrae et Sanctorum” (Munk, 2 70.43–6). Maccabees had been used by Pope Eugenius III and succeeding popes, except Celestine III where it is altogether missing (Imkamp, “Sermo ultimus,” 166).

⁴⁸ Reg 2.258 (270) 31 December 1199 (Hageneder 2 492.6–7, PL 214. 829B; Potth 922).

⁴⁹ Innocent often appealed to the retribution Christ would exact from those who failed to come to his aid, see Reg 2.259(271) “de ingratitude vicio et velut infidelitatis crimine vos dampnabit si ... neglexeritis subvenire” (Hageneder 2 499.25–28, PL 214.833D; Potth 935).

safety, nay a cause of salvation, so that they who would give up all things for him will find him to be all things for all men.⁵⁰

For the remainder of his pontificate Innocent refined the ideas examined above but there was little development in his thought.⁵¹ In reality, events of the period 1200 to 1216 did not offer much hope to a pope whose mind was fixed on “the vision of peace” among the Christian princes. The stream of “dissensions and wars” continued, leaving Innocent deeply distressed for they constituted the main obstacle to the fulfillment of his mission.⁵² The failure of Christians in the Holy Land and at home to appease the Lord meant that the Christian people had laboured in vain. But all was not hopeless. If the earthly Jerusalem remained beyond their grasp, some had at least “gained the heavenly kingdom with the palm of martyrdom.”⁵³ Innocent’s mystical theology thus found hope where there was none, and it could turn defeat into victory. This is well illustrated by his reaction to the news of the Conquest of Constantinople by the Christian army in 1204. Although we shall perhaps never have a final answer to the question of Innocent’s role in the events that led to the conquest,⁵⁴ we can at least say that the outcome fitted his plans of reducing dissensions among the faithful, that is, among those obedient to Rome. He condemned the transgression against fellow Christians and urged the knights to be shriven so that they could get on with the business of the “bellum Domini.”⁵⁵ Yet he found that their evil act had produced some good. The physical carnage of the conquest had ended the schism, an event praised by Innocent in language transposed from the Psalms, “The Lord has brought this about and it is marvellous to our eyes ... The time seems to have come when the golden calves are destroyed so that Israel returns to Juda and Samaria is converted to Jerusalem.”⁵⁶ By creating “one sheepfold and one shepherd” the conquest prepared the way for the day “when all the faithful shall enter the faith, for then shall the whole of Israel be saved.”⁵⁷

⁵⁰ (Hageneder 2 499.29–35, PL 214.833D–834A; Poth 935).

⁵¹ Imkamp, “Sermo ultimus,” 163 comments that Innocent’s crusade thought seems to have been locked in a closed circle throughout his pontificate.

⁵² *Reg* 3.24 (PL 214.904A; Poth 1177), 49 (937A; Poth 1266); 8.126 (PL 215.699C; Poth 2564), 203 (PL 215.783A; Poth 2671).

⁵³ *Reg* 5.26 (PL 214.978A–B; Poth 1667).

⁵⁴ See C. M. Brand, “The Fourth Crusade: Some Recent Interpretations,” *Medievalia et Humanistica*, n.s. 12 (1984) 33–45.

⁵⁵ *Reg* 6.230 *Quia veremur* 7 February 1204 at Anagni to the crusaders at Constantinople (PL 215.260D–261B; Poth 2123).

⁵⁶ *Reg* 7.154 (PL 215.456B; Poth 2324).

⁵⁷ *Reg* 7.203 (PL 215.514C–B; Poth 2382). See also 7.153 & 154 (PL 215.454D

Innocent's optimism was misplaced. From 1206 to 1213 other, pressing matters demanded his attention. Political problems and the need to deal with the Albigenian heretics left him little time for the Latin East.⁵⁸ When he again turned his attention to the Holy Land, in the encyclical letter summoning the Fifth Crusade in 1213,⁵⁹ Innocent had abandoned any certainty of the recovery of Jerusalem by an army obedient to the Lord. His new appeal was couched in eschatological language on behalf of him who died on the cross to save us from eternal death. One who wishes to follow him to the final crown must also engage in the earthly battle. Christ if he wished could easily protect the Holy Land from hostile hands but he allows it to continue in its present state in order to summon believers from the sleep of death. The agony of the fight will test them like gold in the furnace; those who fight faithfully will be crowned, and those who deny him "due service" will be damned. Many will be saved who otherwise would have been damned by their desires, carnal appetites, and worldly snares. For this pope, the coming crusade was a means to expiate sin, and victory in death the reward.⁶⁰ He appealed to the familiar feudal image of the king punishing vassals who deserted him when captured by the enemy. How can I love my neighbour if I allow him to rot in some Saracen cell?⁶¹ In the end it was not the earthly Jerusalem that mattered but the heavenly Kingdom, not conquest and recovery of "Christ's inheritance" but the fight itself, for this guaranteed the crown of victory, the remission of

and 456B; Potth 2321 & 2324). In *Reg* 8.126 12 July 1205 (PL 215.700B/C; Potth 2564) he reprimanded the papal legate, Cardinal priest Peter, for deserting the Holy Land and sanctioning the diversion to Constantinople. The bloodshed alienated the Greeks (701B). In 11.47 to the Emperor Theodore Lascaris (PL 215.1373D; Potth 3337) Christians are not without blame but he believes the Greeks were punished by God's judgment. These were personally styled letters. In his official letters Innocent showed no such regret. See Tillmann, *Innocenz III*, 255 note 88, D. Nicol, "The Papal Scandal," *The Orthodox Churches and the West*, Studies in Church History 13 (Oxford 1976) 141–68, and J. Godfrey, *1204, The Unholy Crusade* (Oxford 1980) 147.

⁵⁸ To the Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1206, Innocent explained that the people of Jerusalem suffered defeat "not only for their own sins but for the sins of others at the hand of the Lord" (*Reg* 9.28 = PL 215.830A; Potth 2731).

⁵⁹ *Quia maior* = *Reg* 16.28 (PL 216.817–21; Potth 4725). On this letter see Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 17 ff.

⁶⁰ *Reg* 16.28 "... occasionem salutis, immo salvationis causam praestando, ut qui fideliter pro ipso certaverint ab ipso feliciter coronentur" (PL 216.817C; Potth 4725); also 11.185 (PL 215.1501C; Potth 3559). Innocent urged Christian prisoners in Muslim hands to remain strong for "God proves his elect like gold in the furnace" *Reg* 14.146 (PL 216.507B; Potth 4365); similar exhortation in 16.34 (PL 216.829A; Potth 4726).

⁶¹ *Reg* 16.28 (PL 216.817D; Potth 4725).

sin, salvation.⁶² As for the date of this glory Innocent wisely substituted apocalyptic imagery for certainty.⁶³

These telling images in the pope's armoury combined moral, feudal, and eschatological elements. God's war was integral to his thought, it was not something to be embarked upon reluctantly but joyfully seized once its necessity was demonstrated.⁶⁴ Underlying it were two principles—the one of vengeance and retaliation derived from the Old Testament and the other of submission from the New.⁶⁵ The suffering experienced by God's army was not exceptional, something to be avoided, but the very fate of man, as the pope explained in a sermon on the Feast of All Saints.⁶⁶ The eternal conflict at the metaphysical and literal levels—the earthly agony called for total submission.⁶⁷ The crusade became the very epitome of the Christian following Christ to his death and resurrection.⁶⁸ It was no longer voluntary but a summons, a vocation by Christ who, dying on the cross with arms outstretched, called all to himself, and this call was to defend his patrimony.⁶⁹ For this reason, from the very beginning of his

⁶² *Reg* 16.178 15 February 1214 instructs Grimald and his fellow crusaders "to fight happily and constantly in this agony so that the crown of so great reward will follow" (PL 216.963C; Potth 4896). Grimald should trust in the Lord's power "who cast the chariot and army of the Pharaoh into the sea ... It is not for you to despair about the multitude of the enemy army, if you fight the Lord's battle with a pure heart, be mindful that the Lord in the battle of Gideon used a small force to restrain his army." With similar language had St. Bernard of Clairvaux encouraged Christian princes to join the second crusade. He urged them "to take up arms with joy and zeal for your Christian name ... you have a cause for which to conquer is glorious and for which you can fight without danger to your souls: a cause in which to die is gain" (W. O. Paulsell, "Saint Bernard on the Duties of the Christian Prince," *Cistercian Studies* 24 [1976] 63–74. He cites [73] Bernard's letter no. 391, 462).

⁶³ *Reg* 16.28 "confidimus tamen in Domino ... quod finis huius bestiae appropinquat, cuius numerus secundum Apocalypsin Joannis intra sexcenta sexaginta sex clauditur, ex quibus jam pene sexcenti sunt anni completi" (PL 216.818B; Potth 4725). See also Roscher, *Innocenz III* 290.

⁶⁴ See Maccarrone, *Innocenzo III* 162–3.

⁶⁵ On the principle of retaliation see M. Laufs, *Politik und Recht bei Innocenz III*, *Kölner Historische Abhandlungen* 26 (Köln-Wien 1980) 257.

⁶⁶ Sermo XXX, *In Solemnitate Omnium Sanctorum* (PL 217.587D–590C). Innocent depicts the triune God with the trinity of his armies, the one that triumphs in heaven, the other fighting in the world, and the third lying in purgatory. "Primus exercitus in laude, secundus in agone, tertius autem in igne" PL 217.589A/B.

⁶⁷ The literature of the Romanesque world portrayed the virtues and vices locked in a death struggle for the soul of man, which finally leads to the triumph of *sapientia* and to peace and concord. See M. C. Barber, "The social context of the Templars," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, s. 5 34 (1984) 27–46.

⁶⁸ It was "a kind of heroic culmination of that [penitential] system for the laity," Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 52–3.

⁶⁹ *Reg* 14.68 "in haereditatis suae subsidium ... ad ipsius patrimonium defendendum" (PL 216.433D; Potth 4267).

pontificate, and more than any of his predecessors, Innocent preached the crusade as open to all Christians it was a test of their faith.⁷⁰ The *militia dei* thus received its final, revolutionary meaning of the whole of the people of God for even the poorest peasant through his offerings could fight "against the perfidy of the pagans."⁷¹ This is well illustrated by Innocent's reply to the following case sent by the Archbishop of Lund. A peasant had caught a priest dallying with his wife, he seized the poor man, and cutoff his nose and tongue. The cleric could no longer speak and had sought refuge in a monastery. The villein wanted absolution. Let him have it, advised Innocent, and let him give the money that it would have cost him to come to Rome as a subsidy to the Holy Land or to the crusaders.⁷²

I suggest that Innocent's pontificate marks the final stage in the development of the doctrine of the Lord's war.⁷³ In his person, to an unparalleled degree, he combined the roles of theologian and jurist, of universal bishop of Rome and charismatic leader of the people of God.⁷⁴ He had no historical sense that the struggle of the ancient people of God was different from that of the Church militant. He saw the two struggles as analogous. The tribes of Israel were called to participate in the wars of Yahweh, to obey without question, and to show fearlessness in face of

⁷⁰ See *Reg* 1.302 (Hageneder 1 432.10–17, PL 214.264D–265A; Potth 320) where Innocent urges all to help the crusade either by participating or furnishing supplies. Other writers, e.g. Maccarrone, *Innocenz III*, 163, and Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, 57, have pointed to this extension. Roscher, *Innocenz III*, 296, argues that this total warfare died with Innocent III. Popular sermons indicate the contrary. G. Rizzardi, "Fra Fidenzio da Padova e l'Islam," *Studi francescani* 82 (1985) 103–121, portrays a friar who regards Islam as the supreme enemy, believing in a totally false doctrine, the source of immorality.

⁷¹ In the earlier centuries it denoted the spiritual army of monks; from the Carolingian period it received a parallel usage of soldiers engaged in war against God's enemies, and during the first century of the crusades it was a synonym for the crusade army. The distinguishing mark of this army is that it abandons worldly concerns and material desires. See A. J. Forey, "The emergence of the military order in the 12th century," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36 (1985) 175–95, here 184 ff.

⁷² *Reg* 7.156 (PL 215.461D–462A; Potth 2323).

⁷³ In a later paper I shall examine the ideology of his successors. They retain the metaphor of the Lord's war but it becomes heavily underpinned with the canonistic doctrine of the just war.

⁷⁴ The Israelite tribes of the old Testament, in the period before the kings, saw war as a holy war of the warrior-God, Yahweh. See N. K. Gottwald, "Holy War in Deuteronomy: Analysis and Critique," *Review and Expositor* 61 (1964) 296–310; P. C. Craigie, "Yahweh is a man of wars," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 22 (1969) 183–88; D. Bergant, C. S. A., "Yahweh: A Warrior-God?" *Bible Today* 21 (1983) 156–61; P. D. Hanson, "War and Peace in the Hebrew Bible," *Interpretation* 38 (1984) 341–62. The tribes fought the wars of Yahweh, to which they were summoned by the charismatic leader.

defeat, for this was a test of the absolute faith of the elect people.⁷⁵ So did Innocent III demand a similar obedience from his people.⁷⁶ This obedience and fearlessness were vital to a pope who recognized that in his time military successes were few. But he wanted the obedience not merely for military victories but because it would signify that the much-needed reform of the Church would come about. For this reason he shifted the emphasis from the appeal “Fight God’s war and you will conquer” to “Fight the Lord’s battle and you will be saved.” If we want God to favour us, we need to be converted. This need for conversion—for reform—helps us to understand why Innocent identified the Church militant with the people of Israel, and why he, more than any other pope, took on the persona of the charismatic leader. He was their David.⁷⁷ Since the eleventh century the papacy had propagated the doctrine that obedience to Rome was the criterion of orthodoxy, to disobey was heresy.⁷⁸ Salvation lay in obedience. Innocent expressed his hopes as follows:

After you have led back Christians, you will convert the remainder of mankind, that is, Jews and pagans. The fish who live in the sea designate Christians for they are born of water and the spirit; the men who dwell on land signify Jews and pagans, they covet and cling to earthly things. But after all Christians have returned to the obedience of the apostolic see, then shall the multitude of races enter the faith, and thus all Israel will be saved.⁷⁹

Given this message, and allowing for the simple truth as seen by Innocent that the soul, not the body, mattered,⁸⁰ we can appreciate why Innocent passionately desired unity, and that he employed all means to achieve it. The Muslims he would wipe out, lapsed Christians and heretics could return to the unity or face the sword, pagans had the choice of the sword or conversion.⁸¹ The duty of Christians was to bear the cross and further

⁷⁵ P. E. Dion, “‘Fear not’ formula and holy war,” *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 32 (1970) 565–570.

⁷⁶ For Innocent’s view of the primacy see *Reg* 1.242 (252) (Hageneder 1 465.18–25, PL 214.812C-D; Potth 336).

⁷⁷ See above note 40. In another variation, Leo, King of Armenia, in a letter to Innocent preserved in the Register 2.242 (252) (Hageneder 2 465.18–24, PL 214.812C-D), asks “mittat etiam salvator et propugnator noster David fidelem in auxilium nostrum.”

⁷⁸ J. Van Laarhoven, “Chrétienté et croisade: Une tentative terminologique,” *Cristianesimo nella storia: ricerche storiche, esegetiche, teologiche* 6 (1985) 27–43 shows the increasing use of the term *christianitas* by the crusade chroniclers.

⁷⁹ *Reg* 7.203 (PL 215.514C-D; Potth 2382).

⁸⁰ *Reg* 12.86 “cum pretiosior sit anima corpore, ac perditioni unius animae multorum interitus corporum nequeat comparari” (PL 216.97D; Potth 3787).

⁸¹ For example, the use of religious typology—the crusaders identifying

the success of God's war. This was the test of their faith, this would ensure them the spiritual victory, the kingdom of Jerusalem in heaven.

Few of the components of the Innocentian programme were new. Yet the lack of novelty does not detract from the awesome grandeur of the message itself. There is here little of the progress that might have been expected from the increased contact between Christians and Muslims over the hundred years that had passed since the First Crusade.⁸² The phantasmagoric images of Muslims painted by the chroniclers of that crusade, themselves stereotypes popularised by the vernacular poetry, especially of the Song of Roland,⁸³ take their place also in Innocent's thought. The rhetoric of opposites—glorious and inglorious, Jesus Christ the son of God and Mahomet the son of perdition⁸⁴—and that of reciprocity—labor and wages, merit and reward—appeal to the Christian soul in its earthly suffering.⁸⁵ The enemy is depicted in terms of abuse. Innocent routinely refers to Muslims as pagans,⁸⁶ they are "Agarenes, perfidious enemies of the cross itself."⁸⁷ Some dismiss this language as mere propaganda and excitatory⁸⁸ but this ignores the fact that Innocent's arguments were

themselves with Israel and the Maccabites—is found at the First Crusade; see Y. Katzir, "The Conquests of Jerusalem, 1099 and 1187: Historical Memory and Religious Typology," in V. P. Goss and C. V. Bornstein, eds., *The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the Crusades*, Studies in Medieval Culture 21 (Kalamazoo 1986) 103–113. See also Cheney, *Innocent III and England* 270. Roscher, *Innocenz III* 261 concludes that "Innocenz als Theologe, Schriftsteller und Prediger kein origineller Geist war."

⁸² Thus confirming R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1962) 28. Out of ignorance perhaps but certainly with poor diplomacy Innocent closed a letter to the Emir of Morocco concerning exchange of prisoners with the wish that he "would hasten to reach that truth, which is Christ" *Reg* 2.9 8 March 1199 (Hageneder 2 17.6–7, PL 214.544; Potth 619).

⁸³ M. Bennett, "First Crusaders' Images of Muslims: The Influence of Vernacular Poetry?" *Forum of Modern Language Studies* 22 (1986) 101–22 and R. Harvey, "Marcabru and the Spanish Lavador," *Forum of Modern Language Studies* 22 (1986) 123–44.

⁸⁴ In 16.28 he identified Muhammed as "quidam perditionis filius, Machometus pseudo-propheta" (PL 216.818B; Potth 4725).

⁸⁵ On the rhetoric see Inkamp, "Sermo ultimus," 162–3.

⁸⁶ *Reg* 2.244[254] (Hageneder 2 469.7, PL 214.814; Potth 909), 249[259] (Hageneder 2 476.1, PL 214.819; Potth 929), 258 [270] (Hageneder 2 496.6, PL 214.831B; Potth 922), 7.156 (PL 215.462A; Potth 2323), 8.126 (PL 215.701B; Potth 2564), 14.68 (PL 216.434A; Potth 4267).

⁸⁷ *Reg* 7.18 (PL 215.302B; Potth 2136). However, he treated Muslims obedient to Christian rule in Sicily with great care and wished them grow "in bonis consuetudinibus" (*Reg* 2.217 [226] December 1199, to all the Saracens in Sicily [Hageneder 2 423.4–5, PL 214.788A; Potth 883]).

⁸⁸ The language is mostly evocative. There is little appeal to apocalyptic and miraculous elements as in other crusaders' thought. See Roscher *Innocenz III*

addressed not simply to the laity but to the church hierarchy also, men of considerable learning and theological depth.⁸⁹ More than any of his predecessors Pope Innocent III shows how deeply the biblical theme of holy war had become fixed in the collective mind of the papal curia, and by its repetition, in letters and sermons, in the European consciousness as a whole. In conclusion, we may reflect on the dilemma western Christendom had created for itself: to convert unbelievers by force or to eliminate them by force.⁹⁰ Today Innocent's wars against enemies of the faith—heretics, pagans, and Muslims—seem moral enormities, but clearly neither he nor his age saw them in that light. Both the pope and the people of God sincerely believed that they were engaged in defensive wars against some “empire of evil”, to use Noam Chomsky's phrase.⁹¹ Criticism of the crusading ideal was rare, and what criticism there was tended to be directed at abuses of the ideal rather than at the ideal itself.⁹² Some historians have suggested that the crusades, preached as defensive wars, marked an advance over the just war doctrine.⁹³ Others, however, have

291. *Reg* 16.28, the encyclical summoning the Fifth Crusade, 19–29 April 1213, is the exception. See above note 59. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 18 refers to “Innocent's apocalyptic vision” in this encyclical.

⁸⁹ The author of the Anonymous Prologue to the Constitutions of Lateran IV, Lisboa B.N. MS Alcob 381 fol 225r, describes Innocent as “patre perspicacissimi ingenii et summe intelligentie, cui a longis temporibus non fuit inventus similis in cathedra piscatoris,” cited by Imkamp, “Sermo ultimus,” 149.

⁹⁰ The problem goes back to an earlier period. See H. D. Kahl, “Christianisierungsvorstellungen im Kreuzzugsprogramm Bernards von Clairvaux. Anmerkungen zum geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext des ‘Wendekreuzzugs’ von 1147,” *Przegląd Historyczny* 75 (1984) 453–61.

⁹¹ N. Chomsky, *Turning the Tide* (Boston 1985) 189–90. A generation ago Innocent's outlook had its modern supporters, for an example see J. Clayton, *Pope Innocent III and His Times* (Milwaukee 1941) 101, where he places Innocent's response to the crusades in a context of “the advancing tide of Islam ... the encroaching religion, the subversive alien rule of the Asiatic.”

⁹² E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274* (Oxford 1985). She intimates that the influence of alternative ideologies such as that of Joachim of Fiore and pacificism has been exaggerated. The official Church and the state certainly sought to squash such ideas. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade* 59ff, uses sermon exempla to show that there was a broad acceptance of the crusade as part of the salvific work of the Church. See also I. Valetti Bonini, “Crociata e antisemitismo nelle lettere di Adamo di Perseigne,” *Analecta Cisterciensia* 36 (1980) 148–63.

⁹³ This supposes that the doctrine was valid. The historical record proves that wars fought on the grounds of defending some right have usually been aggressive, offensive wars. Innocent III's conduct of God's war was no exception. The nuclear age has led Roman Catholic philosophers and theologians to question the just war doctrine as such; see R. Hernandez, “Las Casas en contra de la guerra,” *La ciencia tomista* 111 (1984) 279–305 and R. Larraneta, “Ya no hay guerras justas,” *La ciencia tomista* 111 (1984) 307–27.

rejected the very idea of the crusades as just wars.⁹⁴ It is important to realize that Innocent III himself did not distinguish between just and unjust wars in the modern sense of the just war doctrine, but between political wars among Christians—all of which were unjust—and God's war against the enemies of the faith. He preached one message: the people of God must fight the Lord's war, through it they will be saved. Innocent's theology of war thus marks the culmination of a process by which all barriers between religion and war had been removed. Religion as war and war as religion were now one.⁹⁵ In his call to the Christian people to wage war in the name of religion, this pope set the seal to a machinery for dealing with one's enemies that has haunted the western mentality down to the present day.

⁹⁴ See L. Walters, "The Just War and the Crusades: Antitheses or Analogies," *Monist* 57 (1973) 584–94.

⁹⁵ Roscher, as a part explanation/justification of Innocent's actions, interprets the Jerusalem crusade as an aspect of the "defensio christianitatis" whereas the Mission crusades to the North were part of the "dilatatio christianitatis" (*Innocenz III* 206–7). In *Reg* 12.103 to Waldemar, King of Denmark, 31 October 1209, Innocent commends the king "ad exstirpandum paganitatis errorem et terminos christianae fidei dilatandos viriliter te accingas" (PL 216.117B; Poth 3810). See also H. Hoffman, *Gottesfriede und Treuga Dei*, MGH Schriften 20 (Stuttgart 1964), especially 104–29 for the idea that the church became involved in military activity through the very need to convince recalcitrant laity of the virtues of bridling its internal violence. Innocent's policy in the Fourth Crusade is defended by Joseph Gill, "Innocent III and the Greeks: Aggressor or Apostle?," in *Relations Between East and West in the Middle Ages*, D. Baker, ed. (Edinburgh 1973) 95–108.

"O GOD, THE HEATHEN HAVE COME INTO YOUR
INHERITANCE" (PS. 78.1)
THE THEME OF RELIGIOUS POLLUTION
IN CRUSADE DOCUMENTS, 1095–1188

Penny J. Cole

In his *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, R. W. Southern characterised the middle ages as the 'golden age of the Islamic problem.'¹ The 'problem,' as he defined it, was largely of an intellectual nature. In the period from 700 to 1100, Western thinkers proved unwilling to take up a suitably critical attitude towards such information about Islam—most of it polemical, and much of it inflammatory—that they received through Spanish and Byzantine sources.² Although Southern takes an optimistic view of the development of Muslim and Christian relations after the beginning of the 12th century, seeking evidence, however slight, of Christian awakening, he is clear that not until the 15th century is there any real sign on the Christian side of an interested and reasoned approach towards Islam.

For the period up to the end of the 11th century, Southern adduces geographic remoteness from Muslims as a partial explanation for Western ignorance of Islam. With the First Crusade in 1096, however, which brought Christians in the thousands to the Orient, this explanation becomes less convincing. Much more revealing is the idea of the exclusiveness of the Christian world view and the complacent assumption of superiority, both of which stemmed from the tenets of the Christian faith. Here, Southern observes, the one thing we must not expect

¹ R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962) 13.

² On the Spanish and Byzantine sources and their transmission, see especially M. T. d'Alverny, "La connaissance de l'Islam en occident," in *L'occidente e l'Islam nell' alto medioevo*, in *Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo* 12 (Spoleto 1965) 577–602; D. Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam* (Leiden 1972); J. Meyendorff, "Byzantine Views of Islam," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 18 (1964) 115–32; P. Alphandéry, "Mahomet—Antichrist dans le moyen âge latin," in *Mélanges Hartwig Derenbourg* (Paris 1909) 261–77; P. Alexander, "The Diffusion of Byzantine Apocalypses in the Medieval West and the Beginnings of Joachism," in *Prophecy and Millenarianism: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Reeves* (Harlow, Essex: 1980) 53–106; D. Melitzki, *The Matter of Araby in Medieval England* (New Haven 1977); B. Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission* (Princeton 1984).

to find is that spirit of detached and academic or humane inquiry which, he supposes, has characterised much of scholarly research into Islam over the last 100 years.³

This Christian narrowness of attitude and the failure to observe desirable standards of ecumenism—what Hans Küng has described as a process of coming to terms with Islam⁴—have been widely criticised by scholars who attribute the malice evident in much of medieval Christian writing on Islam to the Christian sense of cultural and intellectual inferiority.⁵ This, it is supposed, explains why medieval Christians so readily accepted and propagated nonsense about Islam, and obstinately refused to alter that prejudiced habit of mind which distorted their view of Muslims. *Prima facie*, the thesis of cultural inferiority has much to commend it. Islam enjoyed a rich, unbroken tradition of intellectual achievement, the product in part of a Hellenistic inheritance; by contrast, Western intellectual endeavour which, until the late middle ages, was restricted largely to ecclesiastical foundations, appears limited. By way of illustrating the implications of this, Southern, for instance, offers the intriguing suggestion that had Gerbert of Aurillac been able to pursue his scientific investigations in Baghdad or Isfahan, his name would now be as familiar as that of the great Muslim scholar Avicenna.⁶ But, however valuable this comparative approach to cultures, the tendency to regard the matter of Christian and Muslim relations as principally a history of intellectual confrontation between unequals has limitations: it presupposes, for example, that a culture can be usefully assessed according to objective, absolute criteria; even more, it fails to assess adequately the influence of the crusades upon Christian attitudes to Muslims.

After 1095, the struggle for control of the Holy Land dominated the course of Christian and Muslim relations. The Christian conviction that any Muslim presence there was a violation of the places sacred to Christ, and the literature which systematically propagated this notion fed the Western imagination with a pernicious image of the Muslim as the incorrigible and militant

³ Southern, *Western Views*, 3. Cf. E. Said, *Orientalism* (New York 1979).

⁴ H. Küng, "Christianity and World Religions: The Dialogue with Islam as One Model," *The Muslim World* 77 (1987) 80.

⁵ N. Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, (Edinburgh 1960); J. Kritzeck, "Moslem—Christian Understanding in Medieval Times," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4 (1961/62) 388–401; W. Montgomery Watt, *The Influence of Islam upon Medieval Europe* (Edinburgh 1972), "Muhammad in the Eyes of the West," *The Boston University Journal* 22/3 (1974) 61–9.

⁶ Southern, *Western Views* 10.

enemy of the Christian religion. This was not the product of mere intellectualising. The menacing power of the image was grounded in the Eastern struggle, and, as the evidence of the 12th century indicates, it was frequently invested with a terrifying dimension calculated to override, in even the most cultivated Christian thinker, all considerations of charity and common humanity.

The English monastic historian, William of Malmesbury, provides an immediate example of this. It is unlikely that William had ever met a Muslim but, in his little known *Commentary on the Book of Lamentations*, he gives a sign of having an intellectual interest in the phenomenon of Islamic monotheism; indeed, the suggestion has been made that William, in emphasising this, was seeking to correct the popular misconception about Islamic polytheism.⁷ When we turn, however, to William's better known historical work, the *Gesta regum Anglorum*,⁸ any initial sense we might have had that William was trying to promote a kind of Kūngian ecumenism, a spirit of Christian charity towards all those outside the Church, is quickly dispelled: he rails against all those Muslim nations he calls Agarene, Turkish and Arab, denouncing them as non-Christians; he interprets their advance through the East as the rapid spread of evil,⁹ and evinces relish in recounting how, during the First Crusade, a Turk who had caught a crusader's spear in the neck, vomited up a hord of gold bezants.¹⁰

William's evident antipathy to Muslims casts a long shadow over the *Commentary*, and makes it clear that if the work is to bear any weight as evidence of his enlightened approach to Islam, there must be reservations. Islamic monotheism may well have held some intellectual fascination for William, but this paled into insignificance in the face of what he conceived to be his greater purpose as a Christian writer: to demonstrate through the Christian victory at Jerusalem in 1099 the invincible power of Christ and the validity of his truth. Unless we believe that William relished stories of gratuitous violence,—and there is no reason

⁷ On this, see R. Thomson, "William of Malmesbury and Some Other Western Writers on Islam," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 6 (1975) 179–87.

⁸ William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum*. W. Stubbs, ed.; 2 vols. RS 90/1–2 (London 1887–89).

⁹ William of Malmesbury, 1. 276: 'Nec moram festinatio malorum fecit quin Agareni et Arabes, et Turchi, alienae scilicet a Christo gentes, Syriam, et Liciam et Minorem Asiam . . . ipsam etiam Jerosolimam depopulati super Christianos invaderent'.

¹⁰ William of Malmesbury, 2.445: 'Erat spectaculum quod videnti cachinnum excuteret, cum Turcus, in collo . . . percussus, bizantinos evomeret.'

to suppose this—it is by reference to his high-minded perception of the underlying religious ideals of the crusade, and not to any deeply seated feeling of cultural inferiority, that his apparent satisfaction in recording, for instance, the grisly death of the Turk can be explained.

For William, the crusade was God's war. In November 1095 Pope Urban II had preached at Clermont, calling upon the Franks to take up Christ's cross and march to Jerusalem to free the Holy Sepulchre and other sacred places from Turkish domination. There was no promise of material gain, although undoubtedly many hoped to make a profit. Instead, the Pope offered the reward of spiritual salvation. The response was overwhelming. People surged forward, demanding to receive one of the cloth crosses that the Pope had prepared, and swore to set out at the appointed time. In 1096, the main army of the knights left France and proceeded by the overland route east. After a gruelling march, they remustered at Constantinople preparing to enter enemy territory on the far side of the Bosphorus. They anticipated a swift victory. Count Stephen of Blois wrote home to his wife Adelaide that he expected to be in Jerusalem in 5 weeks. In the event, however, Stephen would be proved wrong, for it was not until July 1099 that the crusaders breached the north wall of the Holy City, and entered to claim it for Christ.

The story of this astonishing achievement and the heroic exploits of the crusaders fed historical writing for the next two decades. William of Malmesbury belonged to the second wave of these crusade historians. He had not participated in the expedition, but when he took up his pen some time in 1125 to recreate the history of the crusade from the reports of others, he wrote with a gusto that stemmed directly from his approval of the undertaking as a glorious war of liberation and purification of God's sacred places from the Muslim enemy. The danger which Muslims posed did not derive from their armaments—since William believed that the Christians held the advantage in spirit—but from their aggressive infidelity. Although aware, as has been noted, that Muslims were monotheistic, worshipping God, not Muhammad, any sympathetic interest that William might have taken in Islam was subverted by his abhorrence of what he firmly believed were their sacrileges against the holiest things of Christianity, notably, the Church of St. Peter at Antioch whose sanctity, William implies, was threatened by their very presence,¹¹

¹¹ William of Malmesbury, 2.416: '*ecclesia toto Turchorum tempore illibata permansit . . .*'.

and the *Templum Domini* in Jerusalem where, he says, they erected a statue of Muhammad.¹² Against this background of alleged atrocities, we can begin to see that there is a strong sense in which William must have viewed the painful death of the Turk who vomited bezants, as a just punishment for his impious violation of God's sanctuaries.

William derived much of his evidence about Turkish sacrilege from Fulcher of Chartres.¹³ Fulcher had gone on the crusade as chaplain to Baldwin of Boulogne, and composed his account of it in the early years of the 12th century.¹⁴ Unlike William, therefore, he had direct experience of Muslims and their civilization. But, if we approach his history expecting to find there researched insights into Islam, we will be disappointed. Fulcher's Islamic Orient is the creation, not of an objective observer, but of a Western clergyman at war who believed that the crusade was a divinely ordained war to defend Christianity against Muslim encroachment.

Fulcher begins his history with a report of Pope Urban's sermon at Clermont. Prominent among Urban's ideas are religious pollution and the need to exterminate from Christian lands all trace of the Muslim polluters whom, according to Fulcher, the Pope described as a 'despicable people' (*gens sprete*), 'degenerate' (*degener*), and 'enslaved by devils' (*daemonum ancilla*).¹⁵ Although Fulcher confidently assumed the superiority of Christianity to Islam, the Turkish occupation of Antioch troubled him. How could this apparent triumph of impiety be reconciled with his belief in an omnipotent, benevolent God? His answer derived from the conviction that the Muslim desecration of Christian places was part of the divine plan, and he believed that God had devised this crisis in the East in order to test his faithful, to see who would obey God's command, take up the crusader's cross and, at great personal cost, join the campaign to drive out the pagans.

That Antioch belonged properly to Christ, Fulcher had no doubt, and his account of its fall to the crusaders conveys the sense that the Turkish sufferings were justly deserved. Three times, he says, Christ appeared to a Turk to assert his possession of the city, and three times his revelation was mocked by the Turkish

¹² William of Malmesbury, 2.423: 'simulacro Mahumet ibidem collocto'.

¹³ William of Malmesbury, 2.434.

¹⁴ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*. H. Hagenmeyer, ed. (Heidelberg 1913).

¹⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, 135.

amir Kerbogha, who referred to him mockingly as a ghost.¹⁶ Kerbogha's refusal to recognise Christ, and his open disobedience to Christ in obstinately refusing to relinquish Antioch to Christian authority, underpin Fulcher's absolute conviction that God's purpose in the crusade demanded the indiscriminate extermination of the pagan enemy. Kerbogha's eventual defeat and death were followed by a Christian massacre of Turkish women, an act which gave Fulcher no qualms: 'The Franks did them no harm,' he remarks, 'except to drive lances into their bellies.'¹⁷

The consummate acts of pollution, however, occurred in Jerusalem. Fulcher had not been among the victorious crusaders who entered the Holy City in July 1099, but he nonetheless includes in his history an account of the terrible events that transpired there. He speaks of the Muslims who, trapped on the roof of the Temple of Solomon, provided easy targets for the Christian archers, and he speaks too of the other 10,000 who were brutally decapitated. He describes the rivers of blood that stained Christian ankles, and he lends a certain poetic piquancy to that gruesome riot by comparing the helpless, terrified victims to 'rotten apples falling from their shaken branches,' and to 'acorns tumbling from the swaying oaks.'¹⁸

Fulcher's description of the Muslims as 'rotten apples' and 'tumbling acorns' may, at first sight, seem to be a scholarly jest. The figures come from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (7. 585–6) and attest to Fulcher's classical learning. But, when considered within the context of the desecration of the Christian holy places, the imagery assumes a darkly menacing meaning. Fulcher interpreted the crusaders' capture of Jerusalem as a stage in a comprehensive rite of purification. Two assumptions, both of which are suggested in his account of the purification of the *Templum Domini*, underpinned this: first, that Islam's claim to be a valid religion was false; and secondly, that Muslims were in some way not quite human.

Fulcher first entered Jerusalem in December 1099, five months after its capture. His stay was brief. He was accompanying

¹⁶ Fulcher of Chartres, 232.

¹⁷ Fulcher of Chartres, 257: 'nihil aliud mali eis Franci fecerunt, excepto quod lanceas suas in ventres earum infixerunt'.

¹⁸ Fulcher of Chartres, 303: 'veluti cum putrida motis/Poma cadunt ramis, agitata illice glandes'. It is noteworthy that Fulcher is concerned only with the crusaders' attacks upon Muslims. He makes no specific mention of the large Jewish community which was living in Jerusalem in 1099. On this, see J. Prawer, *The History of the Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Oxford 1988).

Bohemond of Antioch and Baldwin of Boulogne on a Christmas pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre. In November 1100, however, he entered the Holy City once again, but this time to establish permanent residency with Baldwin, who had been elected to succeed Godfrey as King of Jerusalem. Until his death some time around 1127/28, Fulcher, we may assume, had ample opportunity to acquire an intimate knowledge of Jerusalem and its history. Yet, for all this, the description of it which we find in his *Historia Hierosolymitana*, although interesting and valuable, places an unexpected emphasis upon such secular concerns as water supplies, town plan, and architecture.¹⁹ Fulcher underlines, for instance, the aridity of the region immediately around Jerusalem; he describes in some detail the sources of water and the capacity of the springs; and he praises the symmetrical lay-out of the city, pointing out how its boundaries are defined by the Mount of Olives, Mount Zion, and the Tower of David, whose masonry he greatly admires. His interest in familiar biblical places—the Pool of Soloam, the Brook of Kedron, the Valley of Jehoshaphat—is mainly topographical, with a marked emphasis upon their respective locations. More, when he comes to consider the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, he focuses upon its circular structure and the aperture in its dome and, professing scholarly circumspection, declines to describe what must surely have been of great interest to many of his readers, the sacred treasures within its walls.²⁰ Only when he comes to speak of the area of the Temple Mount, and particularly the Muslim shrine of the Dome of the Rock, does he address specifically religious concerns; indeed, his tone becomes markedly polemical as he launches into a description of the abuses perpetrated by Muslims at this sacred place.

Fulcher could see no evidence to support the Muslim claim that the Rock was worthy of veneration. He seems to have been aware of its sanctity for Muslims. He knew that they prayed there, but he gives no indication that he understood the historical reasons for their devotions. For Fulcher, the Rock was above all else a pagan affront to God. It ‘disfigured’ (*deturpabat*)²¹ the holy place of the Lord’s presentation, and he is insistent that God did not hear the prayers offered there by the Muslim idolaters

¹⁹ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana* 281–92.

²⁰ Fulcher of Chartres, 286–7: ‘Nec valeo nec audeo nec sapio multa, quae inibi habentur, quaedam quidem adhuc praesentia, quaedam vero iam praeterita recitare, ne in aliquo vel haec legentes vel haec audientes fallam.’ If, as is supposed, Fulcher was, at least briefly, a canon of the Holy Sepulchre, his reticence concerning its treasures appears remarkable.

²¹ Fulcher of Chartres, 289.

who, he says, erected an idol in the name of Muhammad, and practised a superstitious rite that defiled the sanctity of the place. He recounts how the crusaders, after occupying Jerusalem, covered the Rock with marble slabs and erected an altar upon it. Fulcher thought this action entirely proper: the Christians were doing no more than their duty in eliminating the vestiges of pagan superstition from the Temple, and restoring it to a state of pristine purity.²²

From condemning as a pollution the Muslim presence in the place of Christ's presentation, Fulcher moves easily to condemn as an outrage their presence anywhere in the Holy City. For, according to Christian doctrine, did not Jerusalem stand in a unique relation with God, and was it not his own domain, sanctified for Christians by the saving life and redeeming death of his Incarnate Son? Fulcher had heard Pope Urban preach the crusade as a consummate act of Christian devotion, and he had been among the many who, hearing this, had been moved to take the cross, and follow in Christ's footsteps. For these crusaders, motivated by lofty religious idealism, and sustained by their faith to complete the perilous march to Jerusalem, the presence there of Muslim idolaters, those whom they called 'Christ's enemy,' was intolerable: it was clear that if the city was to be purified, a sweeping, comprehensive action was necessary. While the crusaders' violence in carrying out their purifying task strikes us as excessive, Fulcher saw it as essential for the restoration of the properly Christian character of Jerusalem. In occupying the Holy City, the Muslims had violated divine right. Reduced by their idolatry to the status of rotting fruits, they reaped their proper measure of divine justice in the terrible deaths which the crusaders inflicted upon them.

This perception of the crusade as a war mandated by God for the purification of his sacred places from Muslim defilement was not unique to Fulcher of Chartres. Nor was he alone in evincing what can only be termed a brutal contempt for Muslims. This is evident, in varying degrees, in the histories of Raymond of Aguilers and Peter Tudebode, both of whom, like Fulcher, had participated in the expedition as chaplains, and in

²² The Austins who had charge of the *Templum Domini* also superimposed Christian texts upon the Umayyad decoration and erected a golden cross on the great dome. The building was consecrated in 1149. For a more detailed discussion of the Christianisation of Jerusalem, see B. Hamilton, "Rebuilding Zion: The Holy Places of Jerusalem in the Twelfth Century," in *Studies in Church History*. D. Baker, ed. 14 (Oxford 1977) 105–16.

the anonymous history known as the *Gesta Francorum*.

We do not know the name of the author of the *Gesta Francorum*.²³ We do, however, know that he was a Norman of southern Italy, who went on the crusade as a vassal of Bohemond of Taranto. After the fall of Antioch in November 1098, he left Bohemond to join the Provencal army of Raymond of Toulouse, and proceeded with them to Jerusalem whose siege and capture he describes. Like Fulcher, the anonymous had little respect for Muslims. He characterises them as a 'pagan' enemy (*gens paganorum*),²⁴ and in the course of his narrative, takes every opportunity to point out the implications of this for the nature of the war in which he was engaged. He establishes, for instance, a clear association between Muslims and the devil. He speaks of their 'devilish language' (*diabolicus sonus, demoniaca vox*),²⁵ and he refers to a mosque as the 'devil's house' (*domus diabolica*).²⁶ They are 'unbelievers' (*increduli*),²⁷ an 'excommunicate race' (*excommunicata generatio*),²⁸ and a 'prophane company' (*prophanum collegium*),²⁹ who, shunning Christian trinitarian doctrine, ranged themselves for war against Christ and his people. In matters of faith, the anonymous perceived Muslims to be credulous and simple-minded. The Turkish amir, Kerbogha, appears as a figure of fun who swears oaths by Muhammad and other unnamed gods,³⁰ and believes that the crusader princes Tancred and Bohemond are the madly carnivorous gods of the French, consuming at each meal 2,000 cows and 4,000 pigs.³¹

In spite of his evident disdain for the infidel enemy, however, the anonymous draws no specific correlation between their pollution of Christian holy places and justified Christian violence. Various reasons for this may be canvassed. He may not have possessed the turn of mind for such theologically refined thinking; and secondly, it is quite possible that he felt no necessity to justify the war beyond a simple recognition of the fact that for reasons which stemmed mainly from faith, Muslims were wrong and Christians right. He believed that Antioch belonged to God and Christians because St. Peter had converted it to Christian-

²³ *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*. R. Hill, ed. (Oxford 1962).

²⁴ *Gesta Francorum*, 20, 27, 51, 58, 60, 62, 72, 77, 78, 84, 85, 87.

²⁵ *Gesta Francorum*, 18.

²⁶ *Gesta Francorum*, 75.

²⁷ *Gesta Francorum*, 89.

²⁸ *Gesta Francorum*, 19.

²⁹ *Gesta Francorum*, 66.

³⁰ *Gesta Francorum*, 52.

³¹ *Gesta Francorum*, 56.

ity,³² and he had no trouble accepting Raymond of Saint-Gilles' massacre of the Muslim inhabitants of al-Barah on the grounds that he wanted to restore it to Christianity.³³ Again, when he comes to describe the capture of Jerusalem, his language is dispassionate. He does not diminish the scale of the crusaders' looting and killing, but, at the same time, his account conveys none of Fulcher's excitement over the deaths of God's enemy.

Raymond of Aguilers and Peter Tudebode were clerics who, it was noted, went on the crusade and participated in many of the events which they subsequently described in their accounts of the expedition.³⁴ Unlike the anonymous, however, they were quick to interpret Christian violence against Muslims as a divinely instituted punishment for their infidelity and sacrilege. In their histories, they represent Muslims as an obdurate pagan enemy, engaged in war against God and Christians. Muslim atrocities in the form of kidnappings of children,³⁵ forced conversions and circumcisions, their destruction of churches and religious statuary,³⁶ and above all their desecration of the wood of the True Cross at Jerusalem³⁷ are all advanced as evidence of their malevolence towards the Christian faith. What made Muslims an especially formidable enemy, however, was the obsessive nature of their hatred of Christians which clouded their minds, preventing them from recognising, as the fate of Kerbogha demonstrated,³⁸ the futility of their aggression against Christ, and from understanding the transcendental significance of their defeat, as the bragging of the Egyptian Sultan after his loss of Jerusalem revealed.³⁹

What the Muslims failed to understand, and what Raymond and Peter make quite clear is the fact that the crusade was God's way of punishing his Muslim enemy for their infidelity and transgressions against his inviolate places. This was an idea which

³² *Gesta Francorum*, 66.

³³ *Gesta Francorum*, 75.

³⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*. J. and L. Hill, eds. (Paris 1969); Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere*. J. and L. Hill, eds. (Paris 1977).

³⁵ Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolimitano itinere*, 56.

³⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum* 129–30.

³⁷ Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere*, 137.

³⁸ Peter Tudebode, 93–6, recounts how Kerbogha's mother tried, unsuccessfully, to convince him of this, pointing out that no force of arms, however great, could save him from the anger of the Christian God.

³⁹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 155, reports that after the fall of Jerusalem, the Egyptian Sultan boasted that he would recover the Christian holy places, destroy the manger, Golgotha, and the Holy Sepulchre, and, unearthing Christian relics, hurl them into the sea where they could never be found.

had important implications for sustaining the legitimacy of the Christian claim to the Holy Land. Moreover, as the visions experienced by Peter Bartholomew⁴⁰ and Stephen⁴¹ at Antioch suggest, its genesis lay not with man, but with God. And, knowing this, it was with complete confidence that Count Isoard, William Hugh and the clergy could call upon the crusaders to pray to God to judge those who occupy Jerusalem 'shamefully' (*indigne*), defile the site of his passion and burial, and who try to impair the operation of the grace of redemption by withholding access to Christ's sacred places.⁴² In retrospect, therefore, the Christian victory was never in doubt. Our historians perceived the siege of Jerusalem as a struggle of momentous significance between the unequal forces of the Christian besiegers who fought willingly for God—claiming therefore the spiritual advantage—and the Muslim defenders who are represented as having fought against their will for Muhammad's laws.⁴³ The complete collapse of the Muslim resistance and the massacre which ensued in Jerusalem were, in Raymond's view, 'wholly satisfactory' (*tantum sufficiat*), and by implication, wholly deserved.⁴⁴ Through the crusaders, God had restored his divine economy, and Raymond was deeply stirred to see Christians worshipping without constraint at the Holy Sepulchre; indeed, his expression is extravagant, but there can be no doubt that his feelings of elation and joy were real when he says: 'This day ended all paganism; it confirmed Christianity, and restored faith.'⁴⁵

The idea advanced by Fulcher of Chartres, Peter Tudebode, and Raymond of Aguilers that Muslim pollution of Christian sacred places justified the crusaders' violence received even more compelling expression in the crusade histories of Robert of Reims,⁴⁶ Baudri of Dol,⁴⁷ and Guibert of Nogent.⁴⁸ These three

⁴⁰ Raymond of Aguilers, 78.

⁴¹ Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere* 99, depicts the Blessed Virgin and St. Peter describing Muslim desecrations to Christ: 'Domine, per multa tempora tenuit paganorum gens ecclesias nostras, in quibus multa ineffabilia mala faciebant'.

⁴² Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 145.

⁴³ Raymond of Aguilers, 149: 'Operabantur isti pro Deo spontanei opera ad capiendum, operabantur illi pro legibus Mahummet inviti opera ad resistendum.'

⁴⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, 150.

⁴⁵ Raymond of Aguilers, 151: 'Dies hec inquam tocius paganitatis exinanicio, christianitatis confirmatio, et fidei nostre renovatio'.

⁴⁶ Robert of Reims, *Historia Hierosolimitana*. RHC Occ. 3, 721–882.

⁴⁷ Baudri of Dol, *Historia de peregrinatione Hierosolimitana*. RHC Occ. 4, 9–111.

⁴⁸ Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur gesta Dei per Francos* RHC Occ. 4, 117–263.

French Benedictines did not go on the crusade, but they made it their business to rewrite the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*, whose prose they considered rough, and whose omission of Pope Urban's sermon at Clermont, they sought to correct. The result of their labours was a more ample and theologically refined expression of the ideas and ideals of crusading⁴⁹ in which the Christian fear of Muslim pollution was related to the wider threat posed by Islam's claim to a valid system of belief and morality. Something of the inspiration for this line of thinking derived from Psalm 78.1: "O God, the nations have come into your inheritance; they have polluted your holy temple; they have made Jerusalem guard the fruit-trees; they have put out the dead bodies of your servants to feed the birds, and the flesh of your saints to feed the beasts of the land."

Robert of Reims amplifies the Psalm graphically. He relates, for instance, how the Muslims were deliberately polluting Christian churches by smearing altars with the blood of circumcision, or by pouring it into baptismal fonts.⁵⁰ He viewed the Muslim presence in Christian lands as a defilement of their sacred dignity, and he therefore interpreted the crusader capture of Nicaea as a purifying process which had the effect of expelling its 'demonic' Turkish captors.⁵¹ Moreover, in the fall of Jerusalem, he found vindication of the Christian truth and the triumph of Christ's humility over the pomp of the deceiver.⁵² He interpreted the Muslim presence in the city as yet another of Lucifer's vain attempts to challenge Christ's authority, and concerning the deaths of the Muslims there, he says glibly: 'But those to whom nature denied wings, had their miserable existence terminated in unhappy death.'⁵³ Like Fulcher, Robert easily justified the crusaders' occupation of Jerusalem, with all of the attendant violent excesses, as a divinely sanctioned act of purification.⁵⁴

Baudri of Dol believed that to explain the phenomenon of the

⁴⁹ See J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (Philadelphia 1986).

⁵⁰ Robert of Reims, *Historia Hierosolimitana* 3, 727.

⁵¹ Robert of Reims, 759: 'Liberata est Nicaea civitas et expulsa est ab illa omnis diabolica captivitas'.

⁵² Robert of Reims, 869: 'Ibi triumphabat humilitas Salvatoris et longe cedebat pompositas fraudatoris'.

⁵³ Robert of Reims, 48: 'Sed quibus natura alas negavit, misera vita infelices exitus donavit'.

⁵⁴ Robert of Reims, 870: 'His, ut praefatum est, alternis bellorum conflictibus gens Gallicana fines Orientis penetravit; et immunditiis gentilium, quibus per annos circiter quadraginta Iherusalem fuerat inquinata, divina opitulante gratia, emundavit'.

crusade, one had to explore something of the history of God's relation with the Holy Land, and especially with Jerusalem. From reading Josephus and the Gospels he knew that the Holy City had a tumultuous history, and he related this to the faith and sense of reverence possessed by its inhabitants. His historical perspective was wholly theocentric: he believed that when the inhabitants were faithful, the city prospered, but that when they disobeyed, the city endured tyranny.⁵⁵ When he considered the state of Jerusalem in his own day, he saw the truth of this wisdom. Subject to the ruler of Babylon, the city of Christ was in a period of shameful decline: it paid tribute to 'foreign gentiles' (*gentiles adventicii*) who did not recognise Christ, but 'polluted' (*pollutum est*) the Lord's Temple, 'irreverently' (*irreverenter*) converted his sanctuary into a 'gentile assembly place' (*gentium convenarum conventiculum*), and turned his 'house of prayer' (*domus orationis*) into a 'den of thieves' (*spelunca latronum*); so effective was the spiritual alienation imposed by these gentiles that the Church was regarded not as mother, but as 'step-mother' (*noverca*) by her children.⁵⁶

Muslim depredations were not, however, confined to buildings; Christian pilgrims too were victimised. They were subjected to extortionate taxes and physical abuse, and even worse, they frequently found that the sacred places which they had come to venerate, had been converted to stables.⁵⁷ Now, whether or not this litany of abuses has any real substance is unimportant. What does matter is the importance of such detail to Baudri's concept of the crusade and its cause. For he goes on to demonstrate that it was this gentile pollution and maltreatment of the holy places which set in motion that sequence of events which culminated in the Christian capture of Jerusalem in 1099. The genesis of the war against Islam lay in the divine mandate: in his anger at the polluters of his sanctuaries, God decreed that they should be 'eliminated' (*eliminare*) by those over whom they ruled.⁵⁸

Baudri's account of Pope Urban's sermon is largely a restatement of the causative importance of Muslim pollution. The sanctity of the Holy Land, deriving directly from Christ's life on earth, is brought into a jarring contrast with the polluting presence of Muslims, and he loses no opportunity for underlining the menace

⁵⁵ Baudri of Dol, *Historia de peregrinatione Hierosolimitana*, 11.

⁵⁶ Baudri of Dol, *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Baudri of Dol, 12.

⁵⁸ Baudri of Dol, *ibid.*: 'Decrevit igitur eos divinum consilium castigare et per eos quibus imperitaverant deliberavit eos a Deo locis dicatis eliminare'.

which the Muslim occupation of Jerusalem was presenting to the survival of Christian worship. A significant factor in this threat was the aggressive nature of Muslim idolatry. According to Baudri, Urban condemned the Muslim desecration of the Lord's sanctuary, but what, he implies, the Pope thought invested this desecration with a terrifying sense of urgency was their erection of images of their own gods in the Temple of Solomon and the *Templum Domini*.⁵⁹ Urban apparently held this action to be contrary to the law of man and God (*contra jus et fas*), and, Baudri implies, it was his acute sense of outrage over the violation done to Christ that lay behind his cry: 'O God, the heathen have come into your inheritance.'⁶⁰

Muslim hostility to Christ and all things Christian, and their successful advance in the East were given a novel and important dimension by Guibert, abbot of Nogent, the last, and perhaps, the most compelling of the first wave of 12th century crusade historians. Guibert possessed a mature sense of historical causation and of the inexorable influence of Providence in human affairs. This led him to include in his history an account of the life of Muhammad and the rise of Islam.⁶¹

Guibert weaves a tale in which the Prophet appears as a fraud, and the adherents of Islam as gullible. He claims that Muhammad was an epileptic, an unwitting and indeed witless tool of the devil in his ongoing struggle against Christianity, and the dupe of a disgruntled, heretical Christian hermit. Muhammad's wife, whom Guibert does not name, appears as unimaginably credulous, unable to recognise her husband as the religious charlatan Guibert says he was. The Qur'ān, according to Guibert, was the concoction of Muhammad and the wicked renegade hermit. It propagated nothing but sexual licence, and was delivered on the horns of a trained cow, although the people in their foolishness believed that it came from heaven. Muhammad died, says Guibert, as foully as he had lived. In the course of a seizure, he fell unconscious and was devoured by pigs. All that remained for his followers to revere were his ankle bones.

Guibert's Muhammad can be easily characterised. He was a stupid and diseased man, led by his own arrogance and innate wickedness to perpetrate what was, in effect, no more than a

⁵⁹ Baudri of Dol, 13: 'Sed quid templum Salomonis, immo Domini praetermisimus, in quo simulacra sua barbarae nationes contra jus et fas modo collocata venerantur?'

⁶⁰ Baudri of Dol, 14.

⁶¹ Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur gesta Dei per Francos*, 127–8.

vicious hoax upon an unsuspecting people. Guibert was certain that neither the man nor the doctrine of pleasure which he propagated were inspired by God, and this conviction led him to classify Islam as yet another one of the many heresies—together with Pelagianism, Arrianism, Manicheism, and Nestorianism—which flourished in the East after the conversion of Constantine.⁶²

Few now would credit Guibert's account of Muhammad and the beginnings of Islam as other than malicious propaganda designed only to foster ridicule of and contempt for Muslims. But, before dismissing it as polemical nonsense, the product of what Southern has described as the 'ignorance of a triumphant imagination,'⁶³ we would do well to consider the broader theses which it serves concerning Guibert's concept of the Orient and the crusade.

We begin by crediting Guibert with a serious historical purpose. He was a painstaking historian who, like all historians, sought to be credible and convincing. He is careful, for instance, to inform his reader that he drew his information about the Christian heresies from an ecclesiastical history—although he does not tell us which one—catalogues of heresies, and writings 'against the heretics,'⁶⁴ although again, he provides no more precise bibliographical information. Concerning Muhammad, however, he confesses that as he has not been able to find any information in the writings of the Fathers of the Church,⁶⁵ and has had to rely upon what he describes as *plebeia opinio*, 'commonly held opinion.'⁶⁶ What precisely this means is difficult to say for certain. It may suggest that Guibert talked to returning crusaders, and based his account upon their oral testimony. On the other hand, it may simply indicate that he derived his material from sources that did not carry patristic authority, such as the letter, whose text he paraphrases, of Alexius I Comnenus to Robert of Flanders on the subject of Muslim immorality.⁶⁷ Or, again, he may be referring to one or some of the legends about Muhammad

⁶² Guibert of Nogent, 125–6.

⁶³ Southern, *Western Views*, 14.

⁶⁴ Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur gesta Dei per Francos*, 125.

⁶⁵ Guibert of Nogent, 128: 'quia ecclesiasticorum doctorum neminem contra eius spurcitiam scripsisse repperio'.

⁶⁶ Guibert of Nogent, 127. Cf. N. Daniel, "Crusade Propaganda," in *A History of the Crusades*. K. Setton, general ed., 6 vols (Madison, 1969–1989) 6, 68, who translates this as 'folklore'. He is not altogether clear concerning the implications of this rendering.

⁶⁷ Guibert of Nogent, 131–2.

which enjoyed some currency in latin translations of Byzantine polemical sources.⁶⁸

Whatever his source, however, whether written or oral, Guibert's unquestioning acceptance of Islam as an absurd distortion of Christianity cannot be explained solely by reference to a deeply-rooted, uninformed prejudice; rather, it is part of what Guibert believed to be his informed conclusion, based upon responsible historical research, that the Orient was a seed-bed of religious heresy and immorality.⁶⁹ For Guibert heterodoxy not only distinguished the Orient from the West, it formed the fundamental basis of its demonstrable inferiority to the West.⁷⁰ In the first chapter of the *Gesta Dei*, he points repeatedly to the fickle faith and iniquity of Orientals in matters of doctrine, and in their refusal to be obedient to Rome. In assuming this position, and in subjecting Eastern history to close religious scrutiny, Guibert effectively polarized East and West, thereby setting the scene for the great military confrontation between them which was, of course, the subject of his history.

Against this background, Guibert's perception of Islam as yet another Oriental aberration seems not unreasonable. Certainly, it had the merit of providing a sound rationale for the crusade. It explained, for instance, why Muslims were Christ's enemy and the violent transgressors of all things holy. It explained why God had summoned his faithful to join the 'holy war' (*praelium*

⁶⁸ The lines through which these reached the West have not been clearly established. See, for instance, Baron Carra de Vaux, "La légende de Bahira," *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* 2 (1897) 439–54; A. d'Ancona, "La leggenda di Maometto in Occidente," *Giornale storico della letteratura Italiana* 13 (1889) 199–281; R. Gottheil, "A Christian Bahira Legend," *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 13 (1898) 189–242, 14 (1899) 203–68, 15 (1900) 56–102; A. J. Wensinck, "Bahira," in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* 1 (Leiden and London 1913), 576–7; A. Mancini, "Per lo studio della leggenda di Maometto in Occidente," *Rendiconti della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei: classe di scienze morali storiche e filologiche* 10 (1937) 325–49. See also Cambier's studies of the sources used by the later 12th century writers, Walter of Compiègne and Embrico of Mainz, who composed scurrilous poems on Muhammad's life: G. Cambier, "Quand Gauthier de Compiègne composait les 'Otia de Machomete'," *Latomus* 17 (1958) 531–9, "Embricon de Mainz (1010? – 1077) est-il l'auteur de la 'Vita Mahumeti'?" *Latomus* 16 (1957) 468–79, "Les sources de la 'Vita Mahumeti' d'Embricon de Mayence," *Latomus* 20 (1961) 364–80. For the texts, see R. B. C. Huygens, "'Otia de Machomete': Gedicht von Walter von Compiègne," *Sacris Erudiri* 8 (1956) 287–328; F. Hubner, "Vita Mahumeti," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* N. F. 29 (1935) 441–90.

⁶⁹ Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur gesta Dei per Francos* 125–7.

⁷⁰ Guibert's assumption concerning Oriental inferiority rests upon narrowly religious criteria, and places him at the head of a tradition of European "Orientalism" which defined the Orient almost exclusively in terms of Western experience. On this, see E. Said, *Orientalism*.

sanctum) against what Guibert calls 'gentile aggression' (*gentilitas incursus*).⁷¹ Above all, it underpinned Guibert's belief that the crusaders' capture of Jerusalem, a feat which he describes as 'an unprecedented and incomparable victory,' (*nova et incomparabilis victoria*)⁷² was proof not merely of Western superiority in the field, but, more important, of the incontestable validity of Christian truth, and conversely, of the vanity of its Eastern, heretical, Muslim imitators.

Fulcher of Chartres, the anonymous, Peter Tudebode, Raymond of Aguilers, and their literary refiners, Robert of Reims, Baudri of Dol and Guibert of Nogent bequeathed a legacy in which the pollution of Christian sacred places by Muslims was advanced as a valid justification for Christian war and violence. We have seen some evidence of this in William of Malmesbury's *Gesta regum Anglorum*; it remains to see how durable and how versatile the idea would prove throughout the rest of the 12th century.

In the ninth book of his *Historia ecclesiastica*, Orderic Vitalis included an account of the crusade which he based to a considerable extent upon the histories of Fulcher and Baudri.⁷³ Like William of Malmesbury, Orderic had probably never met a Muslim. Yet, in a blistering attack, he vilifies Muslims as the embodiment of all the vices most abhorred by Christians. He reviles them as 'foreigners' (*ethnici*),⁷⁴ 'creatures of another race' (*allophili*),⁷⁵ 'raging idolaters against Christ,' (*vesani ydolatre in Christum*),⁷⁶ 'adulterers' (*adulterini*),⁷⁷ and 'bastards' (*populi manzerini*)⁷⁸ who, with their superstitious and idolatrous rites, had defiled the Church at Antioch,⁷⁹ wickedly oppressed the city,⁸⁰ contaminated God's sanctuary there, and transgressed Christian boundaries. 'Stupid and barbarian' (*barbara stoliditas*),⁸¹ he calls them, pos-

⁷¹ Guibert of Nogent, *Historia quae dicitur gesta Dei per Francos* 124.

⁷² Guibert of Nogent, *ibid.*

⁷³ Orderic Vitalis, *Historia ecclesiastica*. M. Chibnall, ed. and tr., 6 vols (Oxford 1969–80) 5, 6.

⁷⁴ Orderic Vitalis, 5: 4, 15, 36, 52, 114, 120.

⁷⁵ Orderic Vitalis, 5: 4, 17.

⁷⁶ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 96.

⁷⁷ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 156.

⁷⁸ Orderic Vitalis, *ibid.*

⁷⁹ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 100. Peter Bartholomew envisioned the Blessed Virgin and St. Peter complaining to Christ about the Muslim defilement of God's house.

⁸⁰ Orderic Vitalis, 5.4: 'allophilis devictis a quibus olim sancta civitas conculcabatur, et sanctuarium Dei nefarie contaminabatur. Detestabiles enim agereni . . . Christianorum limites iamdudum transierunt, sancta loca invaserunt'.

⁸¹ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 52.

sessing no moral sense, they oppress the weak and the poor with the excesses of their 'pagan tyranny' (*pagana tyrannis*).⁸² They act solely out of the animal instincts of anger and fear,⁸³ and in war with the Christians, they behave like 'cruel monsters' (*crudeles belvae*),⁸⁴ 'howling and gnashing their teeth' (*dentibus in eos stridentes clamitabant*).⁸⁵ Orderic's purpose in these and other similarly abusive epithets, was clearly to strip Muslims not only of their humanity, but also of any claim they might have had on Christian mercy. Thus, undisturbed by the prickings of his Christian conscience, Orderic tacitly approves their massacre at Jerusalem: "They [the crusaders] pursued them and cut them down with such great hatred, because they had polluted the Temple of the Lord and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and because they had taken and shamefully defiled the Temple of Solomon and other churches for their own illicit uses."⁸⁶ This image of the implacably hostile Muslim enemy of Christ, and the idea of the crusade as a purgative enterprise derived from the military success of the first crusaders and would underpin much of the propaganda for the Second and Third crusades.

In December 1145, and again in March 1146, Pope Eugenius III issued his great crusade bull *Quantum predecessores*.⁸⁷ The Muslim commander, 'Imad-ād-Dīn Zengī, had captured the crusader Principality of Edessa, and the bull called upon Europe to prepare for another crusade against Islam. In his text, the Pope evoked the example of the first expedition, and interpreted its achievement as the freeing of Jerusalem and the Lord's Sepulchre from defilement. Then, he underlined the historical preeminence of Edessa as a bastion of Christianity in the midst of paganism to argue that now it too was a victim of infidel defilement.

This theme of Muslim pollution and its transferred application from Jerusalem to Edessa was disseminated and amplified by the great French Cistercian, Bernard of Clairvaux. Preaching in the diocese of Constance, for instance, Bernard told people how

⁸² Orderic Vitalis, 5, 16.

⁸³ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 58.

⁸⁴ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 84.

⁸⁵ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 82.

⁸⁶ Orderic Vitalis, 5, 172: 'Tanto siquidem odio persequerantur eos et perimebant, quia templum Domini et sancti Sepulchri basilicam polluerant, et templum Salomonis aliasque aecclesias suis usibus illicitis peculauerant, ac indecenter contaminaverant'. Trans. M. Chibnall.

⁸⁷ For the text, see P. Rassow, "Der Text der Kreuzzugsbulle Eugens III.," *Neues Archiv* 45 (1924) 302–5. Tr. J. and L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality* (London 1981) 57–9.

Zengī had murdered Christians and polluted and destroyed the sacred things of God.⁸⁸ In a letter of 1146 to the Eastern Franks and Bavarians, he went on to depict the Muslims as beastly and demonic, raising their 'sacrilegious head' (*caput sacrilegium*) against the Christian places of redemption, and he urged them to emulate the first crusaders by eradicating such 'heathen filth' (*spurcitia paganorum*) with the sword.⁸⁹ In the same vein, he wrote to Duke Wladislaus and the people of Bohemia. Here, the force of his appeal is based upon what he alleges to be the ultimate aim of the Muslims, the destruction of Christianity. Like Orderic, Bernard charges that Muslims have no sense or awe of what is sacred, and this he attributes to the fact that they deny the divinity of Christ.⁹⁰

Bernard's apparent awareness of Muslim teaching concerning Christ, and his conviction that the only acceptable Christian response to this was war, placed him in an interesting relationship with his irascible Cluniac contemporary, Peter the Venerable, who also had a considerable interest in Islam. In 1141, he had travelled to Spain and commissioned Robert of Ketton and Hermann of Dalmatia to prepare a latin translation of the Qur'ān and other materials relating to Islamic doctrine and the life of Muhammad.⁹¹ By 1143, the project was complete. While there are questions concerning Peter's motive in this, there is reason enough to suppose that he believed that the collection would provide a sound basis for well directed scholarly polemics against Islam which he apparently feared had the potential to undermine the Christian faith. He wrote:

In having this translation prepared, my intention was to follow the precedent set by the Church Fathers, who never at any time let slip the opportunity of refuting even the most absurd heresy. Rather, they martialled all the strength of their faith to oppose it, and to demonstrate in their writings and disputations what a damnable and odious thing it was. And so I wanted to do the same with respect especially to this error of errors, so that the uninformed,

⁸⁸ *Casus monasterii Petrihusensis* MGHS 20, 674.

⁸⁹ For the text, see J. Leclercq, "L'encyclique de Saint Bernard en faveur de la croisade," *Revue bénédictine* 81 (1971) 295–300.

⁹⁰ J. Leclercq, 286–8.

⁹¹ M.-T. d'Alverny, "Deux traductions latines du Coran au moyen âge," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 16 (1948) 69–131, "Marc de Tolède, traducteur d'Ibn Tumart," *Al-Andalus* 17 (1952) 124–31, and "Quelques manuscrits de la 'Collectio Toletana'," in *Petrus Venerabilis 1156 – 1956: Studies and Texts Commemorating the Eighth Centenary Anniversary of His Death*. G. Constable and J. Kritzeck, eds. *Studia Anselmiana* 40 (Rome 1956) 202–18; see also J. Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, and "Peter the Venerable and the Toledan Collection," in *Petrus Venerabilis 1156–1956*, 176–201.

by recognising how it has with its deadly pestilence infected half the world, may recognise its stupid and disgusting nature and see therefore how execrable and despicable it is.⁹²

Although he expressed his hope that Bernard would take the initiative in mounting the polemical attack, there is no evidence that Bernard ever replied.⁹³

Bernard's silence may be explained by reference to the rivalry which existed at this time between the Cluniac and Cistercian orders, but the possibility must also be canvassed that it reflects a fundamental difference in opinion between the two men concerning what constituted the proper Christian response to Islam. Peter called for war, but as his letter to Bernard indicated, what he had in mind was the war of verbal dispute. This, however, is not to suggest that he did not applaud the martial achievement of the first crusaders in recovering Jerusalem. Preaching in 1146 on the theme of the Lord's Sepulchre,⁹⁴ he praises the crusaders for 'having purged with the swords of piety the place and the house of heavenly purity from the filth of the impious,'⁹⁵ and he points out that their crusading action forms part of an historical continuum in which men have cleansed and liberated the Holy Sepulchre in preparation for Christ's Second Coming. It would, however, be a mistake to assume from this that Peter was actively engaged in promoting another expedition. Careful study of the complete text of his sermon suggests rather that it was delivered to stimulate meditation upon the grace of redemption, not to inflame men's passions for holy war.

Bernard, on the other hand, favoured the force of arms. Referring clearly to Muslims, he had stated as early as 1138, in

⁹² Peter the Venerable, ep. 3. For the text, see *The Letters of Peter the Venerable*. G. Constable, ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 1, 294–5: "Fuit autem in transferendo haec mea intentio ut morem illum patrum sequeretur, quo nullam unquam suorum temporum vel levissimam ut sic dicam heresim silendo preterirent, quin ei totis fidei viribus resisterent et scriptis ac disputationibus esse detestandam ac dampnabilem demonstrarent. Hoc ego de hoc praecipuo errore errorum, . . . facere volui, ut sicut laetali eius peste dimidius pene orbis infectus agnoscitur, ita quam sit execrandus et conculcandus, detecta eius stultitia et turpitudine a nescientibus agnoscatur." On the date of this letter, see 2, 278.

⁹³ Peter the Venerable, 1, 298: 'Hoc ea de causa feci, ut rem vobis notam facerem, et ad scribendum contra tam perniciosum errorem animarem'.

⁹⁴ For the text, see G. Constable, "Petri venerabilis sermones tres," *Revue bénédictine* 64 (1954) 232–54. The sermon was probably preached at a council held in France some time between 24 April and 12 June, 1146. The composition of Peter's audience is not known, but Constable, 229 argues that it comprised mainly ecclesiastics. Cf. however, V. Berry, "Peter the Venerable and the Crusades," in *Petrus Venerabilis, 1156–1956* 153, who maintains that laymen were also present.

⁹⁵ Constable, "Petri Venerabilis sermones tres," 247: "piis gladiis ab impiorum sordibus caelestis munditiae locum et habitaculum expurgastis. . . ."

his *De laude nove militie*,⁹⁶ that it was better for a pagan to be killed since this removed temptation from the just.⁹⁷ Moreover, he was insistent that those who transgressed the divine law—by which he meant Muslims—who stole Christian treasures in Jerusalem, who occupied God's sanctuary, and who 'polluted' (*polluere*) his holy places were to be cut down and driven from the city.⁹⁸ Muslim pollution of the Temple, he proclaimed, was a more heinous outrage than had been the commerce of the money-lenders,⁹⁹ and it was, he believed, only through their military defeat that the new order prophesied by Isaiah would be fulfilled and Jerusalem raised from the dust of oppression.¹⁰⁰ This conviction, coupled with his abiding fear for the integrity of Christ's holy places, remained with Bernard for the duration of his life. It reinforced his belief in the rightness and righteousness of crusading. It fortified him against the criticism that followed the collapse of the crusade which he had preached, and it was in his thoughts when from his death-bed in 1153, he wrote to Andrew, his Templar uncle, expressing his hope of mounting another expedition.¹⁰¹

The failure of the crusade in 1148, and the spectacle of Conrad III and Louis VII returning home after a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Muslim enemy, brought the Church into serious disrepute. Those who had been primarily responsible for organising the expedition, namely, Pope Eugenius and Bernard, were publicly denounced as deceivers of the people, 'pseudo-prophets, sons of the devil, and witnesses of Antichrist.'¹⁰² As events would show, however, the fiasco of the Second Crusade had done little to diminish the powerful appeal which the idea of Muslims as Christ's declared enemy and the polluters of all things sacred had within the crusading context.

On July 15 1187, the largest Frankish field army ever assembled in the East against Islam was defeated by Saladin at the Horns of Hattin in Galilee. The defeat was crushing. One historian has rightly observed that it destroyed the military capacity of the

⁹⁶ St. Bernard, "De laude nove militie," in J. Leclercq and H. M. Rochais, eds. *S. Bernardi opera* 8 vols (Rome 1957–78) 3, 213–39.

⁹⁷ St. Bernard, "De laude nove militie," 217.

⁹⁸ St. Bernard, "De laude nove militie," 218.

⁹⁹ St. Bernard, "De laude nove militie," 222.

¹⁰⁰ St. Bernard, "De laude nove militie," 218.

¹⁰¹ Ep. 288 in *S. Bernardi Opera* 8, 203–4.

¹⁰² See, for instance, the stinging indictment levelled by the annalist of Würzburg, *Annales Herbipolenses* MGHS 16, 3. For further discussion of this and other critical sources, see E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274* (Oxford 1985) 198–201.

crusader states to defend themselves ever again.¹⁰³ The Christian death-toll was staggering, and included many of the fighting élite of the Latin Kingdom. The King of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan, and many other nobles were captured for ransom, and those who did not enjoy such exalted status, were led off to the slave markets of Damascus. But most shameful of all, the fragment of the True Cross which the Christians had carried as their banner into the battle, had been taken. The most evocative symbol of Christianity was now in Muslim hands.

The letters which poured out of the East announcing the disaster and seeking immediate military aid, contained sharp denunciations of Saladin's unprovoked aggression against Christ and his faithful. Writing to Pope Urban III and to Emperor Frederick Barbarossa,¹⁰⁴ the Eastern princes describe Saladin as a 'tyrant' (*tyrannus*), his Muslim followers as the 'enemy of the Crucified One' (*inimici Crucifixi*), and to encourage Frederick to take the cross, they relate the miracle that occurred after the battle when Saladin, in a display of arrogant contempt for Christ, threw the cross into a fire. The cross, however, immediately jumped out. This astonished Saladin, and he commanded that it be safeguarded in his treasury. The tale is almost certainly apocryphal, and any analysis of its intended meaning must consider how important for the mobilisation of a crusade was the attested survival of the cross. But, beyond this, the force of its message clearly rests upon the perception which Westerners now had of Muslims as violent and sacrilegious. This image is underscored further by the Templar Terricus who, in a letter addressed to Western Templars, Pope Urban III, King Henry II of England, and all Christians¹⁰⁵ ascribed Muslim aggression to their bestial lust for Christian blood, and by the Latin Patriarch of Antioch who, writing to Henry II, depicted the Muslims as cruel aggressors bent upon desecrating and destroying those most

¹⁰³ N. Housley, "Saladin's Triumph over the Crusader States: The Battle of Hattin," *History Today* 37 (1987) 17.

¹⁰⁴ The letter appears in the continuation of the chronicle of Hugh of St. Victor, MGHS 21, 475–6.

¹⁰⁵ For the version received by Pope Urban III, see the *Annales Colonienses maximi*, MGHS 17, 793; by the Templars, see PL 201.1408–9, Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta Regis Henrici secundi*. W. Stubbs, ed. RS 49/2 (London 1867) 13–14, Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*. W. Stubbs, ed. RS 51/2 (London 1869) 324–5, *Chronicon magni presbiteri*, MGHS 17, 507–8; by Henry II, see PL 201, 1409–10; by all Christians, see R. of Diceto, *Ymagines historiarum*. W. Stubbs, ed. RS 68/2 (London 1876) 49–50. Although Ralph identifies the sender of this letter as the Templars, the text is substantially the same as that of Terricus.

sacred Christian objects, the Lord's cross and tomb.¹⁰⁶

Saladin's triumph at Hattin opened his way to the reconquest of the crusader states of Syria and Palestine. Tiberias, Acre, Nablus, Jaffa, Sidon, Ascalon and Gaza all surrendered in quick succession, and on September 20, Saladin pitched camp before the walls of Jerusalem ready to commence the siege. The Christian defenders resisted, but, weakened by the loss of so many fighting men at Hattin, were soon forced to accept terms. On Friday, October 2 1187, Saladin entered Jerusalem to reclaim it for Islam.

The impact of Saladin's triumph was not long in making itself felt. Western sensibilities were outraged, and reports received in the West of renewed Muslim atrocities fired Christian rancour to an unprecedented intensity. In October/November 1187, Pope Gregory VIII promulgated *Audita tremendi* in which he summoned the West to a crusade against Islam. In solemn and moving language he expressed the sorrow felt by all Christians over the calamitous events in the East.¹⁰⁷ Drawing upon Psalm 78.1: 'O God, the heathen have come into your inheritance,' Gregory depicts Saladin's siege and capture of Jerusalem as a 'pagan invasion' (*paganorum incursus*) directed against Christians with 'bloodthirsty savagery' by a 'barbarian' people desiring to 'prophane the sacred places and obliterate the worship of God from the earth.'¹⁰⁸ The Muslims were God's enemy and for this reason, Gregory must surely have believed that their defeat was inevitable. Implying, however, that because the unique genius of the crusade was moral in character, he underlines that the crusaders have a special obligation to think of their Muslim enemy in almost exclusively moral terms, recognising the 'evil foulness' which inspired their aggression against God, and conversely, realising that success depended upon their own moral rectitude and God's favour.¹⁰⁹

Propagandists of the crusade seized readily upon Gregory's bellicose language to vilify further the Muslim enemy and impress upon crusaders the magnitude of their task. Poets styled the

¹⁰⁶ PL 201, 1407–8.

¹⁰⁷ The letter appears in Ansbert, *Historia de expeditione Friderici Imperatoris*. A. Chroust, ed., in *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I* in MGH, Script. rer. Germ., n. s. 5 (Berlin 1928) 6–10.

¹⁰⁸ Ansbert, 7: 'cum ex ipsa periculi magnitudine ac feritate barbarica christianorum sanguinem sitiante ac totam suam in hoc apponente virtutem, ut prophanare sancta et cultum dei valeant auferre de terra...'

¹⁰⁹ Ansbert, 9: 'deinde foeditatem et malitiam hostium attendamus et quod illi contra dominum attemptare non timent, nos pro deo agere nullatenus hesitemus'.

Muslims the 'new Philistines,' the Christians the 'new Israelites,' and, to underline the gravity of the defeat, they compared the loss of the cross with the loss of the Ark of the Covenant.¹¹⁰ In December 1187, the Bishop of Strasbourg, preaching to a congregation of the German aristocracy, painted a grimly moving picture of the suffering, humiliated Jerusalem, and urged them to their crusading duty by adducing the spectre of an earth engulfed by paganism.¹¹¹ That the triumph of evil in the form of Islam could even be contemplated was again demonstrated by Prepositinus of Cremona who, preaching probably soon after Hattin, pictured the Muslim celebration of victory as a pagan bacchanal around Christ's tomb; their attitude is irreverent and unmistakably hostile as they taunt Christians with the death of Christ: "Where is the god of the Christians? The Saracens have not lost their god; the god of the Jews is asleep, and the god of the Christians is dead."¹¹² The most impassioned condemnation of Muslims, however, is found in the *De expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum libellus*, an anonymous account of the fall of Jerusalem written by a man who witnessed the events he describes.¹¹³

As an eye-witness account, the *De expugnatione* is valuable, but its singular interest derives from the evidence it provides concerning the profound effect which Hattin and the fall of Jerusalem had in shaping its author's view of Muslims as the devil's allies and the polluters of everything associated with Christ. The anonymous despised Saladin and his Muslims for the havoc which, he believed, they alone had caused in the Holy Land. In a torrent of abusive epithets and images, he depicts Saladin's campaign as the operation of a demonic enemy who placed no moral or ethical limits upon cruelty and destructiveness, and whose humanity was all but lost. The Muslims were, he says, the sons of the devil, and in imitation of their father,¹¹⁴ they pursued the Christians like 'ministers of evil, thirsting after the blood of the

¹¹⁰ E. Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading* 82.

¹¹¹ Anonymous, *Historia peregrinorum*, in A. Chroust, ed., *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I* in MGH, Script. rer. Germ., n. s. 5 (Berlin 1928) 123–4: 'Compungat igitur corda vestra, moveat vos et incitet ad vindictam, quod mater et nutrix fidei vestre, civitas sancta Ierusalem, deletio et eliminato ab ea Christiane cultu religionis prophanis paganorum ritibus ancillatur'.

¹¹² See G. Lacombe, *La vie et les oeuvres de Prévostin* (Le Saulchoir, Kain 1927) 199–200.

¹¹³ *De expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum libellus* in Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicanum*, J. Stevenson, ed. RS 66 (London 1875; repr. 1965) 209–62.

¹¹⁴ *De expugnatione*, 211: 'patrem illorum (scilicet diabolum) imitantes...'

saints, rushing like mad dogs to the carcass.¹¹⁵ Associated with this image of the Muslim as evil and bloodthirsty, is his image as a religious polluter. Mount Tabor,¹¹⁶ Nazareth,¹¹⁷ and the entire route to Jerusalem, in addition to the Holy City itself, were defiled in what he apparently supposed was a campaign of blasphemy and pollution contrived by Saladin expressly to denigrate Christ and Christian doctrine.¹¹⁸ So pervasive, indeed, did the anonymous believe the contaminating power of the Muslims to be that he says it would pollute his own lips were he to describe, for instance, how the Muslims treated the Lord's cross.¹¹⁹ Not surprisingly, his obsessive preoccupation with Muslim pollution is reinforced by an absolute rejection of the Muslim claim to valid religious observance. He condemns them outright as the agents of a 'wicked error,' and he ridicules them for calling their religious officials 'bishops' and 'priests'. Like Fulcher of Chartres, he scoffs at their ritual of prayer as merely a sham, and portrays their cleansing of the Temple as a preposterous, barbaric act, accompanied by a 'filthy and horrible bellowing of Muhammad's law'; the performance was, he says acidly, not a cleansing, but a pollution of the entire place.¹²⁰

The anonymous's depiction of Muslims as the issue of the devil whose mission was to eradicate the worship of Christ was not novel, but his testimony provides further indication of how integral was the theme of pollution to the idea of the crusade as Christ's holy war against evil.

This concept of crusading as a specifically Christian war against God's Muslim enemy was also expressed, although in more theologically sophisticated language, by Henry, Cardinal Bishop of Albano, the papal legate responsible for preaching and

¹¹⁵ *De expugnatione*, 210: 'Igitur ministri iniquitatis, sanguinem sanctorum sientes, sicut canes rabidi ad cadaver currentes...'.
¹¹⁶ *De expugnatione*, 219.
¹¹⁷ *De expugnatione*, 231.
¹¹⁸ *De expugnatione*, 239: 'Arripientes demum iter suum filii Babylonis per montana usque Jerusalem, nomen Christi et crucem nostrae redemptionis inter se polluto ore garriendo blasphemantes'.

¹¹⁹ *De expugnatione*, 226: 'Heu mihi! dicam pollutis labiis, qualiter pretiosum lignum Dominicum nostrae redemptionis tactum sit damnatis manibus damnatorum?'
¹²⁰ *De expugnatione*, 249: "Igitur Alphachini et Cassini, ministri scilicet nefandi erroris, episcopi et presbyteri, secundum opinionem Sarracenorum, primum Templum Domini, quod Beithalla vocant, et quo magnam salvationis habent fiduciam, quasi causa orationis et religionis, ascenderunt, mundere aestimantes quod spurcitiis et mugitibus horribilibus, legem Mahumeti pollutis labiis vociferando 'Halla haucaber, Halla haucaber' polluerunt. Coinquinaverunt omnia loca quae in templo continentur."

organising the Third Crusade.¹²¹ In the 13th tract of his *De peregrinante civitate Dei*,¹²² written sometime in 1188 and dedicated to the monks of Clairvaux, Henry gave himself to theological reflections on the crusade. His discussion proceeds from the view that the spiritual and earthly worlds are inextricably linked, with the earthly providing an accurate measure of the state of the spiritual; thus, the fall of Jerusalem was not only evidence of how little importance Christians gave to the preservation of their most holy places, it also revealed how little faith they possessed. For Henry, the pollution of sacred places by an infidel provided sufficient provocation for military action,—the Machabean revolt against Antiochus Epiphanes was proof of this—and he is critical of Christians for their lethargic response to Pope Gregory's call for a crusade. He emphasises that the danger to the continued survival of Christianity posed by the Muslims cannot be exaggerated. Saladin is the tool of the devil who by polluting Christ's tomb and cross seeks to destroy the Head of the Christian body, and remove thereby all hope of salvation;¹²³ moreover, he has, Henry alleges, offered Christ's cross to Muhammad as a sign of his victory not only over the Christians, but also over Christ.¹²⁴

Within this apparent calamity, however, Henry finds the seeds of consolation. For, when he examines the Muslim claim to victory in light of the tenets of Christian teaching, he is able to argue that their success is part of God's plan. Proceeding from Matthew 24.15, he points out that by occupying Jerusalem, the Muslims have fulfilled Christ's prophecy that one day the abomination of desolation would stand in the holy place.¹²⁵

With similar confidence, Henry addresses the crucial problem of the effect of Muslim pollution of the holy places and objects upon Christian salvation. Did the captivity of the cross and the loss of Jerusalem, for instance, impair the Christian's chance of gaining eternal life? Henry's thinking on this turns on the unique paradox of the redemption in which Christ's apparent defeat on the cross was in fact a victory over evil. Although the fruits of this triumph were spiritual, Henry offers the reminder that Christ gave a tangible reality to his faithful in the form of the eucharistic

¹²¹ For more detailed discussion, see P. J. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270*. Medieval Academy Books, No. 98 (Cambridge, Mass. 1991) 65–71.

¹²² Henry of Albano, *Tractatus de peregrinante civitate Dei* PL 204, 350–61.

¹²³ Henry of Albano, 359.

¹²⁴ Henry of Albano, 355.

¹²⁵ Henry of Albano, 359.

sacrament whose effect of cleansing and sanctification is eternal, and whose efficacy cannot be diminished by defilement from any external force of evil. Christians should indeed weep for the shameful treatment meted out to the fabric of the sacred places, but, Henry intimates, physical contamination, even of the holiest objects, does not alter the relationship of sacred trust which God has with his people. If anything, says Henry, Muslim pollution advances Christian salvation. The sacred places are a concrete reminder and symbol of Christ's redeeming sacrifice and their defilement is God's way of providing Christians with an opportunity to prove their faith by eradicating the source of the contamination, thereby vindicating the insult to him.¹²⁶

Henry's perception of the Eastern crisis as a test of faith had interesting implications for what he thought was the proper Christian response. It is not enough, he implies, for Christians to lament what has happened; the proof of faith is action. And, consistent with his lofty concept of the crusade as divinely ordained holy war, he draws a parallel between Christ's betrayal by Judas, and the surrendering of the holy places to the Muslims. In both sets of circumstances, he sees the devil attempting to destroy faith in God through a campaign of mockery and destruction of his visible, sacred things.¹²⁷ Yet, in this implied parallel between Christ's personal betrayal and Saladin's military successes,—both suggesting the temporary ascendancy of the devil—Henry finds consolation: if, as he implies, the calamitous events in the East reflect the terrible events which led to Christ's passion, it follows that the issue of the crusade against Saladin, whom he describes as the devil's tool,¹²⁸ will be successful and will reflect Christ's spiritual triumph over the devil himself.

In his interpretation of the crusade as an expression of faith whose paradigm and inspiration was the crucifixion, Henry of Albano expressed perhaps better than anyone else the spiritual idea of the crusade as Christ's holy war against his Muslim enemy. The fact remains, however, that this noble sentiment was of paramount importance in underpinning and stimulating Christian hatred and violence against Muslims, and some, such as Peter of Blois, elevated the combination of the spiritual and the bellicose to a dogma of religious violence: "I believe (*credo*)," Peter wrote to Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury, "that it is entirely

¹²⁶ Henry of Albano, 355.

¹²⁷ Henry of Albano, 359.

¹²⁸ Henry of Albano, 358.

acceptable for the filthy dogs [the Muslims] to be driven out of the Holy Land. The means to do this rests with men; the authority and power rest with God."¹²⁹

Peter's clear approval of violence against Muslims suggests that little had changed since Fulcher of Chartres described dying Muslims as 'rotten apples' and 'tumbling acorns'. The perception which many 12th century thinkers came to have of Muslims as a formidable, immediate enemy, bent upon the annihilation of Christianity, was the product of a combination of inextricably related motifs of Muslims as the polluters of Christ's sacred things and the violators of his people. The picture is not attractive, but within the context of the struggle for domination of the Holy Land, it served a real purpose: it was versatile to the point where any Muslim action against a Christian position, such as Edessa, could be interpreted as unprovoked aggression against Christ; it was essential to the idea of the crusade as a cleansing operation and a divinely mandated war of reprisal, and it justified the crusaders' violence, however excessive or wanton, against Muslims. Moreover, the evidence shows clearly that what gave these ideas and motifs their real substance was not a Christian feeling of cultural or intellectual inferiority to Islam, but the belief in the unassailable truth of Christian revelation.

¹²⁹ Peter of Blois, ep.232 in PL 207, 533: 'Credo acceptissimum Deo esse si de terra sancta canes immundissimi extrahentur: huius rei ministerium penes homines est, penes Dominum vero auctoritas et potestas'. For further discussion of the context of this letter, see R. W. Southern, "Peter of Blois and the Third Crusade," in *Studies in Medieval History presented to R. H. C. Davis*. H. Mayr-Harting and R. I. Moore, eds. (London 1985) 207–18. On the psychological implications of *credo*, see J.-C. Schmitt, "Du bon usage du *credo*," in *Faire croire: modalités de la diffusion et de la réception des messages religieux du XIIe au XVe siècle*. Collection de l'École Française de Rome 51 (Rome 1981) 337–61.

ALEXANDER III AND THE JERUSALEM CRUSADE AN OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND FAILURES

John G. Rowe

Alexander III inherited the Jerusalem crusade and all its responsibilities and problems. The crusade was by then a well established institution in Latin Christendom. It was generally accepted that the pope was the director of the crusade, the abettor of all its fortunes. This was no simple, easy task. For one thing, there was the legacy of the Second crusade.

The legacy was unfortunate. The expedition had been an ill-fated fiasco with many destructive consequences. While some survivors had returned breathing an air of pious resignation to the will of God, others were full of recriminations and accusations. These hostile sentiments spared no one—the Pope, Bernard of Clairveaux, the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Comnenus, to name only the most obvious candidates for criticism and blame. Most of all, popular opinion blamed the crusaders in the East and spoke darkly of treason at the walls of Damascus.¹ The papacy was quite aware of the dark cloud which hovered over the memory of the Second Crusade. From this unfortunate development, the papacy had learned caution. Large expeditions were rendered suspect.²

Yet the problem posed by the Jerusalem crusade did not end there. The failure of the Second Crusade had, as William of Tyre well knows, both heralded and initiated the decline of the Latin Orient itself.³ The myth of Frankish invincibility was shattered forever, and the collapse of this myth seemed illustrated by the defeat and death of Prince Raymond of Antioch at the Fountain of Murad on 29 June 1149.⁴ Added to this was the ignominious

¹ We should always remember that the Latin crusaders had adjusted to their eastern environment in ways which made them seem strange to westerners. See Fulcher of Chartres' famous passage, 3 37 in the edition by H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg 1913) 746–9. There are many analyses of the decline of favourable western opinion concerning the Jerusalem crusade after 1148. The latest is C. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades 1095–1588* (Chicago 1988) 37–8.

² Such seems a justifiable deduction from evidence: Hadrian IV JL 10546 dated 18 February 1159.

³ William of Tyre *Chronicon*, R. B. C. Huygens, ed. (Turnhout 1986) XVIII 9, 770–1.

⁴ William of Tyre, XVII 9, 771–2.

capture of Count Joscelin of Edessa in 1150.⁵ The news of these disasters, which seemed to presage an irreversible decline of the Latin Orient, was not long in reaching the West and the papacy. Indeed, it is at this time that we became aware of the letters sent from East to West, informing their recipients of unfavourable developments, depicting the general depressed state of the Latin Orient and asking for quick and effective aid. Only a fraction of the letters written have survived, to be enumerated in Röhricht's magisterial *Regesta*, and indeed much research should be done on their content, date and provenance.⁶ They are an important witness to what the crusaders thought of their condition and future prospects, opinions not lost on the pope and his cardinals. Clearly, the Latin Orient was financially and physically exhausted. It was lacking in leadership and hard pressed by the infidel. Above all, it was discredited in the West. Despite a brilliant success in the capture of Ascalon (19 August 1153), the crusaders faced a bleak, uncertain and dangerous future. However, the crusaders could not be abandoned by their mother, the Roman Church, and this meant that for Alexander and for many of his associates there now stretched before them a road of indeterminate duration, of agonized concern for the Christian cause in Syria-Palestine.

One response to the situation which emerged in the pontificate of Hadrian IV seems to have been for the papacy to intensify its support for the Military Orders. The Orders were riding the crest of a great wave of popularity and generosity. Exempt from the control of princes and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, subject only to the supervision of the pope, the Military Orders ensured that a small trickle of men and resources passed to the Latin East, a welcome transfusion of strength which would augment declining resources in the never-ending struggle against the infidel. We note the remarkable number of privileges for the Military Orders which remain for the years 1160–1165 which testify to the minute care lavished by the papal curia on the Orders. Then too there was the reissue of the great bulls, *Christianae fidei* and *Milites Templi*, which confirmed the exemption of the Orders from ecclesiastical and secular control and placed them under the direct jurisdiction of the pope alone.⁷ The papacy had a confidence in

⁵ William of Tyre, XVII 11, 774–5.

⁶ R. Röhricht, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* (Innsbruck 1893–1904) 261.

⁷ Critical texts for these great bulls may be found in R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in*

the Orders which it did not entertain towards the temporal and spiritual powers of Outremer. Whatever the Orders gathered of men and money in Latin Europe would be better used for the defence of the Holy places than if the same resources of men and treasure were handed over for use by the princes and ecclesiastics of the Latin Orient.⁸

The lack of papal confidence in the crusaders can be shown in still another way which was, from one point of view, a rebuke to the crusaders, and, from another, a demonstration to the crusaders that the Roman Church had not forgotten them and was working ceaselessly for their welfare. Judging that many of the difficulties of the Latin Orient had arisen because of a lack of papal supervision, the pope determined to provide for the visitation of the Latin East by papal representatives at least once every eight years. By papal decree, the archbishops of Genoa were commissioned to undertake this legatine responsibility accompanied by a cardinal of the Roman Church. However, there was more here than the understandable desire to strengthen the papal presence in the crusaders' states. For more than ten years, the Genoese had seen their privileges in the crusaders' states flouted by the king and princes of the Latin Orient. They had appealed to Rome for help, and Hadrian IV had written letters on their behalf. Alexander's decision to invest Genoa with the *legatio transmarina* was probably animated by his desire to support Genoa vis-à-vis the crusaders. He would teach them a salutary lesson. They had forgotten the great services which Genoa and other Italian maritime cities had rendered and were determined to divert to their own empty coffers some of the revenues which Genoa, by virtue of her privileged position, was extracting from the Latin Orient.⁹ In keeping with much informed opinion in western Europe, the pope saw the Latins as victims of their own short-sighted greed. He saw that Genoa was making a powerful

Göttingen, *Vorarbeiten zum Oriens Pontificius* 2 (Göttingen 1984) 67–103, 104–135.

⁸ It is in this context that we should read William of Tyre's wonderful account of the appeal by the Patriarch Fulcher to Hadrian IV against the Order of the Hospital, XVIII 3–8, 812–21.

⁹ Intimately related to these problems is the current debate on the golden inscription in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre which recorded the contributions which the Genoese made to the conquest of the Holy Land and the privileges which Baldwin I of Jerusalem had granted to them. A good statement of the discussion may be found in B. Z. Kedar, "Genoa's Golden Inscription in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre: A Case for the Defense," published in *Atti del Colloquio I Comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme*, A. Airal di and B. Z. Kedar, eds. (Genova 1986) 317–36.

contribution to the strength of the crusade. The pope was confident that he could see the issues; he was equally confident that the crusaders could not. They needed to be guided back into the paths of prudence and integrity. The appearance of the Archbishop of Genoa every eight years, armed with legatine power, would encourage this development.¹⁰

The Jerusalem crusade was a many-sided reality, and there was one aspect which, until now, we have not mentioned: the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire had long been regarded with suspicion by the Latin crusaders, and the Second Crusade had done little to improve the Greeks' reputation. Yet there were new developments. In the 1150s, the Emperor Manuel had been quick to note the weakness of Antioch and had slowly insinuated himself into the political life of the Latin principality. A decade of astute diplomacy reached its climax when at Easter, 1159, the Emperor occupied the great city on the Orontes for several days. Byzantine majesty, martial strength, opulence and lavish generosity now combined to vindicate imperial claims to suzerainty over Antioch. More, these events suggested to the crusaders that the Emperor might willingly assume the role of benevolent protector of the Latin Orient. The manifold signs of Greek beneficence and the desperate needs of the Latin Orient for a time overrode the traditional suspicion of the Greeks, and in 1159 a rapprochement between Greeks and Latins in the East seemed likely.¹¹

What would Alexander make of this new development? In times past, the Popes had often shared in the general Latin suspicion of the Byzantine Empire and its emperor, quick to see every Greek advance towards Antioch as naked aggression designed to rob Latin Christendom of those lands and churches which its sons had purchased from the infidel with their own blood and treasure.¹² Yet the Byzantine menace occasionally had further ramifications. The Emperor Manuel dreamed fitfully of the re-establishment of his power in Italy, a frightening prospect for both the papacy and its vassal, the Norman king of southern Italy

¹⁰ Pertinent documents may be found in R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Kirchen im Heiligen Lande, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Vorarbeiten zum Oriens Pontificius* 2 (Göttingen 1985) 214–16, 231–2, 256–8, 287–8, 289–90, 329.

¹¹ For anticipations of new attitudes and possible realignments, see J. G. Rowe, "Hadrian IV, the Byzantine Empire, and the Latin Orient," in *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke, eds. (Toronto 1969) 3–16.

¹² Consult JL 7883 being a letter of Innocent II dated 28 March (1138–1143) printed in R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden* III 168–9.

and Sicily. However, at the moment, such fears were passing away. A common antagonism against Frederick Barbarossa was pulling Greeks, Normans and the papacy slowly together.¹³ Mindful of the needs of the Latin Orient, the papacy now seemed disposed to regard the ascendancy of the Emperor Manuel over Antioch with more friendly eyes. Might not the Roman Church even allow itself to remember that possibility which went back to the origin of the Crusade movement and even before—the reconciliation of the Greek and Latin Churches?¹⁴

Thus it was that diplomatic exchanges between the pope and the Emperor Manuel began when Alexander formally requested that Manuel recognize him as pope. The course of these negotiations is hard to follow, and little wonder, given the abyss between the cultures of East and West, the vast distances involved, the time sequences which were interminable.¹⁵ Much evidence is missing, and the meaning of what remains is often not entirely clear. Much of the obscurity is to be traced to the fact that the Byzantine emperor was unduly fond of oral and secret diplomacy. Even so, we can discern something of the discussions which ensued. The astute emperor, ever quick to press his advantage, wanted to make the pope pay dearly for his acceptance of him as the legitimate pontiff. Accordingly, he countered Alexander's request for recognition with the suggestion that he, Manuel, might assume the imperial crown of the West. The Byzantine monarch would thus replace the excommunicated schismatic, Frederick Barbarossa. The proposal was a bold one, for it had many favourable and dangerous ramifications for all concerned. The pope could not but reflect on what the Normans of southern Italy might think. The Greeks were their ancient and inveterate enemies. Then too the Emperor Manuel saw in his own proposal a possible way of containing Frederick Barbarossa who had ambitions from time to time in eastern Europe. Yet, for all its

¹³ The latest authoritative research on the complicated relationships between the Byzantine East and the Latin West is to be found in *Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Peter Classen* assisted by C. J. Classen and J. Fried; J. Fleckenstein, ed. (Sigmaringen 1983).

¹⁴ The most convincing presentation of the role of Church union in the launching of the First Crusade is A. C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade—Success or Failure," *American Historical Review* 53 (1948), 235–250.

¹⁵ A way into these negotiations may be found in F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Ostromischen Reiches von 565–1453*; part two *Regesten von 1025–1204* (Munich-Berlin 1925) Nos 1438, 1445, 1450, 1451, 1457. The essentials of Manuel's foreign policies in both East and West (with all its subtle counterpoint) may be found in this section of Dölger's great Register.

ambiguous and dangerous implications, the imperial suggestion could not be lightly dismissed.

Beset by many quandries, and perhaps fearful that relations between Latins and Greeks in the East might deteriorate, the pope turned to Louis of France for guidance. The king advised the pope to raise the question of union between the Greek and Latin churches. The Greeks and Latins might thus find a new basis for co-operation against the infidel. The Emperor Manuel professed to receive this counter proposal with joy, and negotiations between East and West continued on in sporadic fashion. We may assume that there was a continuing exchange of letters and embassies. It was all a complicated game, a delicate, sophisticated gambit wherein Manuel Comnenus played with considerable relish and much panache the role of master of the revels. Perhaps nothing concrete emerged because it was so difficult in all this complexity to assign priorities and not lose them in a welter of innuendo, half-truth, suggestion, mutual misunderstanding as well as a real ignorance of the other's true intentions.

Alexander did not become discouraged. He continued to entertain the liveliest feelings of friendship for the Byzantine emperor who was his beloved son in Christ, the illustrious Emperor of Constantinople. He avoided the pejorative phrase "emperor of the Greeks." However, the news from the East was not encouraging. The working alliance between the crusaders and the Byzantine Empire did not live up to expectations. Even the splendours of Manuel's triumph in Antioch in the spring of 1159 could not hide the complexities of the relationship and its many tensions.¹⁶ Manuel's behaviour towards the Latin Orient left much to be desired. The negotiations which preceded his marriage to the Princess Maria of Antioch were tactless and insulting.¹⁷ Any joint military undertaking by the Greeks and the Latins seemed fated to be abortive.¹⁸ In many respects, Manuel consistently refused to act as a genuine ally of the crusaders. These facts must have been troublesome to the new king in Jerusalem. Amaury seems to have realized that if he were to pursue his ambitions in Egypt, he might have to leave Antioch to the hegemony of the Emperor Manuel. It would be a sign of the times when Manuel eventually in 1165 insinuated a Greek patriarch into Antioch, a

¹⁶ J. Kinnamos, *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*, translated by C. M. Brand (New York 1976) IV 21, 142-3.

¹⁷ William of Tyre XVIII 30-1, 855-7.

¹⁸ For example, the important defeat of the Christians at Harim in August 1164, William of Tyre XIX 9, 874-5.

development which infuriated some and frightened many more since it presaged the absorption of the principality into the empire.¹⁹ In the meantime, the emperor would keep the crusaders in a weakened condition, dependent on himself, serving all the while as a buffer between the empire and the power of the infidel. Clearly only his empire mattered, and Manuel cared not a whit for Latin feeling. Whatever course of action the crusaders might choose to follow—for example, the marriage of Amaury to the Greek princess Maria Comnena (29 August 1167)—by 1165 they were disillusioned, and the old suspicion of the Greeks revived. The entente between Manuel and the crusaders was not reaching fruition.

This mistrust of the Greeks and their own chronic weaknesses produced in the crusaders a state of unease which manifested itself in another spate of letters sent off during these years to the West. All these letters are marked by anxiety and pessimism. The vulgar allurements of earlier crusade *excitatoria* are replaced by an austere emphasis on the need for heroism and sacrifice. Addressed to Louis of France, the writers assure the king that the crusaders' states are his and by such flattery attempt to elicit from the king *consilium*, *auxilium* and *subsidium*. The letters betray a deep suspicion of the Greeks. Certainly the writers of the letters make no distinction between Greek and Moslem. Both are enemies. These letters were entrusted to emissaries, often men of high rank who are now to be found following disconsolately in the train of some great Latin prince or prelate, seeking aid and above all men who could go to the East and instil fresh courage in the crusaders.²⁰

However, it was clear that the needs of the Latin Orient were not being met. Despite all the papal attempts to succour the Latin East, the fortunes of the crusaders were in obvious decline. There was now no alternative but to do what Alexander had almost certainly contemplated from time to time, but until now he had refused to take the decisive step: he would issue an appeal for large-scale assistance to the Latin Orient even though that eventuality was made suspect by both experience and history. Nevertheless Christians must recognize the peril to the Holy Places. They must engage in a new effort to save the Latin Orient, and to this end Alexander published his first general crusade appeal

¹⁹ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge 1952–1954) 2 371.

²⁰ Röhrich, *RRH* Nos 382–4, 392, 394, 396, 399, 403–7, 410–41. No 410 seems particularly important.

on 14 July 1165, *Quantum praedecessores nostri*.²¹

The *incipit* of this bull tells us immediately where we are. We are back in the days of the Second Crusade, for this crusade bull, directed to all the faithful, is a reissue, with some emendations of the bull which Eugene III published December 1145—March 1146. Our first question therefore must be why the curia was content to use a bull whose basic thought and structure was twenty years old? The answer must lie in the conviction that the bull had been effective before. Perhaps it would be effective again. In other words, the use of *Quantum praedecessores nostri* was a response to what the papacy felt was a risky situation. Would there be any favourable response at all? The curia could not be sure since it was well aware of the bad reputation which hung over the Jerusalem crusade and the Latin Orient. The reissue of Eugene's bull was in itself a gesture of pessimism and lack of confidence. To realize this is to set the stage for a deeper penetration into the bull and its meaning.

We might well ask what was the occasion for the republication of *Quantum praedecessores nostri*. The bull is dark in tone, but then the news from the Latin Orient was bleak. Around the beginning of January 1165, a new and important embassy arrived from the Kingdom of Jerusalem which conveyed to the pope and his associates the latest developments in the struggle against the infidel. Much was made of Saladin's operations around Banyas and the attempts of the Latins to inhibit his threatening manoeuvres. These matters are discussed in a papal letter dated 20 January 1164–1165 to the Archbishop of Rheims.²² The pope begs Henry to receive the embassy generously and grant full support to its quest for alms and aid. We can guess that other messengers arrived in the first six months of 1165, all bearing tidings of Latin weakness in countering Saladin's attacks.²³ There was nothing new about this bad news. Yet its effect must have been cumulative. There had been the fall of Edessa, a passage which Alexander allows to stand in this new version of *Quantum praedecessores nostri*. It was valuable propaganda. Then there were his reflections on the fact that the Second Crusade, that great outpouring of religious enthusiasm, had done nothing to remedy the situation. In fact the débâcle had made matters worse thanks

²¹ JL 11218 PL 200, 384–6.

²² JL 11105 PL 200, 328.

²³ These messengers, including the Archbishop of Mamistra and high-ranking officials of the Military Orders, are mentioned in the letter cited in Röhricht and cited above in Note 20.

to the damage inflicted on the Latins' reputation. Why had this happened? The answer, which Alexander writes into the bull, was the hidden judgement of God. The pope is doubtless giving expression to his deepest religious convictions, but they are hardly the sort which might inspire a great new effort in the direction of the Latin East. The same judgement can be rendered on his observation that God is afflicting the Eastern Church.

However, all these feelings of loss and pessimism lead to the inner nerve of the papal anxiety. Just as Edessa was lost and remains lost, so the day may come when Antioch and Jerusalem will be lost and lost forever to Christendom. This is really what the pope is saying when he refers to the increasing fierceness of the heathen. The real papal fear is for Antioch and Jerusalem. Just how long this anxiety had been present in the papal court we cannot say. We can, however, say that some twenty years before the disaster at Hattin and the subsequent loss of Jerusalem, the highest counsels in Latin Christendom could contemplate the possibility that the holy shrines of the faith might once again be desecrated by the contaminations of the infidel.

The papal problem in reissuing this bull can now be stated: how to make Latin Christendom see just how dangerous the situation really was. The pope was well aware that many would say he was acting in an alarmist fashion. The fall of Jerusalem was a long way off. Nonetheless the papal reply to this was firm: better to act now than when it is too late, and Alexander redoubles his exhortations on behalf of the Eastern Church.

Once again, we sense a pessimism running through the pope's brave words like a thin line of blood. He pleads for a revival of Christian fortitude, implying that it has all but disappeared. But had it? Would it not have been better to say, with William of Tyre, that faith and commitment had declined, bringing a concomitant decline in fighting strength and vigour?²⁴ Doubtless, the emissaries from the East spoke of the decline to which William refers. It would have been particularly advantageous for the Military Orders to circulate such reports which in their turn underscored the importance, the necessity of the Orders.

The conclusion of *Quantum praedecessores nostri* sees the enumeration of the usual crusade privileges. Alexander's version offers nothing new here. Our final impression of this document must be that it is somewhat faded and worn. It was also unsuccessful. The bull did not stimulate significant numbers to go to the East

²⁴ William of Tyre XXI 7, 969–70.

to aid the embattled crusaders. Can this failure be explained by reference to the plain fact that the bull was dated and therefore ineffective? Probably not. The truth is that circumstances in European society had changed. The overwhelming response to Urban's appeal arose from the fact that Latin civilization was then maturing and expanding at great speed, generating enthusiasm in all its myriad activities. Spiritual ideals and the possibility of adventure beckoned; new lands to conquer tempted the needy and the ambitious. In the case of the Second Crusade, we should not denigrate the effect of Bernard of Clairveaux. His hallucinatory rhetoric and pithy observations whirled men into a delirium of enthusiasm. This time there was no Bernard to ring the changes on the marvellous opportunities for forgiveness and salvation which the crusade opened to all believers.

It must certainly be significant that we know of no papal plan to disseminate the message of *Quantum praedecessores nostri*. Perhaps we can go further and suggest that the lack here may well point to a still larger lacuna in planning. Was there behind the bull a plan for a new expedition to Jerusalem? The silence of our sources suggests that this was not so. In other words, there were tactics, but there was no strategy. The pope seems to have been following ad hoc procedures: strengthen this! support that! There were no new directions because there was no new policy.

It may well be that the continuing struggle with Frederick Barbarossa inhibited the pope in his hopes for a new Jerusalem crusade. If a larger expedition had materialized, what manipulations might the schismatic emperor inflict upon it? Here was more pessimism! When we contemplate this papal bull in itself and in its historical setting, we may well feel that Christian Europe also sensed the pessimism. Would not therefore an appropriate response be the postponement of a decision and the opinion that what would be, would be?

Quantum praedecessores nostri did not create a large expedition for the Latin East. While many individuals felt summoned to offer themselves for the crusade, the bull was received with something amounting to a collective indifference. However, thanks to the papal bull and other revelations of the weaknesses of the Latin Orient, there was a greater concern to provide for the financial needs of the crusaders. Hence in England the tax of 1166.²⁵ Of great importance is the fact that Alexander seems to

²⁵ For a lively and suggestive treatment of active interest and participation in the crusade in England in the reign of Henry II, see Tyerman 36–52, esp

have concluded from the relative failure of *Quantum praedecessores nostri* that from now on papal crusade policy would have to be based on astute political calculation. This insight, already clear to others, suggested that the continuing hostility between Louis of France and Henry of England had prevented many from making appropriate responses to the needs of the Latin Orient. The pope now determined to follow the paths of diplomacy and in 1167, he sent two cardinals north of the Alps. The legates, who were noted for their skill in diplomatic negotiations, were commissioned to reconcile not only Henry II and the exiled Archbishop, Thomas Becket, but also to create peace between Henry and Louis of France.²⁶ The pope thus hoped to forward plans to recruit adequate military assistance to the Latin Orient. This was a decisive development in the history of papal crusade policy. The details of their mission have not been preserved although certainly the cardinals failed to achieve all of their goals. Nonetheless, a precedent had been set for the future.

The Latin Orient perhaps knew something about the pope's difficulties.²⁷ The failure of the pope's crusade exhortation may explain why the number of appeals from the East declines significantly. Yet the possibility of a working alliance with the Greeks still beckoned. The marriage of King Amaury to the Princess Anna Comnena facilitated a proposal that the Greeks and the Latins undertake a joint expedition against Egypt. The crusaders offered Manuel a tempting reward: he could have a free hand in Antioch and a share of the spoils.²⁸ The emperor must have been deeply gratified. The weakness of the Latins was driving them into his hands. His success here encouraged him to take a fresh look at his relations with the West. His agents were active in Italy, especially with the Italian maritime cities. To the pope he sent the *sebastos* Jordan of Capua asking for the union of the Greek and Latin churches and the bestowal of the imperial crown. To this now familiar proposal the *sebastos* added a promise of men and money which the pope would find useful in coping with his many Italian problems. Yet the price was high since the scheme might ultimately hand Italy back to the

46. The fundamental article remains H. E. Mayer, "Henry II of England and the Holy Land," *English Historical Review* 97 (1982) 721–739.

²⁶ There are a series of letters cited in JL 11343–11345, 11348, 11359, 11360.

²⁷ It may be appropriate here to point out that none of the great crusade bulls of Alexander III appear in the *Chronicon* of William of Tyre. The great historian's attitude towards Alexander requires further study.

²⁸ Dölger No 1481, 1483 dated end of 1167 with references.

Byzantine Empire—long a dream of Manuel Comnenus—and make the papacy a dependency of the Byzantine emperor.²⁹

Alexander was uncertain as to what course of action to follow. The matter was *alta et valde perplexa*, and in the end the pope offered little more than evasive answers.³⁰ Not even the needs of the papacy in its struggle with Frederick Barbarossa, not even the natural desire to reconcile the Greek and Latin churches, not even the need for co-operation between Greeks and Latins for the sake of the crusade could overcome the papal fear of becoming a Byzantine dependency.

Parallel to papal fear and suspicion are the crusaders' fears of co-operation with the Greeks. The Latins decided once again to attempt to procure aid from the West. A great embassy under the leadership of the Patriarch Aimery of Jerusalem was sent out only to be turned back by storm and shipwreck. In superstitious despair, the ambassadors judged the disaster to be a sign of divine wrath. Only two prelates, Frederick of Tyre and John of Banyas, could be found to continue the mission.³¹ Arriving before Alexander, they explained the imperilled condition of the Latin Orient in great detail. The pope saw that his worst fears were realized. Alarmed he did what he could to ensure the success of the embassy, and to that end on 20 July 1169, he issued a new crusade bull, *Inter omnia quae*.³²

This crusade bull is an original piece of writing. In part, it is a skilfully designed theological and ethical treatise which expounds the religious basis for participation in the crusade. For the rest, it is a reiteration of the basic privileges of the crusader. There are new refinements in the proclamation of the plenary indulgence which seem calculated to clean up misunderstandings as well as attract new volunteers for the Lord's service.

The theology of *Inter omnia* has two principal themes. The first is the theme of charity whose exercise is salvific. Indeed, divine providence has arranged special opportunities for the manifestation of charity which testifies to the imprint of divine piety on the individual soul. Animated by charity, one does not live to oneself but rather gives his life for others. A signal example of this charity is to relieve with aid the dire necessity of the Eastern Church. Nothing is more glorious in virtue, nothing is more

²⁹ Dölger No 1480 the mission (1167) to Alexander, with many references.

³⁰ Consult Boso's life of Alexander II 419–20 (L. Duchesne edition) of the *Liber Pontificalis*.

³¹ William of Tyre XX 12, 926.

³² JL 11637 PL 200, 599–601.

meritorious of a reward. The basic continuity of this theme with some of the fundamental convictions of Urban II and Eugene III is striking.

The theme of charity passes easily into the second leit motif which is the theme of Christian sacrifice taken from the writings of St. Paul. The central image, of course, is the image of the Founder, raised on the gallows of a cross, who died for others as a sacrifice well pleasing to God. Rising again, He elicits appropriate responses of self-sacrifice from the believers. Those who respond do not live to themselves but rather to Him and his brethren. The crusade is the illustration par excellence of this self-sacrifice. The sins of many had been the occasion for the loss of the *terra sancta* to heathen hands. Only by the sacrifices of many Latins, by the shedding of much blood has it been restored to the worship of the divine Name, to access by believers to the Holy Places, the sanctuaries adorned by the presence of Christ.

The very thought of the Holy places brings to the surface of *Inter omnia* the deep anxieties of the papacy over the current dangerous situation in the Latin Orient. There have been military reverses; there is the never-ending labour producing a profound exhaustion; the energies of a diminished population have been depleted. The position of the Eastern Church is therefore precarious, for the crusaders can neither resist the fierce onslaughts of the heathen nor are they strong enough to counter-attack. Assistance is urgently needed. If fraternal charity (Bernard of Clairveaux!) does not come to the aid of the oppressed Latins, there is extreme danger. The possible loss of the *terra sancta* is assumed throughout *Inter omnia*. We can surmise that this was the message of the embassy which had arrived from the East, led by Frederick, Archbishop of Tyre and John, Bishop of Banyas. The preceptor of the Hospital and a certain nobleman were also part of Frederick's entourage. The members of the embassy were adamant and forthright: help was needed *now* that the Latin Orient might be saved. Many warriors should go to the East; many should help with their resources.

The usual papal privileges and protection for the crusaders are announced. Of particular interest is the reiteration of the plenary indulgence, here described as a remission of penances. Those who serve the king and princes of the Latin Orient for two years, assuming suitable spiritual accompaniments, will receive the remission of their sins. Put differently, although he is doing what Urban and Eugene had done, the pope is not content to describe

the indulgence as a *remissio peccatorum*, an all-inclusive but inexact phrase much beloved by preachers. He attempts to be more precise. We see that participation in the crusade will be the concluding act of a process which begins with contrition for sin, leading on to confession and absolution, then followed with the performance of appropriate penances now replaced by participation in the crusade. The entire process effectively purges you from sin and sets you on the road leading out of the ordeals of this life—which the pope likens to a prison—into the infinite expanse of eternal life. Thus defined, a reverent and proper participation in the crusade brings *remissio peccatorum* and eternal life in heaven.³³

We do not know if the pope made any provision for the dissemination of *Inter omnia*, a bull addressed to all the faithful. We can, however, say that the bull is a piece of coruscating rhetoric which would strain the latinity of all but the highly educated. Therefore just how Latin Christendom would have coped with its balanced, glittering cadences is not at all clear. Perhaps the immediate purpose of *Inter omnia* was to be given to Frederick of Tyre and his associates. They might need something to show around, to read from at suitable moments. It may well be that the issuance of the bull was the least the pope could do to mark the arrival of such a distinguished embassy bringing an important message demanding immediate response.

The bull did not travel alone into the world. Alexander added a companion letter addressed to Henry, Archbishop of Rheims and brother to Louis of France.³⁴ *Cum gemitus* opens with the observation that the ears of the Church should be open to all cries of tribulation, especially those expressive of the pain of the Eastern Church. Just as we are recipients of divine compassion, so we should show compassion for the sufferings of Eastern Christians. Is not the Christian East the heart of the Christian community, the place where our spiritual food and drink first originated? There is now a moment of extreme crisis. The Eastern church cannot defend itself against the fierceness of the heathen. We could add that the mission of Frederick of Tyre has had its effect. The critical condition of the Latin East cannot be ignored or evaded.

The pope has specific commands for Henry. The archbishop

³³ There is a careful discussion of the exact meaning of the indulgence in H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, translated by J. Gillingham (Oxford 1972) 32–40.

³⁴ JL 11638 PL 200, 601–2.

should persuade the King of France to hold a council of clergy and laity which will decide what aid is to be given, who is to go to the East, who is to provide material resources. This letter thus goes beyond *Inter omnia*. The clergy are to take the lead in recruiting for the crusade. Together with the French nobility and the king, they will decide who should go to the East and who should give support out of their own resources. Henry is to undertake the organization of these proceedings. He has the pope's authority and should act as his representative.

It would seem that there was to be a preparatory conference before the convening of the council of the kingdom. This will be Henry's responsibility as the bearer of papal authority, a responsibility he will share with the other metropolitans of the kingdom. What indeed is to be done to bolster the defence and security of the Eastern Church? How is this to be carried out? The archbishops should consult the papal letters—presumably Alexander is referring to *Inter omnia*—and see the papal promises on the remission of penances, i.e., the plenary indulgence, the protections offered for families and possessions. The pope concludes with an expression of determination to see to the fulfilment of the Church's obligations to the crusaders.

Cum gemitus reveals a pope set upon action. It suggests that Alexander has lost confidence in the efficacy of general appeals alone, even as persuasive and cogent an exhortation as *Inter omnia*. Not only was the temporal power to be enlisted in aiding the Latin East, but also decisive leadership was to be given by the pope and higher clergy of France in the recruitment of the right military leaders and the deployment of available resources.

Unfortunately we know little about the course of Frederick's mission and the effect of the papal directives. We hear nothing about special activity undertaken by Henry of Rheims. We have no report on the proposed council of the kingdom. Perhaps it never occurred. Certainly we have no direct report on the attitudes of Louis of France. All in all, it is hard to know if anything concrete came of Frederick's mission or the bull *Inter omnia*. William of Tyre makes it seem as if Frederick returned to the East empty handed. He presents Frederick's two-year sojourn in the West as achieving nothing.³⁵ Frederick's report of his visit must have stressed the indifference of Europe and the ineffectiveness of papal appeals, thus contributing much to the desperation of the crusaders.

³⁵ William of Tyre XX 25, 947.

Misfortune continued to dog the Latin Orient. The much-anticipated, much-delayed joint expedition with the Greeks against Egypt proved a costly failure.³⁶ As if this were not enough, an earthquake inflicted heavy damage in Syria in June 1170.³⁷ The only consolation for the Latins in Antioch was that this natural disaster carried off the hated intruder, the Greek Patriarch Athanasius.³⁸

As if emboldened by disaster, King Amaury decided on a state visit to Constantinople whose purpose would be to obtain promises of future aid from the Emperor Manuel. The visit took place in the spring of 1171. Unaware that dazzling the barbarians was an ancient Byzantine stratagem, the king and his retinue fell captive to Manuel's condescension and courtesy. The emperor promised to participate in another expedition against Egypt, but he purposely refused to commit himself to concrete plans. Amaury, however, was persuaded by these vague promises and returned to Jerusalem in high spirits.³⁹

Yet, as the months passed, the king slowly perceived that Manuel had no real intention of assisting the crusaders. His reluctant recognition of this fact coincided with his sorrowful acceptance of another misfortune: Baldwin, his son and heir, was suffering from leprosy.⁴⁰ In the event of Amaury's death, the Latin Orient would be left without an effective monarch. Amaury therefore wearily turned back to the task of obtaining aid from the West. Guided perhaps by Frederick of Tyre and others, the king concluded that the task was hopeless unless the quarrel between Louis of France and Henry of England was resolved. To that end, Amaury sent off Bernard, Bishop of Lydda. The bishop was instructed to visit the pope to gain assistance in the great task of reconciling the Angevins and the Capetians.⁴¹

When Bernard appeared before the pope, Alexander must have felt that the hour had finally struck for providing effective aid to the *terra sancta*. He had recently made some progress with Henry II. As part of his penance for his involvement in the murder of Thomas Becket, the King of England promised to support two hundred soldiers for one year of service with the Templars. He also promised to go to the East for three years. He had made

³⁶ William of Tyre XX 14–17, 927–34.

³⁷ William of Tyre XX 18, 934–5.

³⁸ Runciman 2 389.

³⁹ William of Tyre XX 22–4, 940–6.

⁴⁰ William of Tyre XXI 1, 961–2.

⁴¹ Röhrich *RRH* Nos 497–9 dated summer 1173.

these promises in May 1172. More than a year later he was procrastinating, giving as his excuse his quarrels with his sons and with Louis of France.⁴² Perhaps the advent of Bernard of Lydda would persuade Henry to end his evasions and go to Jerusalem. To smooth the bishop's way into France, the pope composed yet another letter to Henry of Rheims, dated 23 December 1173, *Non sine gravi*.⁴³

The letter undoubtedly reflects the reports given by Bernard of Lydda. Defeat, ruin, desolation, a crippling sense of helplessness—these are some of the words which come to mind when we study this letter, a veritable lament for the *terra sancta*: his picture of a Christian settlement about to be submerged in a rising heathen tide, his grasp of the encircling power of Saladin and the Latin inability to resist. If only peace could be obtained between Louis and Henry, all *Christianitas* would benefit.⁴⁴ The pope is counting on Henry to pursue this goal and bring it closer to fruition. Is not Henry the brother of the King of France? Peace will enable Louis to succour the *terra sancta*. More, Henry should attempt to find help within his own province, from both clergy and laity. The conclusion of the letter is replete with exhortations to hear the messages brought by Bernard and his companions. The papal pessimism is strongly marked.

There is another papal document, *Ingemiscimus et dolemus*, which may belong at this point in our narrative. The eighteenth-century antiquarian, Thomas Hearne, printed a letter in curial style whose transmission has left it without precise identification.⁴⁵ The recipient of the letter is clear from its contents: Louis of France. Yet its date and provenance remain obscure. While several suggestions have been made as to whose pontificate it belongs, I am inclined with Schwerin and Hiestand to place it here.⁴⁶ Its sombre, anguished tone suggests a kinship with the other papal letters we have or are about to examine. Perhaps, and more cogently, several of its phrases are similar to phrases in *Non sine gravi*. However, the scope of its lamentation is far broader than *Non sine gravi*. The papal concern is for more than the damaging war

⁴² Tyerman 43–7.

⁴³ JL 12247 PL 200, 927–8.

⁴⁴ This is a theme which appears, often with great power, in Alexander's correspondence during this period. An example would be JL 12236 dated 28 August 1173, PL 200, 962–3.

⁴⁵ JL 15924, placed in error, I think, under Urban III.

⁴⁶ U. Von Schwerin, *Die Aufrufe der Päpste zur Befreiung des Heiligen Landes von den Anfängen bis zum Ausgang Innozenz IV* (Berlin 1937) 76–80 and tables. The text receives its definitive edition in R. Hiestand, *Papsturkunden* III 275–7.

between Louis and Henry. The repeated *angustias* of the Roman Church, the protracted struggles in Spain elicit Alexander's concern as does the generally unsettled state of Christendom. Yet more than this the papal tears and mourning are reserved for the *terra sancta*, that land adorned by Christ's physical presence, that land of holy places dear to the hearts of all believers. Their profanation by the infidel seems, in this letter, more imminent than ever before. Seemingly nothing can restrain the boldness and hostility of the heathen who are bent on obliterating the Christian name. The implication is clear: the heathen will triumph unless effective aid is given at once. The urgency of the papal tone shows that in 1173–1174 the pope was profoundly disturbed by the firsthand reports he had received from the Latin Orient. As if in a vision, he saw what was happening. *Ingemiscimus et dolemus* is his personal cry of anguish, an anguish all the deeper for a feeling of essential helplessness. Yet there were occasional stirrings of hope. Sometime in the first six months of 1174, Alexander sent the experienced Cardinal Peter of San Grisogono to pursue the grand task of reconciling Louis and Henry. If only they could be persuaded that their enmity was inimical to the survival of the Latin Orient!⁴⁷

Even more promising was news from Manuel Comnenus. The emperor had forgotten his commitment to participate in yet another expedition against Egypt. He now preferred to take decisive action nearer to home, and in 1175 he set in motion a great campaign against the Sultan of Iconium. At first, success attended him, and the imperial armies penetrated deep into Asia Minor. Elated by his victories, the emperor wrote Alexander urging him to encourage the faithful of Latin Europe to fight with him in the glorious cause.⁴⁸ Urban's vision of Greeks and Latins united in the common struggle against the infidel seemed to be a reality at last, and on January 29, 1176, Alexander informed the Cardinal Peter, still working north of the Alps, of the emperor's courage and victorious progress. The legate was directed to exhort all and sundry to join the emperor in the East.⁴⁹ We know of no response to the cardinal's exhortations. What we do know is that on 17 September 1176, the Byzantine army was destroyed at Myriocephalum.⁵⁰ Thus ended the last great demonstration of Byzantine

⁴⁷ JL 12370 PL 200, 98–7.

⁴⁸ Dölger No 1520, with references.

⁴⁹ JL 12684 PL 200, 1063–4.

⁵⁰ For an authoritative interpretation of Manuel's initiatives at this time, which culminated in the defeat at Myriocephalum, see R.-J. Lilie, *Byzanz und die*

military strength. There was no recovery from this disaster, and the emperor spent his declining years burdened by the anguished memory of his defeat and humiliation.⁵¹ The news of Myriocephalum caused Alexander to lose both interest and hope. His attitude towards the Greeks hardened, particularly when the Greeks continued to demonstrate their ambition in Italy and Syria. When Manuel attempted to maintain his influence over Antioch, the pope in 1178 wrote to the Antioch clergy and laity urging them to stand firm against Greek aggression.⁵² The Greeks now had nothing positive to contribute to the crusade, and they could not be allowed to enmesh Antioch in their own weakness. In the West, the pope continued his labours on behalf of the crusade but with weariness and frustration. As before, it was upon the Military Orders that the pope expended most of his activity. Even though the growing hostility against the Orders finally erupted at the Third Lateran Council and the papacy was compelled to place some restraints on their expansion,⁵³ the pope refused to slacken his zeal to increase the strength of the Orders. They were, in his judgement, the chief bulwark against Saladin. At the beginning of his pontificate, Alexander had favoured the Orders because he had doubts about the loyalty of the Latin Orient. He now continued his favour because he recognized clearly the weakness of the crusaders' states. It is within this context that we may mention Alexander's famous letter to the Sultan of Iconicum, urging his conversion to Christianity, surely a counsel of despair. Only the Templars enkindled the pope's enthusiasm and hope, and it was for them that he issued his final crusade appeal, *Cor nostrum et*, dated 16 January 1181. This grand encyclical is directed to all the faithful, especially the laity, the princes and other leaders. It is significant that *Cor nostrum et* was accompanied by another papal letter, *Cum orientalis terra*, addressed to the hierarchy of the Church.⁵⁴ Many of the themes of both letters are well known to us by now: the inability of the crusaders' states

Kreuzfahrstaaten (München 1981) 200–11 which should, however, be read as a supplement to Runciman's brilliantly vivid account of the famous disaster, 2 412–14. Some of the details in the report of William of Tyre (XXI 12, 976–7) have a verisimilitude which indicates that William had access to the accounts of eye-witnesses.

⁵¹ William of Tyre.

⁵² JL 13019–130120 with references.

⁵³ *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta* curantibus J. Alberigo et al., edidit Instituto per le Scienze Religiose, editio tertia (Bologna 1973) *Concilium Lateranense III–1179* canon no 9, 215–16.

⁵⁴ JL 14360, PL 200, 1294–7.

to resist the heathen; the imminent danger of profanation by the infidel of those places adorned by Christ's physical presence; the threat to the honour of the Christian name. We feel that the pope and his cardinals are persuaded that the final collapse is near. The pope emphasizes that the *orientalis terra* is lacking in competent leadership. As a special example, Alexander refers to Baldwin the Leper, struck down, the pope is persuaded, by the just judgement of God. On a more human note, the pope refers to the king's incapacity to govern, to the condition which has crucified his body, thus leaving no doubt as to the agony being endured by the unfortunate monarch. We are assured that the calamities which have befallen the *orientalis terra* have been occasioned by Latin sin, and nowhere does the pope intimate that such an explanation really begs the question as to why the Latin Orient has fallen on such evil days. In more positive fashion, the pope summons the rhetoric of Paul the Apostle to persuade Christian men to assume the burdens of the Jerusalem pilgrimage. The basic Christian equation—the sacrifice of Christ is to be answered by the sacrifice of Christians—is brought out to good effect, and the usual rewards and privileges are announced much after the pattern established in *Inter omnia*. In an attempt to counter indifference and apathy, the pope includes in *Cum orientalis terra* the request that the clergy read his crusade letters to their congregations, taking care to explain what the letters really mean. They should also take care to insure that the right sort of Christian warrior should undertake the journey. There is a note of selectivity here. The pope wants only those who will remedy the deficiencies of the Latin Orient to offer themselves for service.

When we study these documents, we sense the powerful, urgent concern of the curia to head off disaster by effective appeals to the conscience of Christian Europe. To that end, at the close, the papal writers summon all their rhetorical power to enunciate the Christian eschatology which offers a secure escape from the prison of this life. Heavenly joys beckon those who love God.

The letters were confided to the Templars who would bring not only these papal missives but also letters from and verbal reports about the dangerous conditions obtaining in the Latin Orient. The pope is clearly pinning his hopes for the future on the popularity which the Templars enjoyed in Christian Europe. He seems convinced that if a favourable response is to be had at all it will be given to the Templars. Yet there was little response. The pope died a few months later (30 August 1181).

Perhaps he realized at the end that his efforts to save Jerusalem had been unavailing.

Alexander, however, cannot be blamed for the fall of Jerusalem in 1181. We might criticize his seemingly uncritical support for the Military Orders, especially in view of the increasingly ambiguous role which they played in the closing years of the First Kingdom. Or again, we might find fault with his defence of Genoese rights. In this case, the pope failed to see that the Italian maritime cities were leeches on the economic life of Outremer. Yet all these criticisms do is to remind us that the great pope's appraisal of the problems of the Latin Orient seems to us superficial. He could not see that the Latin Orient was irredeemably flawed in its economic foundations and political organization. Neither he nor twelfth-century western civilization had reached the degree of intellectual sophistication required for such an appraisal. Even if he had had the requisite insight, what action could Alexander have taken to correct the situation? The Latin Orient was a colony of western Europe, and western Europe had not reached the level of political and economic maturity required to support such a colony. We cannot therefore blame the twelfth-century papacy for the downfall of Outremer.

Yet, when we study the above record of events and developments, we become poignantly aware of possibilities missed which, had they been grasped and successfully followed through, might have changed the course of crusade history. Chief among these, of course, is the failure of relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Latins. The ebb and flow of these relations is difficult to chart, for the evidence is most fragmentary and often obscure in meaning. A judgement at once just and sympathetic is most difficult, probably impossible to achieve. Nonetheless it is perhaps possible to suggest that the pious ambition of the Emperor Manuel to restore his empire in both East and West was unrealistic and, as events proved, ultimately self-destructive. Had he sought and obtained more realistic goals with both the papacy and the crusaders, Jerusalem might have been saved and the day of reckoning averted. Unfortunately, Manuel's faith in the mythologies of the imperial Byzantine tradition prevented him from pursuing more practical goals which might have yielded more positive results.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The leading apologist for Byzantine conduct towards the Latin Orient is S. Runciman who, however, presents a sharply critical but telling appraisal of Manuel's reign, *A History of the Crusades*, 2 426.

‘IMĀD AL-DĪN AL-ISFAHĀNĪ ADMINISTRATOR, LITTERATEUR AND HISTORIAN

Donald S. Richards

‘Imād al-Dīn was a man of many parts and solid achievements, a man of varied experience in times of stirring events. His career brought him to the heart of those great events, close to the great men who shaped them. Yet he was no mere reflector of events. Rightly or wrongly he saw himself as an important actor in them, a necessary part in their unfolding. He gives us therefore a good deal of himself in his writings. His egotism is not distasteful, certainly not to one who finds a fascination in the eighteenth-century diarist, James Boswell. After all, to be interesting to others one has to be somewhat interested in oneself.¹

Of course, it goes without saying that every life has its uniqueness, its particularity—and that is important. But ‘Imād al-Dīn was very recognisably one of a type, however successful and productive he may have been as an individual. We may take ‘Imād al-Dīn as a heightened exemplar of the occupations, attitudes,

¹ The following abbreviations have been used:

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| Barq | ‘Imād al-Dīn, <i>al-Barq al-Shāmī</i> , ed. Ramazan Sheshen (Istanbul 1979) vol. v. |
| Fath | ‘Imād al-Dīn, <i>Kitāb al-Fath [al-Faiḥ] al-Qussī fī l-Fath al-Qudsī</i> , ed. Carlo de Landberg (Leiden 1888). |
| Mufarrij | Ibn Wāsil, <i>Mufarrij al-Kurūb fī Akhbār Banī Ayyūb</i> , ed. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl (Cairo 1953–77). |
| Khall. | Ibn Khallikān, <i>Wafayāt al-A‘yan etc.</i> , ed. Ihsān ‘Abbās (Beirut 1977). |
| Khar. (S) | ‘Imād al-Dīn, <i>Kharidat al-Qasr wa-Jaridat al-‘Aṣr</i> (Syrian poets), ed. Shukrī Faiṣal (Damascus 1955–68) 4 vols. |
| Khar. (I) | op. cit. (Iraqi poets), eds. Muḥammad Bahjat al-Atharī and Jamīl Sa‘īd (Baghdad 1955–1981) 4 vols. & suppl. |
| Rawd (B) | Abū Shāma, <i>Kitāb al-Rawḍatayn fī Akhbār al-Dawlatayn</i> , Būlāq ed. (Cairo 1870). |
| Sana | al-Bundarī, <i>Sanā’ al-Barq al-Shāmī</i> , ed. Ramazan Sheshen (Beirut, Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadid 1971) vol. i. |
| Sana (C) | al-Bundarī, <i>Sanā’ al-Barq al-Shāmī</i> , ed. Fathiyya al-Nabarāwī (Cairo, Maktabat al-Khanjī 1979). |
| Zubda | al-Bundarī, <i>Zubdat al-Nuṣra etc.</i> , ed. M.T. Houtsma, <i>Recueil de textes relatifs à l’histoire des Seljoucides</i> (Leiden 1889). |

and predilections of a whole class, that of the *kātib*, the scholar-secretary. He was indeed known as al-Kātib al-Isfahānī, the Secretary from Isfahan.

This sobriquet reminds us that the man whom we are considering for his role in twelfth-century Syria was of Persian origin, born in Isfahan. However, higher religious and literary culture in Islam was unitary and 'Imād al-Dīn's career split between the eastern and the western parts of the Fertile Crescent was not untypical of the age. His move was one amongst many to-and-fro movements of personnel. There may well have been local problems for 'Imād al-Dīn in Syria, but they were of a different order, a matter of detailed differences in administrative practice and of personal rivalries. None of these touched his membership of the over-arching *kātib* class. Syria was one field of activity open to the talents of its members, even though 'Imād al-Dīn may have continued to believe that true fame and material success lay in the orbit of Baghdad.²

So what of his early formative life? He was born in July or October 1125 into a family of some standing.³ His uncle, al-'Azīz [Abū Naṣr Aḥmad ibn Ḥāmid], was an important official of the Seljuq Sultan Maḥmud. Even though he was executed in 1132, the prestige of his memory and his former contacts were of great advantage to 'Imād al-Dīn's career. A friendship made in Iraq between al-'Azīz and the brothers Ayyūb and Shīrkūh, respectively the father and uncle of Saladin, reminds us that the Ayyūbid family fortunes also started in the East. The memory of that friendship gave 'Imād al-Dīn a ready entrée to influential circles when he eventually came to Syria.

When he was about 15 (1139–40) he moved to Baghdad with his father, who was seeking asylum, and entered the famous law school for Shāfi'is founded by Nizām al-Mulk, the Nizāmiyya madrasa.⁴ One of his exact contemporaries there was a member of the Shahrazūri family of qadis and administrators prominent in Zengid and Ayyūbid history. During the next fifteen years he continued to study, although three of those years were spent studying jurisprudence in a more recently opened madrasa, the Thaqafiyya 'on the river bank below the Caliphal Palace',⁵ and also to travel widely, for example to Mosul, back to Isfahan, and

² E.g. Sana 198; Sana (C) 92.

³ Khar. (S) ii 330; Khall. v 152. His full name: Abū Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥāmid.

⁴ Khar. (I) ii 53, (S) ii 93 & 330.

⁵ Khar. (I) i 144–5.

to Mecca on pilgrimage. He was certainly already collecting material for his large-scale anthology of contemporary and near contemporary poets with brief biographical notices on each. In this endeavour he was following a series of predecessors, but he is noteworthy for his zeal in recording the dates and places, when and where he obtained his material, and for the energy and persistence with which he asked for copies of individual's work so that his work could be as comprehensive as possible.

The first official employment we know about came in 1157, when he was 32. He was sent to administer Wāsit and also Basra,⁶ first in a subordinate position but then in full charge, of financial matters too, on behalf of the famous Vizier, Ibn Hubaira.⁷ After the execution of his uncle, his father had sworn an oath never again to serve a sultan or hold government office.⁸ Did this have an early effect on 'Imād al-Dīn? Was he perhaps destined in the first place for a religious career? Does the family experience explain the comment about his first appointment: "He [i.e. Ibn Hubaira] transferred me from the madrasa to government office and put an end to my preoccupation with religious studies, and thought that by his employing me he had adorned my plain existence."⁹ He certainly was capable of, and did return to, teaching at later stages of his life, and from 1172 held the post of mudarris (professor) in a Damascus madrasa.¹⁰

For eight years, from 1157 to 1165, he was to-and-fro between lower Iraq and Baghdad. Incidentally his personal history nearly came to an end in January 1163 when, travelling down river, his barge hit a floating palm trunk, capsized, and he almost drowned.¹¹

His close association with the Vizier Ibn Hubaira is not without significance for 'Imād al-Dīn's later career, because the vizier corresponded with Nūr al-Dīn and they shared the same religio-political aims,¹² the establishment of a strong Sunni state, no accommodation with heterodox Islam, especially the Ismā'īlīs, but every attempt to heal the differences in the Sunni fold, the destructive factionalism and local power struggles which had been a feature of the last century or more. 'Imād al-Dīn's connection

⁶ Khar. (I) i 39; iv 365.

⁷ Sana 95.

⁸ Zubda 181.

⁹ Zubda 255.

¹⁰ Khall. v 149.

¹¹ Khar. (I) iv 768.

¹² Ibn Rajab, *Dhail 'alā ṭabaqāt al-Hanābila* (Cairo 1952) i, 258, 279–90. Cf. N. Elisséeff, *Nūr ad-Dīn* etc. (Damascus 1967) 603, 750.

with Ibn Hubaira may well have contributed to his finding a new niche in Syria with Nūr al-Dīn.

Ibn Hubaira died in March 1165. This led to the fall of all his protégés—and by June ‘Imād al-Dīn found himself imprisoned in Baghdad, but only for a month or so.¹³ In his own words: “Thank God, no disaster assailed me and no calamity descended on me, while I devoted myself to the canon-lawyers and benefited from discussion and disputing with them.”¹⁴ In other words he knew when to keep a low profile. Two years later, at the age of 41, he eventually moved to Syria.

He came to Damascus in May or June 1167¹⁵ and by the autumn was in the service of Nūr al-Dīn. Initially he was helped by the Qadi of Damascus, Kamāl al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, the father of his fellow-student from the Nizāmiyya. Kamāl al-Dīn effected his introduction to Nūr al-Dīn.¹⁶ In that sphere where literary values dominated, it was the presentation of a panegyric ode which gained ‘Imād al-Dīn a post in Nūr al-Dīn’s chancery. Then, because of the former family connection, Ayyūb and Shirkūh sought him out for their patronage and soon, according to ‘Imād al-Dīn, a firm friendship with Saladin followed. This was the time of the expeditions to Egypt, to which area the centre of Ayyūbid family interests soon moved.

‘Imād al-Dīn claims to have had no experience of chancery scribal work at this stage. Perhaps this was true, because he had been engaged in long years of study and then provincial administration. No stranger to false modesty he writes: “I had thought the craft of secretary, especially in the chancery, difficult, until I read the letters and documents coming in from other parts and found them very feeble.”¹⁷ He proceeds to claim to have thrown off old fashions, to have devised a new style, with which he ‘bewitched and astounded’ rulers from Persia to Egypt. We may doubt such immediate success, especially as in another context he recognizes his great debt to the example of al-Fāḍil, Saladin’s chief secretary.

In due course his standing with Nūr al-Dīn increased and his position became ever more influential. He was made *mushrif*, general overseer of the administration, although he claims that he demurred at first because of his unfamiliarity with local affairs

¹³ Khar. (I) i 56, 63, 154.

¹⁴ Sana 58.

¹⁵ Sana 52, 55; Khar. (S) ii 156, 324.

¹⁶ Sana 66.

¹⁷ Sana 67.

and practices. There was jealousy from colleagues and opposition too from his subordinates of the non-cooperation type but 'Imād al-Dīn persevered and gained control of his office.¹⁸

'Imād al-Dīn permits us this glimpse of his position at this time, as he saw it. He had been intentionally left out of the invitation list at the reception of a Caliphal envoy. Nūr al-Dīn noticed his absence and kept the whole ceremony waiting while 'Imād al-Dīn was fetched. Nūr al-Dīn then handed him the Caliph's letter to read out, but al-Qaisarānī, the acting vizier, took it from him. 'I humoured him and didn't argue'. Then he adds triumphantly, 'I corrected and guided him in his reading where he went astray.'¹⁹

Apart from the chancery and secretarial duties, we see him involved in the review of emirs' troops and the supplementing of their 'fief' income if that should prove necessary. Indeed, in time he acquired the further post of financial comptroller (*must-awfi*).²⁰ He also carried out diplomatic missions for Nūr al-Dīn, for example to Khilāt in 1169. By his own estimation he was not successful. "I returned to my normal work in the chancery. My mission was a mixed affair; the thanks it gained did not compensate for the complaints."²¹ He also went on an embassy to Baghdad, to urge Nūr al-Dīn's claim to Mosul after the death of his brother in the autumn of 1170. 'Imād al-Dīn's eastern connections were useful to Nūr al-Dīn because the vizier in Baghdad was a friend of 'Imād al-Dīn's from the days of Ibn Hubaira. Indeed Nūr al-Dīn consulted 'Imād al-Dīn for his knowledge of the Caliphal court, where incidentally a brother of 'Imād al-Dīn's held office and secured for him an annual pension of a robe of honour and 100 dinars, which was confirmed by the subsequent Caliph, al-Nāṣir.²² An eastern affiliation clung to him. 'Imād al-Dīn willingly acknowledged himself to be a product of Baghdad: 'It gave me life and there I found my wings.'²³

On the death of Nūr al-Dīn in May 1174 his fortunes changed once again. His rivals came to the fore and he was confined to mere drafting duties. Perhaps fearing worse, for he claims that Ismā'īlī assassins were engaged to remove him, he decided to return to Baghdad. A post had been offered and his brother was

¹⁸ Sana 120–2.

¹⁹ Sana 116.

²⁰ Sana 131.

²¹ Sana 88.

²² Sana 102–3.

²³ Sana 104.

there. He bided his time to secure his family and some of his property and then fled to Mosul. There he fell ill and on recovery heard the welcome news that Saladin was marching on Damascus. He made his way there by the desert route to avoid interception from Aleppo and arrived back in January 1175 to start another phase in his life.²⁴

He was clearly confident of his reception by Saladin, but there was in fact some delay before he found employment. Perhaps he was to some extent identified with Zengid interests, and Saladin was, like Nūr al-Dīn at one stage, unwilling to disturb existing personnel arrangements.²⁵ However, al-Fāḍil, whom 'Imād al-Dīn had recently met, urged that he should be employed as his deputy, especially emphasising 'Imād al-Dīn's useful ability to maintain a Persian correspondence with eastern courts.²⁶

To what extent should we accept 'Imād al-Dīn's assertion that he became in time not only the official secretary of Saladin, but also his personal confidant? Certainly we know that his access to the Sultan gave him personal prestige and opportunities for enrichment.²⁷ The fact that the Sultan consulted him on suitable appointments and for positions such as tutor for one of his children²⁸ effectively gave 'Imād al-Dīn powers of patronage. He belonged to that circle of intimates who stayed on after the emirs and officials had left the general audience. This gave privileged private access to the Sultan's ear. There is one example of its use—when he put in a word for a more forgiving attitude to Saladin's son-in-law, the Mesopotamian emir, Kökbüri.²⁹ In 1186, because the Sultan was calling on him night and day for administrative purposes, 'Imād al-Dīn built himself a new house adjacent to the Damascus citadel.³⁰ He wrote, it seems, from a genuinely insider viewpoint.

But what were the tasks he was called on to do? If we recall that al-Fāḍil was often in Egypt, 'Imād al-Dīn remained as the secretary in attendance, on campaign or in winter quarters. This is why there is no further need to follow his movements—broadly speaking, he went where Saladin went.

He had to write, as required, letters, treaties, victory despatches,

²⁴ Sana 184–5.

²⁵ Rawd (B) i 633, 641; Sana 193.

²⁶ Sana (C) 328.

²⁷ Barq 93; Sana 355.

²⁸ Sana 340.

²⁹ Sana (C) 255. Cf. his interventions for clemency: Sana 214; Sana (C) 193.

³⁰ Sana (C) 288.

appointment instruments and diplomas granting fiefs and such like—all this in the elaborate, rhyming and chiming prose, rich in vocabulary and imagery, which had for some good time been the *sine qua non* of such productions. We have to imagine a lot of this work being done in the field, in a tent pitched next to the Sultan's, as he says on one occasion, 'screened to prevent my being distracted from the Sultan's business.'³¹ After the taking of Āmid, he wrote his victory despatches by the light of ten candles taken from a tower storeroom.³² Granted the abstruse, *recherché* nature of his prose, I wonder whether he had reference works in his baggage!

‘Imād al-Dīn has given us this general description of his routine with Saladin:³³

If he needed to draw up an official letter or to divulge some confidential plan, he would sit me down and dictate the main outlines. Then I'd leave and spend the night composing the letters. Early next day I would go and present them to him. If he decided to add or change something in the content he would bring my attention to the paragraphs and tell me which passages. I would stay until I had put it all in order. When he had approved them in their final form, he would sign them and say, 'Let's send them off without delay.'

This last phrase has a nice note of friendly but demanding authority! The passage could be compared with the record of an occasion, on which ‘Imād al-Dīn takes down a whole host of points from Saladin and then goes away to clothe them in the required language. It is a passage of not very subtle self-advertisement in which Farrūkhshāh, Saladin's nephew, is seen to doubt whether ‘Imād al-Dīn can possibly have grasped all the points at once, but on reading over the finished letter is obliged to admit his error.³⁴

We find ‘Imād al-Dīn after the battle of Marj Ayun in 1179 taking down the names and details of prisoners all through the night until the dawn prayer,³⁵ and at other times writing an order for somebody's pension, which Saladin then signs,³⁶ or advising the Sultan during the reception of Caliphal envoys at Mosul³⁷ (on an earlier occasion he had been used to meet an envoy from

³¹ Barq 105.

³² Barq 80.

³³ Sana 233 ult.–234.

³⁴ Barq 43.

³⁵ Sana 328 (cf. 336).

³⁶ Sana (C) 193 (cf. 200).

³⁷ Barq 17.

Baghdad because that person was married to his cousin).³⁸ When negotiating with Mosuli envoys and left to it by his own colleagues, 'Imād al-Dīn doggedly kept on with the negotiations only to see the agreement totally repudiated by the principals in Mosul. He really didn't have much success as a negotiator!³⁹ When Saladin was ill in 1185 and feared the worst, 'Imād al-Dīn took down his last will and testament,⁴⁰ and in Mosul he was asked by the Sultan to apportion gifts to deserving panegyricists, as a sort of *arbiter artis poeticae*.⁴¹

In addition to these official and semi-official roles, 'Imād al-Dīn was for Saladin what one can only describe as a ghost-writer.⁴² He would provide him with appropriate poems or little prose essays to send in his own hand to acquaintances and correspondents. Whether any one was ever fooled or was even meant to be fooled, I have no idea. It is surprising how much time and effort was devoted to this literary culture—writing, memorizing, quoting, discussing poetry. Saladin is shown as an enthusiastic lover of poetry—he was especially fond of the diwan of Usāma ibn Munqidh. By contrast, Nūr al-Dīn's portrait is much more sombre. I shall merely mention an occasion, when the beauties of Damascus were being discussed and its praises sung in verse. Nūr al-Dīn's contribution was to say, 'My love for the Jihād would console me for its loss—I have no desire for it.'⁴³

On very few occasions was 'Imād al-Dīn absent from Saladin's side for any length of time. There were two periods of illness. In early spring 1185 'Imād al-Dīn fell ill at Baalbek.⁴⁴ Both Saladin and al-Fāḍil sent doctors. He was away for about three weeks. And again during the victorious campaign after Hattin in 1187 he fell ill outside Beirut, was carried off to Damascus in a litter (after dictating the surrender instrument from his sick-bed), and was absent for just over eight weeks, returning to Jerusalem the day after its surrender.⁴⁵

In all this welter of official tasks, it is surprising to record that he found time for his own literary activity. But he did indeed. His large anthology of contemporary poets, which he had begun

³⁸ Barq 164.

³⁹ Sana (C) 205–6 (cf. Saladin's annoyance at his handling of Gümüşhtegin at Aleppo, Sana 216.).

⁴⁰ Sana (C) 268.

⁴¹ Sana (C) 270.

⁴² Sana 275, 312; Sana (C) 246–7.

⁴³ Sana 126.

⁴⁴ Sana (C) 252.

⁴⁵ Sana (C) 305, 313; Fath 40–41.

writing at least as early as 1155,⁴⁶ was completed some time soon after 1176, some of it during a visit to Egypt. A later supplement to this anthology was interrupted by the pressure of the Sultan's business, and when ‘Imād al-Dīn was writing his major history (*al-Barq al-Shāmī*) he had still not completed his work on all the new material he had gathered.⁴⁷ It was also in Egypt during a period of relaxation in 1181 that he translated Ghazālī's *Alchemy of Happiness* from Persian into Arabic. It was a commission from al-Fāḍil which he completed in about four months. His very valuable *History of the Seljuqs*, probably begun in his Iraq days (he gives a vivid eyewitness account of the siege of Baghdad by the Seljuq Sultan Muḥammad in 1157), was finished in Syria in 1183.⁴⁸

Very well known, of course, is his chronicle covering the period from 1187, the year of the re-conquest of Jerusalem, to just after the death of Saladin, the famous *Faṭḥ al-Qudsī*, which has been translated into French by Massé.⁴⁹ That work was available in some form by 1192, since the author gave a reading from it to the Sultan in that year.⁵⁰ There are not infrequent cross references to it to be found in ‘Imād al-Dīn's larger work, *al-Barq al-Shāmī*.⁵¹ Cahen has written⁵² that ‘Imād al-Dīn ‘a detaché’ the *Faṭḥ* from his ‘oeuvre fondamentale’, that is, the *Barq*. This seems to mean that Cahen looks on the *Faṭḥ* as later than and deriving from the *Barq*, which I do not believe to be the case.

In ‘Imād al-Dīn's new circumstances after the death of Saladin, when for the third time in his life he faced loss of position and status, he turned his hand first, I believe, to a short monograph, *al-Uṭba wa’l-Uqba*, which took his record of events down to 1196. It is at all events referred to by its title as a finished work at the end of the major work to which ‘Imād al-Dīn applied himself, the memoirs of his Syrian career, *al-Barq al-Shāmī*.⁵³ This may mean that he started work on the *Barq* as late as 1196, although he had obviously been gathering and preserving material before then. At one point the year of writing is specified as November

⁴⁶ Khar. (I) iv 478.

⁴⁷ *al-Barq al-Shāmī*, vol. iii, Bodleian Ms. Bruce 11, fol. 34b.

⁴⁸ See note 1 s.v. Zubda for al-Bundari's précis. The full work, *Nuṣrat al-Faṭra wa’l-Uṣrat al-Qaṭra*, is preserved in Paris Ms. 2145. For the translation from Ghazālī (not extant), see Sana 358; Rawd (B) ii 20.

⁴⁹ ‘Imād ad-Dīn al-Isfahānī, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin (al-Faṭḥ al-quṣṣī...)*, trad. française par Henri Massé (Paris 1972).

⁵⁰ Sana (C) 301 (cf. Rawd (B) ii 87). The reading was from Faṭḥ 31, lines 17ff.

⁵¹ E.g. Sana (C) 291: the Faṭḥ version referred to as the fuller account.

⁵² *Arabica* 33 (1986), 179.

⁵³ Rawd (B) ii 225, 228.

1197–8 (594 H.).⁵⁴ It was probably completed about the beginning of 1199.⁵⁵ There were also two other shorter historical works,⁵⁶ the second of which carried his chronicle of events from 1196 down to the year he died (1201). Neither of these survives, except in short extracts in Abū Shāma. The problem with any complete judgement on the *Barq* is that much of it too has been lost. Two parts of the full work survive in the Bodleian Library at Oxford⁵⁷—although Cahen has reported second-hand the existence of a third part ‘in a Moroccan library’.⁵⁸ Otherwise there is a sizeable abridgement by Bundarī and of course the abundant quotations, though again pruned, even paraphrased, in Abū Shāma.⁵⁹ Cahen once raised the question, whether Abū Shāma worked from Bundarī’s abridgement, rather than from the original. A far from exhaustive comparison of the three historians’ works would suggest that Abū Shāma worked directly with the full *al-Barq al-Shāmī*.

His historical works were quickly quarried by his younger contemporaries, such as Ibn al-Athīr, Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād and Ibn Abī Ṭayy, and even though much survives only in truncated form, they are indispensable for modern historians. He writes largely from his own experiences. The introduction to the *Faṭḥ* claims, ‘I report only what I saw and witnessed . . .’, but no-one can see everything or be everywhere, so inevitably he must have collected oral information. For instance, on the corrupt collection of the ransom money at Jerusalem, he quotes ‘someone whose word I do not doubt.’⁶⁰ Not infrequently he quotes directly, say, from Saladin himself. It is very doubtful whether one should accept the substance of these sayings as authentic, far less the actual wording. Of course, to give speeches to protagonists is part of a long tradition of historiography—a way of adding immediacy to one’s narrative and expressing a point of view—but there is a difference between inventing speeches for remote historical

⁵⁴ Sana (C) 283.

⁵⁵ The death of Saladin’s son, ‘Uthmān, in November 1198 is mentioned in the *Barq*, see Rawd (B) ii 224–5. In general, see D. S. Richards, “A consideration of two sources for the life of Saladin,” *Journal of Semitic Studies* 25 (1980), 46–65.

⁵⁶ The titles are: *Nihlat al-Rihla* and *Khatfat al-Bāriq wa-‘Atfat al-Shāriq* (see Rawd (B) ii 231, 233, 244).

⁵⁷ Ms. Bruce 11 (years 573–575 H.) and Ms. Marsh 425 (years 578–579 H.) See H. A. R. Gibb, “al-Bark al-Shāmī: the History of Saladin by the Kātib, ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī,” *WZKM* 52 (1953), 93–115.

⁵⁸ *Arabica* 33 (1986), 179, note 38.

⁵⁹ I. e. the Sana (the Istanbul Ms. covers up to the year 1183 (583 H.) and the Rawd (see note 1).

⁶⁰ Rawd (B) ii 95.

figures and claiming to record the words and opinions of people with whom one actually associated. He refers only rarely to official reports and such like, but frequently includes the letters he wrote on his own account and for the Sultan and others. It is clear that copies of letters and documents were kept. ‘Imād al-Dīn writes in one context of the evidence of letters kept in some sort of file (*idbāra*). He also uses the letters of others, above all of course, al-Fāḍil’s. We comb these letters for historical nuggets, but I feel that for ‘Imād al-Dīn it was their literary qualities that dictated their quotation in his works. ‘Imād al-Dīn had no doubt that his histories were part of literature. In his introduction to the *Fath*—which incidentally is one of the most artfully crafted and pointed introductions I am aware of in mediaeval Arabic literature—he writes, “In this book I have given shares both to the literati who watch for brilliant purple passages and to those with historical interests who look out for embellished biographies . . .”⁶¹

‘Imād al-Dīn uses all his literary skills in praise and commemoration of the two regimes he served in Syria. One should not expect him to rise above his contemporaries (nor, indeed, above the mediaeval world in general) in his concept of history. History, as the introduction to the *Fath*⁶² has it, preserves the memory of the good deeds of men of affairs, and assigns them praise or blame. History is here the familiar arena for moral judgements. The record of events also constantly reminds one of the fickleness of fortune, that easy times can follow hard, and equally and, in the light of his own career only too truly, hard times can follow good. The ultimate explanation for all is God’s will and fate, but more immediate secular explanations are not lacking from his narrative.

He strikes one as being an essentially conformist man, accepting the society he lived in and the attitudes of his class. Should one wish to take the step of arguing from style, one could claim that ‘Imād al-Dīn’s style is self-regarding, complacent and exudes membership of a privileged elite, in short, that it is fundamentally inimical to a thorough-going critical attitude towards his society.

Apart from what is often a very lively narrative and vivid description, all in his own extraordinary rhetoric, an important thing he managed to do was to bring the portrayal of individual

⁶¹ *Fath* 3.

⁶² *Fath* 4.

character into his writings. Saladin is shown in many guises: his generosity, his impatience with financial detail, his long-suffering dealings with his family, his mercurial change of mood, his emotionalism, his callousness, his self-control, his love of poetry, but his dislike of divisive disputation. Through deft touches 'Imād al-Dīn's people take on personality—and no individual more so than himself. This is what makes the *Barq* as much an extended memoir as an impersonal chronicle.

The introduction ingenuously claims that the work is going to be an account of the 'partnership' between 'Imād al-Dīn's pen and the Sultan's sword—practically equal partners, one is left to understand!⁶³ He reveals his own efforts to 'seize the main chance', to look after his own career and financial advantages. Others doing much the same thing are scheming rivals—but that is human nature. One senses his outrage at the fact that during his second illness Saladin was beset by petitioners for his jobs. It would be easy to concentrate on elements in 'Imād al-Dīn's account which suggest that everyone around Saladin was seeking advancement, office and personal gain, and thereby exploiting the almost reckless generosity of the Sultan. This was possibly even true—and the generosity was perhaps sometimes calculated—but 'Imād al-Dīn writes about all this from within, from his own particular niche in this society, fighting his own corner within it and taking all the opportunities that it offered him.⁶⁴

An ever present theme is that of counter-Crusade, the presentation of the great common endeavour of all right-thinking Muslims in the Jihād. 'Imād al-Dīn accepts the Islamic values of Jihād against the kingdom of Jerusalem without question. The eradication of the Franks was the great aim. Could one expect otherwise? However, in 'Imād al-Dīn there is little blatant anti-Christian fanaticism, certainly nothing beyond the conventional. Even the incursions into the Red Sea did not arouse 'Imād al-Dīn very much. Al-Fāḍil's letters in comparison piled on the religious outrage. We may even detect in 'Imād al-Dīn a certain covert admiration for Frankish courage and zeal. On the subject of Muslim-Christian relations in the conquered territories we owe to him two or three useful texts on instances of peaceful accommodation, even outright cooperation.⁶⁵ He clearly did not approve

⁶³ Sana 53.

⁶⁴ E.g. his acquisition of books from the Fāṭimid Library, Sana, 235–6; his persistent petitioning, Sana (C) 286; gaining captives from Jerusalem, Sana (C) 316; in general, Sana 199, 212–3; Barq 58–9.

⁶⁵ Barq, 151 (cf. Sana (C) 233); Sana (C) 302 (this gives a fuller text than

of that, but there is no attempt to hide it and his reaction is not extreme.

Since the over-riding aim is to defeat the Crusaders, he accepts the policy of expansionism as a means to that end. The building up of dynastic power by both Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin is justified by its propaganda end, the Jihād. Can we read behind the lines? If so, we are more likely to detect the historian's own thoughts than we are to penetrate further still into the thoughts of his *dramatis personae*, say, into the motives of Saladin himself. My assessment of ‘Imād al-Dīn is that he was a realist with a healthy *savoir-faire*, a true professional. He was also a man with few allusions, either about himself or others. His admiration for Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin was genuine, as was his gratitude for their patronage. Yet he knew the reality of *realpolitik*, the force of ambition and the strength of self-interest. In his narrative an opaque, neutral phrase may cover a wealth of such matters. Occasionally he can be explicit in his criticism, as when he queries Saladin's ignoring guarantees he had given some lesser Zengid princes.⁶⁶ The later chronicler, Ibn Wāsil accused ‘Imād al-Dīn of hiding the truth in his last monographs about al-‘Ādil, Saladin's brother, that he long schemed to seize power from his nephews.⁶⁷ ‘Imād al-Dīn was no willing martyr for an anachronistic principle of free speech! However, consider this. On hearing the public crier announce a victory and the safety of the Sultan after the Mont Gisard affair, which serious setback he himself had profitably avoided, ‘Imād al-Dīn commented wryly to the effect that that could only mean that the Sultan had had a lucky escape!! Such a man, I feel, knew quite well when—in our phraseology—he was creating an image. He knew the value of propaganda and a ‘good press’, so that he persuaded Saladin to settle the small grievances of a visiting qadi of Erzerum in the knowledge that he would return home and speak positively of the Jihād and the campaigns.⁶⁸

It must be borne in mind that the *Barq* was compiled after the death of Saladin, not only when Ayyūbid cohesion was shaken by the all too common political rivalries, but also in a somewhat disillusioned old age of ‘Imād al-Dīn.⁶⁹ For the third time the

that used in D. S. Richards, “A Text of ‘Imād al-Dīn on 12th century Frankish-Muslim Relations,” *Arabica* 25 (1978), 202–4); Sana (C) 303 (cf. Rawd (B) ii 88); Fath 36–37.

⁶⁶ *Barq* 168.

⁶⁷ *Mufarrij* iii 56–7, but cf. 58–9, 66.

⁶⁸ Sana (C) 325.

⁶⁹ E.g. Sana 212. The village given to him by Kökbūri was taken away under

death of his patron deprived him of his outstanding position of influence, and put his Syrian property at risk. Whether by design or by circumstance—for he was sent to Egypt as an envoy—he became associated with the new supreme power, al-ʿĀdil. He was in any case rather too old to regain his old position, but he settled down to study and writing in Damascus, where he died in June 1201,⁷⁰ aged seventy-six.

Certainly the *Barq*, written in his retirement, does express the mutability of fortune and the fickleness of fate. Even the title, *The Syrian Lightning*, was chosen to convey what we might loosely call the ‘flash in the pan’ nature of that period. The implication is there that under Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin great things were done in the name of higher Islamic ideals, but now that is over. Peter Holt has written that within about 20 years of Saladin’s death there were two rival presentations of 12th century Syria, glorifying Zengids and Saladin respectively, and that the two strands were harmonized by Abū Shāma.⁷¹ Perhaps this is overstated. For ʿImād al-Dīn there was no problem. The fact that he admired and praised Saladin did not necessitate his denigration of Nūr al-Dīn. Quite the contrary.

There are two aspects, as it were, the message and the legend. In Abū Shāma the message for his generation is made explicit. At the end of his first version,⁷² before he added an appendix, Abū Shāma explicitly prayed that the princes of his age might now rekindle the earlier spirit of unity, and wage successful Jihād. This message is merely implicit in ʿImād al-Dīn. But as for the ‘legend’ of the successive rulers, symbolized by the *Two Gardens*, the portrayal of Saladin as the moral heir of Nūr al-Dīn, which Holt sees as the harmonizing creation of Abū Shāma, that is already explicit in the writing of ʿImād al-Dīn. He wrote, “I found the regime in his [Nūr al-Dīn’s] and Saladin’s days to be balanced in excellence” and he also maintained that Saladin “modelled himself on all Nūr al-Dīn’s qualities of piety, chastity, decency, nobility and statecraft. He studied from him the principles of virtue, and then in his own days surpassed him in them.”⁷³

al-ʿĀdil, *Barq* 58–9; for his Damascus property, see Mufarrij iii 61–2, 68.

⁷⁰ *Rawd* (B) ii 244–5; *Khall.* v 152.

⁷¹ P. Holt, “Saladin and his admirers; a biographical reassessment,” *BSOAS* 46 (1983), 236.

⁷² *Rawd* (B) ii 231.

⁷³ *Sana* 52 & 56.

THE CRUSADING STRATUM IN THE ARABIC HERO CYCLES

Malcolm C. Lyons

The Crusades, perhaps unsurprisingly, produce an academic paradox. In the case of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem we are awash with information, not just about wars and battles, rulers and their reigns, but about the kind of minutiae that elaborate the administrative background with its panoply of legal, religious and economic details, allowing us to see not merely what was done but how life was lived. On the other side of the divide, Arabic provides both the corroboration of its professional historians, and, in addition, material such as the reminiscences of Usāma ibn Munqidh telling how he was allowed by his Templar friends to pray by the Dome of the Rock, the impressions of Ibn Jubair who was passing on his way to Tyre while Saladin was campaigning east of Jordan and a wealth of letters picturing tortuous diplomacy, what the weather was like during the siege of Acre and even the horrors of toothache suffered by Saladin's secretary, 'Imād al-Dīn.

In spite of this, however, to the outsider an elementary interpretative question still remains unanswered, as we ask what the Crusades really were. They can be taken as a clash between religions, on the lines of Chesterton's Lepanto, with the Pope calling 'the kings of Christendom for swords about the Cross'. Some may see them as the stirrings of a new colonialism, or, if the suggestion of an Umayyad plan for a flanking attack on the east and the west of Europe can be accepted, they may represent a belated Staff College solution of the installation of a forward defensive base, threatening enemy communications. I doubt whether many scholars would still support the claim that they

ABBREVIATIONS

- A *Sīrat 'Antar b. Shaddād* (Cairo 1962, 8 vols., 59 pts.).
B *Sīrat al-Zāhir Baibars* (Cairo n.d., 5 vols.).
DH *Sīrat al-Amīra Dhāt al-Himma* (Cairo n.d., 7 vols., 70 pts.).
H *Qissat al-amīr Hamzat al-Pahlawān* (Cairo n.d., 4 vols.).
HK *Sīrat Banī Hilāl al-Kubrā* (Beirut n.d.).
S *Sīrat Fāris al-Yaman al-malik Saif* (Cairo n.d., 4 vols.).
TH *Tagriba Banī Hilāl* (Beirut n.d.).

left no significant impression on the Islamic world, a notion which always seemed to sweep both Ayyūbids and Mamlūks under the carpet of history, but the fact that it could have been advanced in the first place suggests that we may be better acquainted with the form of the period rather than its spirit, its statics rather than its dynamics.

Here an instant objection must be that we do have a quite extensive knowledge of the dynamic propaganda, religious and secular, that was called into service by both sides. It is clear, however, that such propaganda may not reflect the outlook of the common people. It must always be dangerous to extrapolate too far from patterns superimposed by authority and, at least as far as the Muslims are concerned, it is on the level of the common people that our ignorance of the Crusades is at its most profound.

If this is accepted as self-evident, it may be asked whether anything at all can be done about it, and here I admit to be skirting academic quicksands by looking for evidence in the hero cycles of popular Arabic, for which there are no definitive texts, few firm dates and a dearth of comprehensive studies. But if evidence from the missing level is to be found at all, then this is perhaps its only plausible source.

It was Edward Lane who provided English readers with the most graphic introduction to these cycles. In his *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* he wrote¹: 'The Egyptians are not destitute of better diversions . . . : reciters of romances frequent the principal kahwehs (or coffee-shops) of Cairo and other towns, particularly on the evenings of religious festivals, and afford attractive and rational entertainments'. Amongst these entertainers he listed the 'poets' who recited the *Sira* of the Banī Hilāl, the story-tellers who confined themselves to the *Sira* of the Mamlūk Sultan Baibars, and the 'Antariyeh, who specialized in the history of 'Antar, the pre-Islamic warrior poet. 'All of them', he added, 'occasionally related stories from a romance called "Seeret el-Mugahideen" ("The History of the Warriors") . . . A few years since, they frequently recited from the romance of "Saif zu-l-Yezen"'. Historians may be dismayed to hear, of the *Sīrat Baibars*, that 'much of the entertainment derived from recitations of this work depends upon the talents of the Muhaddit' (or narrator), 'who often greatly improves the stories by his action and by witty

¹ E. W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (London 1860) 391 ff.

introductions of his own invention'.

The literary construction of the cycles fits exactly into the formulaic theories applied by Radlov to his south Siberian poetry and later developed by Lord, Parry and their train of disciples. It represents oral accretive tradition, based on the manipulation of standard narrative ingredients in which a concern for historical accuracy is not amongst the narrators' priorities. Thus in the cycle of Baibars, Saladin is shown as recapturing Baghdad from the Mongols, battles are introduced by ineffective and anachronistic bombardments, and a magician of sporting tastes stands watch in hand measuring the three hour start that he gives to would-be thieves.

What has to be examined, then, is not historical accuracy in points of detail but recognition patterns found in the narrative blocks. If sufficient of the internal dimensions of these blocks can be shown to apply to or to predate the Crusades, and if they extend in space as well as time to other areas of interest, such as the *Chansons de Geste*, then to my mind the literary archaeologist must be justified in searching for evidence of, and in, a Crusading stratum.

To examine the provenance of the cycles in detail is to open the flood gates to a torrent of evidence in which the Crusades themselves would be submerged. By way of brief illustration, however, the obvious choice must be the *Sīrat Baibars* which, at least ostensibly, deals with the right period. At first sight, as has already been shown, there are disappointments here for historians. Admittedly the cycle covers the attack by St. Louis' Crusaders on Damietta, but this is merely one of some twenty other invasions that it describes by land and sea. The Muslims are allowed to capture Genoa, to fight in Rome and to kill the King of England in his capital. The date quoted for Saladin's death gives him more than 160 years of extra life and makes his death coincide with the actual accession of the Mamlūk Ṣalāh al-Dīn Zal-Ṣalih.

This kind of thing, however, is only to be expected in a popular context and for the present investigation I would suggest that such inaccuracies are of less importance than the indications that we are dealing with a narrative tradition which extends over and beyond the Middle East almost from the start of recorded literature. For example, the *Sīrat Baibars* opens with the device of the message tattooed on the shaven head of a slave, credited by Herodotus to Histiaeus of Miletus at the beginning of the Ionian revolt. It continues with the motif of the robbers who kill one another for gold, for which, when it is found in the *Pardoner's*

Tale, Chaucerian scholars produce a formidable list of sources and parallels. The silver horse-shoes deliberately lost by Baibars in Cairo are exactly matched by their golden counterpart, which, according to the *Heimskringla*, King Sigurd allowed to fall off in Constantinople. As with Theseus in the *Hecale* of Callimachus, an attempt is made to keep Baibars safely within doors after he arrives in Cairo. His associate, Shiha, wields what appears to be the vanquish-spirit's whip of Chinese mythology and Shiha himself is the personification of the Homeric epithets applied to Odysseus, *πολύμητις* and *πολίπορος*, it is this character, who is omnipresent in the Arabic cycles, who has influenced the development of Maugis in the *Chansons de Geste*, in the full form of whose name, Aumaugis, can be seen the Arabic *al-majūs*, the Magian.

Within such a field, details of customs if not of events may be accepted with gratitude. Thus an unhistorical Frankish attack on Damascus is prompted in the *Sīrat Baibars* by a quarrel over shared grain revenues, the method of whose division was quoted some years ago from this source by Professor Riley-Smith, where agents from both sides supervised the distribution of the grain into differently coloured sacks. More generally, however, we are looking for something less tangible, opinions, prejudices and preoccupations whose dimensions in the time and space are as vague as their basis in reality.

Of these dimensions, the spatial geography of the cycles can be seen as a series of concentric circles, expanding from the inner ring of their heartlands through a wider circle of identifiable regions to an outer realm of hazy imagination. Here the Crusades, or the Crusaders, are given two main centres, one of which coincides roughly with the Latin Kingdom, with the other expanding beyond the recognisable frontiers of Europe to an indefinite series of islands. Thus, beyond 'the islands of Portugal' lie 'the islands of England', which are reached, in the *Sīrat Baibars* by a six-month journey from Egypt. Amongst their more dubious neighbours are the islands of Gold, the Black Islands, the Island of the Fish, and, somewhere off the Catalan coast, the Island of Masts. To these, in the *Sīrat 'Antar*, are added the Frankish Island of Camphor and what is described as another island stretching from Andalus to the Sea of Darkness. Nearer to the centre of action lies Greece, a land of castles and passes, 'the city of Macedonia', Rome and Genoa. In the *Sīrat Baibars*, Venice is only mentioned indirectly, in connection with its gold thread, but the *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma* reports that the villages in its territories are each as large as a city. Barcelona is an enemy base, Moorish Spain

is represented by Seville and, arguably, Toledo, while of the Mediterranean islands Malta, Sicily, Cyprus, Rhodes and perhaps Crete can be identified.

In the Middle East itself, in the Crusading geography of the *Ṣirat Baibars* Aleppo controls the road from Mosul to Egypt and is shown as the key to the defence not only of Syria but of Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula itself. Safad, Tiberias and the coastal towns of al-ʿArish, Jaffa, Acre, Tyre, Beirut and Tripoli are all held by enemy kings, while Jerusalem itself is in Muslim hands. Edessa is curiously linked with Isfahan as being under Christian control, as is part of Armenia, while in north Syria the roads are watched by Baibars' allies, the Ismāʿīlis. In the Hilālī cycle Ramla is held by Franks, while, for Hamzat al-Pahlawan and Firūz Shāh, Caesarea is the capital of Caesar, 'king of the Rūmān.' In a Hilālī story Franks besiege a town near Aleppo, while in the *Ṣirat ʿAntar* a Frankish force from 'the islands' arrives with the intention of staying in Syria as well as making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

Time is linked with space in this narrative confusion. Bohemond, who has captured Constantinople with a Frankish army, leads them on against the Muslims, telling them that he intends to settle in Muslim territory, but this is in the *Ṣirat Dhāt al-Himma* where the Bohemond in question turns out to be a near contemporary of Hārūn al-Rashīd. In the *Ṣirat ʿAntar*, Franks advance along the Euphrates. In the Hilālī cycle the invasion route follows the western line from Antioch to Aleppo and then down through Syria to the coast, but in the *Ṣirat Dhāt al-Himma* it runs by Khilat, Amid and Mosul down to Baghdad.

Clearly, if the texts are supposed to represent accretions and developments in an undateably early narrative tradition, it will be impossible not to see in this some admixture of Procopius and pseudo-Callisthenes, in which Alexander and the Byzantine—Persian wars are jumbled together with the Crusades in an amalgam where it is only the weltanschauung, the attitudes and not the details, that can have significance for this investigation.

Within this weltanschauung the Byzantines play their role as the perpetual opponents without being lent distinguishing racial or social characteristics. Beyond them, however, in the snow and sea, are the Franks who appear as silhouettes on the cycles' horizons. The visual impression is stressed of huge, clean-shaven, men 'like left-overs from the race of ʿĀd' [DH 9.21, cf. 54.20,], or not like men at all [DH 20.46]. They carry broadheaded lances or spears of tempered steel [DH 54.20]; their archers never miss [DH 53.48] and their shafts pierce mail [DH 24.30, 53.48]. The

rider, his horse and his armour form a single unit [DH 21.14], and in spite of their formidable appearance, the ruler of Andalus points out that the Franks seen in the east are 'the weak ones' [DH 21.14]. It is their boast that they are not on a par with the Byzantines [DH 31.51]. They do not fear death [DH 15.39], and, whether in the background of their islands or in their wars against Islam, they represent a menace, typified by one of their leaders, an unidentifiable 'great duke', who is described as 'the bravest of the Franks and a very wicked and guileful man' [DH 42.18].

The menace itself is multifarious. Trade is threatened and in the *Sīrat Baibars* it is the complaints of merchants that lead to three separate campaigns against Tripoli, Beirut and Acre. There is also the threat of conquest in the context of expansionist aggression. In the *Sīrat 'Antar* the Byzantines, strengthened by the arrival of a Frankish fleet, plan to reestablish the empire of Alexander [32.139], while in the *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma* a Byzantine emperor proposes to take Baghdad as his capital [69.142]. A Frankish king, Milas, who intends to 'sit on the throne of Constantinople', has been inspired by a vision to attempt the recovery of Jerusalem [DH 61.10], but to the narrators of the cycles the loss of Jerusalem is of less significance than the familiar nightmare, conjured up in Saladin's lifetime by Reynaud de Chatillon, of an attack on the shrines of the Peninsula. Thus the Hilālī cycle opens with a Byzantine march on Mecca. In the *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma*, after the defeat of the caliph, another Byzantine army marches against the Ka'ba [37.45]. Mecca is attacked both in the *Sīrat 'Antar* and in that of Hamza and not surprisingly the cycle's major hero, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, is given the title of: 'Shield of the Prophet's grave'.

It is not only on the Christian side that commerce, conquest and religion are intermixed. Baibars, who in a fit of religious zeal plans to close the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, is warned that not only will this cause disturbances in Christian lands, but that it will lose revenue for the Muslims [B2.34, c.f 4,497]—and it is perhaps in the type of context where religion is shown at work amongst everyday realities that the evidence of the cycles may begin to lay claim to importance.

It must be emphasised here that we are dealing neither with the private relationship of the individual to his God nor with developed theology, Muslim or Christian, but with what can be seen as a lowest common denominator of 'religious' feeling which provides the dynamism of the narrative with ready-made identifications and explanations.

This common denominator is far from being uniquely Islamic and, in its fondness for multiplying miracles and miracle workers, it finds almost exact parallels in the matching stratum of popular Christianity. In its view of its own origins, particular emphasis is placed on claims that would have been firmly rejected as foreign by early Islam. For instance, although Muḥammad is the last of the prophets, he is their alpha as well as their omega. It is said that he worshipped God two thousand years before the creation of Adam [TH 173], that he was created five thousand years before the creation of the world [A 48.170] and that he was used by Adam as an intercessor with God [B 1.45]. He cured a girl who had no hands, feet, hearing or sight [A 59.293]; his footsteps did not show on sand but sank into rock [BH 23]; at his bidding day turned into night and the moon circumambulated the Ka'ba [A 8.303], while when his mantle was won in battle by Hārūn al-Rashīd, 'east and west were darkened' in the face of the enemy [DH 17.65]. This type of claim is reflected in the *Chansons de Geste* as where, in the *Chanson de Gaufrey*, a Saracen is made to refer to him as 'the giver of rain and wind'², and as far as Christianity itself is concerned, it finds its most obvious parallels in pious legend.

Not surprisingly, the common denominator has an important role to play in religious controversy. While on a higher theological level there was accurate information available on both sides of the religious divide of the Crusades, popular discussion enjoyed the misconceptions that it took as its base. Thus, while Fāṭima Dhāt al-Himma shuddered to hear of a Christian sect claiming that Christ 'was not the Spirit of God but God Himself' [DH 33.23], it is a vulgar misunderstanding of the doctrine of the Trinity that lies at the heart of most of the anti-Christian arguments of the cycles. The narrators assumed, or pretended to assume, that to the Christians the Virgin could only be the wife of God, which lead to the query, 'if monks cannot marry, how can God?' [DH 57.38] and the comment: 'if I suggested to you that the contemptible Catholics and the Patriarch had wives, you would be angry' [DH 4.34]. Christ is admitted to be 'a great and honoured prophet' [56.46], but 'Abd al-Wahhāb asks how he can be a god 'when he ate food, walked in the suqs and rode on a donkey' [DH 11.75]. Confusion marks the arguments 'your statement that Christ was crucified is not true' as God 'gave the

² *Gaufrey*, F. Guessard & P. Chabaille, eds. (Paris 1859; Kraus Reprint, Liechtenstein 1966) 262.

shape of Christ' to a Jew who was crucified in his place [DH 57.38], which is juxtaposed to the irreconcilable objection 'were it true, as the Christians claim, that God was Christ's father, He would not have left His enemies to crucify him.' Finally, Christ, in the eyes of his followers, is made to usurp the functions of creation in order to have his right to them denied [DH 70.48].

For their part, the Christians were clearly familiar enough with this type of objection and they enjoyed parodying it, as where, in *L'Entrée d'Espagne*, the Muslim hero, Feragu, asks Roland in bewilderment: 'what is the Father? What is the Son and what is the Spirit? Are they three gods or what are they?'³ That three can be one and one three is not to be proved by argument, according to the *Vie de Saint Auban*⁴, and rather than attempt the impossible, the sample, polemical, solution of the Chansons is to claims that the Muslims, who criticise the Christian Trinity, themselves worship four gods⁵. This is on a par with the interchange about pork and wine, which for the Arab cycles are amongst the destructive lures of Christianity, while to the Chanson authors they were only banned by Islam because the Prophet was killed, when drunk, by a herd of pigs.

It is clear from the childish nature of this 'it is' 'it isn't' repartee that at this level religion, or the manipulation of religious feeling, is really not much more than an aid to identification. As can be seen amongst the urbanised bedouin of Ibn Khaldūn, or in Mr. Gorbachev's Russia, for all complex societies identification is a matter of vital importance. Like the human body, for their own survival, they must develop immune systems to identify self and non-self and here the recognition patterns of the narrative blocks can be applied in a wider context.

It is obvious enough that, for the Muslims, the Crusaders must be identified as non-self. The formulae, that is, the recognition patterns, that announce the arrival of each new Frankish king in the cycles alert the audience to danger. Where they are found in the inner circles of heroic geography, they represent an intrusion to which, in fact as well as in fiction, the immune system was forced to react. What is less clear, however, is how, in fact let alone fiction, any individual Muslim group would have defined itself. As Christians readily fought Christians, so Muslims fought Muslims. As an aid to identification, the cycles develop pictures

³ *L'Entrée d'Espagne*, A. Thomas, ed. (Paris 1913) 3620.

⁴ *La Vie de Saint Auban*, A. R. Harden, ed. (Oxford 1968) 192.

⁵ *La Chanson d'Aspremont*, L. Brandin, ed. (Paris 1970) 8279.

of the various racial groupings within Islamic society—the hard-hearted Turks, thieving Kurds, and formidable negroes, but it is in their qualification of the term ‘Arab’ that there is the most pronounced wavering in the compass needle of the narrators’ judgements. The Arabs of the Peninsula are, of course, the premier grouping of Islamic society and the true north of orthodoxy is represented by Mecca and the sanctity of its shrine. Set against this, however, are conflicting views of the bedouin, whose life style, to their detractors is that of madmen [HK 714]. A Persian vizier is made to say [H 1.65]: ‘The Arabs are famous for plunder, pillage and the taking of captives; they live from theft and beggary and know of nothing apart from that.’ To this his colleague replies: ‘what they do is not to be classed as theft, as they raid one another and take their plunder by force of arms. They keep their covenants, show manliness, attack only their foes and treat guests with generosity.’

By the Crusading period the Arabs themselves, as represented both by the bedouin and by the settled inhabitants of the Peninsula, had lost much of their importance, but it can be argued that the ambivalent attitude to them shown by the narrators is transferred to those whom they describe as having no trade but that of warfare [cf. H 1.11]. Here an episode in the *Sīrat Baibars* may be used as evidence.

Towards the end of the *Sīra* [B 5.51 sq.], Baibars is shown as defending Aleppo against the Mongols, who succeed in burning his camp and so destroying all the equipment of this army. Tent-makers, saddlers and armourers are sent from Egypt and all the equipment is replaced, only to be lost again in another fire. The narrators’ fondness for repetition extends the series over five more disasters, by which time Baibars’ treasury is empty. He returns to Cairo, where he borrows money from the emirs, the merchants and the people of the city, only to lose it all again immediately after his return to Aleppo.

This time, he tries to raise funds from Damascus, telling the Damascenes that if Aleppo falls, their city will be the next to be attacked. In spite of this, they refuse to help, telling him that their money is tied up in trade and adding: ‘you are a king and kings meet one another and fight for their positions while we obey whoever sits on the throne.’ Unsurprisingly, Baibars is angry and says that were they not Muslims, he would have them killed. He asks: ‘how can I let my lands fall into the hands of the unbelievers?’, and he proposes to levy a tax of one dinar for each house, two for a khan, half a dinar for a town shop and a total

of ten dinars from each village, promising to hand back the money when the Mongols have been defeated.

So far this looks like a straightforward dispute in which we might expect to recognise the true self of Islam, represented by the tireless champion of the faith, confronting the selfish money-grubbers, who sit within the illusory safety of their walls. But the narrative takes an unexpected twist with the introduction of the devout shaikh al-Nūrī, the spiritual leader of the city. Far from supporting Baibars against the Mongols, he denounces the proposed tax, saying that it will be of no help as it is characterised by injustice. When Baibars asks him: 'do you consider it right, shaikh of Islam, that the believers should consent to accept the authority of unbelievers?', the shaikh goes so far as to curse him, accusing him of treating with contempt 'the men of virtue'. The curse is effective. After another defeat Baibars goes blind and it is only by supernatural means that his sight, and his good fortune, are restored.

A variant of this episode is repeated later [B 5.270], where Baibars again fails to raise a loan from the Damascus merchants to pay for troops. This time, he proposes to levy a land tax and again al-Nūrī intervenes, telling him that if he cannot fight the holy war, presumably with his own resources, then he has no right to claim even legal taxes, let alone to introduce innovations. Baibars retaliates by banishing him, to which he replies: 'I shall return, but you will not come back again', a prophecy which is proved true by Baibars' death through poisoning.

To raise difficult questions or to pose moral dilemmas is quite foreign to the narrative technique of the cycles. It may be that the audience would sympathise with Baibars, who had found himself in an impossible situation. But, although in the cycles a prophetic knowledge of the future is no guarantee of virtue, the answering of prayers and the fulfilling of curses falls within a standard recognition pattern if not of sanctity at least of what has divine approval. In Baibars' clash with al-Nūrī there is, I think, no doubt that al-Nūrī is seen to be in the right. For an audience, which I assume to be primarily that of the city masses, it is he who occupies the centre, representing true self, while Baibars and his fighters have, temporarily, been expelled to an outer circle.

Identification is most obviously the point at issue in the final piece of evidence that I want to produce, and which is derived not from the cycles but from the biography of Saladin written by his secretary, Ibn Shaddād. When reading the accounts of

Saladin at Acre, I was struck with the coincidence between his conversation on the sea-shore with Ibn Shaddād and Napoleon's remarks, on almost exactly the same spot, to his secretary Bourrienne⁶. Napoleon, who was in the process of failing to take the town, was looking forward to finding in it 'treasure and arms for 300,000 men'. He would then rally the Syrians to his cause and 'arrive at Constantinople with large masses of soldiery, 'I shall' he added—optimistically—'overturn the Turkish empire and found in the east a new and grand empire. Perhaps I shall return to Paris by Adrianople or Vienna, after having annihilated the house of Austria'.

Even had Acre fallen, others have found difficulties in overturning the Turkish empire, but it is an uneasy business to calculate what Napoleon's genius could or could not have achieved. This is not the case with Saladin, who had told the admiring Ibn Shaddād⁷: 'It is in my mind that when Almighty God facilitates the conquest of the rest of the Coast, I shall divide up the lands, give my instructions and take my leave. Then I shall cross this sea to the islands of the Franks and pursue them until no one remains on the face of the earth who does not acknowledge God, or until I die'.

When I first saw this, I took it as pure self-deception. Far from being able to take the whole of the Coast, Saladin was to fail at Tyre, and later at Acre itself. He was not challenging the Crusaders at sea; his followers were likely to become restive and must have known that he had no chance whatsoever of embarking on an invasion of Europe. What I did not realize, however, is that his remarks can be seen as an identification signal, which presumably he was repeating to Ibn Shaddād by way of self-encouragement, and for whose interpretation it is the cycles that provide an obvious clue.

Whatever the differences of their background—the deserts of pre-Islamic Arabia or the Cairo suqs—the surprisingly homogeneous narrative blocks of the cycle are deployed in accordance with formulae worked out in terms of the characters around whom their patterns revolve. Of these central figures, one is the universal king, the world conqueror. For his portrait the Alexander saga, with its innumerable ramifications, provides an introductory

⁶ F. de Bourrienne, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte* (trans.); E. Sanderson, ed. (London 1904) 85.

⁷ Ibn Shaddād, Bahā al-Din, *al-Nawādir al-sultāniya*, J. al-Shayyāl, ed. (Cairo 1962) 22.

sketch, but of more importance is the concept borrowed from or coinciding with, the Buddhist chakravarti, the king of the world, with his distinguishing marks and his guardian spirits. An example from Tibetan epic is the supernatural Gesar of Ling, of whom prophetic writings revealed that he would 'march over the whole earth, subduing nations and preaching the Law of Justice'⁸. An undeveloped specimen of this character in Arabic is the virtuous prince Badi' al-Zamān in the *Sīrat Hamza*, who in his triumph is accompanied by one of the four supernatural animals, a tortoise. It is Saif b. Dhī Yazan, however, with his army of eighteen million men and jinn, who is the most obvious Gesar figure in the cycles and who, more specifically, echoes Saladin where he swears to clean the earth of unbelief, 'and if there are any unbelievers left, I will fight against them until they accept belief in God' [S 4.290].

If it is accepted that Saladin is really claiming a central position by identifying himself as the just king, but were this the only role open to him, then the point would have no more than curiosity value. In the *Sīrat Dhāt al-Himma*, however, we have the heroic 'Abd al-Wahhāb, an Arabic Akritas or frontiersman, the lord of the Islamic marches and the Shield of the Prophet's grave. At times his relationship with the caliphs almost exactly duplicates that of Saladin as seen through the eyes of his propagandists. The simple, true-hearted, hero is constantly treated with suspicion and ingratitude, accused of trying to subvert the caliphate, threatened and even imprisoned. He is the man of action, who could echo the line in the *Chanson de Florence*⁹: 'I am not a king to go and repose myself', and, as paladin rather than king, he is, of course, a familiar figure throughout world literatures.

Were we dealing with fiction, this would seem a more sensible role to allot to Saladin, who was fighting to turn the tides of invasion while the other Islamic leaders were playing polo. The problem here, though, is linked with the old and awkward question of the legitimisation of authority. Islamic thinkers have frequently tackled, with subtlety, the organisational difficulties of what was originally a theocratic state, but, as with theology, the niceties of theory need not necessarily have appealed to common people living through the rise and fall of dynasties whose tenure of power depended, most obviously, on force of arms. Religious prestige

⁸ *The Superhuman Life of Gesar of Ling*, translated by A. David-Neel & The Lama Yongden (London 1959) 201.

⁹ *Florence de Rome*, A. Wallensköld, ed. (Paris 1907) 2445.

might bolster the claims of the caliphate, but elsewhere, in the case of contenders for power, to be identified in what would have been accepted by the people as a popular role must have been at least of propaganda advantage. This would apply particularly to Saladin, the legitimacy of whose rule, both in Egypt and in Syria, had been difficult to establish.

It would, of course, be naive to suggest that support for a player identified in the role of king would be more effective than that for a paladin, but it is here that an economic factor intrudes itself. Particularly at a period of military tension, a commander needed men for successes; success in turn brought in more men, for whose payment further success had to be sought. This creates, at least briefly, a boom—a pattern of growth which, while it lasts, broadcasts prosperity. It is the appearance of the universal king, who carries with him his own good fortune, and not of the paladin, that is the signal for fictional growth in the cycles, and actual growth was a vital ingredient of Saladin's rise to power and his struggles for recognition, until it was checked by the Third Crusade.

During this process of growth the self and non-self decisions of society are simplified, as the inner circle is expanding rather than contracting. The same simplification would apply to a stable state where the circles remain the same. But in the case of contraction, when growth stops, as was highlighted by the Nūri episode in the *Sīrat Baibars*, then it is no longer an easy question of Islam against the unbelievers but a conflict of interest between rival groupings. In what can be seen as a closed economic model, it is the armies that are principally affected by the fluctuations of growth that accompany the rise and fall of dynasties. By contrast, the cities had a long-established form of at least some tenuous demographical stability—if Robertson Smith's statements about their birth and death rates can be accepted¹⁰. It is the cities which, in the Middle East, have outlasted empires, adapting to political, economic and cultural changes that swept away their temporary masters. In this respect they can be argued to have been less affected, or at least differently affected, by the Crusading threat, as opposed to the soldiers, who were temporarily taken aback by new equipment and tactics. So when the immune system of Aleppo, as represented by its townsmen, fought off Saladin's attack at the end of 1174, they were presumably not distinguishing

¹⁰ W. Robertson-Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (London 1907) 11.

between Muslims and Crusaders or concerning themselves with the legitimacy of Saladin's claims, but merely reacting instinctively to the approach of what was to them a foreign body. In the case of the armies, a pattern of growth was reestablished for a time by Saladin, but its breakdown under the later Ayyūbids introduced the novelty of the Mamlūk state, whose establishment is one of the remarkable by-products of the Crusades.

Perhaps the most important key to the patterns of the cycles where the supernatural is omnipresent and where the most unlikely-looking beggar may be a hero or a saint, is that things are not what they seem. Identification or recognition are of supreme importance and a significant part of the narrators' technique is concerned to cover this. If one can extrapolate from the narrators themselves to their audience, then it can be suggested that, as the bases for their judgements are not those of orthodoxy, there follows a general blurring in the focus of opinion. As far as the real nature of the Crusades is concerned, this has a obviously negative aspect as merely conjuring up fresh difficulties. At the least, however, I would suggest that as far as the original question of identification is concerned, the Crusades were not seen and should not be studied in terms of Middle Eastern history as an isolated phenomenon. Together with the pre-Islamic wars of Persia and Byzantium and the expansion of the Islamic conquests, they fitted into a recurring pattern of expansion and contraction to which, because of its inevitability, common people were forced to make their accommodation.

As was the case with the fictional Damascenes, they were ready to obey whoever was in power, letting the men of war, as Ibn Jubair noted, get on with their wars¹¹, but they had a clear view not merely of the qualities of the ideal leader, but of how he was to react in various situations. It went without saying that he must be a champion of the faith, but the rules that bound him had more than a touch of the opportunism of the desert raider. Thus, in general, he must keep his word at all costs, but were he to break it to an enemy, as Saladin on occasion was accused of doing, this was acceptable as, at least fictionally, the enemy was invariably planning some wickedness of his own. What was not acceptable, either in the *Sīrat 'Antar* or during Saladin's siege of Mosul, was the rejection of an embassy of women. Above all, however, what every successful hero—or, more specifically, the hero king, rather than the champion—must have was the gift of

¹¹ Ibn Jubair, *Tadhkirat al-akhbār*, W. Wright, ed. (Leiden 1907) 300 ff.

luck, the signs of which pointed the way to the good times that were just around the corner of both fact and fiction. Although it may be possible to rationalise the Crusades, from the standpoint of both sides, as a defensive struggle, at the level of popular expectation defense is merely a prelude to expansion. If expansion does not come, then the leader, however virtuous, is not the glückskind, the longed-for favourite of fortune, under whom alone the diverse elements of society can happily unite to form a greater self.

Within a short paper it is difficult to do more than to obfuscate this issue by indicating complexities that cannot be worked out in full. I would suggest, however, that in the same way in which narrative formulae common in the cycles are also to be seen in authors such as Ibn Shaddād, so in the history of the same period, and particularly in the career of Saladin, there are to be found at least some of the conventional recognition formulae, attached to patterns of behaviour, claims and expectations. I would further suggest that a number of these recognition patterns are shared at similar levels of society between east and west, in exactly the same way that shared patterns of behaviour amongst the men of war led to the boisterous friendships struck up between Richard Coeur de Lion and a number of his supposed enemies amongst the Muslims. Obviously this can be related in some way to social and economic development patterns, but to what extent it could be developed to produce a clear picture of social groupings as opposed to a mere sketch of possibilities remains to be seen. I must, however, emphasise, repetitively but with conviction, that the *weltanschauung* of the cycles is a subject for serious investigation, as having a potentially important bearing on the relationships between Muslims and Crusaders and, more generally, on the whole range of phenomena that this Conference has been discussing.

THE REACTION OF THE SYRIAN MUSLIMS AFTER THE FOUNDATION OF THE FIRST LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

Nikita Elisséeff

What was the political climate of the Muslim Near East in the middle of the 11th century?

The caliphate of Baghdad, formerly controlled by the Buwayhids of Daylam, was governed by the Seljukids Turks, the defenders of the Sunna. Henceforth real power lay in the hands of the Sultan while the Caliph symbolised religious authority. The Muslim principalities squandered their resources squabbling amongst themselves. The neighbouring Byzantine Basileus and the Armenians supported first one emir and then another until the Seljukids, led by Sultan Alp Arslān, reacted violently, defeating the troops of the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes at Malāzgird, in the Lake Van region in 1071 (463 H.), and taking the Emperor himself prisoner. This victory precipitated the progressive settlement of Anatolia by the Turks which culminated in the foundation of the Sultanate of Rūm at Konya around the middle of the 12th century. Byzantium panicked and sent requests for help to Western Europe, which responded with the Crusades, but the Franks, instead of helping the Byzantines, installed themselves in the Near East where they founded Latin states.

The creation of the County of Edessa and the Principality of Antioch in the lands occupied by the Byzantines and the vassals of the Basileus did not produce any immediate reaction in Syria. However, when the Crusaders captured Jerusalem from the Fāṭimids in 1099 (492 H.), many Palestinians took refuge in the suburbs of Damascus. At the time, there was no collective reaction from the Syrian Muslims, but it should be noted that forgetting the obligation of the Jihād was not a new phenomenon in the Muslim world. It had been spreading ever since the end of the ninth (third H.) Century when the caliphate abandoned its *ṣayfiyya*, summer raids along the northern borders (*‘awāṣim*). The phenomenon seems to have been part of the gradual decline in the religious and moral conscience which occurred in the Muslim world at this time. Another was the political fragmentation of the Dār al-Islām and its plunging into internal wars. The arrival of

the Crusades changed all this. In Syria, within the *Bilād ash-Shām*, the diffusion of propaganda gained new impetus, inspired by religious men from Damascus and Aleppo. This propaganda had three main themes. Firstly, to emphasize the abyss between the European Infidels and the Muslims, something which was essential, though far from simple, for the Syrians of the time, who failed to distinguish them from the local population. Secondly, there was the need to protest against the people's indifference towards this abyss and towards the Jihād. Thirdly, there was the *da'wa*, the call to the Holy War. Some information about this *da'wa* survives in a treatise by 'Alī b. Tāhir as-Sulāmī an-Nahwī, 1039-1106, called *Kitāb al-Jihād*. The author, a shāfi'ī preacher from Damascus, was an active Jihād propagandist whose text reproduced a series of public lectures given in 1105 (498 H.), six years after the Crusaders' capture of Jerusalem in 1099 (492 H.). He chose to address the faithful in the Great Mosque of Bayt Lahiyya, in an eastern suburb of Damascus. This mosque was erected on the site of a church which, in turn, had been built on the ruins of a pagan temple in a village which had since disappeared. In his lectures, 'Alī as-Sulāmī described the rules of the Holy War and listed the traditions celebrating the Jihād, just as the 13th century historian Ibn al-Athīr, author of the lengthy *Kāmil*, identified the Crusade as a "western Jihād", and reminded his audience that the Crusaders' primary objective and overriding wish was to conquer Jerusalem, while their second objective was to come to the aid of Eastern Christians who were reduced to the status of *dhimmīs*, of a protected population.

On the arrival of the Frankish Crusaders in Syria at the end of the 11th century, the inhabitants of that country tended to confuse them with the Byzantines. After all, had they not come to reestablish the power of the Basileus over the territories of Northern Syria which the Seljukids had captured fifteen years earlier? Within a short time, however, the Crusaders were differentiated from the Byzantines. The latter continued to be called *Rūm* while the Franks were known as *Ifrandj*. The Crusaders started by supporting the Armenians, whose borders were being harassed by the Seljuk Turks. A short time after the Franks had installed themselves on the territory of the *Bilād ash-Shām*, the Maronites joined forces with them. This action resulted in the "romanization" of their church, and the Maronite patriarchate was integrated into the Roman Church in 1182. Following the Crusaders' departure at the end of the 13th century, the Maronites withdrew to the high valleys of Mount Lebanon and did not openly return

to Catholicism until the 16th century. The Crusaders suspected the Jacobites, who in Dār al-Islām were dhimmis, of founding a pro-Muslim community.

As-Sulāmī understood that the Frankish objective was to ensure a permanent occupation of the regions held by the Crusaders. He was the only person in his time to be so clear-sighted, as neither the people in power nor the general population shared his fears. Seizing the opportunity created by the disaffection among the Muslim emirs, the Franks occupied a great part of Bilād ash-Shām and even thought of establishing themselves in Egypt where the Fātimid power was weak.

‘Ali as-Sulāmī saw only one solution which could save the Muslim provinces, the call to the Jihād. Two preliminary phases were necessary. The first phase consisted of a “moral rearmament” designed to end the “spiritual decline” which had reduced the Muslims to their current situation. The Frankish aggression must be seen to be a divine punishment, a warning from Heaven to the Muslims to pull themselves together and re-establish the Unity of Islam. The spiritual laxness existing in Islam on the eve of the Crusades was underlined by al-Ghazālī, d. 1111 (505 H.), in 1096. The illustrious philosopher who, at that time, was teaching in Damascus, emphasized the priority of the Jihād of the soul—the *Jihād al-akbar* (the major Jihād),—struggle against evil—over the *Jihād al-asghar* (the minor Jihād), i.e. the struggle against the infidel. His aim was to help the believer rediscover his soul. At this time, it was necessary to effect the reform of morals and beliefs and to devise ways of combating the various heterodoxies existing in the very bosom of Islam.

The second phase consisted of regrouping the Islamic forces by putting an end to the disaffection which had enabled the Crusaders to become so firmly established in the Orient. For ‘Ali as-Sulāmī, this unity was to be as broadly based as possible. Syria, Egypt and the Jazira were to forget their enmity and their differences and cooperate against the invader. This unity in the face of the Franks, founded on a religious revival in the Near East, would not occur until the second half of the 12th century, as-Sulāmī also believed that this unity should not merely last for the duration of the war against the Crusaders but should be maintained afterwards as a means of revitalizing the Muslim world. Only when this psychological climate had been created, could the military Jihād commence, and, therefore a certain time-lag was inevitable.

In the 12th (7th H.), century the Jihād had two aspects. The

defensive one concerned the protection of Muslim countries against Frankish expansion. The Jihād was thus an individual obligation. The offensive aspect related to the reconquest of territories lost to the Crusaders. In this sense, the Jihād was a collective obligation.

Could military operations start at the beginning of the 12th century? 'Ali as-Sulāmi has left a clear description of the situation at the time. The Crusaders would have to concentrate their efforts on the coastal towns, as these would provide essential sea-links with the western Basin of the Mediterranean. Any attempt to cross both Byzantine territory and Turkish-occupied regions of Anatolia was clearly too dangerous, and led to the massacre of the 1101 Crusade, whose units were not advancing in battle order. This event prevented the Crusader from threatening Syria-Palestine (*Bilād ash-Shām*) and Egypt (*Miṣr*) directly. It was therefore necessary, in as-Sulāmi's opinion, for these countries to give priority to reinforcing the coast before the Frankish enemy could install himself. The Frankish forces were greatly reduced, since the majority of those who had participated in the First Crusade had returned home after the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 (492 H.). As-Sulāmi stressed the fact that these forces were far from their bases, while the Muslim troops—the *mudjāhidīn* were fighting on home ground, and had enormous potential reserves at hand. Immediate and vigorous action would, therefore, prevent the Franks from gaining a strong foothold in the region. Given the exceptional politico-military conditions, as-Sulāmi advocated swift action and concluded that if the opportunity was not immediately seized it would be too late.

The work of the pious as-Sulāmi, prophetic though it was, does not seem to have had any great impact on his contemporaries. The work and its author soon fell into oblivion. The historic opportunity which as-Sulāmi had pointed out was missed and the Crusaders were able to establish a firm foothold in the Near East. Only half a century later, in the time of Nūr ad-Dīn, would Islam, after passing through the three phases suggested by as-Sulāmi, succeed in embarking upon an authentic Jihād movement.

Once the Franks were firmly established in the Near East, the person who would realize the ideal of the Jihād which as-Sulāmi, Ghazālī and the 'ulamā of Damascus had advocated, was Nūr ad-Dīn.

Nūr ad-Dīn was one of the four sons of 'Imād ad-Dīn Zengī b. Aksunkur, an emir of Turkish extraction in the service of Seljukids of Baghdad, atabeg of Mosul and emir of Aleppo. His

father was the first to stop the Crusaders' advance in Northern Syria. Following the capture of Edessa (ar-Ruhā), his men assassinated him during the siege of Qal'at Dja'bar on the left bank of the Euphrates in September 1145 (rabi' II 541 H.). His eldest son, Sayf ad-Dīn Ghāzī, succeeded him at Mosul (Mawṣil) while Nūr ad-Dīn, his second son, reached Aleppo in the company of Shīrkūh, a Kurdish emir and friend of his father. Meanwhile the Crusaders, having neutralised the garrison, recaptured Edessa from the Muslims. Nūr ad-Dīn arrived from Aleppo and succeeded in recapturing the town, which thenceforward remained Muslim.

Nūr ad-Dīn's first objective was to organize the unity of Syria which was both a preliminary condition for the conduct of the Jihād and an economic necessity. Politically independent from the Jazīra, the principality of Aleppo required grain from the plain of al-Biqā' in Central Syria and from the Hauran in Southern Syria to supply Northern Syria. These two fertile areas were currently part of the province of Damascus. It was therefore necessary to find a *modus vivendi* which would permit the permanent supply of cereal to Aleppo. So in the spring of 1147 (541 H.), Nūr ad-Dīn helped the prince of Damascus repress a revolt supported by the Franks of Jerusalem in the Hauran, a rich agriculture area.

Some time later the Zengid prince attacked the principality of Antioch. Having succeeded in capturing several strongholds, he controlled communications in the North and also possessed the wheatlands to the west of Aleppo. At the same time, it was discovered that the German Crusaders of the Second Crusade had crossed the Bosphorus and that King Louis VII of France and his barons were following. Both groups, harassed by the Turkoman cavalry's arrows, suffered heavy losses in Anatolia.

Once they had regrouped in Antioch, the Crusaders divided into two opposing groups. One favoured travelling to Jerusalem to perform their devotions while the others, the "first arrivals", thought it wiser first to reduce Nūr ad-Dīn's strength. The first group prevailed, thus saving the Zengid emir.

Three Eastern Latin states opposed the Muslim prince of Aleppo: the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli and the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Principality of Antioch had suffered losses. Following the disappearance of the County of Edessa, Antioch continued to struggle on alone. The border of Dār al-Islām was moved westwards as far as the Orontes (Nahr al-ʿĀṣī). From this moment onwards Nūr ad-Dīn had only one aim: the unification of Syria. He went so far as refusing to send troops to help the Fāṭimids

of Egypt to save Ascalon, the last Muslim stronghold on the Palestinian coast.

It was difficult to obtain a genuine "Arab" solidarity or even a Muslim one, for Nūr ad-Dīn was a Turk and his entourage was Kurdish. In Egypt, together with the shi'ite Fāṭimids, there were Armenian converts and large contingents of Sunnites. In 1154 (549 H.), Nūr ad-Dīn laid a third siege to Damascus. In order to avoid bloodshed, his principal weapon consisted of propaganda, whispered within the town. It proved effective among the higher and lower sections of the population who opened the gates of the town to him in April 1154 (ṣafar 549 H.).

This marked the beginning of a new era for Syria. At the time, Damascus and Aleppo had the same sovereign, but Nūr ad-Dīn's state was no more than a mosaic of often mutually hostile emirates. It was a patchwork of *iqṭā'*-land grants whose emir owners changed frequently. In order to stabilize the organisation of the land, Nūr ad-Dīn decreed that land grants should be hereditary.

During the first years of his reign Nūr ad-Dīn gave priority to the stabilizing of his authority over Syria. He wished to contain the Seljukid princes of Konya in Cappadocia, who always posed a threat in the North. The twenty-eight years of Nūr ad-Dīn's reign, 1146–1174 (541–569 H.), constitute a decisive phase in the evolution of the Jihād conscience in Syria.

At that time, the idea of the Jihād against the Crusaders became one of the principal strengths of political and spiritual life in both Syria and the Jazīra. Nūr ad-Dīn was at the head of the Jihād's spectacular progress. His achievement consisted in carrying through and consolidating developments scarcely begun before this, which acquired a definitive form under his guidance. The essence of his work in the domain of the Jihād can be explained in terms of four objectives: the revival of the Jihād; the "liberation" of Jerusalem; the re-establishing of the political unity of Islam; and the diffusion of Muslim ideology.

The classical ideology of the Jihād appeared in all its strength during the course of his reign. Among the fundamental ideas which as-Sulāmī originally expressed in the first part of the 12th (6th H.) century and Nūr ad-Dīn further emphasized, was the reglorification of the *ṭalab ash-Shahāda*—the search for martyrdom—which became the most important element of his propaganda. This *ṭalab* turned the Muslim who died fighting a *shahīd* (pl. *shuhadā'*), into a martyr who had fallen on the battlefield, thus securing access to Paradise.

The second and third objectives were new and instilled a certain

vigour into the movement. They are two strength-giving ideas. The first was to ensure the Holiness of Jerusalem (al-Quds) and of Palestine, an objective implying the extermination of the rulers of the Latin Orient. This idea, which neither Zengī nor anyone else had had, acquired a powerful dynamism under Nūr ad-Dīn. It became one of the pillars of the ‘*ulamā*’ propaganda. The second was the re-establishment of the political unity of Islam in the Near East, originally though to be the preliminary phase of the action. Of course, in the beginning, Nūr ad-Dīn paid tribute to Jerusalem while making every effort to regroup the neighbouring emirates. However, he failed to obtain any effective co-operation from the Seljuk prince of Konya.

The last objective was the setting up of an immense network throughout Syria for the diffusion of ideology. Through this network, Nūr ad-Dīn had numerous “agents”, either paid or voluntary, at his disposal, and employed a great variety of methods for spreading his ideology throughout the entire social structure.

The Jihād movement brought to light a powerful spiritual movement which had been fermenting for almost a century in the East. This was the revival of Muslim orthodoxy, the Sunna, which emanated from Hanbalis (*Ḥanābila*) of Baghdad and especially from the jurist and Hanbali Theologian Ibn ‘Aqīl 1040–1119 (431–523 H.). This movement penetrated all social classes and, indeed, became a movement of the people, supported by public opinion.

From the first year of his reign onwards, in addition to the classical method of using the poetic works of panegyrists like Sharaf ad-Dīn Ibn al-Qaysarānī who were mentioned by the historians of the 13th century, particularly Abū Shāma, Nūr ad-Dīn also used the inscriptions engraved on the monuments which he built or restored in order to spread his propaganda. We can follow the political trend of his reign through this rich epigraphic documentation (twenty-nine listed inscriptions).

In 1149 (543 H.), following the Second Crusade, there appears for the first time in one of Nūr ad-Dīn’s inscriptions a series of titles showing that he presented himself to the public as the leader of the Jihād. He was at that time *al-amīr al-isfahsalār*, a title conferred by the caliph of Baghdad upon the emirs who defended the border regions of the Sunnite Empire against the Infidels. It must be remembered that inscriptions on monuments had an important role and were a useful method of stating political aspirations and creeds. They are reminiscent of our election posters, but it was difficult to change ideological direction without having the

text obliterated and a new one inscribed. There was also something of an incantation about these epigraphic texts. When Nūr ad-Dīn was described as a *qāhir al-Mutamarridīn* "the vanquisher of the rebels" or as *qāmi' al-Mulhidīn* "the subjugator of the heretics" this constituted both a reminder of past successes and those asked of the Almighty. From the year 1149 (end of 543 H.—beginning of 544 H.), and especially after the battle at Napa (Ināb) near Apamea, (Qal'at al-Mudiq) which he won in June 1149 (ṣafar 544 H.), we have proof of the programmed activity which was one of Nūr ad-Dīn's major preoccupations. Thenceforward the Jihād propaganda assumed a new form and enjoyed remarkable strength.

An analysis of the texts shows us that the instigator and leader of the propaganda was Nūr ad-Dīn himself, and that he was also the central theme. He is presented as the *mujāhid* "the Fighter of the Holy War, the Champion of the Faith", he is the *rukn al-Islām wa'l-Muslimīn* "the pillar of Islām and of the Muslims". On religious edifices he presents himself as a model of humility and religious ardour.

The inscription giving the most complete list of Nūr ad-Dīn's titles is the one commemorating the restorations which the prince carried out in 1166 (561 H.) on the Great Mosque of Rakka, a town built in the Euphrates which served as a base for the *sayfiyya*. The text, written in naskhi, a type of writing which appears in epigraphy during Nūr ad-Dīn's reign, informs us that he is

the slave thirsting for His (God's) mercy, humble before His respectability, strengthened by His power, champion of the Faith (in His way, fighting against the enemies) of His religion, al-Malik al-'Adil, the just, the learned, the wise, the ascetic, the Champion of the Faith, the warrior, the one helped by God, the victorious, the conqueror Nūr ad-Dīn, the pillar of Islām and the Muslims.¹

The feeling of antagonism between Christians and Muslims was exacerbated. The Cross became the principal symbol of the Frankish enemy. This way of acting was to turn against the Arab Christians who were to see the status of the *dhimmīs* applied literally with the restrictions on freedom which this implied.

Reconquest and Unity were two new slogans in the written propaganda, essentially, the reconquest of the Mediterranean coast—the *sāhil*—and of Jerusalem.

The idea of the liberation of Jerusalem first appeared in the

¹ E. Combe, J. Sauvaget, G. Wiet, *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, Publication de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, 16 vols. (Cairo, 1931-75), vol. 11 No. 3269.

literary texts around 1150 (545 H.). The holy character of the town was brought out, and emphasis placed on the character of Holiness in the name "*al-Bayt al-Muqaddas*" "The Holy Residence" or *al-Quds ash-Sharif* "The noble Holiness".

The *Qubbat as-Sakhra* (Dome of the Rock), the place of the ascension of Muhammad and the *Masjid al-Aqṣā* "the far distant Mosque", monuments of the *Haram* of Jerusalem, crowned with Holiness by Muslim tradition, all justified reconquest. In 1168–69 (564 H.), Nūr ad-Dīn prepared an ex-voto, a wooden *minbar*, a pulpit, carved by an artist and cabinet-maker from Aleppo and destined for the Aqṣā Mosque. This work was only completed after his death but was duly installed in November 1187 (*shaʿbān* 582 H.) by Saladin, the "liberator" of Jerusalem. It disappeared about thirty years ago in a fire started by a lunatic.

The reconquest was intended to cover the whole of the coast, the *Sāhil*. Towards the end of the fifties the theme "*al-Quds-Sāhil*" was somewhat in decline as Nūr ad-Dīn found himself in a defensive position in the face of Byzantine pressure from the North. Next there were the campaigns in Egypt of 1164 to 1169 (559 to 564 H.), which delayed the desired conquest. After the Syrian troops captured Egypt, the theme of Jerusalem once again became central but Saladin's insubordination prevented Nūr ad-Dīn from achieving his objective.

As the champion of Unity, Nūr ad-Dīn realized that the Jihād could not be successful unless all the Near East cooperated under the authority of a single leader. It was necessary to instigate a regrouping of forces in response to the Franco-Byzantine threat. Nūr ad-Dīn decided to alert public opinion so that it would, in its turn, exert pressure on the emirs.

Various forms of literature were now employed in order to awaken the masses and to create the psychological climate in which the Jihād would become a strength giving idea in the current of protest. Firstly, came poetry. We know of eleven poets—not counting anonymous authors—who composed pieces for Nūr ad-Dīn and whose works were recited in other circles and served as propaganda.

Ideology was also diffused through letters—circular letters—inviting the emirs to join the Jihād. There were messages addressed to pietist circles whose members spread the spirit and the ideas of these messages. There were also special compositions extolling the merits of the Holy War. The *Kutūb al-Faḍā'il al-Jihād* consisted of *Hadīths* inciting readers to take part in the Holy War, and evoking not only the merits of the combat but also the

recompenses promised by God. We also find reminders of the glorious campaigns at the dawning of Islam.

The category of the *Kutūb al-Fadā'il* includes books vaunting the merits of the Muslim Countries and of the Holy Land, the land of the Resurrection, and land of the Prophets which must be liberated from foreign Christian aggressors.

There were "Guides to the Places of Pilgrimage" such as the *Kitāb az-Ziyārāt* of al-Harawī, a 12th century sheikh, which contain descriptions not only of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, but also the tombs of the pre-Islamic prophets which are in the Holy Land. These guides show us that during the Frankish occupation of the Near East, people were free to move around in times of truce.

Two institutions played an important role in this "moral rearmament": the *madrassa* and the *khānaqah*. The first was essentially a school for preachers and jurists, the second, a centre for ascetic soufis some of whom would later become Muslim preachers.

Nūr ad-Dīn's originality lies in his ability to profit from the moral rearmament movement whose outlines had already started to appear before his time. He was able to accentuate it and associate it with the idea of the Jihād. He was fortunate enough to have been served by men who were devoted to religion and who organised its propaganda. They were not dependent on him, and their activity was spontaneous and free. Financial recompense did not interest them, since they all considered themselves to be volunteers in the service of the Jihād and the defense of Dār al-Islām.

It should be remembered that while all wars or military operations against non-Muslims were to be considered holy, war was not a religious duty if the protagonists sought booty or were motivated by the idea of establishing personal domination.

Nūr ad-Dīn fell seriously ill, and died in the citadel in Damascus on May 15, 1174 (shawwāl II 569 H.). He was initially buried there, but a short time later, his body was transferred to the funeral *madrassa* which he had ordered to be built south-west of the Great Mosque.

The late Sir Hamilton Gibb said: "Almost instantaneously the territorial and military organization which he had built up with so much labor fell to pieces. But, in contrast to his father Zengī, he had by his life and conduct laid the foundations for that moral unification of Moslem forces on which alone a real political and military unity could be reared. It is ironical that the great name

and reputation which he left was to prove one of the major obstacles to the efforts of his true successor, Saladin, to resume his task and bring it to fruition.”²

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² In K. M. Setton, general ed., *A History of the Crusades* (Philadelphia 1955), 1, 527.

PROPAGANDA AND FACTION IN THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM: THE BACKGROUND TO HATTIN

Peter W. Edbury

One question a colloquium on the theme of Crusaders and Muslims in twelfth-century Syria might appropriately consider is why Guy of Lusignan and the army of the Latin East should have lost at Hattin. It is a question that can be answered on various levels, but historians are, I think, unanimous in believing that at least part of the blame for the Christians' defeat rests on the divisions among their leaders. The Muslims under Saladin had entered the Latin Kingdom and, probably with the deliberate intention of drawing the Christians into battle, laid siege to Tiberias. The king meanwhile had mobilized his entire strength at Saffuriyah. According to both Ernoul and Ibn al-Athir, Raymond of Tripoli pointed out the unwisdom of trying to relieve Tiberias, but Reynald of Châtillon, supported by the Templar master, Gerard of Ridefort, accused him of duplicity. King Guy, who had been helped to the throne by Reynald and Gerard but who had encountered bitter opposition from Raymond, seems to have rejected his advice. The army set off; progress was slow, and it pitched camp for the night in an arid spot. Raymond's worst fears had come true: Saladin had succeeded in getting the Christian army into an exposed position, and the outcome was the catastrophic defeat of 4 July 1187.¹

An explanation of the background to the king's decision to disregard Raymond's counsel is readily available in some of the best known books on the crusades published in the last fifty years. Ever since the time of the leper king, Baldwin IV (1174–85), so the story goes, there had been a polarization between the established baronage of the kingdom and what is often termed the 'court party', many members of which were, like Guy of Lusignan himself, first generation settlers in the East. Count Raymond III of Tripoli, Baldwin of Ramla and his brother Balian of Ibelin, the second husband of King Amaury's widow Maria Comnena,

¹ For a reconstruction of these events, see M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War* (Cambridge 1982) 256–61; cf. J. Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980) 484–500.

Reynald, lord of Sidon, and Archbishop William of Tyre, the celebrated historian, are regarded as the leading figures on the baronial side, while the 'court party' is identified as including Baldwin IV's mother, Agnes of Courtenay, her brother Joscelin, the seneschal of Jerusalem and titular count of Edessa, Reynald of Châtillon, a former prince of Antioch and now lord of Oultrejourdain, Guy of Lusignan and his brother Aimery, Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem and Gerard of Ridefort, who had become master of the Templars in 1185. The weakness inherent in having a king who was a chronic invalid, coupled with disputes over the regency and the succession to the throne, had brought the tensions between these two groups to the fore. What was more, there was a fundamental division between them as to how to deal with the growing Muslim threat: the baronial faction, made up as it was of men who were long familiar with the ways of the Near East, favoured a peace policy; by contrast, the court faction, which included newcomers to the East anxious to strike a blow for the Faith and ignorant of political realities, favoured aggression. Thus, in July 1187, Reynald and Gerard's desire to confront the enemy and Raymond's advice to temporize were in keeping with their known attitudes. In the event Raymond's policy was vindicated, or, to be more precise, that of his opponents was discredited, and historians, taking their cue from the principal narrative accounts of these years, have in consequence tended to give the baronial party a 'good press' and regard their rivals with disdain. The clearest expressions of this interpretation of politics in the years leading up to Hattin are to be found in the writings of Marshall W. Baldwin and Sir Steven Runciman. Baldwin's seminal study, *Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem*, appeared as long ago as 1936 and his chapters in the first volume of the Wisconsin (*née* Pennsylvania) *History of the Crusades* in 1955, while the relevant volume of Runciman's *History of the Crusades* was first published in 1952. Without doubt these scholars influenced a whole generation: for example, Hans Eberhard Mayer, whose highly successful one-volume history of the crusades first appeared in its English translation in 1972, was clearly in their debt when writing on this period.²

So there were factions or parties in which newcomers were

² See in particular, K. M. Setton, general ed., *A History of the Crusades* 1 (2nd ed. Madison 1969) 591–2; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge 1951–5) 2 405; H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades* (Oxford 1972) 128–9. In the second English edition of his book (Oxford 1988) at pages 127–31, Mayer has expanded and somewhat modified his remarks.

pitted against the old-established baronage; 'hawks' *versus* 'doves'. It has been an influential orthodoxy, but an orthodoxy that needs to be called in question. It is unsatisfactory on several counts. For a start, the categorization simply will not do. Agnes and Joscelin of Courtenay were the direct descendants of a participant in the First Crusade and had lived all their lives in the East. Reynald of Châtillon, generally regarded as the greatest exponent of an aggressive policy towards the Muslims, had been in the East since the time of the Second Crusade, forty years earlier. Both he and Joscelin had endured long periods of captivity and so would have been well aware of the military realities and the penalties for any error of judgement. To describe their party as a party of newcomers is therefore misleading, and it is quite unfair to insinuate that they were anxious to do battle with the Muslims because they were ignorant and inexperienced.³ Nor was the 'old baronage' uniformly arrayed against them. The 'court party' saw the young Humphrey of Toron, a member of a distinguished baronial family, as a suitable husband for King Amaury's daughter, Isabella, and in 1186 Humphrey showed where his own sympathies lay by refusing to allow himself to be used as a figurehead by Raymond of Tripoli in opposition to Guy of Lusignan. It might also be noted that Agnes of Courtenay remained married to the prominent baronial leader, Reynald of Sidon, until at least 1179 and probably until her death in about 1185.⁴

Similarly, to regard the 'court party' as a party of 'hawks' and the baronial party as 'doves' will not stand scrutiny. Our sources record two substantive truces between the kingdom of Jerusalem and Saladin in the years before Hattin. The first, agreed in 1180, lasted until early 1182. It is a moot point as to who had more to gain by a cessation of hostilities: Saladin wanted his hands free for a campaign in eastern Anatolia; the Christians needed a respite after their defeat the previous year. However, William of Tyre, who suggests that the initiative for the truce came from the Christian side, makes it clear that in 1180 Raymond of Tripoli

³ A point well made by J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (2nd ed. Paris 1975) 1 595–6. In the discussion following this paper, J. Riley-Smith pointed out that, in the case of the Lusignans, though they themselves were immigrants, members of their family had been coming to the East since the time of the First Crusade.

⁴ B. Hamilton, "Women in the Crusader States: the Queens of Jerusalem (1100–1190)," in D. Baker, ed., *Medieval Women* (Oxford 1978) 163–4. For Humphrey of Toron, idem, "The Elephant of Christ: Reynald of Châtillon," in *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades (900–1300)* (London 1979) 101 105.

was absent from the kingdom while the negotiations were taking place and that his opponents were in control. The truce was therefore the work of the 'court party'. Indeed, it is evident from William's narrative that it did not cover Raymond's own county of Tripoli.⁵ The second truce was agreed in 1185 and held until the early part of 1187. On this occasion, Raymond, who by now was regent in Jerusalem, was responsible. According to Ernoul, he had the full support of the barons and had consulted the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars; the truce had been prompted by a drought that had led to food shortages and, once it had been agreed, traders from the Muslim lands were able to bring in plenty of supplies. There is nothing to suggest that the truce was sought because Raymond was opposed to war with the Muslims *per se*, and, if Ernoul is to be believed, it had the support of all, including presumably Gerard of Ridefort and Reynald of Châtillon.⁶

More pertinent in a discussion of the background to Hattin is the question of the policy to be adopted in the event of a Muslim invasion. The Christians could either do battle with the enemy, or they could seek to contain the invading forces by shadowing the movements of the main Muslim army and trying to cut off its supplies and reinforcements in the knowledge that sooner or later it would disperse of its own accord. Both responses had their dangers. Pitched battles were risky, and it is clear that the rulers of Jerusalem had insufficient troops to put an army in the field and also garrison their strong-points. In 1182, 1183 and 1187 the mobilization of the kingdom's military resources to meet Saladin's invading army had denuded at least some of the fortresses of defenders. Contemporaries would have been well aware that if the field army were defeated, there was no second line of defence. On the other hand, by not engaging the invader, the Christian leaders would expose the countryside to pillage and invite the censure of arm-chair strategists who would accuse them cowardice and inaction.⁷

During the decade before Hattin both strategies were employed. Thus in 1177 the forces of the Latin Kingdom scored a notable

⁵ William of Tyre *Chronicon*, R. B. C. Huygens, ed. (Turnhout 1986) (henceforward WT) XXII 1; cf. XXII 2–3 for Tripoli. For a discussion of this truce from the Muslim perspective, see Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 144–7.

⁶ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184–1197)*, M. R. Morgan, ed. (Paris 1982) 23–4. For the Muslim side, see Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 221–2.

⁷ See R. C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193* (Cambridge 1956) 135–7 149–56.

success in pitched battle against Saladin at Montgisard, although in 1179 at Marj 'Uyūn the Christians having sought battle, were caught off guard and defeated. In 1183, however, the Christians under Guy of Lusignan refused to give battle, and, despite the Muslim *razzias*, their policy of caution and containment can be said to have succeeded.⁸ Raymond of Tripoli's advice in 1187 to avoid engagement even although it meant risking the fall of his own city of Tiberias is famous; indeed, it is largely on the strength of this advice and the fact that he had negotiated the 1185 truce that his reputation as an advocate of peace and circumspection depends. Equally famous is the espousal by Reynald of Châtillon and Gerard of Ridefort of direct confrontation. What is less clear is whether it is right to assume that Raymond's advocacy of avoiding battle should be seen as the hallmark of baronial attitudes in contradistinction to those of his opponents.

In 1182 Baldwin IV led his forces into Oultrejourdain to confront Saladin who was intent on attacking Reynald's fortress of Kerak. According to William of Tyre, Raymond of Tripoli had advised against deploying the Christian forces there, since other parts of the kingdom would be left unprotected; and William, who evidently sympathized with Raymond's viewpoint, went on to record how the Muslims were able to enter Galilee from the direction of Damascus and cause considerable havoc. Raymond's attitude in 1182 would seem to have been consistent with his attitude in 1187: risk the fall of a particular fortified point (Kerak in 1182; Tiberias in 1187) rather than chance the outcome of a pitched battle, and at the same time keep the army in position for more general defensive duties. William's disgust at the strategy chosen in 1182 was heightened by the fact that Baldwin's army missed its opportunities to catch Saladin's forces at a disadvantage.⁹

But William's account of the 1183 campaign suggests a very different approach by Raymond and the barons.¹⁰ The Christians, commanded by Guy of Lusignan who was now regent for the largely incapacitated Baldwin IV, rightly anticipated that Saladin would invade Galilee and so mobilized their own forces in

⁸ R. C. Smail, "The Predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183–87," in B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer and R. C. Smail, eds., *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem 1982) 169.

⁹ WT XXII 15–16. See Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 165–7.

¹⁰ For what follows, see Smail, "Predicaments," 164–71. William of Tyre's account of the campaign and its aftermath is at XXII 27–8 30. See also Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 204–8.

readiness. At the end of September Saladin led his army across the Jordan. Guy brought his into proximity to the Muslims but refused to do battle. Although Saladin sent out raiding parties, Guy's tactics in effect prevented him from achieving anything of significance, and after a few days he withdrew to Damascus. The presence of what was evidently a substantial Christian army would have stopped Saladin from undertaking any major siege, and at the same time the Christians could occupy the best water supplies and threaten the Muslims' lines of communication. All in all the campaign would appear as a text-book example of how to conduct a successful defensive strategy with minimum risk; in 1187 Raymond would presumably have expected events to have taken a not-too-dissimilar course had his advice been followed. However, according to William of Tyre, in 1183 Guy's position as commander was deeply resented, and at the critical stage in the campaign, when Saladin was trying to draw him into a military engagement, he was faced by a refusal to cooperate on the part of at least some of the barons who were with him;¹¹ then, when the campaign was over, these same barons—Raymond of Tripoli, Reynald of Sidon, Balian and Baldwin of Ibelin, together with Prince Bohemond III of Antioch—exploited the criticism he had incurred for his failure to join battle to have him removed from his regency. In other words, it has to be assumed that these men either believed, or affected to believe afterwards, that the Christian army should have accepted Saladin's challenge and risked a full-scale conflict.

In matters of diplomacy and military strategy there is therefore no clear pattern. At different times truces were agreed by both Raymond of Tripoli and his opponents, and, if Raymond was the exponent of cautious containment in 1182 and 1187, Guy of Lusignan adopted this line of policy in 1183 only to incur the strident criticism of the barons. So rather than behave consistently as 'hawks' or 'doves', it would seem that all concerned tended to adopt a pragmatic view of the best policy to be adopted.

There is, however, no denying the existence of personal animosities among the higher nobility during these years. What is less clear is how far it is correct to speak of coherent groupings with identifiable aims or policies—indeed, whether it is helpful to think in terms of 'factions' or 'parties' at all. William of Tyre's account of events is especially useful because he was not writing

¹¹ There is a lacuna in William's text at this point in his narrative. WT XXII, 28 line 55.

after Hattin and so did not have the benefit of hindsight or feel the urge to apportion blame. He was quite categorical: Raymond of Tripoli was the most capable figure in the kingdom.¹² Usually William's partiality for Raymond is linked with the idea that Raymond had given him both the chancellorship and his archbishopric during his regency at the start of Baldwin IV's reign. However, remarks made by Ibn Jubair, an Arab visitor to Palestine in 1184, would seem to confirm William's opinion,¹³ and so it could well be that William was voicing a commonly held view. It would certainly be wrong to question the sincerity of his judgement on the basis of the charges that were being levelled against Raymond in the aftermath of Hattin at a time when some people were trying to hold Raymond responsible for the defeat. But we must also consider William's wider purpose in writing. At the very end of the *Historia*, with Baldwin too ill to continue ruling, he was concerned to portray the kingdom as being safe in Raymond's hands; he wanted to believe, and he wanted his readers in the West to believe, that Jerusalem was being properly and ably governed. It has been argued elsewhere that his *Historia* is an *apologia* for the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and in particular for the kingship of Baldwin IV. William had emphasized Baldwin's abilities as a capable military leader (although other evidence suggests that in 1177 the Christian commander at the victory at Montgisard was Reynald of Châtillon and not the king as William indicated) and stressed his legitimacy (although this was explicitly contradicted by Ernoul, and a contemporary Arabic letter suggests that his accession in 1174 was not accepted as readily as William would have us believe). William would not have wanted his readers to think any less of Baldwin's effective successor.¹⁴

William furnishes no evidence to suggest that the political divisions which emerged in the 1180s were already in existence during the previous decade. In 1174 Raymond had come forward as a candidate for the regency in opposition to Miles of Plancy, a recent arrival in the East who had enjoyed the favour of his distant kinsman, King Amaury. William named Humphrey of Toron the constable, Baldwin and Balian of Ibelin, and Reynald

¹² WT XXII 30; cf. XXII 10 XXIII 1.

¹³ *Les voyages d'Ibn Jubair*, M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, ed. and trans. (Paris 1949–65) 362.

¹⁴ P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, *William of Tyre, Historian of the Latin East* (Cambridge 1988) 76–7 79. For Ernoul's denial of Baldwin's legitimacy, see *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 20.

of Sidon as being among Raymond's supporters. But bearing in mind that the other two major figures of the reign, Count Joscelin and Reynald of Châtillon, were still held captive and that Reynald of Sidon was Agnes of Courtenay's husband, this list would seem to confirm William's claim that there was a consensus calling for Raymond's elevation and that Miles was politically isolated, rather than indicate that Raymond's assumption of power rested on the support of a baronial clique.¹⁵ The men mentioned by William were indeed the leading figures of the time, as their position among the witnesses to Baldwin IV's charters confirms, and he gave almost identical lists, although now with the addition of Reynald of Châtillon and Joscelin, when enumerating the chief participants in the military operations of 1177 and 1183.¹⁶ William provides no other references to Raymond acting in collusion with the barons before 1180—indeed, but for his presence at the battle of Marj 'Uyūn in 1179, Raymond seems have remained in the county of Tripoli after 1175¹⁷—and William was sharply critical of two other 'baronial' figures: the constable, Humphrey of Toron, for his role in the campaign of 1175, and Reynald of Sidon for his role in 1179.¹⁸ William has two further scraps of evidence that would seem to cut across the usual interpretation of political divisions. In his account of the events of 1175, he recorded the election of Eraclius to the archbishopric of Caesarea. At the time Raymond may still have been regent, and so it is possible that, as Bernard Hamilton has suggested, Eraclius, like William himself, owed his promotion to Raymond's patronage or approval.¹⁹ Secondly, in 1177 he noted the marriage of Balian of Ibelin and King Amaury's widow, Maria Comnena, *with the king's consent*. In other words, at a time when it is assumed that the influence of

¹⁵ WT XXI 3.

¹⁶ WT XXI 21; XXII 28. For the royal charters, see e.g. R. Röhrich, ed., *R[egesta] R[egni] H[ierosolymitani] (1097–1291)* (Innsbruck 1893, 1904) nos. 537 562 593. All those mentioned in the text witness frequently, although not invariably.

¹⁷ WT XXI 28; cf. 10 18. Raymond does not appear as a witness to the royal charters in the late 1170s.

¹⁸ WT XXI 8 28. But compare William's obituary of Humphrey at XXI 26.

¹⁹ WT XXI 9; cf. XXI 8; B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: the Secular Church* (London 1980) 80. There are chronological uncertainties that may invalidate Hamilton's suggestion: the context of William's notice of his election is the death of the previous archbishop, and it is not known how long the vacancy lasted; nor is it clear when precisely Raymond relinquished his regency. Ernoul (*La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 49–50) claimed that he owed his archbishopric to Agnes of Courtenay. RRR no. 539, issued at some point during 1176, is the earliest document recording Eraclius as archbishop. If Eraclius's election took place in 1176 rather than directly after the death his predecessor in mid 1175, there is no reason why Agnes should not have had a hand in it.

the Courtenays was pre-eminent and with Raymond out of the way in Tripoli, the king allowed Balian to make an extremely advantageous union with a woman who was not only a close relative of the Byzantine emperor and mother of his own half-sister, but who also brought him her marriage portion, the valuable town of Nablus and its *banlieue*²⁰.

William rarely drew attention to political infighting in Baldwin's reign. One notable exception is his outburst directed at the king's mother, Agnes of Courtenay, a woman who was a 'utterly detestable to God and assiduous in her acquisitiveness', and her brother Joscelin. The context was an incident that took place in late 1181 or early 1182 in which Baldwin, supposedly at their instigation and that of other evil counsellors, refused Raymond of Tripoli entry into the kingdom on the grounds that he was out to supplant him.²¹ There is no doubting that both Agnes and her brother the seneschal were using their position to acquire landed property for themselves—Hans Mayer has spoken of Joscelin's 'sheer and unparalleled greed'²²—but precisely what was going on is not clear: maybe Raymond was making a bid to take control of the kingdom. William seems to indicate that it was the king's attitude, rather than that of his advisers, that was crucial. He described how 'the more important barons' then persuaded Baldwin, much against his will, to let Raymond return to the kingdom and be reconciled to him.²³ This episode was clearly connected in some way with the events of 1180 when, as William records, Baldwin was stampeded by fear that Raymond and Bohemond III of Antioch were out to dethrone him into marrying his sister and heiress, Sybilla, to Guy of Lusignan.²⁴

In late 1174 and 1175 Raymond had acted as regent; after 1175 he had spent his time in the north; when in 1180 and again in 1181 or 1182 he tried to make a comeback in the Latin kingdom he was rebuffed. As the closest adult potential heir to the throne and as count of Tripoli and, by marriage, lord of Tiberias, he could not but be a powerful figure in the kingdom should he choose to remain there. It therefore comes as no surprise that the king's mother and uncle, who as seneschal would have had

²⁰ WT XXI 17.

²¹ WT XXII 10.

²² *The Crusades* 2nd ed. 128. For Agnes's acquisition of Toron and Chastel Neuf, see Hamilton, "Women in the Crusader States," 167.

²³ A surviving royal charter shows that Raymond was back in the Latin Kingdom and attending the High Court by April 1182. RRH no. 615 cf. nos. 617 624.

²⁴ WT XXII 1.

a considerable degree of control over the day-to-day running of the king's government and household, opposed his return. There is no indication that in 1180 Raymond found any support within the kingdom, but in 1181 or 1182 it was a group of barons who persuaded the king to receive him back into favour. In the meantime Guy of Lusignan had married Sibylla, Baldwin's sister and heiress. Guy had thus come to stand between Raymond and the regency just as he had come to stand between Raymond and the succession. What was more, if later evidence is to be believed, in marrying Sibylla, Guy had thwarted the ambitions of Baldwin of Ramla who had hoped to marry her himself.²⁵

Guy is thus the pivotal figure in these events. The circumstances of his marriage at a time when Raymond and Bohemond were regarded as a threat to the political status quo in Jerusalem had the effect of tying the Courtenays to his own political fortunes; it also assured him of the hostility of Raymond and Ibelins. He was a newcomer whose meteoric rise caused resentment. William of Tyre was probably not alone in regarding him as unfitted by both birth and temperament for the responsibilities he now had to bear.²⁶ In 1183 Guy became regent, but his critics did not have long to wait before they had an opportunity to strike. As mentioned already, they seized on his conduct of the military operations of that year to discredit him, but in fact Guy played into their hands by allowing himself to be drawn into a quarrel with the king over a completely different issue, namely the king's personal income. Perhaps it was because of this quarrel that Agnes's voice was added to clamor calling for his removal from the regency. The upshot was a complete reversal of fortunes: Guy was dismissed and humiliated; the young Baldwin V was crowned in a move designed to pre-empt the possibility of Sibylla and her husband ascending the throne; Raymond was installed as regent.²⁷ The king's attitude was crucial: he may have been ill, but his wishes and opinions were nevertheless of the utmost significance. Just as in 1180–82 Baldwin had been determined to keep Raymond away from his kingdom, so at the end of 1183 he was determined to destroy Guy. Had Baldwin stood by Guy when he came under fire for his conduct of the 1183 campaign, it is unlikely he would have been toppled from power.

William's *Historia* ends with a description of events at the

²⁵ See Smail, "Predicaments," 161.

²⁶ WT XXII 1 lines 9–18; 26 lines 49–57.

²⁷ WT XXII 30.

beginning of 1184, and his final episode concerns Patriarch Eraclius. After the coronation of Baldwin V, relations between Baldwin IV and Guy continued to deteriorate to the extent that the king told the patriarch he wanted Guy's marriage to Sibylla annulled. Guy then had the gates of Ascalon shut in Baldwin's face. Eraclius, however, acting in concert with the masters of the military Orders, tried to intercede with the king on his behalf, and, when Baldwin remained obdurate, angrily stormed out of his presence.²⁸ In the past Eraclius has been subject to persistent calumny, but more recent research has done much to rehabilitate him and he has now emerged as an able and vigorous church leader.²⁹ His only other activities as patriarch that William recorded were his attempts in 1181 to reconcile Bohemond III and his opponents in Antioch—significantly he involved Raymond of Tripoli, at that time *persona non grata* in Jerusalem, which may suggest he was not too closely tied to Raymond's detractors.³⁰ Perhaps in speaking up for Guy the patriarch wanted to do a political ally a good turn, but it is equally likely that his efforts on Guy's behalf and his anger when thwarted came about because he was trying to do what he would have regarded as his duty as the senior churchman in the kingdom: act as peacemaker between the king and his brother-in-law, just as previously he had tried to act as peacemaker in Antioch. Exactly what happened next is not clear—William's history ends at this point—but the marriage was not annulled, and soon afterwards Eraclius and the masters of the Orders were sent on a major diplomatic mission to the West. Despite their support for Guy, they apparently continued to enjoy the confidence of the king and his regent, Raymond of Tripoli.³¹

The great problem in using William of Tyre's *Historia* for the period under discussion is that it is difficult to read it without preconceptions. We know, and William did not, that in 1187 the Kingdom of Jerusalem foundered; we also know that other, later evidence suggests that William himself suffered at the hands of the 'court party'; furthermore there is a strong tradition in modern historiography which believes that there were clearly drawn factions in the Latin East at this time and which tries to read

²⁸ WT XXIII 1.

²⁹ Hamilton, *Latin Church* 79–84; B. Z. Kedar, "The Patriarch Eraclius," in B. Z. Kedar *et al.*, eds., *Outremer* (as note 8) 177–204.

³⁰ WT XXII 7.

³¹ R. C. Smail, "Latin Syria and the West, 1149–1187," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th series 19 (1969) 18–19.

these factions into William's narrative. Elsewhere John Rowe and I have suggested that William's political role in the time of Baldwin IV may have been misunderstood: rather than being ousted from the forefront of the political life in the kingdom by his supposed enemies, he may have chosen to concentrate on his ecclesiastical duties and deliberately took only a limited part in secular affairs. As for the election of Eraclius as patriarch in preference to William, it may simply be that Eraclius was regarded at the time as the better candidate. Take away the polemic of later sources—Ernoul in particular—and the evidence for William as the victim of Agnes and her party is very thin indeed.³² This is not to say that William did not applaud Raymond, detest the Courtenays, and regret Guy's marriage to Sibylla. But you will look in vain in his *Historia* for evidence that the Courtenays plus Reynald of Châtillon plus the Lusignans and Eraclius had been running the kingdom for much of Baldwin IV's reign in the face of a party of opposition made up of the landed baronage led by Raymond and the Ibelin brothers and numbering William himself among their supporters. Of course, it may be that William, in producing an *apologia* for the crusading enterprise and the Latin settlements in the East that was itself designed as a work of edification, wanted to avoid washing dirty linen in public; that, while owning up to some of the conflicts, he managed to conceal much of the party strife. But a more dispassionate appraisal of his *Historia* demands that we jettison some of the assumptions which have led to too much subtlety being read into his narrative and to the identification of patterns of political alignment which are just not there.

I want to turn now to the other principal narrative for events in the East in the decade before 1187: the chronicle by Ernoul. Ernoul's original text is lost, but it was written after the Battle of Hattin and the Third Crusade. Accordingly it was influenced by what the author knew had happened later, in particular, by the internal struggles during the Crusade in which the party of Conrad of Montferrat, Balian of Ibelin and others sought to exclude Guy of Lusignan and his followers from power in what remained of the Latin Kingdom. Ernoul was also concerned to explain the disaster of 1187. That meant apportioning blame, and this he did, as a retainer of Balian of Ibelin, from the standpoint of the Ibelin family. The guilty men were Guy himself, his two principal military advisers, Reynald of Châtillon and Gerard

³² Edbury and Rowe, *William of Tyre* 19–22.

of Ridefort, his wife's uncle Joscelin of Courtenay, and Patriarch Eraclius who had assisted in the coup that brought Guy to power and had failed to give the moral leadership necessary to turn away God's disfavour. Ernoul's history has been transmitted to posterity in the various recensions of the Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, otherwise known as 'Eracles' and in the so-called 'Chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer'. In her study of these texts Ruth Morgan identified the version found in a Lyon manuscript of 'Eracles' as being the closest to Ernoul's original and demonstrated that the group of texts she dubbed the *abrégé* ('Ernoul and Bernard' and 'Eracles' variants C and G) was a much more distant derivative in which history was well on the way to being turned into romance and in which any additional detail was of doubtful historical value.³³ As it is, the Lyon 'Eracles' is interpolated with material which suggests that it acquired its present form around the middle of the thirteenth century,³⁴ and all the versions of the Continuation have lost the sections covering events before 1184, which were lopped off when they were stuck on to the end of the French translation of William of Tyre. The so-called 'Chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer' alone preserves a version of the earlier portions, but it is impossible to know how far they have been refashioned and how much credence the information contained within them deserves. If we are to treat with scepticism any additional material contained in the *abrégé* not found in the Lyons 'Eracles' for the period after 1184, we ought also to be cautious about the use we make of the earlier sections of 'Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer' for which we have no parallel.

Ernoul's chronicle, as preserved in the Lyon manuscript, is strongly biased against Guy of Lusignan and his associates but not noticeably favourable to Raymond of Tripoli, and it gives scant support for the idea that he was the head of a baronial faction. Three episodes are relevant. First there is the assembly of barons Raymond called at Nablus in 1186 on the death of Baldwin V.³⁵ Previously they had sworn to recognize Raymond

³³ M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford 1973). The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre was published as "L'Estoire de Eracles empeureur et la conqueste de la terre d'Outremer," RHC Occ 2. For the Lyon version, see *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (above note 6). For Ernoul and Bernard, see *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, L. de Mas Latrie, ed. (Paris 1871).

³⁴ P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, "William of Tyre and the Patriarchal election of 1180," *English Historical Review* 93 (1978) 3 note 7.

³⁵ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 31–5.

as regent until the kings of the West should determine the rights of succession, but now Joscelin of Courtenay had engineered a *coup d'état* to put Guy and Sibylla on the throne. Various points may be suggested: the barons' presence does not necessarily mean they were Raymond's partisans—simply that they were still prepared to accept his summons as the duly appointed regent; the proposal to put forward Humphrey of Toron as an anti-king was never feasible—as Jonathan Riley-Smith has pointed out, even if the barons had supported the idea, their combined military resources would have been far from overwhelming;³⁶ once Humphrey had submitted to Guy, almost all the barons, including Balian of Ibelin, did homage to the new king; only Baldwin of Ramla preferred voluntary exile to reneging on his oath to uphold Raymond's rights. Raymond was isolated. Ernoul then described Raymond's behaviour at Tiberias.³⁷ Guy was threatening military action against him. Raymond was dependent on Saladin's support, and Saladin was able to exploit this dependence by insisting that he allow a raiding party to enter the kingdom through his territory. Ernoul made no attempt to conceal Raymond's treasonable behaviour in agreeing to this and he made little attempt to exculpate Raymond, since by the time of the raid Guy had changed tactics and decided to open negotiations with him. The upshot was the battle of Cresson on 1 May 1187 in which a hastily assembled Christian force under the masters of the military Orders was overwhelmed and the Hospitaller master killed.³⁸ A third episode also shows Raymond in a poor light: after the capture of Jerusalem he refused to allow the refugees to enter Tripoli and left them prey to the local brigands.³⁹ The Ibelins, however, emerge well from these episodes. At Nablus Baldwin remained steadfast to his oath, while it was in response to Balian's mediation that Guy was preparing negotiations at the time of Cresson; furthermore, the fact that refugees were allowed to leave Jerusalem at all was partly the result of Balian's efforts.

³⁶ J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London 1973) 109–11.

³⁷ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 36–8.

³⁸ For Cresson, see besides *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (38–41), the account in *De expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum libellus* (J. Stevenson, ed., in Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicorum*; RS 66 209–217), and a contemporary papal letter preserved by Giraldus Cambrensis in his *De principis instructione liber* (*Opera*, G. F. Warner, ed.; RS 21 8, 201–2). The *De expugnatione* conceals Raymond's involvement with the Muslim raid, although Raymond's remark at p. 217 may suggest his complicity. The papal letter is useful as it provides corroboration of several elements in Ernoul's account.

³⁹ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 74. Raymond comes out badly from the story of the “marriage of Botron,” 45–6.

Ernoul thus gives the impression that although Raymond and the Ibelins were united in their hatred of Guy, the bonds between them did not amount to anything more.

Ernoul gives the fullest version of the *coup d'état* that led to Guy's coronation.⁴⁰ But we should be wary of viewing the *coup* as the work of a closely knit 'court party'. Count Joscelin was the moving spirit behind it: his own interests would be far better served by the accession of his niece and her husband than by an interregnum presided over by Raymond. Ernoul explains Gerard of Ridefort's backing for Guy in terms of Gerard's private quarrel with Raymond. Indeed, it could well be that what united the perpetrators of the *coup* was a common hostility to Raymond as much as any positive support they may have had for Guy. Once Guy was crowned, they could be reasonably certain of success since most people would fall into line behind a duly consecrated monarch whose wife had a strong claim to the throne as the legitimate heiress.

More suggestive are the apparent attitudes of Reynald of Châtillon and Patriarch Eraclius. Reynald had nothing particular to gain from Guy's accession—indeed it has been pointed out that he might have had more advantage from the accession of his step-son, Humphrey of Toron⁴¹—nor was he conspicuous for his loyalty to other members of the so-called 'court party'. He has the reputation for being the most 'hawkish' of all the Latin Syrian leaders and in the past has been censured for breaking both the 1180 and the 1185 truces. Recently there has been some attempt to put his activities into a more explicable and hence less reprehensible context,⁴² but, however reasonable his behaviour may have seemed at the time, breaking truces was an act of insubordination towards the ruler of Jerusalem, and on each occasion—at the beginning of 1182 and the beginning of 1187—it was members of the 'court party' who were in control. According to the admittedly hostile Ernoul, in 1187 Reynald responded to King Guy's order to return what he had taken in his raid on a Muslim caravan with a powerful assertion of independence: he was lord of his own lands just as much as Guy was of his, and *he* had no truces with the Muslims.⁴³ Reynald was thus his own man. In 1186 he must have considered that allowing

⁴⁰ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 30–3. See Kedar, "Patriarch Eraclius," 195–8.

⁴¹ Hamilton, "Elephant of Christ," 106.

⁴² Hamilton, "Elephant of Christ," 102–3 106–7; Prawer, *Royaume latin* 1 594–5, 638; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* 480–2; Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 157–8 248.

⁴³ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 36.

the coronation of Guy to go ahead was the best of the various alternatives.

Eraclius' position was more complex. In 1184–5 he led a delegation to the West to find someone, preferably a member of one of the western royal families, to take charge in the East. Baldwin IV was now incapable of ruling, but it is not clear whether the patriarch was looking for a man who would himself become king and so supplant the royal dynasty, or whether he wanted someone to act as regent until there was a member of the royal house of Jerusalem able to take control for himself. Either way, the ambitions of both Raymond and Guy would be undercut. Eraclius' activities at this time suggest, in Professor Kedar's words, that he was 'neither a diehard supporter of Guy nor a subservient tool of the "court party"'.⁴⁴ But the mission failed, and in 1186 the patriarch anointed Guy and Sibylla king and queen of Jerusalem. By then he must have taken the view that there was nothing else he could do.

So the 'court party' and also Raymond and his supporters would appear to have been no more than groups of individuals whose interests and sense of duty coalesced on the key point of whether or not they wanted Guy to rule over them. It is probably a mistake to see the individuals pilloried by Ernoul for the defeat at Hattin as comprising a cohesive group in the proceeding period; in his view they shared the blame, but that in itself does not make them a political party. Similarly, it is questionable how far the baronial supporters of Conrad of Montferrat after 1187 should be seen as a party before that date. Guy's brother Aimery had been married to Baldwin of Ramla's daughter since at least 1176,⁴⁵ and, as has been seen, there were a number of other features of the politics of the period that would seem to cut across the usual understanding of the situation.

In their different ways both Ernoul and William of Tyre were writing propaganda. An older generation of historians was largely taken in by it. More recently there has been a reaction, with the result that the standing of Eraclius and Reynald of Châtillon and indeed of Guy himself has risen, while that of Raymond has

⁴⁴ Kedar, "Patriarch Eraclius," 193. For a discussion of Eraclius' mission see, in addition to Kedar, H. E. Mayer, "Kaiserrecht und Heiliges Land," in his *Probleme des lateinischen Königreichs Jerusalem* (London 1983) 4; R. C. Smail, "The International Status of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1150–1192," in P. M. Holt, ed., *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades* (Warminster 1977) 33 and note 38 (at 41–2).

⁴⁵ RRH no. 539.

fallen.⁴⁶ The problem in dealing with tendentious sources lies in knowing how much allowance needs to be made for their tendentiousness, and, in trying to ascertain what was happening, these narratives need to be considered carefully. It is my belief that notions of 'party' are misconceived and obscure the issues. Guy had good reasons in 1187 for wanting to win a resounding victory. Hans Mayer has pointed out that to meet the Muslim threat he had, with the connivance of Gerard of Ridefort, seized a large part of the treasure that King Henry II of England had been stock-piling in the East against the day when he himself should fulfil his crusading vows; only a major success would serve to offset the row that would be certain to follow when Henry discovered what he had done. The late R.C. Smail drew attention to the more general aspects of the predicament Guy was in: he knew he was unpopular in certain quarters; he knew what had happened in 1183 when he had avoided battle; the only way to prove himself and silence his critics once and for all was a military triumph.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See Smail, "Predicaments," 174–6.

⁴⁷ H. E. Mayer, "Henry II of England and the Holy Land," *English Historical Review* 97 (1982) 735–7; Smail, "Predicaments," 173.

Additional note:

Since this paper was read the following articles which bear on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the years before Hattin have come to my attention: J. Dunbabin, "William of Tyre and Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders' *Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België. Klasse der Letteren* 48 (1986) 111–17; B. Hamilton, "Manuel I Comnenus and Baldwin IV of Jerusalem," in J. Chrysostomides, ed., *Kathegetria. Essays presented to Joan Hussey* (London 1988) 353–75; H. E. Mayer, "Die Legitimität Balduins IV. von Jerusalem und das Testament der Agnes von Courtenay," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 108 (1988) 63–89; M. G. Pegg, "Le corps et l'autorité: la lèpre de Baudouin IV," *Annales ESC* 45 (1990) 265–87.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MUSLIM AND FRANKISH RULERS 1097–1153 A.D.

Hadia Dajani-Shakeel

This paper will probe some aspects of the diplomatic relations between some Muslim and Crusade/Frankish rulers in the Shām region which at the time included Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, between 1098 and 1153 A.D., focusing on the following issues:

- I. *The Earliest Diplomatic Contact Between Some Muslim and Frankish Leaders:*
 - A. Fāṭimid-Frankish contact near Antioch: 1097–1098.
 - B. The diplomatic mission of Peter the Hermit to Kerbogha of Mosul outside Antioch in June 1098.
 - C. The leaders of the First Crusade and some petty Muslim rulers in Syria.
- II. *Diplomatic Relations Between the Kings of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and Two Rulers of Damascus: Ṭughtikin and Muʿin al-Dīn Unur, Between 1103 and 1153.*
- III. *Peace Between Muslims and Crusaders:*
 - A. Diplomacy between the Muslim and Frankish rulers within an Islamic Framework
 - B. Treaties
 - C. Prisoners

INTRODUCTION

The early military successes of the Crusaders in al-Shām (the area known as Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, or Bayt al-Maqdis) were largely due to the prevailing political instability, disunity and lack of dedication among the various rulers of the region, most of whom were new comers to the area with very little interest in the native population. Realizing this aspect of the ‘politics of the region, the Crusaders allied themselves with one ruler against the other, thus further splitting the Muslim ranks.

In order to understand the nature of the diplomatic relations between the Muslims and the Crusaders, one needs to probe briefly into the political situation in the region towards the end of the eleventh century.

Shortly before the First Crusade, the Seljuk empire underwent

a process of disintegration, following the death of the Seljuk Sultan Mālikshāh in 1092. Al-Shām suffering most from this process, lost much of its territory to the Crusaders. Syria, for example, was divided into two centres of Seljuk influence: Aleppo in the north, ruled by Riḍwān (d. 1113 A.D.), and Damascus in the south, ruled by Duqāq (d. 1104 A.D.). These two rulers were the contending sons of Tutush (d. 1095 A.D.), the brother of Mālikshāh. The two brothers were surrounded by many petty rulers from Aleppo to Damascus who shifted loyalties between them. Among them were Mālik Ibn Salim, the lord of Ja'bar; Khalaf Ibn Mulā'ib, the governor of Misyaf; Qaymaz, ruler of al-Rahba; Janāh al-Dawlah Ḥusayn Ibn Aytikin, the governor of Homs, who was also the stepfather of Riḍwān and one of his enemies. In addition to those, was Yaghisiān, the governor of Antioch, first victim of the early Crusaders. Intrigues and fighting amongst these rulers diverted them from the real Jihād against the Crusaders.

In addition to these Syrian Seljuk rulers, representatives of the Ismā'īlī Fāṭimid caliphate in Egypt administered some coastal cities. Two of them were Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli and Kutayla, the judge of Tyre, who mutinied against the Fāṭimids just shortly before the Crusaders entered Syria and was killed in 1096. The coastal cities of Acre and Ascalon in Palestine were also held by Fāṭimid representatives. However the rest of Palestine was ruled by the Turkish Urtuqid, Suqman and Ilghāzī, up to 1098 when al-Mālik al-Afḍal, the Egyptian vizier, restored it to the Fāṭimids.¹

While the Crusaders were passing through Muslim territories in 1097–1098, Riḍwān, the ruler of Aleppo tried to capture Damascus from his brother Duqāq. After defeating him, Duqāq attacked Aleppo, but failed to capture it. The wars between the two brothers involved other rulers like Yaghisiān of Antioch, who first supported Riḍwān of Aleppo, then shifted his support to Duqāq of Damascus. Subsequently, when the Crusaders invaded his territory in Antioch, he failed to get the support of either of the two.² The conflict between Riḍwān and Duqāq intensified when Riḍwān, under the influence of the Shi'a majority in Aleppo, declared his allegiance to the Fāṭimids of Egypt. This added an

¹ For details, see Shakir Mustafa 'Tughtikin' *Majallat Kulliyat al-Adab of Kuwait University*, 2 (1972) 46–48; P. M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517* (London 1986) 1–15. Also, see Ḥamza ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl Ta'rikh Dimashq* (Beirut 1908) 128–129, 133–135; 'Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kāmil fī'l-Ta'rikh* (Beirut 1966) 10, 270–275.

² Kamāl al-Dīn ibn al-Adim, *Zubdat al-Ḥalab min Ta'rikh Ḥalab* (Damascus 1154) 2 119–127, 129–130. Also, see Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 133–134.

ideological dimension to the conflict, at the same time, threatening Damascus. Later through the mediation of other Syrian rulers, Riḍwān renounced the Fāṭimids, reaffirming his loyalty to their rivals the Sunni ‘Abbāsids.³ This action must have alienated al-Aḍfal, the Egyptian vizier, who had aspired to restore Fāṭimid influence in Syria. It may explain al-Aḍfal’s attempt to ally Egypt with the early Crusaders.

The demographic composition of al-Shām was an important factor in weakening the Islamic front against the Crusaders. The population was not homogenous either ethnically or religiously. Northern Syria and the Jazira had a large population of Armenians and Syriacs, while Lebanon had a considerable population of Maronites, in addition to other Christians belonging to the Byzantine church. Many of these groups joined ranks with the invading Crusaders as soon as they entered al-Shām providing them with needed intelligence information and supplying them with guides during their march to Jerusalem.⁴ It was an Armenian, named Feroz, who surrendered one of the towers of Antioch to Bohemond, thus, contributing to the fall of the City, after a long and costly siege.⁵ After Antioch, the Crusaders did not have much trouble conquering other localities in Syria on their way to Jerusalem.

Other non-Christian groups who were ready to deal with the Crusaders against Muslim rulers were the Ismā‘īlis in Syria, known as the Assassins, and the Bedouins of southern Palestine and Sinai. Both groups enjoyed good relations with the Crusaders throughout the twelfth century. The Bedouins of Sinai provided the authorities of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem with intelligence information and helped them obtain the release of some of their men held in Muslim prisons.⁶

I. THE EARLIEST DIPLOMATIC CONTACT BETWEEN SOME MUSLIM AND FRANKISH LEADERS

A. *Fāṭimid-Frankish Contact Near Antioch: 1097–1098*

The earliest diplomatic contact between the leaders of the First Crusade and Muslim authorities took place on the outskirts of

³ Ibn al-‘Adīm, 2 127–129.

⁴ Ibn al-‘Adīm, 132, 138–141. Also, see William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea* (New York 1943) 1 258, 2 15–16. Also, see Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10, 44.

⁵ See Ibn al-‘Adīm, 2 133–134; William of Tyre, 1 249, 255–258.

⁶ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhyal*, 183.

Antioch early in 1098. While Arabic sources provide us with a very brief account of this contact, Latin chroniclers, like William of Tyre and Caffaro discuss this event in greater detail.

William of Tyre reports that, while the Crusaders were besieging Antioch, an envoy from the Caliph of Egypt arrived to discuss a treaty of friendship with them. The motive behind this embassy, according to William of Tyre, was the Fāṭimid's desire to combat the influence of the Seljuks, considered at the time their arch-enemy. "The Egyptian monarch", says William of Tyre, "regarded with suspicion any increase in the ranks of the Persians or Turks." Accordingly, the news that Qilij Arslān had lost Nicea, where his army was reported to have been badly treated, and also that the Christians had laid siege to Antioch pleased him greatly. He regarded the loss of the Turks as a personal gain and their troubles as affording him peace and security. Fearing, therefore, that weariness of the long drawn siege might cause our people to fail, he sent envoys".⁷

Describing the Egyptian ambassadors, William of Tyre indicates that they were dignitaries from the Caliph's own staff. They were entrusted with the task of assuring the leaders of the First Crusade that the Egyptian government was ready to help them with "military support and resources".⁸ The Egyptian ambassadors travelled from Egypt to Antioch by sea, a faster and safer route. (The Fāṭimids were still in control of some of the coastal cities of al-Shām). They were received upon their arrival with full honours by the Crusade leaders with whom they held several meetings during which they conveyed the messages of the Egyptian rulers.⁹

From this brief summary of William's account regarding the nature of the Egyptian embassy and its motives, it is obvious that the chronicler was fully aware of inter-Muslim politics and sectarian conflicts, and the role they played in the Ismā'īlī Fāṭimids attempt to secure a treaty of friendship with the Crusaders, the enemies of Islam. However, he gives more credit to the Fāṭimid caliph al-Musta'li (d. 1101 A.D.), in whose name the negotiations were carried out, than to the strong Armenian vizier al-Afdal, the real force behind the negotiations.¹⁰

⁷ William of Tyre, 1 223–224.

⁸ William of Tyre, 1 224.

⁹ William of Tyre, 1 224. Also, see J. F. Michaud, *Michaud's History of the Crusades* (London 1852) 1 138.

¹⁰ William of Tyre, 1 223–224.

William of Tyre does not discuss the details of the agreement between the Crusade leaders and the Egyptian ambassadors. These are provided by other sources which also give us new insight into the motives of early negotiations. Steven Runciman indicates that the Byzantine emperor had advised the Crusaders, while they were still in Constantinople, to arrive at some understanding with the Fāṭimids. "For the Fāṭimids," says Runciman, "were uncompromising enemies of the Turks. They were tolerant towards their Christian subjects and had always been ready to treat with Christian powers."¹¹

Other Latin sources indicate that the leaders of the Crusade had sent an embassy to Egypt from Nicea seeking some kind of agreement.¹²

As far as the terms of the agreement are concerned, Runciman points out that the Fāṭimids proposed the division of al-Shām. Under this proposal, the Crusaders would take the northern part while the Fāṭimids would take Palestine, which they had lost to the Turks (1071 A.D.). Al-Afdal of Egypt, according to Runciman "no doubt, regarded the Crusaders merely as mercenaries of the Emperor and assumed, therefore, that such a division based on the state of affairs before the Turkish invasion would be perfectly acceptable".¹³ Runciman's allusion to the division of al-Shām may have had some basis. However, his reference to al-Afdal's ignorance of the Crusader's mission is questionable. For the shrewd vizier had already had some diplomatic and commercial contact with two of the states involved in the First Crusade, namely, Sicily and Genoa.¹⁴ Contrary to Runciman, al-Kinānī emphasizes the role of Genoa, rather than Byzantium, in the negotiations between the Fāṭimids and the Crusaders prior to the military expedition of the First Crusade. He points out that the Egyptians may have sanctioned the idea of Frankish military intervention as early as 1085. Basing his conclusion on the account of the Genoese chronicler Caffaro, al-Kinānī indicates that the Count of Flanders (one of the prominent leaders of the First Crusade) and other prominent Franks, went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1083–1085 aboard a Genoese vessel. When they stopped at Alexandria, they were provided with Egyptian escorts

¹¹ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (New York 1988), 1 229; Sa'īd A. Ashur, *Al-Ḥaraka al-Ṣalibiyya* (Cairo 1971) 1 229.

¹² Runciman, *History*, 1 229; Sa'īd A. Ashur, *Al-Ḥaraka al-Ṣalibiyya*, 1 198.

¹³ Runciman, *History*, 1 229.

¹⁴ Mustafa al-Kinānī, *Al-'Alaqāt bayn Genoa wa 'l-Fāṭimiyyin fī 'l-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 1095–1171 A.D.* (Alexandria 1981) 50–59.

to the port of Jerusalem (Jaffa), who also accompanied them on their way back to Egypt. It was during one of their stops in Egypt that they must have held some negotiations with the Egyptian authorities.¹⁵ Al-Kinānī further relates that the same Caffaro who provided details about the negotiations between the Fāṭimids and the Franks near Antioch may have been involved in the pre-Crusade negotiations, for he was the only chronicler to report them in great details.¹⁶

We mentioned earlier that medieval Arabic chroniclers, with the exception of Ibn al-Athīr, scarcely refer to the Egyptian-Frankish contact. Ibn al-Athīr accuses the Egyptians of complaisance with the Franks, stating that the Fāṭimids invited the Franks to invade al-Shām in order to protect Egypt from the Muslims (Turks).¹⁷ Other Muslim scholars accuse the Fāṭimids of cooperating, at least indirectly, with the Crusaders. Ibn Taghribardī, for example, wonders, "why al-Afdāl of Egypt did not respond to the appeals of the Muslim rulers when they sought his help".¹⁸

The first Egyptian mission to the Crusaders paved the way for further negotiations. When the Egyptian envoys returned to Egypt, an envoy representing the Crusaders accompanied them to discuss their own proposals.¹⁹ Some of these proposals requested a commitment from al-Afdāl to guarantee the Crusaders safe passage through the coastal cities of al-Shām controlled by the Fāṭimids, to their destination: Jerusalem. Heading the Frankish embassy was a Genoese, known as John.²⁰

The Crusader embassy was received with full honours at al-Afdāl's court. The vizier offered them valuable gifts and assured John, their chief leader, that he, al-Afdāl, had already sent orders to all the governors of the coastal cities under his control to facilitate the passage of the Crusaders through their territories. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the delayed siege of Antioch by the Crusaders, al-Afdāl regained Jerusalem from its Turkish rulers. (August, 1098 A.D.). As a result of his campaign in Jerusalem, his negotiations with the Frankish envoys were stalled. Hence the envoys' stay in Egypt was prolonged; there were reports that they were even detained in prison.²¹ Upon receiving news of the

¹⁵ Al-Kinānī, *Al-ʿAlaḳāt*, 89–91.

¹⁶ Al-Kinānī, *Al-ʿAlaḳāt*, 92–93.

¹⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 227.

¹⁸ See Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Taghribardī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa'l-Qāhira* (Cairo 1939) V 147–148.

¹⁹ Runciman, *History*, I 229–230.

²⁰ Al-Kinānī, *Al-Ḥaraka*, 93.

²¹ Michaud, *Michaud's History*, I 195.

Crusader's victory at Antioch and their subsequent advance into Lebanon, on their way to Jerusalem, al-Afḍal released the Frankish envoys. He sent with them another Egyptian envoy in 1099. This time al-Afḍal, who was better acquainted with the names and the ranks of all the Crusade leaders, sent valuable gifts to each one of them according to his rank.²² The second Egyptian delegation advised the Crusaders that their vizier had recovered Jerusalem from the Turks, that he wanted to maintain peace with them, and that Egypt was prepared to protect the Christian pilgrims going to Jerusalem. Nevertheless they proposed that Egypt only allows pilgrims numbering between 200 and 300 at one time, to go to Jerusalem, and stay only one month in the Holy Land. Furthermore, they requested the Crusaders to return to Northern Syria.²³

The victorious Frankish leaders rejected the Egyptian proposals, threatening the Egyptians that they would not only capture Jerusalem, but march on Egypt itself.²⁴ Not long after that they took Jerusalem from the Egyptian authorities and set out for Egypt (July, 1099 A.D.). Since the Franco-Egyptian alliance failed to materialize, the Egyptians, realizing they could not defeat their Frankish enemy, turned to the Turkish rulers of Syria for support. The Egyptian chroniclers, al-Maqrizī and Ibn Muyassir, point out that following the fall of Jerusalem to the Crusaders, al-Afḍal sent an envoy to the Crusaders to protest and condemn their atrocities in Jerusalem. The Crusaders rebuffed the envoy and followed the Egyptian messengers to al-Afḍal's camp, where they attacked his forces. Al-Afḍal fled to safety inside Ascalon. This was the last time that he ventured to risk his own life, according to al-Maqrizī.²⁵

This incident polarized the conflict between Egypt and the Crusaders, convincing al-Afḍal, and the Fāṭimid administrators after him, that Egypt could not win a war against the Crusaders without help from Syria.

B. The Diplomatic Mission of Peter the Hermit to Kerbogha of Mosul Outside Antioch, 1098 A.D.

Soon after the capture of Antioch, on the third of June, 1098, Qiwām al-Dawla, Kerbogha, the ruler of Mosul, deciding to regain

²² Michaud, *Michaud's History*, 1 195.

²³ Al-Kināni, *Al-Haraka*, 94.

²⁴ William of Tyre, 1 326.

²⁵ Ahmad al-Maqrizī, *Itti'az al-Hunafā' bi Akhbār al-A'imma al-Fāṭimiyyin al-Khulafā'* (Cairo 1973), 3 24. See also Muḥammad ibn Muyassir, *Akhbār Miṣr*

the Muslim territory, sought the help of several rulers of Syrian cities, as well as the garrison of the city still inside the city. The Muslim allies blockaded the city till 28th June, 1098, during which the Crusaders suffered famine and death. Consequently, they decided to negotiate with their adversaries. The report of the negotiation by Ibn al-Athīr differs slightly from that of Fulcher of Chartres and William of Tyre. Ibn al-Athīr indicates that the Franks, weakened by the blockade, sent to Kerbogha asking for safe conduct (*amān*), in order to leave Antioch. However, Kerbogha refused their request.²⁶ The Crusaders, on the other hand, started fleeing the city in small numbers. This frightened Kerbogha's allies, who advised him to kill the departing Crusaders while they were vulnerable, but he refused. Eventually, a battle took place between the Muslims and their enemies in which the Crusaders won, inflicting heavy casualties on the Muslims.²⁷

William of Tyre, on the other hand, points out that the Crusader leaders decided, after the discovery of the lance, to send representatives to Kerbogha proposing that he agree to two requests: first, he abandons the city to the Christians as a possession forever, and secondly an ultimatum, that if he refused to leave the city, he should prepare for battle.²⁸ The Christian leaders sent Peter the Hermit, along with an interpreter, Herluin, a native Christian.²⁹ In order to allow the envoys to reach Keroghā, both sides agreed on a temporary truce.

Peter the Hermit's message, as stated in William's chronicle, seems to have been more of a rhetoric sermon aimed at intimidating the Muslim forces with the might and determination of the Crusaders. Being neither diplomatic nor a mission of peace, it did not impress Kerbogha, who was fully aware of the grave situation his enemy was in at the time. In his response, equally rhetorical, he threatened to exterminate the Crusade leaders while leaving the younger Crusaders for the service of the Muslims.³⁰

The account of Fulcher of Chartres agrees in its basic details with that of William's,³¹ although other authors add a religious dimension to the negotiations. Fulcher reports an invitation from

(Cairo 1964) 67.

²⁶ Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 276.

²⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 276–277.

²⁸ William of Tyre, 1 282.

²⁹ William of Tyre, 1 282 and note 8, 282–283.

³⁰ William of Tyre, 1 284.

³¹ Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem* (Knoxville 1969) 103–104.

the leaders of the First Crusade to Kerbogha to convert to Christianity and a response from Kerbogha inviting them to Islam.³² The failure of the mission seems to have worried the besieged Crusaders so much that Godfrey of Bouillon asked Peter the Hermit to present only a brief summary of the negotiations instead of the rhetorical details which he thought might affect an already demoralized army.³³ Soon after, the Crusaders charged out of the city and defeated the Muslim forces. Ibn al-Athir blames the defeat on the mismanagement and arrogance of Kerbogha, stating that he forbade other Muslims from killing the fleeing Crusaders. At the same time he had failed to prepare for a battle.³⁴ Kerbogha's defeat marked a turning point in Muslim-Frankish relations. It opened the gates to most of Syria to the Crusaders, who, for almost fifty years imposed their own terms of war and peace on their Muslim counterparts.

C. The Leaders of the First Crusade and Other Petty Muslim Rulers in Syria

We mentioned earlier that the two centres of power in Syria were Aleppo and Damascus. The rulers of both controlled several towns and forts that were at the same time buffer zones between these centres and their neighbouring Frankish principalities. The governors of these small buffer localities often shifted alliances between their Muslim and Frankish neighbours in Syria: Antioch, Edessa and Tripoli. The Franks were continuously ready to deal with the petty governors often providing them with military aid against their co-religionists, whenever these governors requested for it. Thus the Franks tried to weaken both centres, by depriving them of their territories and subjects. The early agreements between individual Muslim and Frankish rulers were often binding especially on the Muslims who were in a much weaker position. One such example was the case of 'Umar, the *wali* of the Fort of 'Azaz in 1098. 'Umar had mutinied against his lord Riḍwān of Aleppo. In response, Riḍwān marched against 'Azaz to discipline the mutinous *wali*. Consequently, according to Ibn al-'Adīm, 'Umar appealed to Raymond, the Count of Toulouse, for help. Raymond responded immediately by leading his forces to 'Azaz and, thus, forcing the Aleppan forces to withdraw. Following his military success against the Aleppan forces, Raymond looted the

³² Michaud, *Michaud's History*, 1 168.

³³ William of Tyre, 1 285.

³⁴ Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 227.

area before he returned to Antioch. In order to guarantee the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement with 'Umar, Raymond took the son of the latter as a hostage.³⁵ William of Tyre's report about the details of the agreement, between the Franks and 'Umar, differs slightly from that of Ibn al-'Adim, stated above. William indicates that 'Umar contacted Godfrey who was still in Antioch for help, instead of Raymond. He adds that the *wali* sent a messenger, one of his own people, a loyal Christian to request an alliance of friendship with the Duke". He also sent gifts and promised to devote himself heart and soul to Godfrey's service. He expressed desire to bind himself by the indissoluble bonds of a treaty, and in order that the Duke (Godfrey) might have full confidence in his words and not hesitate over any part of this promise, he offered to send his own son as a hostage. The *wali* seems to have offered to pay Godfrey a price for his services.³⁶ Accordingly, Godfrey responded favourably. He sought the help of his brother, the Count of Edessa and proceeded to help his Muslim ally. They were joined by other Frankish leaders. On hearing about the approaching Frankish forces, the Aleppans retreated. On the other hand the Franks continued their advance towards 'Azâz. When they finally reached, the *wali* 'Umar came out to welcome them along with 300 of his knights. "In full view of the assembled legions", according to William of Tyre, he knelt on the ground and, with bowed head, returned thanks, first to the Duke and then to the other Chiefs. Before all the people (assembled) he pledged himself to be faithful to the Christian Chiefs and gave an oath of fidelity, declaring that no exigency of time or circumstance should ever draw him away from fealty and obedience to them.³⁷ As for the hostage, the *wali*'s son, he died soon after he was taken to Antioch in an epidemic which had smitten its population. The Frankish leaders expressed grief for his death, and sent his corpse to his family with full honour.³⁸

The negotiations and resulting treaty between 'Umar and the leaders of the First Crusade marked the beginning of formal diplomatic relations between the Muslims and the Franks in Syria, establishing some precedents for binding treaties in the twelfth century. For example, the choice of a Christian ambassador to the Franks was a clever move on the part of 'Umar in order to

³⁵ Ibn al-'Adim, *Zubda*, 2 141.

³⁶ William of Tyre, 1 301.

³⁷ William of Tyre, 301–302, 304.

³⁸ Michaud, *Michaud's History*, 1 182.

gain the trust of the leaders and, at the same time, express his good will towards his Christian population. Many of the ambassadors to the Franks later were Christians. Furthermore, the fact that he ('Umar) expressed a desire to "bind himself by the indissoluble bonds of a treaty", as William of Tyre points out, seems to have been at the request of the Crusade leaders to ensure his commitment to the alliance. The treaty was neither recorded nor signed, like many other earlier treaties, however, 'Umar surrendered his son to the Crusaders as a guarantee for his commitment.³⁹

One aspect of William of Tyre's report concerning the manner in which 'Umar paid homage to the Crusaders seems rather strange to an Islamic society. Kneeling on the ground with bowed head, 'Umar returned thanks and gave an oath of fidelity.⁴⁰ This seems more like a Western feudal practice that may have been applied for the first time in the East, although it never became a common practice thereafter.

Soon after this incident, 'Umar was assassinated on behalf of Riḍwān of Aleppo. The treaty was annulled and 'Umar's successor at 'Azāz carried out some raids against the territory of Antioch.⁴¹

After this encounter with a Muslim ruler in Syria, the Crusaders started their march towards Jerusalem through the Syro-Lebanese coastal route. On their way, they negotiated another peace treaty with Ibn 'Ammār, the ruler of Tripoli. Ibn 'Ammār, who was afraid that his city would fall to the Crusaders, sent a delegation to the leaders proposing peace. Since he initiated the peace proposal, he had to entice the leaders by offering them generous terms, which, according to William of Tyre, included the immediate payment of fifteen thousand pieces of gold, in addition to a specified number of horses and mules along with food supplies, needed by the Crusaders. He also offered the leaders gifts of silk and valuable vases and supplied them with escorts on their way to Jerusalem. In return, the Crusaders agreed to spare the cities of Tripoli, 'Arqa and Jubail.⁴² This agreement was also short lived, for soon after the capture of Jerusalem (July 15, 1099 A.D.) Raymond of Toulouse returned to invest the city.⁴³

³⁹ William of Tyre, 1 301.

⁴⁰ William of Tyre, 1 304.

⁴¹ Ibn al-'Adim, *Zubda*, 2 141-147.

⁴² William of Tyre, 1 330.

⁴³ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 162-163.

II. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KINGS OF THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM AND TWO RULERS OF DAMASCUS: ṬUGHTIKIN AND MUʿIN AL-DĪN UNUR, BETWEEN 1103 A.D. AND 1153 A.D.

The emergence of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem as a dominant power in the Shām region, contributed to the achievement of rapprochement among the different feuding Muslim rulers, all of whom were faced by a common threat. Thus, Damascus sought help from Mosul and Aleppo, its rival as well as from other principalities, whenever it was threatened. Others also appealed to Damascus for help whenever the need arose. On the other hand, Egypt also started to appeal to Damascus, its former enemy, for military help. An Egyptian vizier, al-Šāliḥ ibn Ruzzik (d. 1160 A.D.), approached Nūr al-Dīn Zengi (d. 1174 A.D.), requesting that both leaders coordinate their military offensive activity against the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem from Syria and Egypt. Furthermore, Syria, and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem fought each other on Egyptian soil in a race to conquer Egypt (1164–1171 A.D.). The war among the three contenders (who shifted alliances) resulted in the rise of Saladin; the latter eventually united Egypt with Syria and eliminated the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem (1187–1189 A.D.).

Attempts at the consolidation of Muslim resistance forces in al-Shām, changed the balance of power between the Muslims and the Crusaders. It also helped change the nature of the relationship between the two formerly warring states in which the Kingdom always won and imposed its terms of peace, to one where diplomacy became the norm.

The first ruler of Damascus to challenge the Crusaders of the Latin Kingdom and the Syrian Franks was Ṭughtikin, (d. 1128 A.D.). Ṭughtikin was the *atabek* (tutor), stepfather and successor of Duqāq (d. 1104 A.D.), the young ruler of Damascus. He (Ṭughtikin) was a noted military general in the army of Tutush before he moved to Damascus to apply his military expertise against the Crusaders.

The earliest encounter between Ṭughtikin and the forces of the Latin Kingdom was in 1105–1106 A.D., when King Baldwin I started to build a fort, known as ‘Al‘al in the Quneitra area. He (Ṭughtikin) responded to this threat by attacking the unfinished fort and demolishing it. This victory was celebrated in the Muslim East and soon after earned Ṭughtikin an investiture from the Caliph and the title of *mujaḥid*. On the other

hand, it disturbed the King of Jerusalem who had not only suffered a defeat, but lost a large number of his men including two hundred knights taken prisoners to Damascus.⁴⁴

This victory was followed by another in the Tiberias area, causing great concern in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁴⁵ Soon after these setbacks, King Baldwin decided to open diplomatic relations with the ruler of Damascus (Ṭughtikin). Ibn al-Qalānīsī reports in the events of the years 1108–1109 that a succession of envoys representing the King of Jerusalem went to Damascus to negotiate peace and establish amicable relations.⁴⁶ Ṭughtikin accepted the King's overtures and signed his first treaty with the king [1109 A.D.]. After this, two more treaties were signed and two unilateral proposals were made from Baldwin to Ṭughtikin and Ṭughtikin to Baldwin. In addition two treaties were concluded with the Syrian Franks of Tripoli and Antioch.

The following section discusses the circumstances leading to these treaties and proposals.

Treaties Between Ṭughtikin and King Baldwin I

Treaty 1—Muwāda'a between Ṭughtikin and King Baldwin I on the Biqā' 1109 A.D.

Ibn al-Qalānīsī reports that in 1109, King Baldwin started to ravage the Biqā' valley. Consequently, there was an exchange of correspondence between him and Ṭughtikin which resulted in the conclusion of a peace treaty (*muwāda'a*). The terms of the treaty stipulated that both sides should agree to refrain from military activity in each other's territory for a period of four years. It also stipulated that one third of the produce of the Biqā' goes to the Latin Kingdom and two thirds go to the Muslims and the peasants. They also agreed to divide the areas of Sawad and Jabal Awf into thirds, with Ṭughtikin taking one third, while the Franks and the peasants in the area would take two thirds. The terms of the agreement were recorded in 1109, according to Ibn al-Qalānīsī and a *muwāṣafa* (description of the terms of the agreement) was written explaining the conditions agreed upon in September 1109.⁴⁷

It was not long after signing this agreement, that Ṭughtikin became involved militarily with the Franks of Syria in the Tripoli

⁴⁴ See Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 407; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 149.

⁴⁵ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 151.

⁴⁶ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 164.

⁴⁷ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 164. Sawad is cultivated land in the Jordan region.

area (1109 A.D.). He was defeated and fled to Damascus. In response to ʿUḡhtikin's defeat, King Baldwin I, who considered ʿUḡhtikin's involvement in Syria as a violation of the truce, wrote to him rebukingly, saying: "Do not think that I will annul the agreement with you because of what you did, an adventure that led to your defeat. Rulers are often afflicted with more than that which has afflicted you, but they do recover." Commenting on this incident, Ibn al-Athīr points out that, "had the king attacked ʿUḡhtikin soon after this defeat, he could have swept his territory."⁴⁸

Treaty 2—Between ʿUḡhtikin and the ruler of Tripoli on Rafaniya, 1110 A.D.

One year after this incident, ʿUḡhtikin became involved again with the Frankish rulers of Tripoli who had planned to capture Rafaniya (1110 A.D.). ʿUḡhtikin set out from Damascus to defend the city and he camped at Homs. Being unable to capture the city, the Frankish rulers corresponded with ʿUḡhtikin asking for an agreement on the settlement of some territory in exchange for peace. ʿUḡhtikin agreed and a treaty was signed, according to the terms of which the Franks of Tripoli received one third of the produce of the Biqāʿ valley. They were also given the castles of Muneitra and Ibn Akkar (north of Tripoli), on condition that they stop ravaging the neighbouring Muslim territory. The terms of the treaty also stipulated that the inhabitants of three other forts, namely Hisn al-Akrad, Hisn al-Tufan and Misyaf, should pay a fixed sum of money annually to the Franks as protection money.⁴⁹ This is comparable to the *jizya* (poll tax) in Islam.

Treaty 3—Unilateral proposal from Baldwin I to ʿUḡhtikin, 1113 A.D.

As soon as the four years truce between ʿUḡhtikin and the King Baldwin I expired, 1113, the King started to raid Damascene territory, imposing an economic blockade on Damascus itself. Since ʿUḡhtikin was unable to resist these raids alone, he appealed to the *atabek*, Sharaf al-Dīn Mawdūd of Mosul, for military support. This was rendered within a short time. The ʿUḡhtikin-Mawdūd alliance disturbed king Baldwin, who contacted his ally Joscelin, then the lord of Tiberias, asking him to approach ʿUḡhtikin for a peace agreement. Baldwin also proposed to Joscelin to offer

⁴⁸ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 162. Also, see Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 468–469.

⁴⁹ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 165.

the surrender to ʿUḡhtikin of the castle of Thamanin as well as Jabal ʿĀmila in exchange for the castle of Habis in the Sawad, half the Sawad, and the promise (on behalf of Baldwin) that he would observe the terms of the agreement and refrain from attacking Muslim territory any more. ʿUḡhtikin, rejected these proposals. Hence, the allied forces of Mosul and Damascus engaged those of the Latin Kingdom and its allies in a battle at al-Uḡhuana, near Tiberias (summer, 1113 A.D.), which resulted in the defeat of King Baldwin and his allies. The King was captured, according to Ibn al-Athīr, but his captors, not recognizing him, set him free after stripping him of his arms and possessions.⁵⁰

William of Tyre, whose report about the battle agrees in its main details with that of the Muslim chroniclers, points out that the King fled. "He threw down the standard which he bore in his hand and barely made good his escape, as did Arnulf, the patriarch".⁵¹ This victory earned the Muslim forces new allies. These were some of the Muslim natives of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. William of Tyre says that

during these days our domestics deserted us and also the Saracen dwellers in our villages, which are called Casalīa. These joined cohorts of the foe and instructed them how to destroy us. This they were able to do, in as much as they possessed full information about our situation.⁵²

Ibn al-Qalānīsī's report about the attitude of the Muslims in the Latin Kingdom confirms William's. He says "all Muslims in the Frankish territory (the Latin Kingdom) sent to the Atabek (ʿUḡhtikin) asking that he should guarantee them security and confirm them in their property. A portion of the revenue of Nablus was brought to him".⁵³

Treaty 4—Mawādaʿa and Musālama, between ʿUḡhtikin and King Baldwin I, at al-Sanamayn, 1111 A.D.

Baldwin violated the earlier *muwādaʿa* that was concluded at the Biqāʿ (1109 A.D.). He sought the help of Bertram of Tripoli and both marched to Tiberias. ʿUḡhtikin set out to meet them, camping at al-Sanamayn. He blocked the road to prevent them from reaching him. Accordingly, they were forced to seek *musālama* and *muwādaʿa*. Both sides exchanged correspondence and an agreement was reached. According to the terms of the agree-

⁵⁰ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 184–185; Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 495–496.

⁵¹ William of Tyre, 1 494.

⁵² William of Tyre, 1 494–495.

⁵³ Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhayl*, 186.

ment, King Baldwin was to take half of the produce of Jabal Awf, the Sawad, Jabaniyya, in addition to what he had already held as a result of the earlier agreement. This is in addition to areas neighbouring those that belonged to the clan of Jarrāḥ.

The conditions of the treaty were sent by the negotiators to Ṭughtikin and Baldwin and approved. After the treaty, both returned to their respective territories.

Treaty 5—Muhādana between Ṭughtikin and Baldwin I, 1114 A.D.

The victory at al-Uqhauana was followed by a truce between Ṭughtikin and King Baldwin I (1114 A.D.). The truce, according to Ibn al-Qalānisi, was to help both sides rebuild their territories after the ravages of war and to ensure safe passage and travelling. Both took oaths to abide by the conditions of the truce.⁵⁴

Ṭughtikin's diplomatic encounters with King Baldwin, encouraged him (in 1115 A.D.) to ally himself along with the rulers of Aleppo, Ilghāzī, Urtuq and Lu'lu al-YaYa, with the Franks of Syria against the forces of Bursuq al-Bursuqi and the Mosulites. Having feared that Bursuq and the Mosulites would capture Muslim Syria and discipline him for his suspected role in the assassination of Mawdūd of Mosul Ṭughtikin sent messengers to King Baldwin I and the Prince of Antioch along with gifts, asking them for a temporary truce. As a guarantee he offered to give them some hostages and promised under oath that he would not break the agreement during the designated time. Shortly after this agreement, the Prince of Antioch sought help from Ṭughtikin and Baldwin against the same Bursuq al-Bursuqi. Ṭughtikin rushed to Antioch, arriving there, even before the King of Jerusalem. The allies marched towards Shayzar, where Bursuq's forces were encamped, seeing the magnitude of the Frankish-Damascene forces, Bursuq withdrew, so did the Damascene-Frankish allies.⁵⁵ This alliance provided Ṭughtikin with the opportunity of meeting King Baldwin I and other Frank Syrian rulers. This alliance was the last between Ṭughtikin and Baldwin.

Treaty 6—Unilateral proposal for peace (Muhādana) from Ṭughtikin to King Baldwin II, 1118 A.D.

Ṭughtikin set out from Damascus toward the Latin Kingdom in 1118 A.D. He had reached the Yarmuk when the news about

⁵⁴ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 190.

⁵⁵ William of Tyre, 1 500–501; Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 503.

the death of Baldwin I reached him. Messengers from the new King, Baldwin II, called upon him asking for a *muhādana*. ʿUḡhtikin proposed that he would agree to a *muhādana* on condition that the King relinquishes the share of the Latin Kingdom in Jabal Awf, al-Hanna, al-Salt and al-Ghawr. Since the King did not respond to his proposal, ʿUḡhtikin ravaged Tiberias and its environs.⁵⁶

Treaty 7—Treaty dealing with the surrender of Tyre, 1124 A.D.

The last diplomatic contact between ʿUḡhtikin and the authorities of the Latin Kingdom in Jerusalem was in June, 1124 when he negotiated the surrender of Tyre. William of Tyre points that ʿUḡhtikin “sent wise and discreet men as envoys to the chiefs of our army, namely, the patriarch, the Doge of Venice, the Count of Tripoli, William de Bury, and other lords of the realm. They bore proposals of peace couched in conciliatory language. After much discussion and many disputes, an agreement was reached between the two parties: the city was to be surrendered to the Christians on condition that those citizens who wished to be allowed to depart freely with their wives and children and all their substance, while those who preferred to remain at Tyre should be granted permission to do so and their homes and possessions guaranteed them.”⁵⁷ Some of the Franks protested the terms of the treaty, for it would have deprived them of the booty but they were convinced to accept.

The people of Tyre were allowed to leave their city without violence, many went to Damascus. [During the capture of Tyre, King of Jerusalem Baldwin II was in captivity].⁵⁸ Ibn al-Qalānisi’s report agrees with William’s indicating that the negotiations on Tyre were rather difficult.⁵⁹ Following ʿUḡhtikin’s death (February, 1128 A.D.), the Franks of Syria and Jerusalem invaded Damascene territory, but were defeated at Marj al-Suffar by Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī, son of ʿUḡhtikin.⁶⁰

During the administration of Muʿīn al-Dīn Unur, 1140–1149 A.D., Damascus and its environs were harassed by the forces of ʿImād al-Dīn Zengi of Mosul and Aleppo on one hand, and King Fulk of Anjou of Jerusalem on the other. ʿImād al-Dīn had already

⁵⁶ Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 543.

⁵⁷ William of Tyre, 2 19. Also, see Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, 10 621–622; Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 211.

⁵⁸ William of Tyre, 2 21–22. During the capture of Tyre, King Baldwin II was in captivity.

⁵⁹ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 211.

⁶⁰ William of Tyre, 2 41.

captured Baalback as well as other Damascene territory before he attacked Damascus in 1139.⁶¹

Treaty 8—Treaty between Muʿin al-Dīn Unur and King Fulk of Anjou

Consequently, Muʿin al-Dīn appealed to Fulk the King of Jerusalem for help, offering him in return for his help, attractive rewards. These included the capturing of the frontier town of Banyas from its Muslim ruler for the king. The King responded favourably, however, he asked in return the payment of a stipulated sum of money and the surrender of a number of hostages as guarantee. The terms were accepted by Muʿin al-Dīn and both parties signed a formal treaty with “solemn oaths and a guarantee of loyal execution of their promise”.⁶² Muʿin al-Dīn paid them the money and sent the hostages who were from among the relatives of the commanders. Accordingly, the king of Jerusalem summoned the lords and other Frankish Syrian rulers to march towards Damascus. On hearing of their approach, ʿImād al-Dīn withdrew, thus completing the allied forces of Muʿin al-Dīn to continue their march to Banyas. The governor of Banyas eventually surrendered to Muʿin al-Dīn, who rewarded him with a fief, and in turn, surrendered it (Banyas) to the Crusaders in fulfilment of the terms of the agreement. He also returned to them all the Frankish captives there. Among those who were returned was the wife of Renier de Brus, the former lord of Banyas.⁶³

William of Tyre’s narrative about the alliance between Muʿin al-Dīn and the King of Jerusalem, agrees in its details with the account of Ibn al-Qalānisi, however, he adds that Muʿin al-Dīn promised to pay the King, twenty thousand pieces of gold per month “for the necessary expenses of the enterprise”.⁶⁴ He also mentions that “the most potent reason and the one which lent universal favour for the proposition was the fact that at the end of treaty was added the clause about the city of Banyas”.⁶⁵

Muʿin al-Dīn had established friendly relations with the Kings of Jerusalem, Fulk of Anjou and Baldwin III. Muʿin al-Dīn used to go often to the Holy land, where, according to Usāma Ibn Munquidh (the Syrian poet and Muʿin al-Dīn’s ambassador to the Kings of Jerusalem) he used to pray in the Aqsa mosque and

⁶¹ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 270–271.

⁶² Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 272.

⁶³ William of Tyre, 2 76–77.

⁶⁴ William of Tyre, 2 105.

⁶⁵ William of Tyre, 2 106.

visit Muslim communities, especially in the Nablus area.⁶⁶ William of Tyre described him as “a man of much wisdom and a lover of our people”.⁶⁷ He adds: “Anar made great efforts to gain the favour of the Christians by all possible complaisance; he made use of every act by which friends are won. But whether this proceeded from the heart and from sincerity of purpose or was forced upon him by necessity contrary to his own wishes may well be questioned by the wise. Doubtless either might be the case, for he regarded his son-in-law, Nūr al-Dīn, with the same distrust that he had formerly felt towards the latter’s father Zengi”.⁶⁸

Treaty 9—Muhādana (Truce) between Mu‘īn al-Dīn Unur and King Baldwin III

Following the failure of the second crusade, the Frankish allies returned to their territories after having lost a strong ally in the area. On his part, Mu‘īn al-Dīn, strengthened by the results of the second Crusade, officially annulled the earlier treaty with King Baldwin II. He led an incursion from the Hauran, in 1149, into the Latin Kingdom, attacking towns and villages, plundering, killing and taking prisoners. He thus forced the authorities in the Kingdom to ask for terms of peace as well as the renewal of the earlier agreement, on the payment of a small tribute. Messengers, according to Ibn al-Qalānisi, from both sides met to draft a treaty acceptable to both. Once the terms of the treaty were accepted, oaths of loyal observance of its stipulations were taken (early May, 1149 A.D.). The period of the truce was for two years.⁶⁹

This was Mu‘īn al-Dīn’s last treaty with the Kings of Jerusalem. He died within two months of concluding this treaty. His successors in power, Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq, grandson of Ṭughtikin, who had been overpowered by Mu‘īn al-Dīn, sought the help of the rulers of Jerusalem against Nūr al-Dīn, who had planned to capture Damascus (June 1151 A.D.). Ibn al-Qalānisi indicates that a large detachment of the Franks went to Damascus (June 1151 A.D.). Mujīr al-Dīn and others went out with their officers and a considerable number of citizens, held a meeting with the King and his officers where they planned their strategy, and then headed to capture Bosra. After failing to capture Bosra, the Franks returned to Jerusalem (1151 A.D.) and sent letters to Mujīr al-

⁶⁶ Usāma ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-I‘tibār* (Princeton 1930) 135, 137, 139.

⁶⁷ William of Tyre, 2 148.

⁶⁸ William of Tyre, 2 148.

⁶⁹ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 304.

Dīn and Mu'ayyid al-Dīn demanding the residue of the tribute promised to them for causing the withdrawal of Nūr al-Dīn from Damascus saying: "Had it not been for us driving him off, he would not have withdrawn from you".⁷⁰

After several attempts to capture Damascus, Nūr al-Dīn finally entered it in 1154. With Nūr al-Dīn in Damascus, a new era of Franco-Muslim relations started in Syria.

III. PEACE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CRUSADERS

A. *Diplomacy Between the Muslim and Frankish Rulers Within an Islamic Framework*

Islam prescribed war, *jihād*, *qitāl* or *ḥarb* under certain conditions. It also emphasized peace, *ṣalam* or *ṣulḥ* as its ultimate objective. The Qur'anic verses on war and peace formed the basis for an elaborate legal theory of the law of nations, known as *al-Siyār*, developed by the jurists between the seventh and tenth centuries.

Since the Islamic legal theory of war and peace developed during a period of Muslim power, it focused on issues relevant to a dominant, rather than a vanquished state. Some jurists emphasized the notion of Jihād, as a vehicle for expanding the Islamic domain, while others emphasized the notion of peace, *ṣalam* or *ṣulḥ*, especially in times when the Islamic state or Islam itself were threatened. These jurists thus added *Dār al-Ṣulḥ*, the (abode of peace), to the earlier notions of *Dār al-Islām* and *Dār al-Ḥarb*. *Dār al-Ṣulḥ* regulated the peace relationship between the Muslims and their non-Muslim political enemies. Thus in their discussions on *Dār al-Ṣulḥ*, the jurists focused on the nature of diplomatic relations, instructions for concluding treaties, as well as dealing with the prisoners of war between the Islamic state and its political enemies.⁷¹ These issues were central in the relationship between the Muslims and the crusaders throughout the Twelfth century, as we have indicated. The early diplomatic encounters between the Muslim petty rulers and the Crusaders in Syria were motivated by fear, especially at a time when there was neither military support from other Muslims nor moral instruction. These were provided later during the century.

⁷⁰ Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl*, 314.

⁷¹ See Majid Khadduri, "International Law," *Law in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C. 1955) 350–351, 359–360.

Although the Islamic theory of war and peace was the basis for regulating Muslim-Crusaders relations it was further developed in the 12th century in response to the Crusades in order to meet the needs of the time and circumstances.

We discussed earlier the diplomatic missions, alliances and counter alliances, as well as peace treaties between some Muslim and Frankish rulers. In this section we will try to assess them in the light of the Islamic theory of war and peace.

The legality of the early diplomatic missions, especially the Egyptian to the Franks, was criticized by some Muslim chroniclers and historians, as we mentioned earlier, as well as jurists. Those scholars pointed out that the immediate response of the Fāṭimids and other Muslims should have been the resistance to the invaders, the fortification of the Muslim frontiers as well as the protection of the Muslim populations as opposed to seeking unilateral peace agreements and intriguing against other Muslims. On the other hand, the Fāṭimids may have defended their mission to the early Crusade leaders as a form of diplomacy, aimed among other things, at assessing the strength and motives of the enemy. As for other rulers, who also negotiated peace with the Crusaders, especially during the first few years of the invasion, they believed that by seeking temporary truces, they could gain time to rally other Muslim forces to their support, especially from the 'Abbāsid Caliphs or their Sultans. Such support unfortunately never arrived on time to save them from surrendering to the invaders. On the other hand, the surviving Muslim rulers in Syria had no option, especially in the first few years (1099 and 1105 A.D.), but to negotiate peace with the Crusaders, on the Crusaders' terms; this was considered a humiliation to Islam and the Muslims.

The practice of exchanging envoys between the Muslim and Crusade leaders and rulers was a continuation of an early practice that had its roots in the Islamic law of peace. The Muslim ambassadors were selected either from among the highest ranking officials of state, like close relatives of the men in power, or from commanders or jurists, or scholars or landlords like Usāma Ibn Munqidh.

In the relationship with the Crusaders, two qualities were considered necessary; knowledge of the language of the particular Crusade leader, as well as some knowledge about their beliefs. This explains why some of the ambassadors to the Crusade leaders in Syria were native Christians. Native Christians, Armenians, and Muslim converts were also sent by the Crusaders as envoys to the Muslims.

William of Tyre reports an episode about a person who was delegated to negotiate peace with Muʿin al-Dīn Unur. "The man", he says, "was of rather doubtful repute, who, once before on a similar errand, had acted disloyally toward the people of Christ. Yet because of his familiarity with the language of the Turks, this mission was also entrusted to him. In response to the injunction that he should faithfully perform the duty laid upon him, he is reported to have said,

The suspicions against me are unjust and far beyond anything that I have deserved; yet I will go. But if I am guilty of the charges brought against me, may I not be permitted to return; or rather may I perish by the sword of the enemy.

The man was eventually killed by Muslims.⁷²

The second generation of the Crusaders in some areas of Syria and some of their leaders were able to communicate with their neighbours in Arabic. One of those was Reginald of Sidon, who was fluent in Arabic and well informed about Islam, and Raymond (III) of Tripoli. Both used to conduct their own diplomacy with their Muslim counterparts.

To conduct negotiation, the ambassadors, on either side had to obtain *amān*, safe conduct. This was expected to provide them with immunity, thus making the detention in prison or execution of ambassadors a gross violation. Despite such a legal commitment, some violations did occur on both sides.⁷³

B. Treaties

The Arabic words for treaties, *hudna*, *muhādana* or *muwādaʿa* are used sometimes alternately in Medieval Arabic Chronicles to denote peace agreements between the Muslims and the Crusaders.

The *hudna*, *muhādana* or *muwādaʿa*—literally "tie" or "conjunction"—was an agreement on a certain act "which has the object of creating legal consequences."⁷⁴ Al-Qalqashandī defines *hudna* as a peace treaty of limited duration with specific stipulations, signed between Muslims and non-Muslims.⁷⁵ A *hudna* was concluded also to stop frequent violations of frontiers, connected with this was the payment of tribute to the enemy, which some

⁷² William of Tyre, 2 155.

⁷³ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (New York 1979) 243.

⁷⁴ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 203.

⁷⁵ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 203–205; Al-Qalqashandī, *Subḥ al-Aʿshāʾ fī Ṣināʾat al-Inshāʾ* (Cairo n.d.) 14 3–4.

jurists sanctioned, while others condemned.⁷⁶ However, payment of tribute in money or produce was practised in the twelfth century. The precedent for this type of peace agreement is the Prophet's agreement with the Makkans in 628. Known as *Ṣulḥ al-Hudaybiyyah*, which was supposed to last for ten years. Following the Prophet's example, Muslim jurists considered the period of ten years as the ultimate limit for any *hudna*.⁷⁷

According to the terms of a *hudna*, neither of the antagonists is allowed to attack the other or else the *hudna* is annulled. The captives taken by both sides were expected to be released and escorted to their respective territories, and the weaker opponent usually undertook the payment of a fixed sum of money annually. This was practised by the Muslims and the Crusaders. The two parties to the treaty were usually expected to exchange territory and allow merchants and travellers to pass through their respective territories without obstruction. Most of the treaties we have discussed in the text deal with these issues.

According to the terms of some treaties, if one of the feuding parties decided to break the truce and enter the other party's territory, it was necessary to inform its enemy of its decision to enter or attack their territory. The Crusaders applied this practice frequently in their relations with the Muslims, especially whenever they received new recruits from Europe (the Second Crusade is an example); Muslims also did the same. An example of this is best explained by William of Tyre. William points that the ruler of Bosra and Sarkhad, Altuntash, "an Armenian by birth", went to Jerusalem (1147 A.D.), seeking the help of King Baldwin III and his mother Melisend against Mu'īn al-Dīn Unur. He offered to surrender to them Bosra and Sarkhad. The King and his advisors welcomed the offer, because of the strategic location of the city. An agreement was reached between the two parties, after which the king and his forces marched towards Tiberias. Since there was a binding alliance between the king and Mu'īn al-Dīn, it was incumbent upon the king to inform the latter about his military plan, in order that he might have a legitimate time, following the custom of the land to assemble an army and make preparations for resistance. Otherwise, the king would appear to have entered his territory suddenly and without official notice, which is contrary to the law of treaties.⁷⁸ The king sent messen-

⁷⁶ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 216.

⁷⁷ Al-Qalqashandi, *Subḥ* (?) 14 4-6, 8.

⁷⁸ William of Tyre, 2 147-148.

gers to Mu'īn al-Dīn informing him about his intention, but, the governor of Damascus delayed his response for one month, utilizing this waiting period to assemble his forces. Once, militarily ready, Unur sent a message to the king reminding him that, in his attempt to help a rebellious official, who was "acting against the allegiance which he had sworn", he was violating the terms of the treaty between them. He also appealed to the king to "preserve the substance of the agreements previously concluded" between them, offering to reimburse him all his expenses for this adventure. The king responded favourably, reaffirming his commitment to the earlier treaty. However, he requested permission to escort the rebellious ruler safely to his castle, while at the same time refraining from "inflicting any injury upon our friend, the king of Damascus, as, by the will of God, we are bound to do."⁷⁹ These remarks by William of Tyre reflect, not only his sensitivity to the legality of the terms of the binding treaties, which he often expresses in his chronicle, but, also a change in the attitude and diplomacy of the Frankish rulers.

Amān (safe conduct) is another form of treaty, which is a pledge of security or safe conduct granted to non-Muslims who wanted to live in Muslim territory. The *amān* as usually granted by the Muslim high official of state for a period not exceeding one year. In exchange the *musta'min*, or the person granted *amān*, agreed to pay certain sums or commodities to ensure his security. This provision could be applied to foreigners living or doing business in a Muslim state and to ambassadors.

In order to ensure the execution of the treaties, hostages, usually from among the dignitaries of both sides were taken. Once the term of the treaty were fulfilled, the hostages were, expected to be returned, unharmed to their territories. These practices were adopted by the Crusaders in the East.⁸⁰

C. Prisoners

Prisoners taken in the war were either forced to convert, used in labour, put in prisons, sold, killed, or released on the payment of ransom money.

Ransom treaties, known as *fidā'* were concluded between the Muslims and crusaders, and once the terms of the treaty were fulfilled, by the payment of the full amount agreed upon, the

⁷⁹ William of Tyre, 2 147–148.

⁸⁰ Khadduri, "International Law," 361–362.

prisoners were escorted to their territories.⁸¹ Though these treaties were legally binding, they were at times broken by some rulers.

Usāma Ibn Munqidh, who used to negotiate the treaties of ransom with King Baldwin II of Jerusalem on behalf of Tāj al-Mulūk Būri and Muʿin al-Dīn Unur gives us a detailed account of how he succeeded once in gaining the release of some Muslim prisoners from the Latin Kingdom. He says:

The Franks used to parade the Muslim prisoners (al-Asra) before me, so I could purchase them (and eventually release them). I used to buy, whoever God willed that they be released. One of their (the Franks') devils, named William had attacked a vessel (near the kingdom) capturing four hundred Spanish Muslims; men and women on their way to perform the pilgrimage (to Makka). Thus, the prisoners used to be brought by their owners, and I (Usāma) would buy whoever I could. Among these prisoners was a young man, who would greet (us), then sit, without talking. I inquired about him, and was told that he was an ascetic, owned by a (Frankish) tanner. I asked the owner: For how much would you sell me this man. The (Frank) answered: By the truth of my faith: I will only sell him along with this old man for forty three dinars, just like I bought them. I (Usāma) purchased both men along with others. I also purchased some prisoners for the amount of 120 Dinars on behalf of Muʿin al-Dīn Unur.

William (referred to earlier as devil), kept thirty eight prisoners, among whom was the wife of a man, I had purchased. I bought her, without weighing her price. Then I went to his (William's) residence. I asked him: Would you sell (me) ten of those prisoners? He answered: by the truth of my faith, I will only sell all of them together. I (Usāma) responded: I do not have money for all! I will purchase some of them now. However, on my next trip I will buy the rest. He insisted on selling all (or none). So I (Usāma) left. However, God willed that all of his (William's) prisoners escaped on that night. The people of Akka, many of whom were Muslims, used to shelter escaping prisoners and escort them to Muslim territory. That accursed man (William) searched for them, but never found any of them.⁸²

Some prisoners were executed, even if they may have offered ransom money. Usama reports about a Frankish official who was a friend of Ṭughtikin of Damascus, named Robert, known as *al-Abraş*, (De Bruse), who was taken prisoner in a battle in which Ṭughtikin and Ilghāzī Urtuq had taken part. Robert offered to ransom himself for 10,000 pieces of gold to Ilghāzī. Ilghāzī wanted more money and sent him to Ṭughtikin. Ṭughtikin, was drinking in his tent. When he saw Robert coming, he rose from his seat,

⁸¹ Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 217–218.

⁸² Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-Iʿtibār*, 82.

went to Robert and cut off his head. Ilghāzī went to Ṭughtikin and reproached him saying: "We do not have one single piece of gold to pay our Turcomans. Here is a prisoner who offers us 10,000 pieces of gold as his own ransom and you kill him instead of extracting a larger amount by terror". Ṭughtikin answered: "For my part I know of no better way of causing terror".⁸³

The Islamic theory of war and peace demands that the highest Muslim authority, ie., the Caliph be in charge of both; however, in the first fifty years of Muslim-Frankish confrontation such authority was almost absent in Baghdad and Cairo, centres of the caliphate. The 'Abbāsīd Caliph was controlled by their Seljuk Sultans, who often failed to respond to appeals of help from Muslims in the Sham region. The Fāṭimid Caliphs, with the exception of al-Ḥāfiz, were too young (some were babies) to know what was happening, and hence the viziers, many of whom were Armenians (in Egypt), held the reins of power in Egypt.

The rulers in the Shām region, acted on their own, for the 'Abbāsīd authorities in Baghdad disregarded their appeals. Ṭughtikin, and Mu'īn al-Dīn received diplomas of investiture from the Caliph. This entitled them officially to take independent action.

⁸³ Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-I'tibār*, 119–120.

ABBREVIATIONS

CGH	<i>Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem (1100–1310)</i> , Joseph Delaville le Roulx, ed., 4 vols, Paris, 1894–1906.
CSS	<i>Le Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint-Sépulcre de Jérusalem</i> . Geneviève Bresc-Bautier, éd. <i>Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades</i> , vol. 15. Paris, 1984.
JL	Jaffé-Löwenfeld. <i>Regesta pontificum romanorum ab condita Ecclesia ad annum post Christum Natum 1198</i> . Philipp Jaffé. ed., 2nd ed. 2 vols. Samuel Löwenfeld, Ferdinand Kaltenbrunner and Paul Ewald, eds. Leipzig, 1885–1888 (Reprint, 1965).
MGH Schriften	<i>Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae Historica</i> . Deutsches Institut für Erforschung des Mittelalters. Stuttgart, 1938–.
MGH Script. rer. Germ.	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum</i> . Hanover-Leipzig-Hahn, 1839–N.s. vol. 1–. Berlin, 1922–.
MGHS	<i>Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores</i> . Hanover-Weimar-Berlin-Stuttgart-Cologne, 1826–. (vols. 1–30 Reprint, Leipzig, 1925; Reprint, 1963–64).
MIC	<i>Monumenta iuris canonici. Corpus collectionum</i> , Città del Vaticano.
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina</i> . Jacques P. Migne, ed. 221 vols. and 4 vols of registers. Paris, 1841–1864.
Potth	Potthast, August, ed., <i>Regesta pontificum romanorum inde ab anno p. Chr. n. 1198 ad annum 1304</i> . 2 vols. Berlin, 1873–1875.
RHC Occ	<i>Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux</i> . Ed. by the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres 5 vols. Paris, 1844–1895.
RHC Or	<i>Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens orientaux</i> . Ed. by the Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres 5 vols. Paris, 1872–1906.
RHC Lois	<i>Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois: Les Assises de Jérusalem</i> . Ed. by the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres 2 vols. Paris, 1896–1906.
RRH	<i>Regesta regni Hierosolimitani; 1097–1291</i> . Reinhold Röhricht, ed. Innsbruck, 1893–1904; Reprint, New York, 1960.
RS	<i>Rolls Series: Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages</i> , published under the direction of the Master of the Rolls (251 vols., London, 1858–1896).

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